Press releases

• Ukrainians are evidently not ready to abandon the tradition of the annual New Year’s address by the President of Ukraine. 73% of Ukrainians have a positive (or rather positive) attitude toward this tradition, and only 14% have a negative or rather negative one.
• Unlike residents of the West, Center, and North, residents of the East, South, and especially Donbas perceive the New Year’s address of the country’s leader less positively. It is likely that respondents’ answers were influenced by their negative attitude toward the incumbent head of state.
• Older people view this tradition more positively than younger people. At the same time, positive attitudes significantly outweigh negative ones in all age groups.
• Women also view the tradition more positively than men. No significant differences were observed in respondents’ answers depending on their level of education.
• 38% of respondents say that they liked the New Year’s addresses of all three Presidents of Ukraine equally. At the same time, 13% liked Leonid Kuchma’s addresses the most, and 8% each preferred Viktor Yushchenko’s and Leonid Kravchuk’s.
• Respondents who have a positive attitude toward the tradition of New Year’s greetings from the head of state rated the addresses of each of the three Presidents more positively.
• It is interesting that Kuchma’s addresses are liked more by supporters of Viktor Yanukovych and Serhiy Tihipko, Kravchuk’s by supporters of Volodymyr Lytvyn and Yulia Tymoshenko, and the incumbent President’s addresses by his own supporters.
• Geographically, the pattern is as follows: Yushchenko’s New Year’s greetings are liked (or were liked) the most in the West, Kravchuk’s in the Center, and Kuchma’s in the South.
• For residents of the East and North, the electoral factor apparently plays the smallest role: they like the New Year’s addresses of all three Presidents of Ukraine. Donbas, as already noted, is simply the most negative toward this tradition and toward all presidents whose last name is not “Yanukovych.”
• In rural areas, Yushchenko’s greetings are perceived best; in cities, Kuchma’s.

• One month before the presidential elections, the first-round ratings are as follows: Viktor Yanukovych is leading (33.8% of all respondents), in second place is Yulia Tymoshenko (18.8%), and third place within the margin of error is shared by three candidates: Arseniy Yatsenyuk (5.9%), Viktor Yushchenko (5.5%), and Serhiy Tihipko (5.5%). They are followed by Petro Symonenko (3.8%), Volodymyr Lytvyn (3.3%), and Oleh Tyahnybok (1.7%); the rest of the candidates have no more than 1%. 7.9% of respondents do not support any candidate, and 7% are undecided.
• Compared with October, support for Yanukovych increased (from 31% to 34%), for Yushchenko (from 3.4% to 5.5%), and for Tihipko (from 2.9% to 5.5%). The largest growth of Yanukovych’s rating occurred in the East, Donbas, and the Center; Yushchenko’s — in the West, where at the same time the ratings of Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk declined; Tihipko’s — across all of Ukraine except the East. In addition, compared with October, the number of undecided respondents decreased by one third (from 10.3% to 7%).
• Voter turnout in the first round is expected at 72%, and in the second round (if Yanukovych and Tymoshenko advance) — 67%.
• To the question “Whom would you vote for if Yanukovych and Tymoshenko made it to the second round?” 43.4% of respondents preferred the leader of the Party of Regions and 30.7% — the leader of BYuT, 12.6% would vote against both, and 8.6% were undecided. Among those who intend to participate in the second round, support for Yanukovych is 52.2%, for Tymoshenko — 34%, against both — 7.9%, undecided — 5.9%.
• It should be noted that in October the gap between these two candidates was about 10%, while in December it is 13%. In the pair “Yanukovych–Yatsenyuk” the gap increased from 13% to 19% in favor of the Party of Regions leader; in the pair “Yanukovych–Yushchenko” it did not change and remains 32%.
• According to respondents, the trait “a good manager” is more characteristic of Yanukovych than of Tymoshenko (41% vs 19%), as well as “a good family man” (32% vs 15%) and “cares about people like me” (31% vs 18%). At the same time, both politicians are considered “strong leaders” (about one third of respondents each). The trait “diplomatic”, in the opinion of respondents, is more characteristic of Tymoshenko (31% vs 28%). 28% of respondents believe the trait “patriot” is more characteristic of Yanukovych, 24% — of Tymoshenko. At the same time 37% of respondents (in the West — 43%, in the East — 44%) believe that neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych possesses such a trait as “patriot.”
• Respondents viewed the following post-election power configurations most positively: Yanukovych as President, Tihipko as Prime Minister (40% evaluated this positively or rather positively), Yanukovych as President, Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister (33%), Tymoshenko as President, Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister (28%), and Tymoshenko as President, Tihipko as Prime Minister (26%). In the West, the option Tymoshenko as President, Yushchenko as Prime Minister is also viewed positively (31%).
• The most negatively assessed option was Yanukovych as President, Yushchenko as Prime Minister (12%).
• At the same time, according to a relative majority, after the elections it will be Yanukovych and Tymoshenko who will form the configuration of power: about 13% of respondents predict the option Yanukovych — President, Tymoshenko — Prime Minister (only 6% consider it optimal for the country); about 9% predict Tymoshenko — President, Yanukovych — Prime Minister (only 3% consider it optimal). 45% cannot predict the post-election format of power.
• The political advertising of Yanukovych was evaluated positively (or rather positively) by 38.6% of respondents, of Tihipko — 37.8%, Tymoshenko — 29.3%, Lytvyn — 27.9%, Yatsenyuk — 27.4%, and Yushchenko — 13.5%.

• Almost 20% of Ukrainians have visited Lviv during the last three years; among them almost 30% went to meet relatives, close people or friends, one quarter went as tourists, one in five went on business trips, about 5% for study purposes, and 22% for other reasons.
  About half of Ukrainians would like to visit Lviv; among them one in five plans to do so already in the coming months, 22% within a year, 22% within the next three years, and another 37% in the more distant future.
  It should be noted that people who have already been to Lviv are much more inclined to visit the city again. Thus, 81% of those who have already been in the city would like to visit Lviv, compared to 40% of those who have not yet been there.
  Lviv was visited most often by residents of the West (about half had been there during the last three years), and of the Center and the North (about 20%).
  Lviv was mainly visited by young people aged 18–39. They also have the strongest desire to visit the city again.
• Most often, Lviv is associated by Ukrainians with beautiful, old architecture (41%). This statement dominates in assessments in all regions without exception. However, 4% think that architectural monuments in Lviv are in very poor condition, and 4% think that besides looking at architecture there is nothing else to do there.
  For almost one in five respondents, Lviv is a city whose residents are patriotic, preserve Ukrainian traditions, and celebrate Christmas, Easter, and other traditional holidays well. For 17% of respondents it is a city of cozy restaurants and cafés, as well as tasty sweets and coffee.
  Almost 15% consider Lviv the cultural capital of Ukraine. For 14%, it is a well-kept, clean, European city (less than 1% consider Lviv a dirty, neglected city).
  14% of respondents consider Lviv a city of tasty beer. 7% consider Lviv the most beautiful city in Ukraine.
• About 13% of respondents believe that the city’s residents react very aggressively to the Russian language; 7% think that “Banderites” live in Lviv. 12% believe the city has a more Polish than Ukrainian spirit. 5% consider Lviv residents very arrogant and condescending. 4% think that Lviv lives off the money earned by Eastern Ukraine, and 3% believe it would have been better if Western Ukraine had not been annexed to the USSR in 1939.
• For the Donbas, Lviv on the one hand is a city with beautiful architecture (24%) and where Christmas and Easter are well celebrated (11%). On the other hand, one in ten residents of Donbas believes that “Banderites” live in Lviv, who react aggressively to the Russian language (16%) and live off the money earned by the East (11%).
  For 6%, Lviv means bad roads; for 4%, a city where water is supplied irregularly.
• 18% of respondents have no idea about Lviv at all (among those who have been to Lviv this is only 0.3%, among those who have not been to the city – 22%). Residents of the Donbas are the least informed about Lviv: 21% have no idea about it, and another 21% did not name any statement that would match their idea of the city.
  The higher the level of education of respondents, the better their understanding of the city.
  It should be noted that for respondents who have already been to Lviv, both the advantages of the city and its shortcomings (bad roads, lack of water, etc.) became more evident.
  Respondents under 40 years of age more often highlighted the cultural advantages of the city. For them, Lviv is also a city of entertainment: cozy restaurants and cafés, tasty sweets, coffee, and beer. At the same time, in the assessments of older people, stereotypical negatives (“Banderites,” language, etc.) are more strongly present.
  Women and men perceive Lviv almost identically, except for one statement: men twice as often spoke of Lviv as a city of tasty beer.

