Press releases

• Rating Group is launching a new project titled “Charity in the Ukrainian Way”, which will include a series of editions devoted to the topic of charity in Ukraine, public attitudes toward it, and the possibilities for engagement in this field both by professional organizations and by ordinary people. The project is funded by the company’s own resources. Today we present Issue No. 1, “Helping during the New Year holidays”, and we sincerely hope that the information presented will inspire readers to take action.
• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2010, more than one quarter of respondents (27%) said they would like to engage in charitable activity during the New Year holidays, while another 20% had not yet thought about it. At the same time, almost half of respondents (47%) said they did not have such a desire, and 6% were undecided. The highest share of those willing to be charitable during the holidays was recorded in Western Ukraine (41%), the Center (35%), and the South (29%), while the lowest was in the North (20%) and in Donbas (15%).
• Women expressed slightly more willingness to engage in charity than men, as did rural residents compared to urban residents. Married and unmarried respondents were more willing than divorced or widowed people. More educated respondents were more inclined toward charity than those with lower levels of education. A clear relationship with financial status was also observed: the better the financial situation of respondents, the more likely they were to express a willingness to be charitable during the New Year holidays.
• By occupational and social status, the strongest willingness to engage in charity was found among managers, professionals, entrepreneurs, and clerical workers. The lowest willingness was recorded among manual workers, pensioners, homemakers, and the unemployed. Students most often said they had not yet thought about the issue.
• Respondents who were willing to engage in charity during the New Year holidays, or who had not yet decided, were asked to indicate the obstacles that might prevent them from doing so. Only 16% of them said they saw no obstacles. The remaining nearly 80% named various barriers: 59% cited their own financial limitations, 10% a lack of information about who needs help, 5% a lack of information on how to provide help, and 3% said they might not have enough time.
• As a result, it can be assumed that of the 27% of respondents who expressed a willingness to engage in charity during the holidays, only about one in five will actually do so. This means that in practice only about 5–6% of Ukrainian citizens are likely to take part in charitable activities during the New Year period. Among the 41% of Western residents and 35% of Central residents who expressed a willingness to help, only 16% and 11% respectively see no obstacles to doing so. In the Center, the main obstacle is a lack of information about who needs help and how to provide it, while in the West the main barrier is financial capacity, since people there generally know how and where to provide assistance.
• When recalculated for the entire population, real charitable activity during the New Year holidays is expected from only 7% of residents in the South, 7% in the West, 4% in the Center, 4% in the North, 3% in the East, and 2% in Donbas. Lack of information about who needs help is the greatest barrier for respondents whose financial situation allows them to save a lot, while less affluent respondents mentioned this factor much less often.
• Only 16% of respondents believe that responsibility for ensuring that those in need receive charitable assistance during the New Year holidays lies with “every citizen, including myself”. At the same time, 28% placed this responsibility on domestic charitable organizations and foundations, another 28% on government institutions, 17% on wealthy individuals, 4% on international organizations and foundations, and 3% on political parties. Notably, those who had no desire to engage in charity during the New Year holidays were the most likely to place responsibility on the wealthy and on the state. By contrast, the highest sense of personal responsibility was expressed by respondents who wanted to be charitable and saw no obstacles to doing so. The highest level of awareness of personal responsibility for charity was found in the South, primarily among middle-aged people with vocational education and average incomes.
• Responsibility for ensuring that people in need receive charitable assistance during the holidays is most often assigned to state institutions in the West and the North, to charitable foundations in Donbas and the Center, and to wealthy individuals in the East. This leads to a series of difficult questions: why do things that seem sociologically logical become so illogical when viewed from the standpoint of everyday human empathy? Why does a significant willingness to engage in charity (27%) become entangled in the most convenient and common obstacles when it comes to implementation? And why, in the end, does the desire to help others survive in only 5–6% of citizens?

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2010, almost 45% of respondents agreed with the statement that revolutionary sentiments are emerging in Ukraine: 13% were fully convinced of this and another 31% rather agreed than disagreed. At the same time, 41% of respondents disagreed with this statement (11% strongly disagreed and 30% rather disagreed), while 15% were undecided.
• Agreement that revolutionary sentiments are emerging was highest in Western and Central Ukraine, particularly among supporters of Svoboda (73%), Batkivshchyna (67%), Front for Change (59%), and UDAR (55%). By contrast, residents of the North, East, Donbas, and South were more likely to disagree, especially supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Strong Ukraine.
• More than one third of respondents (37%) believe that in the near future these revolutionary moods could turn into mass protests similar to the events of November 2004. Almost half (46%) do not believe this will happen, and 17% were undecided. The most radical expectations were expressed by supporters of Batkivshchyna (58%), Svoboda (56%), and Front for Change (52%), primarily in Western and Central Ukraine. The least likely to expect such protests are voters of the Party of Regions (23%). Notably, residents of Donbas (33%) are more likely to expect radicalization than those in the South (30%) or East (28%).
• It is worth noting that the number of respondents who are absolutely certain about radicalization is twice as small as those who rather expect it. Overall, only about one in ten Ukrainians is fully convinced that revolutionary sentiments are definitely emerging, and most of them also firmly believe that these sentiments will lead to mass protests similar to November 2004. This includes almost every fifth supporter of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, and every fourth supporter of Svoboda.
• A plurality of respondents (47%) believe that such mass protests in Ukraine would most likely be driven by social issues (such as low living standards), while only 7% expect protests based on national issues (such as perceived threats to national interests). Another quarter think protests could be equally likely on both social and national grounds, and one in five could not answer. Expectations of socially driven protests are highest in the North (56%, particularly Kyiv), the East (52%), and the Center (51%), and lowest in the West (39%), where more than a third believe protests could arise equally from social and national causes. Nationally driven protests are most often expected in the South, where this view is expressed twice as frequently as in any other region.
• Supporters of Front for Change, Batkivshchyna, Strong Ukraine, and the Party of Regions are the most likely to expect protests based on social issues, while supporters of Svoboda are the least likely, with about half of them believing protests could occur equally on both social and national grounds.
• Nearly one third of respondents (31%) believe that Yuliya Tymoshenko could lead a protest movement in Ukraine if such mass actions occurred. Fifteen percent named Arseniy Yatseniuk, and 14% Oleh Tiahnybok. Smaller shares mentioned Vitalii Klychko (5%), Viktor Yushchenko (2%), and Anatolii Hrytsenko (2%). One quarter of respondents believe that none of the listed politicians would be able to lead such a protest movement. Tymoshenko was most often named in the North (41%), Donbas (38%), West (32%), and Center (30%). Yatseniuk was most often named in the West and Center (21% each), and Tiahnybok in the West (27%) and Donbas (19%). Tymoshenko was most often named by supporters of Batkivshchyna, UDAR, Strong Ukraine, and the Party of Regions; Yatseniuk by supporters of Front for Change and Svoboda; and Tiahnybok by supporters of Svoboda and Front for Change.
• A clear majority of respondents (60%) view the protests by entrepreneurs against the new Tax Code—particularly those held on Independence Square in Kyiv—as a civic protest against government actions rather than a political action. At the same time, 22% see them primarily as political, and 18% were undecided. These protests were most often seen as non-political in every region of Ukraine, especially in the North (73%), particularly Kyiv, and in the Center (69%). However, nearly one third of supporters of Strong Ukraine and the Party of Regions considered these protests to be more political in nature.

• In order to bring the results of sociological surveys closer to the actual results obtained by political parties in elections, all indicators presented in this release are calculated on the basis of responses from respondents who intend to take part in the elections. According to the survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, if parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held in mid-December, 26% of respondents would definitely take part and another 38% would probably do so. Voter turnout in presidential elections is traditionally higher: if a presidential election were held in mid-December, 31% would definitely vote and a further 37% would probably do so. This relatively low expected turnout is explained, on the one hand, by the low participation in the October 2010 local elections and, on the other hand, by the pre-holiday mood of the population. The most mobilized voters are supporters of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and the Party of Regions.
• As of mid-December, the highest position in the presidential rating is held by Viktor Yanukovych, supported by 32% of those who would vote if the election were held next Sunday. Yuliya Tymoshenko remains in second place with 19.9%. Serhiy Tihipko is supported by 8.2%, Arseniy Yatseniuk by 8%, Oleh Tiahnybok by 5%, Petro Symonenko by 3.4%, Vitalii Klychko by 2.7%, Viktor Yushchenko by 1.8%, and Anatolii Hrytsenko by 1.4%. Another candidate would be supported by 2.1% of respondents, while 5.6% would support none. A further 9.1% of those who would vote remain undecided.
• In the party ratings, the Party of Regions holds first place with the support of 30% of those who would vote if elections were held next Sunday. Batkivshchyna is second with 19.6%. Front for Change is supported by 7.2%, Strong Ukraine by 6.4%, Svoboda by 6.2%, and the Communist Party of Ukraine by 4.8%. All of these parties would enter parliament if elections were held next Sunday. The UDAR party of Vitalii Klychko, supported by 2.7%, also has a chance to cross the threshold. Next in the ranking are Our Ukraine with 1.6%, Civic Position of Anatolii Hrytsenko with 1%, the Socialist Party of Ukraine with 0.8%, the People’s Party with 0.7%, and Viktor Baloga’s United Center with 0.6%. In total, 2.3% of respondents would support other parties, 7.4% would support none, and 8.7% of likely voters remain undecided.
• Compared to a similar survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group in October, several trends are evident. The ratings of Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko have stabilized at around 32% and 20% respectively. Over the past three months, the gap between the two has also stabilized at 10–12%, compared to 20–30% in mid-year. Thanks to voter mobilization, Batkivshchyna’s party rating has moved closer to the personal rating of its leader. Over the past two months, Yanukovych has strengthened his position in the South and Center and held steady in the West, North, and East. Tymoshenko has improved her standing in the East and Center but weakened in the West. Arseniy Yatseniuk’s position continues to improve, rising from 4.7% in March, 5.8% in April, 5.1% in June, 5.2% in September, 7.1% in October, to 8% in December. In contrast, Serhiy Tihipko’s support continues to decline, from 13.2% in March, 13.6% in April, 13.2% in June, 12.8% in September, 10% in October, to 8.2% in December. As a result, at the party level Strong Ukraine (6.4%) has for the first time in the past year lost third place to Front for Change (7.2%) and risks also being overtaken by Svoboda (6.2%). Oleh Tiahnybok’s personal rating and Svoboda’s party rating continue to grow, from 2.8% and 4% in October to 5% and 6.2% in December respectively, especially in the West, where Tiahnybok’s rating has reached 17%. The Communist Party of Ukraine remains stable, increasing slightly from 4.3% in October to 4.8% in December, which keeps it on track for parliamentary representation, with the strongest growth observed in Donbas. Over the past two months, UDAR has almost doubled its support, from 1.5% in October to 2.7% in December, and in the presidential rating Vitalii Klychko now surpasses Viktor Yushchenko, Anatolii Hrytsenko, and Volodymyr Lytvyn.