• On the eve of UEFA’s decision on the format of Ukraine’s participation in EURO-2012, interest in the championship among Ukrainians is growing.
  As of early December, about 55% of respondents are against the idea of cancelling EURO-2012 in Ukraine. Only 12% support this idea. At the same time, 23% of respondents do not care whether EURO will take place in Ukraine or not, and another 10% are undecided.
• Compared to August 2009, in December the number of those undecided on this issue decreased by more than half. As a result, the number of those who oppose cancelling EURO-2012 in Ukraine increased from 46% to 55%. At the same time, although slightly, the number of those indifferent to whether EURO will take place in Ukraine or not increased — from 21% to 23%, as did the number of those who support cancelling the championship — from 9% to 12%.
• Compared to August, support for holding EURO-2012 increased the most in the West — from 50% to 63%, in the Donbas — from 41% to 57%, and in the Center — from 45% to 58%.
• It should be noted that in the Donbas the number of those indifferent to the championship also decreased; in the East it did not change; in the remaining regions it increased.
• As in August, the South remains the most neutral toward EURO-2012: only 36% are against cancelling EURO and the same 36% are indifferent to whether EURO will take place in Ukraine or not.
• The number of those indifferent to the championship has generally increased among older people.
• Youth remain the most enthusiastic supporters of holding the European Football Championship in Ukraine.
• By education, the same trends remain as in August: the higher the level of education of respondents, the fewer indifferent people and the more supporters of EURO there are.
• In villages, EURO-2012 continues to be of less interest than in cities.
• Unlike men, among women the number of those indifferent has increased. The number of men who are against cancelling EURO-2012 increased from 53% to 66%, and among women — from 41% to 46%.
• As in August, Ukrainians continue to believe that R. Akhmetov (39.6%) has done the most for the successful hosting of EURO-2012 in Ukraine.
  19.1% believe H. Surkis did the most, 8.1% — Y. Tymoshenko, 7.8% — V. Yanukovych, 5.6% — Y. Chervonenko, 5% — V. Yushchenko, 3.6% — Y. Pavlenko, 3% — O. Yaroslavskyi, 1.9% — V. Lytvyn, 1.2% — A. Yatseniuk, less than 1% — I. Vasiunyk and M. Lubkivskyi. At the same time, 7.3% believe that none of the politicians did anything for the successful holding of EURO-2012 in Ukraine, and another 39% were unable to decide on this issue.
• Unlike other politicians and EURO-2012 officials, whose indicators slightly declined (including H. Surkis), support for R. Akhmetov increased slightly.
• More than half of those who are against cancelling the championship in Ukraine believe that R. Akhmetov did the most for EURO.

• About 73% of residents of Lviv Oblast are against the idea of refusing to hold EURO-2012 in Lviv, while only 7% support this idea. At the same time, for 16% of respondents it does not matter whether EURO will take place in Lviv or not, and another 4% were unable to decide. About two thirds believe that Lviv will host matches of EURO-2012, 17% do not believe so, and 16% were unable to decide.
• About 38% are satisfied with the work of Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko in preparing for the championship, 32% with the work of President Viktor Yushchenko, and 16% with the work of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn. Among local leaders, the highest satisfaction with preparations for the championship is with Andrii Sadovyi (about 40%). About 28% are satisfied with the work of the Head of the Oblast State Administration Mykhailo Kmit, and about a quarter with the Head of the Oblast Council Mykola Senyk. It is interesting that the work of the Prime Minister, the President, and the Head of the Oblast State Administration is evaluated better in villages than in Lviv, while the work of the city mayor is evaluated better in the oblast center.
• In the opinion of the majority, the highest chances of hosting matches of the 2012 European Football Championship are for Lviv (58%), Kyiv (56%), and Donetsk (52%). The chances of Kharkiv were rated by residents of Lviv Oblast more than twice as low (22%). These results were largely influenced by a high level of local patriotism and by wishful thinking. Thus, respondents with higher education (mostly residents of Lviv) rated the chances of Kyiv and Donetsk highest and, significantly more than others, the chances of Kharkiv. Rural residents with lower education and of older age gave preference to Lviv. At the same time, rural residents more than Lviv city residents support the idea of keeping EURO (76% versus 69%), but they believe less that the championship will actually be held in Lviv (65% versus 70%).
• Supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko most strongly defend the idea of holding EURO in Lviv. They also most strongly believe that Lviv will host the championship matches. The greatest skeptics are voters of Serhii Tihipko and Volodymyr Lytvyn.
• For residents of Lviv Oblast, EURO-2012 is above all about improving the quality of roads, airports, and hotels (55%), new jobs (50%), the prestige of the oblast (47%), and the development of the city and the oblast (46%). Thirty-nine percent believe that EURO opens opportunities to present Lviv Oblast to tourists in a better light, 36% see it as a test of the professional competence of the local authorities, and 30% see it as an opportunity for the city and the oblast to earn additional funds. Another quarter believe it is an additional impulse for the development of sport and culture in the region. Only 6% think that EURO-2012 is not important for Lviv Oblast.
• It is interesting that for Lviv city EURO means better roads, urban development, and additional earnings, while for villages and other towns of the oblast it is primarily a matter of prestige, new jobs, and tourism development. Men have significantly higher expectations regarding EURO than women. The younger and more educated the respondents are, the higher their expectations.

• Residents of Lviv Oblast have fairly high expectations regarding the presidential elections: 84% are convinced that any presidential election should change the situation in the country for the better, and 54% expect positive changes as a result of the 2010 presidential election.
• The highest expectations about the elections are among supporters of Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko.
• 56% of residents of Lviv Oblast say that they will definitely take part in the presidential election, and 31% say they will probably take part.
• The higher the expectations about the election, the greater the willingness to participate: among respondents who expect positive changes as a result of the election, 95% intend to vote; among those who do not expect changes, 75% intend to vote.
• Residents of Lviv Oblast believe most strongly in the victory of Yuliya Tymoshenko — 42% of respondents expect that Y. Tymoshenko will become the next President of Ukraine, 21% expect V. Yanukovych, 12% expect V. Yushchenko, and 6% expect A. Yatsenyuk.
• At the same time, 38% of respondents believe that Y. Tymoshenko will take first place in the first round, 32% second place, and 8% third place. 29% believe that V. Yanukovych will take first place in the first round, 28% second place, and 18% third place.
• Half of V. Yushchenko’s supporters are convinced that he will take first place in the first round and become the next President. 15% predict second place for him, and another 15% third place. One third of A. Yatsenyuk’s supporters believe that he will win the first round and the election overall, 11% believe he will take second place in the first round, and one third predict third place.
• The leader of voter sympathies in the oblast is Y. Tymoshenko (26%). This is followed by V. Yushchenko (18%), A. Yatsenyuk (10%), O. Tyahnybok (7%), V. Yanukovych (6%), S. Tihipko (2%), and V. Lytvyn (2%). It is noteworthy that “V. Against-all” is supported by 0.5%, and 10% are ready to vote “against all.” About 11% are undecided.
• Among respondents who intend to take part in the election, the leading five are: Y. Tymoshenko – 29%, V. Yushchenko – 20%, A. Yatsenyuk – 12%, O. Tyahnybok – 7%, V. Yanukovych – 6%.
• Y. Tymoshenko, V. Yushchenko and A. Yatsenyuk have higher support in villages, while O. Tyahnybok and V. Yanukovych have higher support in Lviv city. Y. Tymoshenko and V. Yushchenko have higher support among women, O. Tyahnybok among men.
• V. Yushchenko is mainly supported by less educated citizens and the poorest citizens, A. Yatsenyuk by more educated citizens. Y. Tymoshenko leads among citizens with middle incomes.
• If V. Yanukovych and Y. Tymoshenko reach the second round, about 10% of Lviv Oblast residents would vote for the Party of Regions leader, and about 60% for the BYuT leader.
• If V. Yanukovych and A. Yatsenyuk reach the second round, about 10% would vote for Yanukovych and 64% for Yatsenyuk.
• If V. Yanukovych and V. Yushchenko reach the second round, about 12% would vote for Yanukovych and 54% for Yushchenko.
• The better result for A. Yatsenyuk in the hypothetical second round is ensured by higher support among V. Yushchenko’s supporters. The worse result for V. Yushchenko is due to decreased support among supporters of Y. Tymoshenko and A. Yatsenyuk.
• In hypothetical matchups between Tymoshenko and Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, the BYuT leader wins: 41% vs 33% and 43% vs 30% respectively.
• Voter sympathies in Lviv Oblast for parliamentary elections are distributed as follows: BYuT – 28%, Our Ukraine (Yushchenko) – 19%, Yatsenyuk Bloc – 10%, Svoboda – 9%, Party of Regions – 6%, Lytvyn Bloc – 2%, Tihipko Bloc – 1%. 8% are undecided, 6% would vote against all.
• It should be noted that in local elections support for Svoboda is significantly higher than at the national level. In elections to the Lviv Oblast Council almost 16% are ready to vote for this party — nearly twice as many as in parliamentary elections. The leaders for the oblast council are BYuT – 24% and Our Ukraine – 16%. Yatsenyuk Bloc (9%) and Party of Regions (6%) also pass the 3% threshold.
• In terms of full trust, Y. Tymoshenko leads in the oblast (19% fully trust, 28% rather trust), followed by V. Yushchenko (12% and 28%), A. Yatsenyuk (12% and 38%), and O. Tyahnybok (9% and 32%).
• The greatest distrust in the oblast is toward O. Moroz (91%), V. Yanukovych (88%), and I. Bohoslovska (81%).
• Residents of Lviv Oblast rate the Prime Minister’s work in overcoming the flu epidemic higher (46%) than the President’s (36%). However, electoral preferences dominate these judgments. 75% of Yushchenko’s supporters rate his work positively, while supporters of Yatsenyuk and Tymoshenko rate it twice as low. 80% of Tymoshenko’s supporters rate her work positively, while Yatsenyuk’s and Yushchenko’s supporters do so twice as rarely. Both Tymoshenko’s and Yushchenko’s handling of the flu epidemic is rated much better in villages than in Lviv city.
• Among local authorities, residents are most satisfied with Andriy Sadovyi (10% fully satisfied, 33% rather satisfied). They are somewhat more satisfied with the governor Mykola Kmit (4% fully, 28% rather) than with the head of the oblast council Myroslav Senyk (4% fully, 25% rather). Kmit and Senyk are rated similarly in villages and in Lviv, while Sadovyi is rated higher in Lviv city.
• Regarding national identity issues, if a referendum were held, only 7% would vote for granting Russian the status of a state language, and 84% would vote against. Even among Yanukovych supporters only about half support raising the status of Russian. Over 90% of supporters of Yatsenyuk, Yushchenko, Tyahnybok, and Tymoshenko would vote against.
• Only 19% of Lviv Oblast residents support joining the Single Economic Space. Among them are only about 10% of Yushchenko, Tyahnybok and Tymoshenko supporters, about 25% of Yatsenyuk and Tihipko supporters, and over 60% of Yanukovych supporters.
• 60% support joining NATO, while about a quarter oppose it. The strongest opponents are Yanukovych supporters (60% against).
• 74% would support joining the European Union, and only 10% are against. The strongest supporters are voters of Tyahnybok (85%), Tymoshenko (80%), and Yatsenyuk (79%).
• Given that only a quarter of Yatsenyuk’s supporters back joining the Single Economic Space, while 79% support EU membership, 67% NATO, and 94% oppose giving Russian state language status, it is fully predictable that they will have difficulty accepting Yatsenyuk’s new policy initiatives such as the “Eastern European Project.”