• In October last year, the Rating Sociological Group presented its own project, the “Joy Rating,” which showed that despite the crisis, the flu epidemic, elections, and many other turbulent circumstances at the time, Ukrainians were still able to find space for joy and happiness in their lives. This year, the group introduced a different project — the “Anti-Joy Rating, or What Makes Ukrainians Upset?” — aimed at exploring the other side of people’s feelings and addressing more difficult questions about their lives.
• The issues that trouble Ukrainians the most are their level of income (40% of responses), their own health (31%), the health of their close relatives (25%), and uncertainty about the future (21%). In addition, Ukrainians are distressed by the absence of work that brings satisfaction (15%), which is one and a half times more than the share troubled by the mere absence of a job as such (9%). Another 15% do not take pleasure in their housing conditions, while 10% are worried about the unsettled lives of their children. One in ten respondents is troubled by unrealized opportunities and talents, while others mention a sense of hopelessness (7%), emotional state (5%), loneliness (5%), housework (4%), relationships with children (4%), and relationships with a spouse or marriage (4%). A further 3% are upset by their neighbors and by the envy of those around them. Only 1% of respondents are troubled by the state of their spirituality, and just 2% by their level of knowledge.
• At the same time, 13% of respondents said that nothing in life upsets them — a group of so-called “absolute optimists,” made up predominantly of young people. Nevertheless, among those aged 18–29, one quarter feel uncertain about their future and the same share are worried about the lack of work that would bring satisfaction. Young people are also concerned about the health of their relatives and loved ones. Only young respondents (and only 4% of them) worry about their level of knowledge. Among people of middle age, income levels become a greater concern, as do both their own health and that of their loved ones. Uncertainty about the future grows, and concerns about relationships with a spouse or marriage become more prominent. Among those aged 40–49, dissatisfaction with their sex life also begins to appear.
• For older age groups, worries about the unsettled lives of their children and relationships with their children increase, while health steadily moves to the forefront: 37% of those aged 50–59 and 67% of those aged 60 and over say that their health troubles them most. Interestingly, around the age of 50 there is a turning point at which one’s own health begins to worry people much more than the health of their relatives. Another trend is also evident: the lower people’s income, the more they are troubled by their own health. In addition, weight directly affects how people feel about their health: the higher respondents’ weight, the more often they said that their health was what upset them most.
• Among those aged 50–59, the lack of satisfying work and poor housing conditions become less troubling with age, although one in ten is concerned about a sense of hopelessness. For those aged over 60, loneliness and relationships with children become more troubling, while housing conditions and income levels worry them less. In line with the saying “old age brings contentment,” only 7% of respondents aged over 60 said that nothing in life upsets them. At all stages of life except old age, people are equally troubled by unrealized plans, opportunities, and talents.
• Women, overall, have more reasons to feel upset than men. They are more concerned about income levels, their own health and that of their relatives, uncertainty about the future, the unsettled lives of their children, and their emotional state. Women are also more troubled by housework, loneliness, and a sense of hopelessness. Men, in turn, are more concerned than women about the lack of satisfying work and about unrealized opportunities and talents.
• Based on answers to the question “What upsets you most in your life?”, a kind of “anti-joy matrix” was constructed. Correlated responses allowed eight psychological groups to be identified:
  1. Uncertainty about the future, unsatisfying work, income level, unrealized opportunities and talents, lack of work.
  2. One’s own health and the health of loved ones.
  3. Housework and housing.
  4. Loneliness, sex life, and a sense of hopelessness.
  5. Relationships with children, relationships with a spouse, and the unsettled lives of children.
  6. Relationships with parents, appearance, and level of knowledge.
  7. Spirituality, the past, and emotional state.
  8. Neighbors, the envy of others, and how one is treated by those around them.
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• If people had the chance to start their lives over, only 25% of respondents said they would live it exactly the same way. Such answers were most common in the West and East of Ukraine, and among both young people and the elderly. The majority (48%) said they would live partly the same way and partly differently, with this view most common in the North and among those aged 50–59. Almost one in five (17%) would live their life completely differently, especially in the Center of Ukraine and among those aged 40–49. Another 10% could not answer.
• The survey also showed that the higher people’s incomes, the more likely they are to say they would live their life exactly the same way. Among respondents with household incomes above 3,000 hryvnias, 35% would change nothing, compared with only 18% among those with incomes below 1,000 hryvnias. The same pattern holds for education: nearly one third (31%) of respondents with higher education would live their life the same way, compared with less than a quarter (21%) among those with only secondary education. Finally, 33% of those who consider themselves happy would live their life the same way, compared with only 9% among those who feel unhappy.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group in October 2010, 68% of Ukrainians described themselves as relatively happy, although only 17% said they felt unequivocally happy. At the same time, one in five respondents considered themselves unhappy, while another 13% were unable to give a definite answer.
• The year that had passed did not make Ukrainians happier. Compared with a similar survey conducted in October 2009, the share of people who felt happy to a greater or lesser extent declined slightly from 70% to 68%. More importantly, the proportion of those who considered themselves unequivocally happy fell sharply, from 27% to 17%. As a year earlier, residents of the North and the West felt the happiest, while those living in the Donbas felt the least happy.
• Over the year, moods in the North (78%), Center (65%), and South (66%) remained almost unchanged. In contrast, at the geographical extremes of the country happiness declined: most sharply in the West, from 85% to 72% (with the share of those who felt unequivocally happy halving from 39% to 19%), in the East from 73% to 64%, and in the Donbas from 58% to 52%. Notably, at least one in four residents of the Donbas felt unhappy, and only 9% described themselves as unequivocally happy.
• As in the previous year, the study confirmed the notion that the sense of happiness in Ukraine tends to decline with age. Young people aged 18–29 were the happiest group, with 70% describing themselves as happy, while the least happy were elderly people, among whom only 53% felt happy. Nearly one third of respondents aged over 60 considered themselves unhappy.
• Unmarried respondents tended to feel happier than those who were married, although married people were much happier than those who were divorced or living alone. People with higher levels of education were also happier: 74% of respondents with higher education described themselves as happy, compared with only 51% among those with only general secondary education.
• The popular saying that “money does not buy happiness” was not confirmed by the survey. On the contrary, the higher people’s incomes, the happier they tended to feel. Among respondents whose household income exceeded 3,000 hryvnias per month, 79% felt happy and only 10% unhappy. By contrast, among those whose family income was below 1,000 hryvnias, only 49% felt happy, while 37% felt unhappy.
• The study also touched on a topic often discussed among women, showing how body weight is related to feelings of happiness. Among women, the pattern was clear: the lower their weight, the happier they felt. For example, 74% of women weighing under 60 kilograms described themselves as happy, compared with only 55% among women weighing 90 kilograms or more. Among men, the relationship was the opposite: the thinnest men were the least happy, while heavier men tended to be happier. Only 57% of men weighing under 60 kilograms felt happy, compared with 70% among those weighing 90 kilograms or more. In this sense, the “happiest” weight for women was under 60 kilograms, while for men it was in the range of 70–79 kilograms.

• According to a study conducted by Rating Group in October 2010, only 17% of respondents did not believe that Ukraine would successfully host the UEFA EURO 2012 football championship, while 62% expressed positive expectations and 21% were undecided. The most optimistic views were recorded in the regions that were due to host the tournament, namely the North and Donbas, where 69% expressed confidence, and the West with 64%. The most pessimistic expectations were observed in Central Ukraine, where 55% believed in a successful hosting of EURO 2012 and 26% did not. Among supporters of political parties, voters of Strong Ukraine, Front for Change, Batkivshchyna and the Party of Regions were the most optimistic. Younger respondents were more likely to believe in a successful tournament, and men were more optimistic than women.
• Compared to August 2009, public assessments of Ukraine’s readiness to host EURO 2012 improved significantly. On a five-point scale, where 1 indicated low readiness and 5 high readiness, the average score increased from 2.4 in August 2009 to 3.0 in October 2010. The number of respondents giving a score of four tripled over the year. As in the previous year, the highest ratings were recorded in Donbas, with an average score of 3.2. The greatest progress was seen in the North, where the average score rose from 2.2 to 3.1, and in the West, from 2.1 to 3.0.
• For Ukrainians, EURO 2012 was primarily associated with national prestige and the creation of new jobs, each mentioned by 42% of respondents. It was also seen as an opportunity to improve the quality of roads, airports and hotels by 34%, and to generate additional income for the country by 31%. Over the year, fewer people viewed EURO 2012 as a driver of development for host cities or as an opportunity to present Ukraine positively to Europe and the world, while more saw it as a test of whether Ukraine is a civilized country. Only 3% of respondents considered EURO 2012 unimportant for the country, compared with 9% a year earlier.
• Economic crisis, corruption in government and poor-quality roads were seen as the main obstacles to a successful hosting of EURO 2012. Compared to August 2009, the share of those who viewed the economic crisis as a key problem fell from 61% to 46%, corruption from 51% to 35%, and poor roads from 39% to 34%. Concerns about political crisis dropped most sharply, from 54% to 26%. Perceptions of problems such as slow stadium construction, difficult urban transport, lack of quality hotels and modern airports remained largely unchanged.
• For the second year in a row, 40% of respondents believed that Rinat Akhmetov had contributed the most to the successful preparation for EURO 2012. As in previous surveys, Hryhorii Surkis ranked second. Viktor Yanukovych’s perceived contribution doubled compared to August and December of the previous year, while Borys Kolesnikov and Mykola Azarov appeared in the ranking for the first time. The contributions of the previous government were rated more modestly, with Yulia Tymoshenko, Yevhen Chervonenko, Yurii Pavlenko, Viktor Yushchenko and Ihor Vasiunyk mentioned less frequently.

• The vast majority of both Ukrainians and Russians identify themselves as patriots, at 76% and 84% respectively. At the same time, among Ukrainians there are twice as many respondents as among Russians who were unable to answer the question of whether they consider themselves patriots. In Russia, self-declared patriots are most common among residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, while in Ukraine they are most prevalent in the Central, Northern and Western regions. Only about one in ten respondents in both countries said they do not feel patriotic, with this more typical of residents of small towns in Russia and of Donbas in Ukraine. Urban residents in Ukraine are generally less patriotic than rural residents, and in both countries younger people are the least patriotic, while older respondents show the strongest patriotic sentiment.
• For Ukrainians, the main sources of pride in their country are the place where they were born and raised and the land on which they live. For Russians, by contrast, the country’s historical past is the dominant source of pride. Russians are also more likely than Ukrainians to take pride in their literature and arts and in military strength, while Ukrainians more often express pride in prominent people of their nationality, the state they live in, the character of their people, their language, their work ethic, national traditions, and religion. In both countries similar shares take pride in national symbols and in sporting achievements, while Ukrainians are somewhat more likely to take pride in ancestors and family heritage.
• Regional differences within Ukraine are pronounced. In the South, pride is most often linked to birthplace; in the Center to work ethic; in the West to language and religion; in the East to the character of the people; and in Donbas to sporting achievements. Residents of Donbas, the South and the East are more likely than others to cite historical past as a source of pride, while those in the Center more often cite great national figures.
• For many respondents in both countries, true patriotism is expressed through respect for traditions. Russians more often associate patriotism with strengthening the family and raising children, while Ukrainians more often see it in political participation, support for patriotic parties, involvement in patriotic organizations, and constructive criticism of their country’s shortcomings. In both countries, work done with full dedication and the celebration of historical events are also widely viewed as expressions of patriotism. These views vary by age and region: for example, residents of Western Ukraine more often link patriotism to political engagement and civic participation, while those in Donbas more often associate it with respect for traditions.
• A majority of both Ukrainians and Russians primarily identify themselves as citizens of their respective countries. At the same time, Ukrainians are more likely than Russians to define themselves through their region or locality and through their national identity. This is especially pronounced in Western and Central Ukraine, while residents of the South and Donbas more often define themselves by their region or simply as “a person.” A small minority in both countries still identify themselves as Soviet people, more often in Russia than in Ukraine. Smaller shares in both countries define themselves through family roles, profession, religion, cosmopolitan identity, or as Europeans.

• On October 31, 2010, the Rating Group conducted the local exit poll “Halychyna-2010”. Voters were surveyed at polling station exits on election day in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil. Around 250 specialists worked on the exit poll on election day, including nearly 200 interviewers. In total, more than 7,700 voters were surveyed at 96 polling stations.
• It should be noted that during the “Halychyna-2010” exit poll, there were no recorded cases of polling station officials refusing to allow the survey. All teams started and finished their work according to the agreed schedule.
• A distinctive feature of this year’s exit poll, also noted by all sociological companies conducting surveys in Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, was a high number of refusals from respondents to answer interviewers’ questions. At some polling stations, the refusal rate reached up to 40%, compared to the standard 15–20%. This situation was partly a result of the escalation of the political climate ahead of the elections, as well as citizens’ reactions to certain “information wars” conducted in some media outlets against exit polls.
• Despite this, all exit polls announced in Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk were conducted successfully and produced consistent results. The only minor exception was Ivano-Frankivsk, where according to Research & Branding Group candidate Yurii Solovey was leading, while according to the Rating Sociological Group Viktor Anushkevychus was leading. The latter ultimately won the mayoral election according to the official vote count.
• It is worth noting that the results of all exit polls conducted in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil were consistent with each other regarding party elections, although in some positions they differed from official results.
• In particular, this concerns VO Svoboda, which according to all exit polls in the city council elections in Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk received support from more than 30% of voters, while according to local election commissions the figure was about 6% lower.
• For most other positions, deviations between official data and exit polls were generally within the margin of statistical error. One exception was Ternopil, where the official result of the Party of Regions, as well as its mayoral candidate, exceeded exit poll results by 4–5%.

Demographic structure of party voters

• In these local elections, “against all” voting was more typical among men and young people (18–29 years old).
• Older and elderly voters were more active in these elections, while a significant share of young people (at least one quarter) did not vote, which affected overall turnout.
• According to exit poll results, men dominated among voters of VO Svoboda. Compared to previous studies, the share of older voters among Svoboda supporters increased significantly — largely former supporters of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko.
• The highest share of men was also observed among voters of the People’s Movement (Narodnyi Rukh). In contrast, Our Ukraine and the “For Ukraine!” party (Ternopil) were oriented more toward women.
• The youngest electorate belonged to the PORA party and UDAR of Vitalii Klitschko.
• Among supporters of Front for Change, a large share were young voters, but middle-aged voters dominated overall. There was also a significant share of women. A similar electorate profile was observed for Third Force (Ivano-Frankivsk).
• The oldest electorate was observed among the Party of Regions, Our Ukraine, and the Republican Christian Party (Lviv).
• Interestingly, in Lviv and Ternopil, women primarily voted for the Party of Regions, while in Ivano-Frankivsk men did.

Demographic structure of voters for mayoral candidates

• Among leading mayoral candidates in Lviv, the youngest voters supported Andrii Sadovyi, while the oldest supported Yurii Mykhalchyshyn and Vasyl Hirniak. Women mainly supported Sadovyi and Hirniak, while men supported Mykhalchyshyn.
• In Ternopil, men most often supported Serhii Nadal and Volodymyr Lylo, while women supported Volodymyr Chubak, Petro Hocha, and Roman Zastavnyi. The oldest voters supported Nadal and Hocha, while youth supported Chubak.
• In Ivano-Frankivsk, men mainly supported Ruslan Martsinkiv, Vasyl Balagura, and Yurii Solovey. The highest share of women was among voters of Viktor Anushkevychus.
• Interestingly, according to real-time data from the Ivano-Frankivsk exit poll at 11:00 a.m., men were more active voters than women. As a result, Solovey was leading Anushkevychus by more than 3%. Around midday, the demographic structure of voters became more balanced, and so did the positions of the two competitors. However, after noon, women became more active, and by the evening Anushkevychus was leading. Thus, women’s turnout largely determined the election outcome in Ivano-Frankivsk.
• Youth primarily supported Balagura and Solovey. Older voters supported Martsinkiv and Boichuk, while middle-aged voters supported Prokopiv.
• It is worth noting that three weeks before the elections, the Rating Sociological Group conducted a study of electoral preferences among residents of Ivano-Frankivsk. According to that study, only 31% of residents were satisfied with the performance of the incumbent mayor Anushkevychus, while 64% believed it would be better if a new person led the city.
• At that time, Yurii Solovey was the clear leader in the race (over 30%).
• The key reason for Anushkevychus’ victory was the fragmentation of the opposition electorate. In particular, candidates Solovey, Martsinkiv, and Prokopiv together received almost twice as many votes as the winner (47% vs. 27%).
• Thus, the situation in Ivano-Frankivsk elections in many ways repeated the previous elections in Kyiv, where due to the absence of a single opposition candidate, Leonid Chernovetsky won the mayoral election.