Cinema preferences

• The most popular film genres among Ukrainians are comedies (45%), melodramas (31%), and historical films (28%). These are followed by adventure films (24%), action movies (16%), and documentaries (15%).
  Every tenth Ukrainian enjoys science fiction. Dramas are popular among 8%, thrillers among 7%, horror films among 5%, and erotic films among 4%.
  Only 4% of Ukrainians say they do not like movies at all.
• With age, interest declines in comedies, adventure films, action movies, science fiction, horror, and erotic films, while interest increases in melodramas, historical films, and documentaries.
• Among more educated citizens, comedies, documentaries, science fiction, historical and adventure films are more popular. People with middle levels of education prefer melodramas and action films.
• Documentaries are twice as popular in cities as in rural areas. In general, people in cities like movies more. Melodramas and action films are watched equally in cities and villages.
• Melodramas are six times more popular among women than men, while action films are six times more popular among men. Women also prefer comedies and dramas more than men. All other genres are more popular among men: they watch twice as much science fiction, thrillers, erotic and documentary films, and 1.5 times more historical, adventure and horror films.
• The greatest interest in cinema is shown by couples living in civil partnerships. They prefer comedies, adventure and historical films, action movies and documentaries. Unmarried people prefer science fiction, thrillers and mysticism. Married and divorced people, especially the latter, mostly prefer melodramas.
• Another trend: the more children in a family, the less popular comedies and adventure films become, while melodramas grow in popularity.
• Documentaries are most popular among voters of Viktor Yushchenko and Volodymyr Lytvyn. Yushchenko’s voters also prefer historical films, as do voters of Serhiy Tihipko. Interestingly, Yushchenko’s voters do not like horror films and almost never watch erotic, mystical, or science-fiction movies, while these genres are very popular among Tihipko’s voters.
• Yuliya Tymoshenko’s voters prefer melodramas and comedies.
  The greatest love for comedies belongs to Viktor Yanukovych’s supporters.
  Adventure films and action movies are most popular among voters of Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Viktor Yanukovych.

Music preferences

• The most popular music styles among Ukrainians are pop music (32%), folk music (25%), and chanson (22%).
• Every fifth Ukrainian likes classical music. Dance/disco music is listened to by 13%, romances by 12%, club music by 9%, rock by 7%, bard music by 6%, religious music by 5%, jazz by 5%, rap by 3%, and blues by 3%.‍
• Heavy metal and reggae are the least popular genres.
• Several clear trends emerge. The older people are, the more they prefer folk music; the younger, the more they prefer pop music. About one third of young people like club music, and almost one fifth like rock. Older people prefer romances and religious music.‍
• Chanson, classical and bard music are most popular among middle-aged people.
• More educated respondents prefer classical music, romances, rock, and jazz, in addition to pop music. Among the least educated, folk music dominates.Religious music is most popular among Greek Catholics, and least popular among believers of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates of the Orthodox Church.Folk music is twice as popular in villages as in cities, while classical music, rock, jazz, and chanson are far more popular in cities.
• Men and women differ strongly in music tastes. Women prefer pop, folk, dance music, classical and romances. Men prefer chanson, bard music, jazz, rock, rap and electronic music.Club music, rock, and rap are most popular among unmarried respondents without children.‍
• Pop music is most popular among civil-partnership couples, who also like bard music and jazz.‍
• Married people prefer folk and classical music, as well as chanson, and also enjoy dance and pop music.
• By political preference:
  • Tymoshenko’s voters prefer folk, classical and club music
  • Yanukovych’s voters prefer pop, chanson and dance music
  • Yatsenyuk’s voters prefer chanson, dance music and rock
  • Yushchenko’s voters most strongly prefer folk and religious music
  • Tihipko’s voters prefer classical, dance music, romances and jazz
  • Lytvyn’s voters (more than any others) prefer classical music, followed by chanson, though some also enjoy club music

Pets

• Almost two-thirds of Ukrainians keep pets. The most popular are cats (41%) and dogs (41%).
  More than half of Ukrainians keep both a dog and a cat.
  About 6% keep birds, 3% keep fish, and 2% keep rodents.
• The more children a family has, the more likely it is to have pets. At the same time, almost 30% of pet owners would prefer to have no animals at all.
• Only 14% of rural residents have no pets, compared to 48% in cities.
  Dogs are more popular in villages, cats in cities.
  Women prefer cats; men prefer dogs.
• People in civil partnerships are more likely to keep dogs, while married and especially divorced people more often keep cats.
• In general, Ukrainians are more loyal to dogs than to cats: people who have cats are more willing to get a dog than dog owners are to get a cat.
• Tymoshenko’s and Lytvyn’s voters are more likely to keep cats, while most other voters prefer dogs.
  Pet ownership is highest among supporters of Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and Yanukovych.
• Notably, Yatsenyuk’s and Tihipko’s voters are the most likely to have no pets at all and also the most likely to say they do not want any animals at home.

• Some skeptics today claim that there is no joy or happiness in our lives because of the crisis, the epidemic, and other hardships. The sociological group Rating Group disagreed with this view and decided to compile and present a special Joy Rating based on data from a nationwide survey. The team also had its own reason to celebrate, as this was their 500th survey, which they wished to share with the public.
• Almost 70% of Ukrainians consider themselves happy, including 27.1% who say they are definitely happy and 42.5% who say they are probably happy. Nearly 20% consider themselves unhappy, while about 10% were unable to say whether they are happy or not. In terms of how often people feel joy, 28.5% of respondents say they experience joy every day, 24.4% several times a week, and 13.6% several times a month. In total, about two thirds experience joy at least once a month. About 20% say they rarely feel joy in life, and 12% were undecided.
• The survey shows a strong link between happiness and joy: the happiest Ukrainians feel joy every day. In the West, 40% of residents say they feel joy daily, the highest share among regions, while in Donbas this figure does not exceed 20%, and in the Center it is only 13%. Joy declines with age: nearly half of respondents aged 18–29 feel joy every day, while among those aged 50 and over, especially pensioners, only about 20% do so. At the same time, the share of those who rarely feel joy increases from 9% among those aged 18–39 to 35% among those aged 60 and older.
• Education also matters: the lower the level of education, the less joy people report. Married respondents feel joy less often than those who are unmarried or living in a civil partnership. The greatest sources of joy for Ukrainians are family, mentioned by more than 60%, followed by children at 47% and friends at 37%. Completing the top five are watching television at 32% and money at 27%. Almost 20% enjoy nature, and one in six Ukrainians finds joy in travel. Ukrainians enjoy receiving gifts more than giving them, and vacations and holidays more than work or study. For 13% household chores bring joy, and for 10% pets do so. Among the arts, music brings joy to 16% and cinema to 14%, while theater brings joy to only 2%. Books bring joy to 12% of Ukrainians. One in ten finds joy in food, and one in ten in sex, which ranks higher than prayer, shopping, sports, cheering for a favorite team, singing, or alcohol.
• As people age, enjoyment from friends, music, vacations, travel, cinema, birthdays, sex, shopping, sports, the internet, dancing, studying, and money declines. As family and children appear, some pleasures become less relevant or inaccessible, while others grow in importance. The joys that become more important with age include family, children, watching television, being in nature, household chores, books, pets, prayer, singing, and solitude. Enjoyment from work remains stable and even increases in middle age, as do food and alcohol. Attitudes toward gifts remain largely unchanged over time.
• The more children people have, the more joy they derive from them: only 8% of childless respondents find joy in children, compared to 53% of those with at least one child and 74% of those with four or more. Among unmarried respondents and those in civil partnerships, fewer than 40% derive joy from family, while 70% of married respondents name family as a key source of joy. Prayer brings the most joy to believers of the UAOC and Greek Catholics, and the least to followers of the UOC of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates. In the West, one in five respondents finds joy in prayer, compared to about 4% in the South and Donbas and only 3% in the North.
• Men more often than women derive joy from friends, television, the internet, vacations, work, sports, victories of their favorite teams, alcohol, and money. Men also enjoy sex about twice as much as women, while women enjoy shopping about three times more than men. Women’s joy rankings also include family, children, household chores, books, pets, and prayer. Women enjoy gifts more than men, both receiving and giving them. However, both men and women enjoy nature, music, travel, cinema, food, and dancing to similar degrees.
• The higher the level of education, the more joy respondents derive from music, theater, books, travel, work, sex, shopping, the internet, and learning, while the opposite is true for prayer. Analysis shows that people who enjoy family also enjoy children, gift giving, household chores, pets, and prayer. Friends are associated with the internet, sports, alcohol, birthdays, music, and learning. Television is linked with alcohol, food, cinema, and receiving gifts. Money is associated with sex and shopping. Nature is linked to solitude, theater, household chores, dancing, and church. Music is associated with learning, theater, cinema, dancing, the internet, and birthdays. Books are linked to solitude, theater, cinema, and learning. Sex is associated with dancing, sports, the internet, birthdays, and learning.
• According to the survey, 3% of respondents have sex every day, 20% several times a week, and 13% several times a month. Nineteen percent say they do not have sex at all, and 33% refused to answer. This means that only 36% of Ukrainians aged 18 and over, and 54% among those aged 18–49, say they are sexually active. The study also shows that sex increases joy: the more frequently people have sex, the more often they feel joy, with several times a week being optimal. Sexual activity is highest in the South, Donbas, and the East, and lowest in the West and Center. Men are one and a half times more sexually active than women, with the most active age group being 23–37. The most regular sexual activity is found among couples in civil partnerships, especially those without children.
• Summing up, Rating Group encourages everyone to change the statistics by rediscovering sources of joy across generations.