• According to the survey conducted in October 2010, the average Ukrainian household spends about 400 hryvnias per month on clothing and footwear, which is roughly one sixth of the total household budget. One in six households spends up to 100 hryvnias per month, almost one in four spends between 100 and 300 hryvnias, and nearly one in five spends between 300 and 500 hryvnias. Over a period equivalent to a calendar year, 16% of respondents purchase clothing and footwear every month, 41% buy them once or twice per season, 22% once or twice per year, and 13% less often than once a year.
• Residents of the West and the North, particularly Kyiv, are the most active clothing buyers, while people in the East and Donbas are the least active. Purchase frequency increases among younger respondents, urban residents, women, those with higher incomes, people who are employed, and those with higher levels of education. Unmarried respondents are more active buyers than married respondents, although married people are more active than divorced respondents.
• The vast majority of Ukrainians buy clothing and footwear at markets, with 84% reporting this as their main place of purchase, a pattern observed in all regions. One third shop in small stores, 14% in department stores and supermarkets, 5% in branded stores, 1% online and 1% abroad. Twenty-seven percent usually buy Ukrainian-made clothing, 22% buy Turkish products, 20% Polish, 19% Chinese, 16% from Western Europe, 11% Russian and 8% Belarusian, while 42% do not pay attention to the country of origin. Indifference to the manufacturer is most common in Donbas, the East and the South.
• Consumers in Western Ukraine are more demanding, with Polish and Western European products being more popular there. Residents of the North, especially Kyiv, are the most selective and buy from a wide range of producers. This is also the region with the highest use of Ukrainian-made clothing at 48%, which is linked to better availability, as nearly one third of respondents elsewhere cite the lack of points of sale as a reason for not buying domestic products. The main barriers to purchasing Ukrainian clothing are a poor price–quality ratio, mentioned by 45%, low quality at 37%, limited assortment at 31% and lack of alignment with fashion trends at 14%. Among those who do buy Ukrainian products, half say the main reason is a good price–quality balance, but this group represents only about 14% of all respondents. Others buy domestic products to support Ukrainian producers, for perceived quality or selection, while only 4% believe Ukrainian clothing matches fashion trends, indicating that the domestic consumer is relatively undemanding and constrained by limited incomes.
• Second-hand clothing from Europe has become a real alternative for many consumers. Two thirds of Ukrainians have a positive attitude toward the availability of second-hand clothing, while only 18% have a negative view. Support is strongest in the West, North and Center, and somewhat weaker in the South and Donbas. Women are significantly more positive toward second-hand goods than men. Fifty-seven percent of respondents have purchased second-hand clothing at least once, with 39% doing so currently, while 43% have never done so.
• Second-hand usage is highest in the West, East and Donbas, and more common in cities than in rural areas. Users are mainly women, people aged 30–39, those with vocational or higher education, and married or divorced respondents. More than half of people engaged in household work or on maternity leave use second-hand clothing, and many of them purchase such goods several times per month. Usage is strongly linked to income levels, being highest among respondents earning less than 1,000 hryvnias per month and still significant among those earning up to 2,000 hryvnias. Nearly half of those who spend less than 300 hryvnias per month on clothing are second-hand users.
• Eighty-five percent of respondents believe that banning second-hand imports would harm low-income Ukrainians. At the same time, one third of respondents with higher incomes also use second-hand clothing, indicating that this market is not limited to the poorest segments. Among former users, the main reason for earlier purchases was lack of money, whereas among current users the primary motive is access to good-quality items at affordable prices. Many also cite the opportunity to find new or branded clothing cheaply.
• Most second-hand users say they would continue buying such goods even if they could afford new clothing, while about one third would stop. Among those who have never bought second-hand items, the main reasons are health concerns, sufficient income to buy new clothes, and feelings of embarrassment or humiliation. By contrast, most current users are satisfied with the conditions under which second-hand goods are sold, particularly in the West and North.
• Sixty-two percent of respondents oppose banning the import of second-hand clothing, while 18% support such a ban. Support for a ban is lowest in Donbas and Western Ukraine. If second-hand trade were banned, most low-income users would reduce their spending on clothing, while a small share of higher-income users would increase their spending to maintain previous consumption levels. Many users would switch to cheap clothing regardless of origin or to cheap domestic products.
• Forty-two percent believe that a ban would benefit domestic producers, while 39% disagree, and 20% are undecided. At the same time, 67% think importers of cheap clothing would benefit from such a ban. Almost all respondents believe the state should support domestic clothing production, mainly through tax incentives, anti-smuggling measures and restrictions on cheap imports, while only 4% see banning second-hand imports as an effective measure. A majority believe the government can address smuggling of new clothing without banning second-hand imports.

• As of early October, Viktor Yanukovych remains the frontrunner in the presidential race, supported by 27.1% of all respondents, or 31.3% among those who would vote if the election were held next Sunday. Yuliia Tymoshenko retains second place with the support of 15.5% of all respondents, or 19.7% among likely voters. Serhii Tihipko is supported by 8.3% of all respondents, Arsenii Yatseniuk by 5.6%, Petro Symonenko by 3.0%, Oleh Tiahnybok by 2.3%, Volodymyr Lytvyn by 1.8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 1.1% and Viktor Yushchenko by 1.1%. Another candidate would be supported by 2.8% of respondents, 12.2% would not support any candidate, 8.5% would not participate in the election, and 10.9% remain undecided, or 9.1% among those who would vote.
• In the party ratings, the Party of Regions continues to lead with 23.9% of all respondents, or 29.1% among likely voters. Batkivshchyna holds second place with 12.9% of all respondents, or 16.8% among likely voters. Strong Ukraine is supported by 6.8%, Front for Change by 4.5%, the Communist Party of Ukraine by 3.6% and Svoboda by 3.3%, all of which would enter parliament if elections were held next Sunday. Other parties follow at lower levels of support, while 9.4% of respondents do not support any party, 11.1% would not vote and 16.6% remain undecided.
• Compared to the September wave conducted by Rating Group, several trends can be observed. Viktor Yanukovych’s presidential rating has stabilized and slightly increased from 26% to 27.1%, while the Party of Regions has remained virtually unchanged. Yuliia Tymoshenko’s personal rating declined slightly from 16.8% to 15.5%, but this change remains within the margin of error, whereas support for Batkivshchyna decreased more noticeably from 15.5% to 12.9%, particularly in Western Ukraine, where support for Svoboda and other democratic parties has been growing ahead of the local elections. Serhii Tihipko’s rating continues its steady decline, a trend mirrored by Strong Ukraine. Arsenii Yatseniuk has gradually been regaining support, approaching the level recorded during the presidential election, with Front for Change following the same trend. Both the Communist Party of Ukraine and Svoboda have consolidated their positions above the 3% parliamentary threshold.