• About one third of Ukraine’s adult population identify themselves as football supporters: 5% consider themselves fans, 10% active supporters, and another 18% non-active supporters. Football has a clear unifying potential: the highest share of supporters is found in Donbas, the Centre, and the West of the country.
• Urban residents are more likely to identify as football supporters (35%) than rural residents (27%). The highest level of involvement is among young people aged 18–29 (41%), while the lowest is among those aged 60+ (25%). The gender gap is substantial: 54% of men and only 15% of women say they are football supporters.
• Football is also linked to family status and lifestyle. The highest share of supporters is among unmarried people (46%) and those living together without formal marriage (39%). Among married respondents the figure is 33%, among the divorced 23%, and among widowed respondents 18%. The more children there are in a household, the fewer football supporters it tends to have. The same pattern applies to social factors: higher education and better material well-being are associated with higher interest in football.
• Politically, football supporters are more likely than others to support Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Lytvyn, Oleh Tyahnybok and Anatolii Hrytsenko, and less likely to support Arsenii Yatseniuk, Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Symonenko.
• Overall assessments of Ukrainian football in 2009 were positive. Sixty-four percent of supporters rated the performance of the national team positively, and 59% approved of the work of head coach Oleksii Mykhailychenko. The most positive evaluations came from respondents in the East and West, and the most negative from Donbas. A majority of respondents (57%) believed the national team should be coached by a Ukrainian specialist; 21% preferred a European coach and only 3% a Russian one. Those who were dissatisfied with Mykhailychenko were more likely to favor a foreign coach.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents had a positive attitude toward Andriy Shevchenko’s return to Dynamo Kyiv. Support was highest in the South, North, West and Centre, and lowest in the East and Donbas.
• Sixty-two percent believed Ukrainian clubs could repeat their previous season’s successes in international competitions. At the beginning of October, supporters rated Shakhtar Donetsk’s chances of advancing from its group higher than those of Dynamo Kyiv. It should be noted that at the time of the survey (3–12 October), respondents did not yet know that Shakhtar would defeat Toulouse and secure a place in the playoffs, or that Dynamo would draw with Inter in the Champions League.
• At that time, 51% believed Dynamo Kyiv would reach the next round of the Champions League (by finishing first or second in its group), while nearly 70% believed Shakhtar Donetsk would advance to the next round of the Europa League. Shakhtar’s chances were rated highest in the East, Donbas, Centre and South; Dynamo’s chances in the East, Centre and North. Supporters in Donbas were significantly more confident in Shakhtar’s success in particular than in the overall success of Ukrainian football.

• According to a nationwide survey conducted in October 2009, a plurality of Ukrainians (39.6%) do not believe that a coalition of parliamentary factions with more than 226 MPs will be formed in the Verkhovna Rada of the current convocation. Only 27.2% believe that such a coalition will be created, while 33.2% were unable to decide. Skepticism about the possibility of forming an effective parliamentary coalition is strongest in Donbas, the Center, and the West, while respondents in the North are the most optimistic. Among supporters of political parties, those more likely to believe such a coalition will be formed are supporters of BYuT, Nasha Ukraina, and the Lytvyn Bloc, whereas supporters of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Yatsenyuk Bloc tend not to believe this.
• For a relative plurality of Ukrainians (18.1%), the most optimal coalition in the new Verkhovna Rada would be an alliance of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc. The second most preferred option is an alliance between the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Yatsenyuk Bloc, supported by 11.7% of respondents. An alliance between the Party of Regions and BYuT is supported by 8.5%, while 8.3% support a coalition between the Party of Regions and the Yatsenyuk Bloc. At the same time, the most likely coalition in the new Verkhovna Rada, according to a relative plurality (15.5%), is an alliance between the Party of Regions and BYuT.
• Among party supporters, views differ markedly. Forty-three percent of Party of Regions supporters and 60% of Communist Party of Ukraine supporters believe the best coalition would consist of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc. Only 11% of Party of Regions supporters think that an alliance with BYuT would be the best option, yet 19% believe that such a coalition will in fact be formed. Only 14% of BYuT supporters support an alliance with the Party of Regions, although 21% expect such a coalition to emerge. Thus, both BYuT and Party of Regions supporters generally oppose an alliance between these two forces, yet a relative plurality in both camps believe that this is what will actually happen in the new Verkhovna Rada.
• Most BYuT supporters (36%) believe their party should ally with the Yatsenyuk Bloc, and the same view is held by most Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters (35%). At the same time, 21% of BYuT supporters favor a return to the previous coalition format of BYuT, the Lytvyn Bloc, and Nasha Ukraina. Meanwhile, 18% of Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters favor an alliance with the Party of Regions, a position also shared by 19% of Party of Regions supporters.

• According to the results of a nationwide survey conducted in October 2009, voter activity increased over the previous two months. Thus, 57.5% of respondents stated that they would definitely take part in the presidential election (49% in August), while 26.2% said they would rather take part (31% in August).
• The presidential sympathy ratings are led by Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko. Over the past two months, both front-runners have strengthened their positions. The greatest growth was recorded for Yu. Tymoshenko (from 15.4% to 19.4%), and slightly less for V. Yanukovych (from 28.9% to 31.1%). Both politicians are working on mobilizing their core electorate. Support for Yu. Tymoshenko increased across the country, most notably in the West and the North. In turn, V. Yanukovych increased his support in Donbas, the South, the Center, and the North, while losing some ground in the East.
• Support for A. Yatsenyuk fell from 12.3% to 8%. The leader of the “Front of Change” suffered the greatest losses in the West, where his rating dropped from 24% to 13%. Accordingly, for the first time in the past six months Yu. Tymoshenko topped the sympathy rankings in the West. In addition, A. Yatsenyuk lost support in the East, the South, and the North.
• An increase in support for S. Tihipko was recorded, whose rating has almost tripled since August (from 1% to 2.9%). The largest progress was seen in the East, where his rating rose from 1.7% to 6.4%, as well as in the Center, the North, and Donbas. As a result, S. Tihipko has nearly caught up with V. Yushchenko and P. Symonenko and slightly overtakes V. Lytvyn.
• A slight improvement in the positions of V. Yushchenko was also recorded (from 2.6% to 3.4%), primarily in the West, along with a slight decline in the positions of V. Lytvyn (from 3.7% to 2.2%), mainly in the North. In virtually every region there is a tendency toward a decrease in the number of respondents intending to vote for so-called “other” candidates, indicating a crystallization of voters around the main favorites.
• The distribution of votes among those who intend to take part in the presidential election is as follows: V. Yanukovych – 35.6%, Yu. Tymoshenko – 22.1%, A. Yatsenyuk – 9.1%, P. Symonenko – 3.9%, V. Yushchenko – 3.8%, S. Tihipko – 3.3%, and V. Lytvyn – 2.3%. The remainder account for 4.6%, “against all” – 7.2%, and undecided – 7.9%.
• In response to the question “Who would you vote for if the second round featured V. Yanukovych and Yu. Tymoshenko?”, almost 40% of respondents favored the leader of the Party of Regions and 30% favored the leader of BYuT. It should be noted that in August the gap between these two candidates in a second round was 12.5%, while in October it narrowed to 10%.
• Regarding the alternative pair “Yanukovych–Yatsenyuk”, the opposite trend is observed: in August the difference was 10.5%, while in October it widened to 13% (39% versus 26%) in favor of V. Yanukovych. In the hypothetical pair “Yatsenyuk–Tymoshenko”, Yu. Tymoshenko prevails in October with 27% to 23%, whereas in August A. Yatsenyuk had led with 23% to 19%.
• No Ukrainian politician has a positive trust–distrust balance. In the trust ranking, V. Yanukovych leads (41% trust him, 53% do not). The highest trust in the leader of the Party of Regions is recorded in Donbas and the South (69% and 62% respectively), and the lowest in the West (16%), where 79% of respondents distrust him.
• Yu. Tymoshenko and A. Yatsenyuk have nearly equal overall trust levels, at about 31% each. However, almost twice as many respondents fully trust the BYuT leader compared to the leader of the “Front of Change” (15% versus 9%). At the same time, more respondents distrust Yu. Tymoshenko than A. Yatsenyuk (64% versus 56%).
• V. Lytvyn is trusted by 30% (only 4% trust him fully) and distrusted by 60%. The highest trust in the Speaker of Parliament is in the North and the South (38% and 36% respectively), and the lowest in Donbas (18%). V. Yushchenko is trusted by 9% (only 3% fully), while 86% do not trust him. The highest trust in the incumbent President is in the West and the North (24% and 10% respectively), while in other regions trust ranges from 1% in Donbas to 5% in the Center.
• Party ratings mirror the trends in support for presidential candidates. The distribution of votes among those who intend to take part in the parliamentary elections is as follows: Party of Regions – 35.8%, BYuT – 21.5%, Yatsenyuk Bloc – 7.8%, Communist Party of Ukraine – 3.9%, Our Ukraine – 3.1%, Tihipko Bloc – 2.5%, and Lytvyn Bloc – 1.9%. Other parties and blocs account for 4.8%, “against all” – 8%, and undecided – 10.7%.