• In the run-up to the mayoral election, 44% of city residents believe it would be better if the incumbent mayor remains in office. This view is held primarily by supporters of the Republican Christian Party, which officially nominated Andriy Sadovyi, as well as by voters of Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Our Ukraine, Svoboda and PORA. At the same time, 29% believe it would be better if the city is led by a new person, most notably supporters of the People’s Movement of Ukraine, the Party of Regions and Ukraine United. For 16% it makes no difference who becomes mayor after the election, and 11% are undecided. Fifty-seven percent of respondents say they will definitely participate in the local elections on 31 October, while another 16% assess the likelihood of their participation as high.
• The most mobilized groups in the Lviv mayoral election are voters of Stepan Kubiv and Andriy Sadovyi, while the least mobilized are voters of Oleh Lutsiv. As of early October, Andriy Sadovyi is the clear leader in electoral preferences in the mayoral race, with 46.9% among those who intend to vote. Petro Pisarchuk is supported by 11.2%, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn by 5.7%, Stepan Kubiv by 3.6%, Oleh Lutsiv by 3.3% and Vitalii Hirniak by 3.0%. Other candidates together are supported by 4.5%, 4.0% would not support any candidate, and 15.8% remain undecided.
• The high share of undecided respondents is explained by several factors. First, at least half of voters who previously supported Vasyl Kuibida have still not decided whom they will vote for, including many supporters of the People’s Movement of Ukraine. Second, a large number of candidates have registered for the election, and voters have limited awareness of many of them and do not yet perceive them as key actors in the electoral process. Third, some supporters of Petro Pisarchuk have begun to doubt their choice: whereas previously Pisarchuk effectively boosted the Party of Regions’ position in the city, the current context of growing disappointment with the central authorities is producing the opposite effect, with the Party of Regions now pulling Pisarchuk’s rating down.
• In the city council election, the most mobilized voters are supporters of the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Strong Ukraine and Svoboda, while the least mobilized are voters of PORA. Three weeks before the election, Svoboda leads voting intentions for the Lviv City Council at 22.2% among those who plan to vote, followed by Batkivshchyna at 13.8%. Next come Front for Change at 7.1%, Our Ukraine at 6.4%, the Party of Regions at 6.2%, the Republican Christian Party at 5.9% and PORA at 5.5%, with both parties’ results largely explained by their association with Andriy Sadovyi. Three parties are close to passing the 3% threshold: Strong Ukraine at 2.9%, the People’s Movement of Ukraine at 2.2% and Ukraine United at 2.2%. While the People’s Movement and Ukraine United have gained support during the campaign, Strong Ukraine has been losing voters, with its support over the past six months halving primarily in favor of the Party of Regions and, to a lesser extent, PORA. Over the past six months, Batkivshchyna and Our Ukraine have also slightly declined compared to Svoboda and Front for Change, which is linked to the activation of smaller political forces. Other parties together account for 6.4%, 2.8% support no party, and 14.6% are undecided.
• Only 28% of respondents say they are aware of the conflict surrounding the registration of Batkivshchyna for the local elections in Lviv region, and only about half of them are potential voters of the party. At the same time, 59% say they know nothing about the situation. Respondents were asked to imagine that shortly before the city council election Yulia Tymoshenko appeals to voters not to support Batkivshchyna in Lviv on the grounds that the candidate lists are not legitimate and were formed by the previous party leadership, allegedly cooperating with the Party of Regions, and they were then asked to reconsider their city council choice under these assumptions. As a result, Batkivshchyna’s support would decrease from 13.8% to 4.7%, while Svoboda would rise to 24.7%, Front for Change to 7.4%, Our Ukraine would remain at 6.4%, the Republican Christian Party would rise to 6.2%, the Party of Regions would remain at 6.2%, PORA would rise to 5.9%, Strong Ukraine would remain at 2.9%, the People’s Movement would rise to 2.8% and Ukraine United to 2.4%. Other parties would receive 10.8%, 3.3% would support no party, and 16.4% would remain undecided.
• This scenario suggests that a boycott would primarily harm Batkivshchyna itself, while most other parties, except the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine, would increase their support more or less proportionally, with Svoboda benefiting most. It could also affect the composition of the future city council by increasing the chances of Ukraine United and, in particular, the People’s Movement of Ukraine to pass the 3% threshold.
• As an experimental component, Rating Group asked respondents to assess both awareness and trust toward the leaders heading party lists in the Lviv City Council election, using 13 names for analysis. In general, voters have limited knowledge of the individuals included in party lists, as the first-ranked candidates are known to no more than half of Lviv voters. However, supporters of the parties that nominated these candidates tend to know them better, with awareness ranging from 40% to 90%. Among their own electorates, the best known are Vitalii Hirniak, Taras Diakiv, Ihor Rudnytskyi, Volodymyr Veremchuk and Petro Tkachuk, while the least known are Yaroslav Hinka, Mykhailo Khmil and Oleksandr Blashchuk. The highest levels of trust among their own electorates are recorded for Ihor Rudnytskyi, Taras Diakiv, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn, Petro Tkachuk and Andrii Dziuban, while Petro Adamyk has the lowest level of trust.
• When asked whether they choose a party mainly by its name or by who is included in the top five candidates on its list, 40% said they decide primarily based on the people heading the list and 32% based on the party name. Voting mainly by party name is more typical for supporters of the Party of Regions, Svoboda, Front for Change, Strong Ukraine, PORA, Our Ukraine and Batkivshchyna, while voting mainly based on the first five candidates is more typical for supporters of the Republican Christian Party, Ukraine United and the People’s Movement of Ukraine.
• If parliamentary elections were held the following week, 20.1% of Lviv residents would vote for Svoboda, 18.2% for Batkivshchyna, 7.8% for Our Ukraine, 7.8% for Front for Change, 6.0% for the Party of Regions and 4.3% for Strong Ukraine. In addition, 3.6% would support PORA, 3.2% For Ukraine! led by Viacheslav Kyrylenko and 1.6% UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko. Other parties together would receive 9.6%, 3.6% would support none, and 13.6% would be undecided. These results indicate that Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Our Ukraine and Strong Ukraine would perform better in parliamentary elections than in local elections, whereas Svoboda would perform relatively better at the local level.
• If a presidential election were held the following week, 20.7% of Lviv residents would vote for Yulia Tymoshenko, 14.9% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 14.4% for Oleh Tyahnybok, 7.9% for Viktor Yushchenko, 6.6% for Serhiy Tihipko, 6.3% for Viktor Yanukovych and 3.5% for Anatolii Hrytsenko. Other candidates together would receive 11.9%, 3.6% would support none, and 10% would be undecided. Based on previous research experience, voters disappointed in politicians used to choose the “against all” option, but after the presidential election they more often choose the “other” category even when they cannot name an alternative.

• Only one quarter of residents of Ivano-Frankivsk believe that the overall situation in the city is improving. Most of them are voters of Viktor Anushkevychus and, at the party level, primarily supporters of Batkivshchyna and Strong Ukraine. A further 43% say the situation in the city is not changing, most of them being voters of the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine, while 28% believe the situation is worsening, mainly supporters of Front for Change and the Third Force, whose list is headed by Yurii Solovei.
• Almost one third of city residents are satisfied with the performance of the Mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk, Viktor Anushkevychus, although only 9% say they are fully satisfied, while 52% are dissatisfied. According to respondents, the most effective actions of the local authorities concern garbage collection and waste removal, with an effectiveness index of +39, as well as water supply and sewage services at +36. Actions are also seen as relatively effective in the areas of culture and spirituality, public transport and urban landscaping, while they are viewed as weak in heating, the construction of children’s and sports playgrounds and education. The most ineffective areas are healthcare, the fight against corruption, job creation and the maintenance of roads and sidewalks, with negative indices, and poor road conditions have become the main symbol of dissatisfaction with the incumbent mayor.
• Three weeks before the election, only 17% of residents believe it would be better for the city if the incumbent mayor remains in office, while 64% think it would be better if the city is led by a new person, mainly supporters of the Third Force, Svoboda and Front for Change. Eleven percent say it makes no difference to them who becomes mayor and 8% are undecided. Fifty-nine percent of respondents say they will definitely participate in the local elections on 31 October, while another 14% rate their likelihood of participation as high.
• At the beginning of October, the leaders in electoral preferences in the mayoral race are Yurii Solovei with 35% among those who intend to vote and Viktor Anushkevychus with 21%. Other candidates are far behind, with Ruslan Marcinkiv supported by 6%, Volodymyr Balagura by 4%, Volodymyr Boichuk, Bohdan Fedkiv, Ihor Prokopiv and Vasyl Kozachok by 2% each, Petro Andrusiak by 1%, and other candidates together by about 10%, while 3% support no candidate and 12% are undecided. If Ihor Nasalyk and Zinovii Shkutiak had entered the race, the top five would be Solovei with 32%, Anushkevychus with 19%, Shkutiak with 10%, Marcinkiv with 6% and Nasalyk with 5%, reflecting the fact that many of their supporters were undecided at the time of the survey and tended to lean more toward Solovei than Anushkevychus.
• The key criteria for choosing a mayoral candidate are managerial experience at 43%, the ability to solve household-level problems at 36%, political experience at 34% and an untarnished reputation at 31%, with the importance of managerial experience being lower in Ivano-Frankivsk than in nationwide surveys, reflecting the fact that the frontrunner in the race is a young politician.
• In elections to the city council, the most mobilized voters are those of Strong Ukraine, Svoboda and Batkivshchyna. Three weeks before the vote, Svoboda leads with 25% among likely voters, followed by Batkivshchyna with 16% and the new party Third Force, led by Yurii Solovei, with 9%. Our Ukraine has 7%, the Party of Regions and Front for Change each have 6%, and Strong Ukraine has 5%, while no other party exceeds 2%. About 4% support no party and 12% are undecided.
• If parliamentary elections were held the following week, 23% of residents of Ivano-Frankivsk would vote for Svoboda, 16% for Batkivshchyna, 9% for Our Ukraine, 7% for the Party of Regions, and 6% each for Front for Change and Strong Ukraine. In a presidential election, 27% would support Yulia Tymoshenko, 16% Oleh Tyahnybok, 11% Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 9% Serhiy Tihipko, 7% Viktor Yanukovych, and 6% each Viktor Yushchenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko. Notably, the personal ratings of Tymoshenko, Tihipko, Yatsenyuk and Hrytsenko are significantly higher than their party ratings, while in the case of Svoboda and Our Ukraine the party performs better than its leader.
• The highest levels of trust among national politicians are recorded for Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleh Tyahnybok and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, while Viktor Yanukovych and Mykola Azarov are trusted the least. Among local politicians, Yurii Solovei enjoys the highest trust at 54% and is the only local figure with a positive trust index, followed by Viktor Anushkevychus, Zinovii Shkutiak and Mykhailo Vyshyvaniuk.

• Half of respondents in Lviv Oblast say they are absolutely certain they will participate in the 2010 local elections, while a further 17% assess the likelihood of their participation as high. Almost 40% of respondents expect positive changes in the development of Lviv Oblast as a result of the local elections, 48% do not share such expectations, and 12% are undecided. The most optimistic expectations are observed among voters of the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna, while the least optimistic are voters of Front for Change and Strong Ukraine. Expectations of positive change directly affect electoral participation, as among those who firmly expect positive changes, 72% are certain they will take part in the elections.
• Forty-two percent of respondents expect a significant renewal of the regional council as a result of the local elections in Lviv Oblast, while about half do not expect such renewal and the remainder are undecided. Twenty-two percent believe that deputies will become more open to voters after the elections, while 71% do not expect this. In both cases, voters of the Party of Regions are the most optimistic. At the same time, 42% of respondents expect large-scale electoral fraud that would influence the results, while another quarter expect minor irregularities that would not affect the outcome. Only 14% do not expect fraud, and about one in five are undecided. The highest expectations of fraud are recorded among voters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and Front for Change. Among those who expect significant fraud, more than half believe it would be in favor of the Party of Regions, while one third believe all political forces would engage in fraud.
• Seventy-five percent of residents of the oblast have a negative attitude toward the possibility that Batkivshchyna could be barred by the authorities from participating in elections to the Lviv Oblast Council. Negative assessments of such a decision strongly outweigh positive ones among voters of all political forces except the Party of Regions, more than one third of whose supporters would approve such a move.
• In the presidential rating in Lviv Oblast, Yulia Tymoshenko remains the leader, with her support virtually unchanged since June at 24.7% among all respondents. The ratings of Oleh Tyahnybok at 12.2%, Arseniy Yatsenyuk at 11.6%, Viktor Yushchenko at 6.3%, Serhiy Tihipko at 6.2%, Viktor Yanukovych at 4.4% and Anatolii Hrytsenko at 3.7% also remain within the margin of error. Other candidates are supported by 8% of respondents, 8.7% support no candidate, and 14.5% either would not vote or are undecided.
• The same trends are observed in parliamentary voting intentions in the oblast, where Batkivshchyna leads with 22.4%, followed by Svoboda at 14.9%, Front for Change at 8.3%, Our Ukraine at 5.9%, Strong Ukraine at 4.8%, the Party of Regions at 4.0%, PORA at 2.7%, Civic Position at 1.8%, UDAR at 1.5% and For Ukraine! at 1.5%. Other parties together receive 3.6%, 7.4% would not support any party, and 21.2% would not vote or are undecided.
• In elections to the Lviv Oblast Council, Batkivshchyna remains in first place with 21.4% and Svoboda follows with 18.6%, with Batkivshchyna performing slightly worse and Svoboda significantly better compared to parliamentary elections. They are followed by Front for Change at 7.7%, Our Ukraine at 5.6%, Strong Ukraine at 4.5%, the Party of Regions at 3.9%, PORA at 3.0%, Civic Position at 2.0%, UDAR at 1.3% and For Ukraine! at 1.3%. Other parties receive 4.5%, 6.8% support none, and 18.6% would not vote or are undecided.
• The highest levels of trust in the oblast are recorded for Oleh Tyahnybok at 47% and Yulia Tymoshenko at 46%, followed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk at 40%, Serhiy Tihipko at 29%, Anatolii Hrytsenko and Viktor Yushchenko at 27% each, and Viacheslav Kyrylenko at 26%. Yurii Kostenko is trusted by 16%, while representatives of the incumbent government close the ranking, including Mykola Azarov at 10%, Viktor Yanukovych at 9% and Volodymyr Lytvyn at 8%. Since June, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Trust Index has improved by 6 points and Viktor Yushchenko’s by 3 points, while the Trust Indices of most other politicians have declined.
• Twenty-one percent of residents are satisfied with the performance of the Chair of the Regional Council, 40% are dissatisfied and 37% are undecided. The performance of the Head of the Regional State Administration is approved by 18%, disapproved by 41% and 40% are undecided. Since June, both positive and negative assessments of a possible dismissal of the Head of the Regional State Administration have increased as the share of those unable to assess the issue has declined.
• In September, residents remain most concerned about unemployment, which increased from 34% to 50%, corruption, which rose from 44% to 48%, rising prices, which grew from 25% to 35%, and utility tariffs, which increased from 18% to 24%.
• Ninety-four percent of respondents have a negative attitude toward the government’s decision to raise gas tariffs for households at the request of the International Monetary Fund, with two thirds believing the agreement with the IMF was reached under the Azarov government. Ninety percent also negatively assess the decision to gradually raise the retirement age for women from 55 to 60, with 76% saying the agreement was reached under the Azarov government. Only 12% support repealing the constitutional amendments adopted in 2004, while about two thirds oppose this, 13% are indifferent and 10% are undecided.

• Forty-one percent of citizens surveyed in September feel that freedom of speech in Ukraine has been curtailed since the presidential election. Compared to a similar survey conducted in April this year, this share has more than doubled, rising from 18% to 41%. Thirty-five percent of respondents do not feel any restriction of freedom of speech, which is almost half the April level of 66%, while the proportion of those who are undecided increased from 16% to 24%.
• The perception of a decline in freedom of speech has increased in all regions without exception. The sharpest growth was recorded in Central Ukraine, from 18% to 42%, in the North, from 23% to 55%, and in the West, from 38% to 59%, while the lowest levels remain in Donbas, from 6% to 15%, and in the South, from 10% to 29%. Donbas also saw the largest increase in the share of respondents who were unable to determine whether freedom of speech is being curtailed, rising from 19% to 37%.
• The greatest concern about restrictions on freedom of speech is observed among supporters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, while it is lowest among voters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions. Supporters of Strong Ukraine are divided, with 45% saying they feel a curtailment of freedom of speech and 48% saying they do not.
• A positive balance of responses, where the share of “yes” answers exceeds that of “no,” is recorded across all demographic groups by age, education, type of settlement and gender. The strongest perception of a decline in freedom of speech is found among respondents aged 30–39 and among those with higher levels of education.

• Forty-five percent of respondents surveyed in September support granting the Russian language the status of a state language in Ukraine, while 47% oppose this and 8% remain undecided. In April 2010, parity was recorded between those in favor and against at 46% versus 46%, whereas on the eve of the presidential election in October 2009 and immediately after the election in March 2010 surveys showed a balance in favor of support at 52% versus 41% and 54% versus 40% respectively, with the share of undecided respondents remaining almost unchanged.
• These changes are primarily driven by a sharpening of the issue in Western Ukraine and a softening of attitudes in the rest of the country except Donbas. Voters, including part of the Party of Regions electorate, have reoriented toward other issues, mainly of a socio-economic nature, which has reduced the salience of the language issue that traditionally serves as a campaign tool. Other ideological markers have also softened, although the start of the active phase of the local election campaign may once again shift the situation.
• For example, while 67% supported the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus and 24% opposed it in October 2009, in April and September 2010 parity was recorded at 44% versus 44% and 45% versus 45% respectively. Alongside these trends, a change in the rhetoric of the former opposition, now in power, has also played a role. Whereas in October 2009 accession to the European Union was supported by 51% and opposed by 33%, in April the balance shifted to 52% versus 29%, and in September it reached 57% versus 28%.
• Attitudes toward NATO have also slightly improved. In October 2009, 69% opposed Ukraine’s accession to NATO and only 22% supported it, whereas by September the balance had shifted to 63% against and 26% in favor. None of the Communist Party’s voters support NATO membership, and only 7% of Party of Regions voters do, while the main changes occurred among voters of opposition political forces. Since March 2010 both the number of supporters of extending the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine and the number of opponents have increased, from 41% to 46% and from 38% to 41% respectively, with support rising primarily in the South and declining in the West.
• Support for repealing President Yushchenko’s decree granting Stepan Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine remains at 53%, while opposition to this decision increased from 28% to 31%, further indicating a sharpening of ideological markers in Western Ukraine. Among countries perceived as posing a threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 19% of respondents named Russia, 10% the United States, 4% China, 2% Romania and 1% Poland, while 45% believe no such threat exists and 19% were undecided. Concern about a potential threat from Russia is highest in the West at 46%, particularly among voters of Svoboda, Front for Change and Batkivshchyna, whereas 17% of residents of the Center, 14% of the South and 11% of Donbas expect such a threat from the United States, mainly among voters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine. At the same time, nearly 60% of respondents in Donbas, the South and the East believe that no threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity exists.
• Forty-three percent of respondents stated they would be ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms if a threat emerged, 38% would not be ready, and 19% were unable to answer. This willingness was expressed by 55% of men and 34% of women, mainly among middle-aged and higher-educated respondents, particularly voters of Svoboda and Strong Ukraine and residents of the Center and Donbas, although Donbas is also the region where expectations of an external threat are lowest. The highest share of respondents unable to answer whether they would defend the country with arms was recorded in the West and the East.