• When speaking about the importance of EURO-2012 for Ukraine, most respondents believe it is primarily a matter of national prestige (42.3%), the creation of new jobs through infrastructure development for the championship (40.3%), and improvements in the quality of roads, airports, and hotels (35.9%). About one third of respondents also believe that hosting EURO-2012 gives Ukraine an opportunity to earn additional revenues (32.7%), to present Ukraine in a more positive light to Europe and the world (32.5%), and to ensure the development of host cities (29.8%). Somewhat fewer respondents pointed to other reasons for the importance of EURO-2012: nearly one quarter see it as a test of whether Ukraine is a civilized European state, while 18.6% believe it will provide an additional boost to sports and 16.5% to culture. Almost every sixth Ukrainian believes that EURO-2012 gives Ukraine new opportunities to join the European Union. Only 8.8% of respondents think that EURO-2012 is not important for Ukraine, and another 8.4% were unable to decide.
• It should be noted that in Eastern Ukraine EURO-2012 is primarily associated with new jobs, in Donbas with the development of host cities, in the South with the opportunity to earn additional money, while respondents in the West, Center, and North focus mainly on national prestige. Ukrainians are generally opposed to abandoning the idea of hosting EURO-2012. Almost half of respondents (46.4%) tend to view such an отказ negatively, while only 9.3% would support giving up the championship. At the same time, one in five respondents is indifferent to whether EURO-2012 takes place in Ukraine, and another quarter were unable to decide. Support for EURO-2012 is highest in the North and East and lowest in the South. There is also a clear pattern: the younger the respondents, and the higher their education and material status, the more likely they are to support EURO-2012. Respondents of Ukrainian nationality support hosting EURO-2012 more than Russians. Women are almost twice as likely as men to be indifferent to the championship.
• Ukrainians believe that the central authorities bear more responsibility for organizing EURO-2012 (35.1%) than local authorities (4.4%), although half of respondents believe that both levels of government share equal responsibility. When asked who is currently coping better with preparations for EURO-2012, 29.6% said that neither the central nor local authorities are coping well, 22.8% said that both are coping, 15.9% credited only local authorities, and 13.2% only the central authorities. Respondents in the Center and North assessed the performance of the central authorities more positively than that of local authorities, while in other regions the opposite pattern prevailed.
• According to respondents, Kyiv and Donetsk are the cities best able to represent Ukraine at EURO-2012 and are most likely to host matches. A clear majority (63.2%) believe that Kyiv is the city that can best represent Ukraine, while Donetsk follows with 39.6%. About a quarter of respondents named Kharkiv and Lviv as cities that could best represent Ukraine (23% and 22.6% respectively). As for the likelihood of actually hosting matches, Kyiv’s chances were rated slightly lower than its potential (56.7%), Donetsk’s slightly higher (43.1%), while Kharkiv and Lviv were rated at roughly the same level (21.4% and 20.6%). Residents of the West and East believe that their own cities, Lviv and Kharkiv, together with Kyiv, can best represent Ukraine, although they rate Donetsk’s chances of actually hosting the championship higher.
• The level of Ukraine’s readiness for EURO-2012 was rated by citizens at 2.4 out of 5, while Poland’s readiness was rated at 3.4. Respondents in the North and Donbas assessed Ukraine’s readiness higher than those in the West and South. Another trend is that the higher the level of education of respondents, the more critical their assessments were. Among the obstacles hindering preparation for EURO-2012, respondents primarily named traditional domestic problems rather than those emphasized by UEFA inspectors. The main obstacles were the economic crisis (61.2%), political crisis (54.4%), and corruption in government (50.5%). Infrastructure problems were mentioned less often: poor-quality roads (39%), slow stadium construction (30.3%), lack of modern airports (17.5%), insufficient quality hotels (17.2%), difficult urban transport (14.3%), and railway transport problems (8.8%). Residents of Donbas see the economic and political crises as the main obstacles, residents of the South emphasize corruption, while the West and North focus on slow stadium construction. Donbas highlights poor roads, and the East the lack of hotels and airports.
• Forty-three percent of Ukrainians do not believe that Ukraine will meet most UEFA requirements by 30 November, while only 25.7% believe this will happen. Optimism is highest in the North and lowest in the South and Donbas. Ukrainians rate the chances of meeting UEFA requirements by 30 November about one third higher than Russians do, and the higher the education level, the more optimistic respondents are. Thirty-eight percent of respondents believe that R. Akhmetov has done the most to ensure the successful hosting of EURO-2012 in Ukraine; at least 30% in every region named him, except in Donbas where nearly 60% did so. G. Surkis was named by 21.6%. Other figures were mentioned less often: Y. Tymoshenko (9.2%), V. Yanukovych (8.3%), Y. Chervonenko (7.5%), V. Yushchenko (7%), Y. Pavlenko (5.6%), A. Yatsenyuk (2.5%), V. Lytvyn (2.4%), I. Vasiunyk (0.9%), and others (0.9%). At the same time, 11.6% believe that none of these politicians has done anything for EURO-2012, and 34% were unable to answer. If EURO-2012 were not to take place in Ukraine, most respondents believe that V. Yushchenko (57.8%) and Y. Tymoshenko (42%) would bear the greatest responsibility, while G. Surkis (7.9%), Y. Pavlenko (7%), V. Lytvyn (2.8%), and I. Vasiunyk (2.7%) were mentioned much less often.

• Two thirds of surveyed citizens named Kyiv as the most attractive city for tourists, half named Lviv, and more than one third named Odesa. Other large cities of Ukraine did not receive more than 10% of preferences. While Kyiv ranked first in almost every region of Ukraine, except for the South where Odesa took the lead, other cities were evaluated very differently across regions. Lviv was rated highly in terms of tourist attractiveness in the West, Center, North, and East; Odesa in the South and Donbas; Kharkiv only in the East; and Donetsk only in Donbas. Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia received rather low ratings everywhere.
• In the West, Lviv as the most attractive tourist city in Ukraine received 59% of preferences and Odesa 34%, while in the South the situation was reversed, with 32% for Lviv and 59% for Odesa. There were also differences in evaluations depending on demographic characteristics. For example, the higher the level of education and material well-being and the lower the age of respondents, the fewer undecided answers were recorded. Urban residents were more informed about the tourist potential of large cities than rural residents.
• Regarding Lviv and Kyiv, there was a clear relationship: the higher the level of education, the higher the attractiveness ratings of these cities. Lviv was more often mentioned by people who rated their own material well-being highly, while Odesa was more often chosen by young people. Interestingly, Lviv and Kyiv were more often named by respondents who identified as Ukrainians by nationality, whereas Odesa and Kharkiv were more often named by ethnic Russians.
• The mayors of Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv were considered the best city leaders, each receiving 11–12% of support nationwide. The mayors of Donetsk and Odesa were mentioned by 9–10% of respondents, and the mayors of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro by about 5%. It should be noted that 19% of respondents said that none of the mayors of large cities could be considered the best, while another 43% were unable to give an answer. The responses differed noticeably by region. Andrii Sadovyi was recognized as the best city leader in the West at 20% and in the Center at 17%, Leonid Chernovetskyi in the North at 15% and in the South at 15%, Mykhailo Dobkin in the East at 27%, and Oleksandr Lukianchenko in Donbas at 31%. Eduard Hurvits received his highest ratings in the South at 13%, while Yevhen Kartashov and Ivan Kulichenko received their highest ratings in the East at 14% and 12% respectively.
• In addition to regional differences, demographic patterns were also evident. Among those who were undecided, there were more people with lower levels of education and lower material well-being. The higher the level of education of respondents, the higher the ratings given to Andrii Sadovyi and Eduard Hurvits. Depending on self-assessed material well-being, Oleksandr Lukianchenko received higher ratings.
• Interestingly, Mykhailo Dobkin and Leonid Chernovetskyi received almost twice as low ratings from rural residents as from urban residents, while Andrii Sadovyi and Oleksandr Lukianchenko, on the contrary, received better ratings from respondents living in rural areas. The mayor of Lviv ranked first among respondents who identified as Ukrainians by nationality, while the mayors of Kharkiv and Donetsk received almost twice as high ratings from ethnic Russians than from ethnic Ukrainians.

• According to the results of a nationwide survey conducted in August 2009, 49% of respondents said that if a presidential election were held next Sunday, they would definitely take part, while another 31% said they would rather take part. For parliamentary elections, the figures were 45% and 32% respectively. Thus, voter turnout is expected to be slightly higher in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones.
• The presidential race is led by Viktor Yanukovych, Yuliia Tymoshenko, and Arsenii Yatseniuk. Compared to May 2009, support for V. Yanukovych increased from 25.3% to 28.9%; support for Y. Tymoshenko remained almost unchanged, declining slightly from 15.9% in May to 15.4% in August; and support for A. Yatseniuk also remained almost unchanged, moving from 13.2% to 12.3%.
• The next group of candidates is clustered at the 3–5% level. Compared to May, support for V. Lytvyn decreased from 6.2% to 3.7%, support for P. Symonenko remained almost unchanged, from 4.4% to 3.9%, and support for V. Yushchenko also remained almost unchanged, from 3.1% to 2.6%.
• Among those who intend to vote, the distribution of support is as follows: V. Yanukovych 34.6%, Y. Tymoshenko 18.3%, A. Yatseniuk 14.4%, P. Symonenko 4.4%, V. Lytvyn 4.2%, V. Yushchenko 3.0%, O. Tiahnybok 1.4%, I. Bohoslovska 1.3%, and S. Tihipko 1.1%. Other candidates together account for 1.6%, 7.8% would vote against all, and 7.9% are undecided.
• When asked whom they would support if the second round were between V. Yanukovych and Y. Tymoshenko, 35% of respondents preferred the leader of the Party of Regions and 23% chose the BYuT leader. In a Yanukovych–Yatseniuk runoff, Yanukovych also leads, 34% to 24%. In a Yanukovych–Yushchenko matchup, Yanukovych’s advantage is even greater, 37% to 8%. In a hypothetical Yatseniuk–Tymoshenko runoff, the leader of the Front for Change would win, 23% to 19%, and he would also defeat Yushchenko, 29% to 4%.
• V. Yanukovych’s electoral core is formed in Donbas, the South, and the East, where his support reaches 40–50%. At the same time, he is supported by 13–14% in the North and Center and by about 8% in the West. Y. Tymoshenko enjoys her strongest support in the North and Center, at 26%, and in the West, at 20%. A. Yatseniuk is most popular in the West, at 24%, and lags far behind the BYuT leader in the North and Center, at 11–13%. In other regions, support for Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk is nearly equal, with a slight advantage for the prime minister in the South and for the former speaker in the East and Donbas.
• V. Lytvyn has his strongest support in the North and Center, P. Symonenko in the South, East, and Donbas, V. Yushchenko and O. Tiahnybok in the West, I. Bohoslovska in the South and Donbas, and S. Tihipko in the South and East.
• Electoral preferences differ between urban and rural residents. V. Yanukovych’s support is 1.5 times higher in cities, while his main opponents are stronger in rural areas, especially Y. Tymoshenko, whose support in rural areas is one third higher than in cities.
• Among supporters of the Party of Regions leader, people with secondary and vocational education prevail. Support for the BYuT leader is almost independent of education level, while for the Front for Change leader there is a clear trend: the higher the education level of respondents, the higher the support for A. Yatseniuk.
• Older people are the most decided in their electoral choice and also include the smallest share of those who intend to vote against all. For most candidates, there are no strong age-related trends in support, except for P. Symonenko, who is traditionally supported by pensioners three times more than by other age groups.
• Support for Y. Tymoshenko among women is one quarter higher than among men. Respondents who identify as ethnic Russians support V. Yanukovych twice as much as ethnic Ukrainians.
• The economic crisis largely determines today’s fears and anxieties. Fifty-nine percent of Ukrainians named economic decline among the three main threats to the country, 42.9% rising unemployment, and 38.9% arbitrary actions by the authorities. The devaluation of the hryvnia ranks fourth at 27.8%, and one in five Ukrainians is concerned about the degradation of the population.
• Voters of V. Yanukovych are more worried about economic decline than voters of Y. Tymoshenko, 64% versus 55%. Voters of A. Yatseniuk do not share this pessimism of the Party of Regions electorate, but they do fully share concerns about arbitrary rule, at about 40% compared to 29% among Tymoshenko’s supporters. Supporters of the Front for Change leader are more concerned than supporters of both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych about the threat of Ukraine losing control over its gas transit system and about the loss of independence.
• It is notable that those who are undecided, those who intend to vote against all, as well as supporters of both V. Yanukovych and A. Yatseniuk, are most united by their concern over arbitrary actions by the authorities.
• The top three in parliamentary elections are traditionally the Party of Regions, BYuT, and the hypothetical Yatseniuk Bloc. Compared to May 2009, support for the Party of Regions increased from 24.9% to 28%; support for the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc remained almost unchanged, from 15.2% in May to 14.6% in August; and support for the Arsenii Yatseniuk Bloc also remained stable, from 10.4% to 10.6%.
• At a considerable distance but still with chances to cross the 3% threshold follow the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc, and Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party. Compared to May 2009, support for the Lytvyn Bloc declined from 6.1% to 3.1%, support for the Communist Party fell slightly from 5.4% to 4.4%, and support for Our Ukraine remained essentially unchanged, from 2.8% to 2.4%.
• Among those who intend to vote, the distribution of support is as follows: Party of Regions 34.1%, BYuT 17.7%, Yatseniuk Bloc 12.7%, Communist Party of Ukraine 5.2%, Lytvyn Bloc 3.5%, Our Ukraine 2.7%, and All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda 2.1%. Other parties and blocs together account for 5.8%, 7.9% would vote against all, and 8.3% are undecided.

• The economic crisis largely defines today’s fears and anxieties of citizens. Fifty-nine percent of Ukrainians named economic decline among the three main threats to Ukraine, 42.9% cited rising unemployment, 38.9% arbitrary actions by the authorities, 27.8% the devaluation of the hryvnia, and 20.9% the degradation of the population. Between 10% and 13% of respondents mentioned rising crime, environmental disasters, and deterioration in healthcare.
• Around 10% of Ukrainians are convinced that the country faces the threat of fragmentation and the loss of control over its gas transmission system. Between 6% and 8% of respondents are most concerned about mass emigration of Ukrainians abroad, a demographic crisis, and a decline in the quality of education.
• About 7% believe Ukraine is threatened by an unconstitutional coup, around 6% by the loss of independence, 4% by civil war, 3% by a military threat from Russia, and 1.5% by a threat from the West. Less than 1% fear terrorism in Ukraine.
• There are notable regional and demographic differences. Fear of economic decline is strongest among residents of the Center, South, East, and Donbas, regions with developed industrial production, primarily among economically active people aged 30–49 with secondary or vocational education. Rising unemployment worries young people aged 18–29 the most, and this concern is present in almost all regions, especially in the South and least in the North. Women, particularly those living in rural areas, fear unemployment more than men.
• Arbitrary actions by the authorities are of greater concern to residents of the South, East, and Donbas, regions dissatisfied with the current government. Urban residents are more worried about this threat than rural ones.
• The devaluation of the hryvnia is most feared in the West. Ethnic Ukrainians are significantly more concerned about this issue than ethnic Russians, likely because some associate this threat not only with the erosion of their incomes and savings but also with a weakening of the state.
• The higher the level of education of respondents, the greater their concern about the degradation of Ukraine’s population. This fear is especially widespread in the North and East and is more common in cities than in villages.
• Rising crime worries residents of Donbas the most, environmental disasters concern people in the North and East, and the deterioration of healthcare is most feared in the South.
• Mass emigration of Ukrainians abroad mainly concerns residents of the West and Center. A demographic crisis is feared most in the North, while declining education standards are most feared in the South.
• Those who believe Ukraine risks losing control over its gas transmission system are mostly young people, predominantly men with higher education, with the highest shares in the North, South, West, and East.
• Residents of the Center, West, and North are three times more likely than those in the South, East, and Donbas to cite the loss of independence as a threat. These are mostly older people and ethnic Ukrainians. A military threat from Russia is also expected most often in the West, Center, and North. At the same time, fear of civil war is highest in Donbas and the South. The risk of the country’s fragmentation is most feared in the South and Center and least in the West, while ethnic Russians expect this threat more often than ethnic Ukrainians.
• The regional classification used in the survey was as follows. West: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi. Center: Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy. North: Kyiv city, Kyiv region, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv. South: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv. East: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia.

• Public support for the need to amend the Constitution this year is growing. Whereas in March 2009, 48.9% of respondents believed that constitutional reform was not timely that year, by May 2009 this share had fallen to 44.5%. By contrast, in March only 23.8% supported the idea of amending the Basic Law that year, while in May this figure rose to 31.6%. The share of respondents who were undecided on this issue also declined from 27.3% to 23.9%.
• Compared with March 2009, the number of respondents who believe that amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine should be approved only by a vote in the Verkhovna Rada increased from 12.1% to 15.7%.
• At the same time, public opinion continues to be dominated by the view that constitutional amendments should be approved only through a nationwide referendum, a position held by 62.1% of respondents.
• Only 3.1% believe that constitutional amendments can be legitimized solely by the President’s signature, and 1% solely by the signature of the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada. A further 18.2% of respondents were unable to answer this question.
• According to a relative majority of respondents, 45.5%, constitutional changes should strengthen the powers of the President. One quarter believe that parliament should be granted greater powers, 17.6% think that the Constitution should not be changed at all, and 10.7% were undecided.
• Seventy-eight percent of respondents do not support the idea of electing the President in parliament, with 51.6% completely opposed and 26.4% rather opposed. The share of supporters of this idea stands at 11.4%.
• Only 47.2% of respondents were able to name the correct date of Constitution Day in Ukraine, 28 June. A further 19.6% named a different date, while one third do not know at all when this state holiday is celebrated.