General expectations

• 42% of surveyed Ukrainians definitely intend to take part in the local elections on October 31, 2010.
  Another 36% are rather inclined to participate in the elections than not.
  7% of respondents rather do not intend to take part in voting, and 9% definitely do not plan to do so.
  Another 6% are undecided.
• The highest turnout is expected in Donbas and in Western Ukraine.
  The lowest — in Eastern Ukraine.
  Accordingly, the most mobilized voters at present are supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, Svoboda and Front for Change.
• Almost half of respondents expect positive changes in the development of their regions as a result of the local elections, while 42% do not expect positive changes.
  The quality of expectations directly affects the intention to vote.
  For example, among those respondents who definitely expect positive changes as a result of the local elections, 84% are certain they will take part in them.
• 41% of respondents expect that as a result of these local elections the deputy corps of local councils will be substantially renewed, although only 10% are absolutely confident of this.
  42% do not expect renewal of the deputy corps.
  17% are undecided.
• Only 29% of respondents expect that as a result of these local elections local deputies will become more accountable to voters.
  At the same time, twice as many — 56% — do not have such expectations.
• Summing up, it should be emphasized that supporters of the Party of Regions have the best expectations from the 2010 local elections in each of the above positions, while voters of Batkivshchyna, on the contrary, have some of the worst expectations.
  Supporters of Svoboda also have high expectations — about half of them expect renewal of local councils, while voters of Strong Ukraine, on the contrary, believe in this the least.
• In regional terms, the worst expectations from the elections are among residents of Eastern Ukraine, and the best — among residents of Donbas.

Attitudes toward innovations in the law on local elections

• More than half of respondents support holding local elections under a mixed system (only 20% do not support it).
• At the same time, other legislative innovations are supported much less.
  For example, only 26% support the legal provision under which electoral blocs, various local civic organizations and initiatives are not allowed to participate in elections (47% do not support this norm).
  Only 26% of respondents support the legislative requirement that a candidate for mayor must be nominated exclusively by a political party (53% do not support it).
• It is noteworthy that respondents’ answers hardly differ depending on regions and electoral sympathies.
• Problems of the regions
• Among the key problems that, in respondents’ opinion, must be solved in the regions, the following should be highlighted:
  unemployment (60%), high коммунal utility tariffs (53%), and corruption in local authorities (38%).
• People are also concerned about the poor state of health care (30%), poor road conditions (29%), alcoholism and drug addiction (26%), the closed and inaccessible nature of the authorities for ordinary people (20%), lack of affordable housing (20%), environmental problems (18%), crime (14%), and inefficient land use (13%).
  Within the housing and utilities sector, poor water supply worries people twice as much as heating.
• In regional terms, unemployment is most acute in the West, Center and South, high utility tariffs — in Donbas and the East, while the poor state of health care is one of the most painful problems for Donbas, as well as bad ecology.
  Corruption concerns residents of the West and East the most.
• The lack of decent roads worries residents of Donbas, the Center and the West the most.
  Alcoholism and drug addiction primarily concern residents of the Center and South, and crime — the East and Donbas.

Criteria for choosing candidates

• The criteria for choosing candidates complement the overall picture of expectations from these local elections.
• Thus, the majority of respondents (59%) will look for a candidate with managerial and хозяйственный experience when choosing a mayor or village head.
  For 37% it is important that the candidate is able to solve their concrete social problems — this criterion is three times more important than the candidate’s ability to solve problems of the respondent’s building.
  For 35% an unblemished reputation is important,
  for 32% — openness and accessibility of the candidate to ordinary people,
  for 28% — the candidate’s political experience.
  Party affiliation is an important criterion for only 9% of respondents, and the content of the candidate’s election program — only for 16%.
• Managerial experience is most important in the West and North, the ability to solve concrete social problems — in Donbas as well as in the East and South, and an unblemished reputation — in the Center.

Expectations of election fraud

• Almost 60% of Ukrainians expect fraud in the local elections on October 31, 2010, including 31% who expect significant fraud that will affect election results, and 28% who expect minor fraud.
• Residents of Northern and Western Ukraine are most concerned about possible fraud.
  Accordingly, these are voters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna and Front for Change.
  The fewest expect fraud in Donbas — accordingly, voters of the Party of Regions.
• Among respondents who expect significant fraud, almost half think it will be in favor of the Party of Regions, 9% — in favor of Batkivshchyna.
  At the same time, 27% believe that all political forces will resort to fraud.
• Among those who expect minor fraud, fewer point to the Party of Regions — 30%, while more point to Batkivshchyna — 17%.
  A quarter of respondents in this group think all political forces will engage in fraud.
• More than half of respondents in Western, Central and Northern Ukraine who also believe that there will be fraud point to the Party of Regions, and almost every tenth — to Batkivshchyna.
• About 80% of voters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna think so, 63% of Front for Change, half of Strong Ukraine, and one third of the Communist Party.
• It is interesting that about half of Party of Regions voters also believe that there will be fraud in these local elections, including 13% who expect significant fraud.
  These respondents do not blame any specific party — two thirds of them say all political forces will engage in fraud.

General expectations regarding election results

• The above-mentioned sentiments clearly influence answers to the next question.
  Thus, 54% of respondents think that as a result of the 2010 local elections the President will strengthen his position more, and only 16% think it will be the opposition.
  Another 31% could not decide.
• At the same time, only 32% believe it will be better for the country if the President strengthens his position as a result of the 2010 local elections, and 31% believe it will be better if the opposition strengthens its position.
  37% of respondents could not answer this question.
• Residents of the South are most in favor of strengthening the President’s position.
  Somewhat less so in Donbas and the East — here almost half of respondents could not decide what would be better for the country.
• Strengthening of the opposition is most supported in Western, Northern and Central Ukraine.
• The overwhelming majority of Party of Regions voters (over 70%) believe that it is the President who will strengthen his position and that this will indeed be better for the country.
  Among Batkivshchyna voters only 40% are confident in an opposition victory.
  The rest of the opposition parties feel even less confident.
• Voters of Strong Ukraine are in an interesting position: one third believe it would be better for the country if the President strengthens his position as a result of the local elections, while a quarter, on the contrary, favor strengthening the opposition.
  This contradiction is easily explained by regional specifics — in the East and South, Strong Ukraine voters see the party more as part of the authorities, while in the West — as part of the opposition.

• Seventeen percent of Ukrainians surveyed in September consider a presidential system of government to be the optimal model for Ukraine, one third support a presidential–parliamentary system, one quarter favor a parliamentary–presidential model, 5% support a parliamentary system, 4% a dictatorship, while 18% were unable to decide on this issue. Compared to the survey conducted in April 2010, support for a presidential system declined by one and a half times, from 26% to 17%, while support for a parliamentary–presidential system increased from 16% to 23%. The growth in support for stronger presidential authority is observed only in Donbas, whereas in all other regions support for either a parliamentary–presidential or a parliamentary model has increased.
• The strongest supporters of strengthening presidential power are voters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine, while the strongest opponents are voters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change. Respondents were also asked to indicate what they consider to be the optimal way of appointing the Prime Minister. According to 18% of respondents, the President should appoint the Head of Government directly without parliamentary approval. Almost one third support the current procedure, under which the parliamentary majority proposes a candidate to the President, after which the President submits the nominee to parliament for a final vote. Eight percent believe the parliament should appoint the Prime Minister directly without presidential approval, while 29% would prefer to elect the Prime Minister in nationwide elections. Fourteen percent were unable to decide.
• If elections for Prime Minister were held in the near future and Viktor Yanukovych did not run because he is President and Yulia Tymoshenko did not run because she is the opposition leader, 20.6% would support Serhiy Tihipko, 17.2% Mykola Azarov and 12.5% Arseniy Yatsenyuk. A further 2.8% would vote for Rinat Akhmetov, 1.9% for Viktor Yushchenko, 0.8% for Yurii Yekhanurov, 0.7% for Borys Kolesnikov, 0.4% for Yurii Boiko and 0.3% for Andrii Kliuyev. Eight percent would support another candidate, 18% would not support any candidate or would not vote, and 16.8% were undecided.
• Compared to March 2010, support for Serhiy Tihipko almost halved from 39.4% to 20.6%, while support for Arseniy Yatsenyuk declined from 14.9% to 12.5%. At the same time, support for Mykola Azarov increased from 15.6% to 17.2%, while support for other candidates remained largely unchanged. Tihipko has the strongest support in the North, Center and East, while Azarov is most popular in the South and Donbas.
• Thirty-one percent of respondents support abolishing the constitutional amendments adopted in 2004, which were in force for the past five years, even though this would significantly increase the President’s powers, while 50% oppose this idea. For 9% it makes no difference what happens to the Constitution, and one in five respondents were unable to decide. Positive assessments of abolishing the 2004 political reform outweigh negative ones only in Donbas and only among Party of Regions supporters, but this does not mean the issue is purely electoral. One quarter of residents of Western and Central Ukraine also support abolishing the 2004 reform, as do 15% of Batkivshchyna voters and about one quarter of voters of Svoboda and Front for Change. At the same time, 20% of Party of Regions supporters and more than 40% of Communist Party and Strong Ukraine voters oppose abolishing the 2004 reform.
• A more detailed analysis of the results confirms that a significant share of Ukrainian citizens currently have a poor understanding of constitutional models and the political reform. One quarter of supporters of a presidential system believe that appointing the Prime Minister through parliament is optimal, even though this is not part of that model. More than one quarter of supporters of a presidential system also oppose abolishing the 2004 reform, even though such a step would in fact lead to a presidential system. Conversely, almost one in ten supporters of parliamentary–presidential and parliamentary models support abolishing the 2004 reform. These inconsistencies in respondents’ answers indicate low awareness of the issue and an inability to make a clear choice. At the same time, subjective factors play a significant role in shaping views, as respondents may support a presidential system but not trust the current President, or support a parliamentary system while having little confidence in parliament itself.
• All of these factors confirm that changing the constitutional model is a highly sensitive and controversial issue for Ukraine and requires extensive public information efforts. Moreover, putting this issue on the agenda could generate social instability. One third of respondents believe that changing the President’s powers should require early presidential elections, 45% oppose this, and 22% are undecided. Nearly 60% of respondents have a negative attitude toward extending the term of the current Verkhovna Rada until 2015, while only 19% support this idea and 22% are undecided. The largest share of supporters of postponing parliamentary elections is found in the South and Donbas, although even there negative assessments exceed positive ones. It is also notable that voters of the Party of Regions show the highest level of uncertainty both regarding the need for early presidential elections in case of changes to presidential powers and regarding extending the term of the current parliament, indicating ambivalence toward these initiatives.