• Over the past two months, support for the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, has increased the most, from 20.1% to 25.3%. Support for the leader of BYuT, Yulia Tymoshenko, has instead declined, from 16.8% to 15.9%.
• Support for Arsenii Yatsenyuk has also increased slightly, from 12.2% to 13.2%.
• Support for the incumbent President Viktor Yushchenko fluctuates at around 3–4%, for the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn at 6–7%, and for the leader of the Communists at 4–5%.
• 15.8% would vote “against all,” and 9.6% are undecided.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held next Sunday, five political forces would enter parliament: the Party of Regions (24.9%), BYuT (15.2%), the Yatsenyuk Bloc (10.4%), the Lytvyn Bloc (6.1%), and the Communist Party of Ukraine (5.4%).
• Close to passing the 3% threshold are Our Ukraine (2.8%) and Svoboda (2.4%). 13.4% would vote “against all,” and 11.3% are undecided.
• 54% of respondents agree that parliament should dismiss the Minister of Internal Affairs, Yurii Lutsenko, while 34.3% disagree.
• One third of respondents believe that trade unions in Ukraine primarily defend the interests of company management, and one in five believe they defend the interests of politicians. Only 15% of citizens think that trade unions defend the interests of ordinary workers, 16.6% believe they do not defend any interests at all, and 14.6% were unable to answer this question.
• Accordingly, only 16.8% of respondents rated the activity of trade unions in Ukraine over the past six months positively, while 28.5% rated it negatively. At the same time, 37.2% of respondents think that trade unions in Ukraine play no role at all. 17.5% were undecided.

• hereas in September 2007 respondents to a similar question tended more toward the answer that the country lacked legality above all, in May 2009 it was order that was seen as most lacking (an increase from 41.4% to 45.3%). Perceived shortages of stability (from 21.8% to 25.1%), leadership (from 20.1% to 23.6%), wisdom (from 8.9% to 11.3%), money (from 5.4% to 8.1%), and faith (from 2.8% to 5.3%) also increased. Perceptions of a lack of honesty, justice, decisiveness, and patriotism decreased slightly or remained unchanged.
• Almost 90% of respondents felt the effects of the economic crisis personally.
• In order to reduce the impact of the crisis, 47.2% of citizens cut spending on food, 43.2% abandoned planned purchases of household appliances and electronics, and nearly one in ten limited themselves in everything. In addition, 28.7% of respondents turned to relatives and close ones for help, 17.1% gave up summer holidays, and 14.3% converted all their savings into U.S. dollars.
• Only 1.7% of respondents turned to the state for assistance.
• At the same time, 7.5% of respondents did nothing to reduce the impact of the economic crisis.

I. Perception of presidential candidates by Lviv residents

So what is the dynamic of electoral sentiments among Lviv residents in 2009? Let us begin with the expectations of the people of Lviv regarding the upcoming presidential elections.

We are comparing data from a survey conducted in April 2009 with data from a survey conducted at the end of December of last year. Over these four months, Arsenii Yatseniuk has moved to the top of the list of presidential candidates. In fact, for us, the growth of support for Yatseniuk was an expected trend, and I am convinced that he had already taken first place in January–February of this year, while we only confirmed it in April. The dynamics of his rating were positive throughout this period, starting in October, when Yatseniuk began to be actively discussed as a presidential candidate. At present, he has almost 23.5%.

As for the other candidates, Yulia Tymoshenko has, of course, lost the most. She now has only 19.5%. Compared with the end of last year, she has lost a full 5 percentage points. This is a significant drop, especially given that those 5% have become supporters of her direct competitor in Lviv — Arsenii Yatseniuk. Here we see a clear trend: Tymoshenko is going down, Yatseniuk is going up.

At the moment, my assessment is that the growth of Yatseniuk’s rating and, correspondingly, the decline of Tymoshenko’s rating have stopped. I think that over the next month or two, and perhaps even until autumn, their positions will remain roughly at this level.

The candidate who is now closest to these two leaders is Oleh Tyahnybok. At present, his rating is just over 10%. It should be noted that over the past four months he has lost some of his positions. However, this is probably not so much due to his own personal performance, but rather to the fact that in the most recent April survey we included Anatolii Hrytsenko, who is seen as a certain alternative to the main politicians. He is a new face. He was a relatively “tough” Minister of Defense and also positions himself as a “strong hand.”

So you think that some of Tyahnybok’s supporters moved to Hrytsenko because they have a similar image of strong-willed, authoritarian-type leaders who are capable of “restoring order”?

That is generally how people perceive Hrytsenko. Therefore, I believe that the 2–2.5% decline in Tyahnybok’s rating occurred due to the entry of Anatolii Hrytsenko into the presidential race, whom we included in this list for the first time.

As for Viktor Yushchenko, his rating is stable; over four months it has neither increased nor decreased. At present, it stands at around 7%. It should be said that this is also a certain point at which his rating is likely to remain for quite some time. These are the main positions.

And what about Yanukovych?

Viktor Yanukovych is traditionally perceived rather negatively in Lviv. At present, 4% of Lviv residents are ready to vote for him. On the one hand, this is very little, but on the other hand, it is somewhat more than a year or two ago.

And what has been the dynamic over the past four months?

His rating has been stable. It has not moved in any direction. That is, the people who have gradually become disappointed in the current authorities have not chosen Yanukovych as an alternative. No matter how you look at it, he is not accepted in Western Ukraine, and particularly in Lviv.

So we can say that in Lviv the supporters of the main political figures have already made their choices and the overall picture has stabilized. Are any surprises still possible?

I do not think that any surprises should be expected, even though about 10% of Lviv residents remain undecided. Practice shows that these 10% will in fact be choosing among four candidates — Yatseniuk, Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko. And people tend to vote for those who are leaders, who have a chance to win. Therefore, in practice, it is Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko who will compete for the votes of the 10% of Lviv residents who have not yet decided.

I should also say that in our survey about 10% are ready to vote “against all” in the presidential election, and slightly less than 5% do not intend to participate in the election at all. On the one hand, this group can be considered small, but on the other hand, these figures are higher than last year or the year before. People are disappointed. You know that usually those who vote “against all” make up no more than 2–3%. In our surveys, this figure now stands at as much as 10%, three or even four times higher than usual. However, I think that as the elections approach and the active phase of the campaign begins, a significant share of these people will decide and vote.

We are now talking about ratings in percentages, but could you translate these percentages into absolute numbers?

I am not ready to operate with exact absolute numbers, but we can make a rough calculation. If there are about 530,000 voters in Lviv, then this means that roughly one in five — just over 100,000 — are ready to vote for Tymoshenko. For Yatseniuk, it is 23.3%, meaning about one in four, around 120,000 voters. These are absolute numbers from the total electorate. However, about 70% of voters will actually come to the polls. Presidential elections are more important for people, and turnout is usually higher. Perhaps about 75% will come to vote in Lviv — that would be roughly 420,000 voters. Calculations should be based on this number.

It would be interesting to draw an electoral map of Ukraine from the point of view of different politicians. On such a map, Lviv, for example, would be a city of 120,000 voters for Yatseniuk, but only 15,000 for Yanukovych…

I agree. It would be interesting to compare Lviv with other million-plus cities. Then one should speak not only about percentages and ratings, but also about the absolute weight of the population. After all, 20% in Lviv may correspond in absolute numbers to only 5% in Donetsk. And that is what the competition is about. For Yanukovych, of course, Lviv is not very interesting, but still — the larger the city, the greater its weight in the national sample.

Can one draw a group portrait of a Lviv voter who supports one candidate or another?

We can talk about those candidates who enjoy significant support in Lviv, namely Yatseniuk, Tymoshenko, and Tyahnybok, who has twice the support of Yushchenko. So I would focus on these three typical electorates.

Supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko, who four years ago were considered a protest electorate — that is, people who opposed the authorities and wanted change — have now become the least protest-oriented, since Tymoshenko is in power. This does not mean that the electorate has changed — that four years ago one group voted for Tymoshenko and now another does. These are the same people, but they have changed their attitude toward their leader. And because Tymoshenko is now prime minister and part of the governing authorities, they have also changed their attitude toward politics in the country. As a result, they are currently not ready for early elections or for protest actions.

Are Tymoshenko’s supporters mainly women or men, and what is their age?

Sixty percent of Tymoshenko’s electorate are women and 40% are men. For example, for Lytvyn the picture is the opposite — 65% of his supporters are men. The same is true for Tyahnybok, where 60% of his supporters are also men.

If we continue to draw an average Lviv supporter of Tymoshenko, it is a woman under 30 years old and among the less affluent, which translates into the socialist and populist attitudes characteristic of this electorate. We have already mentioned that compared to a year ago, Tymoshenko’s rating has dropped significantly, by about 10 percentage points, and she has accordingly suffered electoral losses, including in Lviv. However, the 20% who are currently ready to vote for Yulia Tymoshenko are the most confident in their choice. They may be disappointed in Tymoshenko herself, in the economic crisis, in the Ukrainian authorities, and in the electoral process, but they do not see another option or another politician they could vote for. Therefore, she still has a stable core electorate. And as I said earlier, her ratings are unlikely to fall further.

Supporters of Arsenii Yatseniuk

Very different people are his supporters. This is primarily because he is a new name among presidential candidates and represents a relatively new political force. In fact, the core of his electorate consists of people who just a year ago were supporters of Our Ukraine or Viktor Yushchenko, meaning a center-right electorate. It was precisely from among Yushchenko’s supporters that Yatseniuk’s rating began to grow — at least initially. But that was only the beginning. The subsequent growth, the roughly 5 percentage points he gained this year, came at the expense of Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has already bottomed out at 6–7% and is unlikely to fall further. At this point, Yatseniuk is already gaining support from the Tymoshenko Bloc.

Since Yatseniuk’s electorate is being replenished by supporters of different politicians, it has become quite heterogeneous. His electorate is not clearly defined. However, it can be said that almost half of Yatseniuk’s supporters are people under 40 years of age. These are mostly young and active people. They are ready to participate in protest actions, meaning they are more politically active than others. They are among the most financially secure — not necessarily the richest, but those who have been least affected by the economic crisis. These are people who are able to cope even in the difficult conditions in which we now find ourselves.

At the same time, they declaratively seek stability. When we ask people whether they want radical change or stability, Yatseniuk’s supporters overwhelmingly choose stability. These are likely people involved in business, who depend on the economic and political situation in the country. For them, stability is the best option; they do not want radical change. They want to continue living as they have been living, to grow gradually, without revolution and without collapse.

These are interesting people — ready to go to a revolution in order to achieve stability.

That is the paradox. They choose Yatseniuk as someone who is perceived as a pragmatist, a supporter of the European course, and not associated with radical or unpredictable decisions, unlike, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko.

The main advantage of Yatseniuk is that he is seen as a new face in politics, someone not implicated in corruption. That is why Lviv residents are willing to give him a chance in the upcoming presidential election.

Supporters of Oleh Tyahnybok

Tyahnybok also has a very clearly defined electorate. Both he and his political force have for a long time been consistently articulating the same positions and are ideologically well defined. The vast majority of Tyahnybok’s supporters have supported him for many years. We see that his roughly 10% in the presidential race or the 17.5–18% for the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda in parliamentary elections were accumulated gradually, step by step. There have been no sudden spikes; the growth of his rating has been steady.

Back in 2006, about 3% of the population of Lviv Oblast voted for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. Today, according to our surveys, almost 18% in Lviv are ready to vote for Svoboda in parliamentary elections. This is significant growth, but it took four full years. This gradual growth is very good for this politician and this political force, because these people come consciously and are not likely to defect to another party tomorrow.

Please describe the portrait of a voter who would vote for Oleh Tyahnybok.

As I said, most of Tyahnybok’s supporters are men, and almost two thirds of them are over 40 years old. These are people with clearly defined views. They come to Svoboda not because of some short-term campaign or political situation, but consciously, seriously, and for the long term, often for ideological reasons. We can say that about half of Svoboda’s supporters choose ideology over the economy. For Ukraine, this is a very high figure.

Everyone who votes for Tyahnybok trusts him, but not everyone who votes for Svoboda is ready to vote for Tyahnybok as a presidential candidate. They do not believe he can win, and therefore they do not see the point in voting for him. Some of them will vote for Yatseniuk, and a very small share for Tymoshenko.

Both Yatseniuk’s and Tyahnybok’s supporters favor holding early elections at all levels — presidential, parliamentary, and local. This is understandable, since these political forces are not represented in power and want their representatives there. In contrast, the Tymoshenko Bloc and Tymoshenko’s supporters are categorically opposed to any early elections.

Supporters of Viktor Yanukovych

There is only one thing that can be stated with certainty: they are predominantly Russian-speaking people, mostly of retirement age and with higher education. Yanukovych, like the Party of Regions, has in Lviv taken over the votes of those who always voted for socialists and communists. In fact, this pro-Russian vector was transferred to Yanukovych from those two political forces. He himself did not create it here.

Anothers to add, about another 0.5% of Yanukovych’s rating consists of people who vote for him simply to express their disagreement with the Orange politicians. He is the only politician from the “non-Orange” camp who has gained any support in Western Ukraine. Even Oleksandr Moroz, who had 1% in Lviv in December, now has zero; Symonenko has 0.1%.

Lytvyn could also be considered a kind of alternative for some Lviv voters, but the 3% he has are simply people who personally view Lytvyn positively. In the second round, they would vote for someone — or perhaps not come at all. Between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko they might refuse to choose, but between Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk they would likely choose Yatseniuk as a real alternative. In 2006, Lytvyn’s entire campaign was built on the idea of the need for an alternative and a unifying force. In that sense, in a second round his supporters would vote for Yatseniuk.

So Yatseniuk has the greatest growth potential in Lviv?

Yes, because he is perceived as a new politician. Given that Tymoshenko’s rating has been declining over the past one to two years, I do not see a reason why it would suddenly start growing now. Of course, it might increase slightly due to an active campaign, visits, and agitation, but this is unlikely to change the overall picture. Her decline has stopped, and during the campaign she may gain one or two percentage points as people make their final decisions, but she is unlikely to take first place in Lviv or Lviv Oblast.

• In spring 2009, rising prices and the devaluation of the hryvnia are becoming increasingly painful issues for Lviv residents. 51.4% believe that the situation in Ukraine is deteriorating, while 40.3% think it is not changing. Only 2.1% of respondents feel that the situation in the country is improving.
• Only 7.5% of respondents have not felt the effects of the financial and economic crisis in Ukraine. 47.3% have felt the impact of the crisis very seriously, and another 42.9% have felt it to some extent.
• 85.6% of respondents are most concerned about rising prices (in December it was 73.4%), and 40.3% are concerned about the depreciation of the hryvnia (in December it was 33.9%). At the same time, concern about job losses decreased from 48% to 29.1%, and concern about delayed wage payments decreased from 20.1% to 12.5%.
• 58% of respondents personally are ready to take part in various protest actions, including due to non-payment of salaries or pensions (44.5%), deterioration of their personal financial situation (41.4%), rising prices or utility tariffs (40%), and the tense political situation in the country (33.6%). 22% are ready to protest for money or some form of remuneration.
• 11.9% are ready to participate in all of the listed protest actions. 33.4% are confident that they will not take part in any of these protest actions.
• Lviv residents want to primarily elect deputies rather than parties. 49% are against introducing a bicameral Parliament in Ukraine. 26.3% of respondents are ready to support the introduction of a bicameral Parliament, while 24.6% are undecided.
• Residents of Lviv are mostly against early elections. In particular, 47.6% do not support early elections to the Verkhovna Rada (45.5% are in favor), and 52.3% are against early presidential elections (40.9% are in favor). Notably, 37.9% support both early parliamentary and early presidential elections, while 43.9% support neither early presidential nor parliamentary elections.
• Lviv residents do not support elections being held under the existing proportional electoral system with closed party lists. This applies both to elections to the Verkhovna Rada, where only 10.4% called it optimal, and to local council elections, where only 10% consider it the best option.
• Respondents view the majoritarian electoral system most favorably. 33.6% consider it the best for parliamentary elections, and 36.6% for local elections. 20.3% believe that a proportional system with open lists is optimal for elections to the Verkhovna Rada, while 17.5% consider it the best for local elections. 22% believe that a mixed system, combining proportional and majoritarian elements, is the best electoral system.
• In Lviv, the Yatsenyuk Bloc became the leader of electoral support in parliamentary elections. The Hrytsenko Bloc passes the 3% threshold.
• Since the beginning of the year, support for the Yatsenyuk Bloc has increased from 13.6% to 21.4%, allowing it to overtake the BYuT, which has 19.1%. Third place belongs to Svoboda with 16.5%. More than 3% was received by Our Ukraine (5.3%), the Party of Regions (4.4%), and the Hrytsenko Bloc (3.4%).
• Voters’ motives in supporting political forces differ. 40% of BYuT supporters have supported this force for a long time and have not become disillusioned with it, while another 40% have become disappointed but still consider it the best among the alternatives. Meanwhile, 82% of Yatsenyuk Bloc supporters and 48% of Svoboda supporters began supporting these forces recently because they became disappointed with others.
• Notably, 22% of Hrytsenko Bloc supporters support it “out of spite” toward another political force.
• In Lviv, trust in Yushchenko and Tymoshenko continues to decline. Over the past year, trust in Viktor Yushchenko in Lviv has fallen from 77.3% to 22.8%, and trust in Yulia Tymoshenko has fallen from 85.4% to 37.4%. Distrust in the President stands at 66.9%, and in the Prime Minister at 57.1%.
• At the same time, since the beginning of the year, trust in all national leaders has declined, most notably in Oleh Tiahnybok (from 56.6% to 42.6%) and Yurii Lutsenko (from 39.3% to 28.9%). The exception is Arsenii Yatsenyuk, whose level of trust has not changed since the beginning of the year.
• The highest levels of trust among Lviv residents are enjoyed by Yatsenyuk (63.3%), Tiahnybok (42.6%), and Tymoshenko (37.4%). Only Yatsenyuk has a positive trust balance (+35.3%). Respondents were most uncertain in their attitudes toward Anatolii Hrytsenko (18.3%).
• The politician who is most distrusted in Lviv is traditionally Viktor Yanukovych (89.3%).
• In the presidential elections in Lviv, Yatsenyuk leads with 23.3%, followed by Tymoshenko with 19.5%, and Tiahnybok with 10.4%. Viktor Yushchenko’s rating has stabilized at 6.9%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko is fifth with 5.5%. 10.8% of respondents would not vote for any of the candidates, and another 9.5% have not decided.
• It is interesting that in Yulia Tymoshenko’s electorate in Lviv, 59% are women, while among Volodymyr Lytvyn’s voters, 65% are men. The highest shares of voters with higher education are found among Viktor Yanukovych’s and Anatolii Hrytsenko’s supporters.