• As of September, Viktor Yanukovych continues to hold the leading position in the presidential рейтинґ, however compared to a similar survey conducted in June, his support among all respondents declined by one and a half times, falling from 38.2% to 26%. Yulia Tymoshenko ranks second, and since June her rating has increased by about a quarter, from 13.2% to 16.8%. It would be incorrect to claim that the incumbent President has begun to lose support dramatically; rather, the observed trends indicate the end of the so-called “honeymoon period” of the authorities, when ratings were driven primarily by inflated public expectations. Likewise, it would be inaccurate to speak of a fundamental surge in support for Yulia Tymoshenko, as the current dynamics reflect mainly the return of her own voters who had previously become disillusioned after her defeat in the presidential election.
• These developments are also reflected in regional dynamics. Tymoshenko has begun to restore her positions in her core regions — the West, Center and North — although her support there still remains below the level recorded in the first round of the presidential election. In these same regions Yanukovych has started to lose ground, while significantly greater risks for him are concentrated in his traditional strongholds — the East, South and Donbas — where the share of disappointed voters is growing and a gradual reorientation toward left-wing politicians and political forces is taking place.
• As a result, both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are gradually returning to the balance of support observed in the middle of the previous year, with a gap of about 10 percentage points, which was ultimately recorded in the first round of the presidential election. The situation is repeating itself, though with one difference: last year the third position was held by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (until December), whereas today it is occupied by Serhiy Tihipko. Tihipko’s rating overall has not shown sharp fluctuations, while at the same time demonstrating a slight downward trend, declining from 13.6% in March and 13.4% in April to 11.8% in June and 11.1% in September.
• Further down the presidential rating are Arseniy Yatsenyuk with 4.2%, Petro Symonenko with 3.1%, Oleh Tyahnybok with 1.8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko with 1.7%, Viktor Yushchenko with 1.5% and Volodymyr Lytvyn with 1.3%. Another candidate would be supported by 1.5% of respondents, 10.9% would not support any candidate, 10.9% remain undecided, and 9.3% would not take part in the election.
• At the party level, the situation largely mirrors the same trends. The Party of Regions remains the leader of public sympathies, although over the past several months its rating among all respondents has declined from 35.2% in June to 24.4% in September. Batkivshchyna ranks second, with its support rising from 12.4% in June, when it was measured as the BYuT bloc, to 15.5% in September, when it was measured as Batkivshchyna. Third place is held by Strong Ukraine led by Serhiy Tihipko, whose party rating follows the same gradual downward trend as his personal support, decreasing from 12.7% in March and 10.7% in April to 9.2% in June and 8.8% in September.
• The ratings of Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s Front for Change have largely stabilized at 3.5%, while compared to June the support for two ideologically opposite forces has grown, namely the Communist Party of Ukraine, from 2.5% to 3.8%, and Svoboda, from 1.7% to 3.0%. The former are attempting to offer an alternative for voters disappointed with the authorities on the left flank while still remaining part of the governing system, whereas the latter seek to attract those disappointed with the opposition on the right flank. The growth in their ratings indicates the effectiveness of this strategy. It is these six political forces — the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Strong Ukraine, Front for Change, the Communist Party and Svoboda — that would enter parliament if elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday.
• Further down the party ranking are Our Ukraine with 1.4%, Volodymyr Lytvyn’s People’s Party with 1.0%, Anatolii Hrytsenko’s Civic Position with 0.9%, Vitalii Klitschko’s UDAR with 0.9%, the Socialist Party with 0.5%, Nataliia Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialist Party with 0.4% and For Ukraine! led by Viacheslav Kyrylenko with 0.4%. Other parties together would receive 1.1%, 11.5% of respondents would not support any party, 13.3% are undecided, and 9.7% would not participate in the elections.

• The leaders of preferences in the presidential rating are Viktor Yanukovych (20% among all respondents), Yuliya Tymoshenko (18%) and Serhiy Tihipko (12%).
  They are followed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (5%), while Petro Symonenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Oleh Tyahnybok each have about 2%. Support for Viktor Yushchenko is below 1%.
  At the same time, almost every sixth resident of Vinnytsia does not intend to support any candidate, and every tenth is undecided.
• The situation at the party level (elections to the Verkhovna Rada) practically reproduces this configuration, with the difference that the Party of Regions (20%), Batkivshchyna (17%) and Front for Change (5%) have support at the level of their leaders’ ratings, Strong Ukraine (7%) has lower support, while Svoboda (3%) and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (3%) have higher support.
• In the local elections, the situation is somewhat different.
  It should be noted immediately that the survey was conducted under the version of the local election law in force at that time, and some parties were excluded from the ballot for the city council elections.
  The electorate of the Party of Regions is mobilized worse in local elections than in parliamentary ones, while Batkivshchyna supporters are, on the contrary, more mobilized. Accordingly, among respondents who intend to participate in the local elections, Batkivshchyna becomes the leader, while the Socialist Party, Svoboda and Our Ukraine also gain support.
• Thus, in the elections to the Vinnytsia City Council the leaders are Batkivshchyna (24%) and the Party of Regions (22%).
  They are followed by the Socialist Party (5%), Svoboda (5%), Our Ukraine (3%) and the Communist Party (3%).
  10% do not support any party, 20% are undecided — among them, in particular, most supporters of Strong Ukraine and Front for Change. These parties were not included on the ballot, while their parliamentary-election ratings are 7% and 5% respectively.
• In total, 41% of city residents said they will definitely participate in the local elections on October 31, and 29% rated the likelihood of their participation as high.
• The actions of the local authorities are generally recognized by respondents as effective in the following areas:
  public transport services (efficiency index — the difference between positive and negative evaluations — is +64),
  waste collection and removal (+58),
  maintenance of roads and sidewalks (+52),
  urban improvement and landscaping (+51%).
• Relatively effective:
  water supply and sewerage (+30),
  development of culture and spirituality (+12),
  heating supply (+9),
  construction of children’s and sports playgrounds (+3).
• Low effectiveness:
  education (–11) and assistance to low-income groups (–36).
• Ineffective:
  medical services for city residents (–49),
  fight against corruption (–63),
  creation of new jobs (–65),
  tariff policy in the housing and utilities sector (–71).

• Declared voter activity of Ivano-Frankivsk residents in the local elections is 58%, in addition another 21% rated the probability of their participation in voting on October 31 as high.
• The leaders of preferences in the elections to the City Council are Svoboda (26.1% among all respondents) and Batkivshchyna (19.2%).
• Next come Our Ukraine (8.9%), the Party of Regions (5.4%), Strong Ukraine (3.4%), the People’s Movement (Rukh) (2.9%), People’s Self-Defense (2.9%), the Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP) (2.1%), the People’s Party (1.9%), Pora (1.8%), and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) (1.8%).
• Other parties — 5.7%, support none — 4.5%, undecided — 10.8%.
• Among those who will take part in voting in the local elections, party ratings are as follows: Svoboda – 27.1%, Batkivshchyna – 21.6%, Our Ukraine – 9.2%, Party of Regions – 6.2%, Strong Ukraine – 4%, People’s Movement (Rukh) – 2.5%, People’s Self-Defense – 2.9%, UNP – 2.5%, People’s Party – 1.9%, Pora – 2.1%, KUN – 2.2%.
• Svoboda is also leading, although with a smaller margin, in the Verkhovna Rada rating — 21.6% versus 18.6% for Batkivshchyna. Front for Change is supported by 8.3%, Our Ukraine by 7.1%, the Party of Regions by 6.4%, Strong Ukraine by 3.9%, For Ukraine! by 3%. The remaining parties have support of less than 2% of voters. Against all — 4.9%, undecided on which party to vote for the Verkhovna Rada — 8.8% of respondents.
• As of the beginning of August 2010, Yuliya Tymoshenko leads the presidential rating (31.6%). Next come Arseniy Yatsenyuk (13.4%), Oleh Tyahnybok (11.1%), Serhiy Tihipko (7.9%), and Viktor Yanukovych (6%).
• Viktor Yushchenko lost the most support since the presidential elections (from 17% to 6%). Other politicians have hardly changed their positions, except Yuliya Tymoshenko, who declined (from 36% to 32%), and Oleh Tyahnybok, who gained (from 7% to 11%). The number of respondents who do not support any candidate has also increased (from 2.6% to 8%).