Press releases

• Forty-one percent of citizens surveyed in September feel that freedom of speech in Ukraine has been curtailed since the presidential election. Compared to a similar survey conducted in April this year, this share has more than doubled, rising from 18% to 41%. Thirty-five percent of respondents do not feel any restriction of freedom of speech, which is almost half the April level of 66%, while the proportion of those who are undecided increased from 16% to 24%.
• The perception of a decline in freedom of speech has increased in all regions without exception. The sharpest growth was recorded in Central Ukraine, from 18% to 42%, in the North, from 23% to 55%, and in the West, from 38% to 59%, while the lowest levels remain in Donbas, from 6% to 15%, and in the South, from 10% to 29%. Donbas also saw the largest increase in the share of respondents who were unable to determine whether freedom of speech is being curtailed, rising from 19% to 37%.
• The greatest concern about restrictions on freedom of speech is observed among supporters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna and Front for Change, while it is lowest among voters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions. Supporters of Strong Ukraine are divided, with 45% saying they feel a curtailment of freedom of speech and 48% saying they do not.
• A positive balance of responses, where the share of “yes” answers exceeds that of “no,” is recorded across all demographic groups by age, education, type of settlement and gender. The strongest perception of a decline in freedom of speech is found among respondents aged 30–39 and among those with higher levels of education.

• Forty-five percent of respondents surveyed in September support granting the Russian language the status of a state language in Ukraine, while 47% oppose this and 8% remain undecided. In April 2010, parity was recorded between those in favor and against at 46% versus 46%, whereas on the eve of the presidential election in October 2009 and immediately after the election in March 2010 surveys showed a balance in favor of support at 52% versus 41% and 54% versus 40% respectively, with the share of undecided respondents remaining almost unchanged.
• These changes are primarily driven by a sharpening of the issue in Western Ukraine and a softening of attitudes in the rest of the country except Donbas. Voters, including part of the Party of Regions electorate, have reoriented toward other issues, mainly of a socio-economic nature, which has reduced the salience of the language issue that traditionally serves as a campaign tool. Other ideological markers have also softened, although the start of the active phase of the local election campaign may once again shift the situation.
• For example, while 67% supported the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus and 24% opposed it in October 2009, in April and September 2010 parity was recorded at 44% versus 44% and 45% versus 45% respectively. Alongside these trends, a change in the rhetoric of the former opposition, now in power, has also played a role. Whereas in October 2009 accession to the European Union was supported by 51% and opposed by 33%, in April the balance shifted to 52% versus 29%, and in September it reached 57% versus 28%.
• Attitudes toward NATO have also slightly improved. In October 2009, 69% opposed Ukraine’s accession to NATO and only 22% supported it, whereas by September the balance had shifted to 63% against and 26% in favor. None of the Communist Party’s voters support NATO membership, and only 7% of Party of Regions voters do, while the main changes occurred among voters of opposition political forces. Since March 2010 both the number of supporters of extending the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine and the number of opponents have increased, from 41% to 46% and from 38% to 41% respectively, with support rising primarily in the South and declining in the West.
• Support for repealing President Yushchenko’s decree granting Stepan Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine remains at 53%, while opposition to this decision increased from 28% to 31%, further indicating a sharpening of ideological markers in Western Ukraine. Among countries perceived as posing a threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 19% of respondents named Russia, 10% the United States, 4% China, 2% Romania and 1% Poland, while 45% believe no such threat exists and 19% were undecided. Concern about a potential threat from Russia is highest in the West at 46%, particularly among voters of Svoboda, Front for Change and Batkivshchyna, whereas 17% of residents of the Center, 14% of the South and 11% of Donbas expect such a threat from the United States, mainly among voters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine. At the same time, nearly 60% of respondents in Donbas, the South and the East believe that no threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity exists.
• Forty-three percent of respondents stated they would be ready to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity with arms if a threat emerged, 38% would not be ready, and 19% were unable to answer. This willingness was expressed by 55% of men and 34% of women, mainly among middle-aged and higher-educated respondents, particularly voters of Svoboda and Strong Ukraine and residents of the Center and Donbas, although Donbas is also the region where expectations of an external threat are lowest. The highest share of respondents unable to answer whether they would defend the country with arms was recorded in the West and the East.

General expectations

• 42% of surveyed Ukrainians definitely intend to take part in the local elections on October 31, 2010.
  Another 36% are rather inclined to participate in the elections than not.
  7% of respondents rather do not intend to take part in voting, and 9% definitely do not plan to do so.
  Another 6% are undecided.
• The highest turnout is expected in Donbas and in Western Ukraine.
  The lowest — in Eastern Ukraine.
  Accordingly, the most mobilized voters at present are supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, Svoboda and Front for Change.
• Almost half of respondents expect positive changes in the development of their regions as a result of the local elections, while 42% do not expect positive changes.
  The quality of expectations directly affects the intention to vote.
  For example, among those respondents who definitely expect positive changes as a result of the local elections, 84% are certain they will take part in them.
• 41% of respondents expect that as a result of these local elections the deputy corps of local councils will be substantially renewed, although only 10% are absolutely confident of this.
  42% do not expect renewal of the deputy corps.
  17% are undecided.
• Only 29% of respondents expect that as a result of these local elections local deputies will become more accountable to voters.
  At the same time, twice as many — 56% — do not have such expectations.
• Summing up, it should be emphasized that supporters of the Party of Regions have the best expectations from the 2010 local elections in each of the above positions, while voters of Batkivshchyna, on the contrary, have some of the worst expectations.
  Supporters of Svoboda also have high expectations — about half of them expect renewal of local councils, while voters of Strong Ukraine, on the contrary, believe in this the least.
• In regional terms, the worst expectations from the elections are among residents of Eastern Ukraine, and the best — among residents of Donbas.

Attitudes toward innovations in the law on local elections

• More than half of respondents support holding local elections under a mixed system (only 20% do not support it).
• At the same time, other legislative innovations are supported much less.
  For example, only 26% support the legal provision under which electoral blocs, various local civic organizations and initiatives are not allowed to participate in elections (47% do not support this norm).
  Only 26% of respondents support the legislative requirement that a candidate for mayor must be nominated exclusively by a political party (53% do not support it).
• It is noteworthy that respondents’ answers hardly differ depending on regions and electoral sympathies.
• Problems of the regions
• Among the key problems that, in respondents’ opinion, must be solved in the regions, the following should be highlighted:
  unemployment (60%), high коммунal utility tariffs (53%), and corruption in local authorities (38%).
• People are also concerned about the poor state of health care (30%), poor road conditions (29%), alcoholism and drug addiction (26%), the closed and inaccessible nature of the authorities for ordinary people (20%), lack of affordable housing (20%), environmental problems (18%), crime (14%), and inefficient land use (13%).
  Within the housing and utilities sector, poor water supply worries people twice as much as heating.
• In regional terms, unemployment is most acute in the West, Center and South, high utility tariffs — in Donbas and the East, while the poor state of health care is one of the most painful problems for Donbas, as well as bad ecology.
  Corruption concerns residents of the West and East the most.
• The lack of decent roads worries residents of Donbas, the Center and the West the most.
  Alcoholism and drug addiction primarily concern residents of the Center and South, and crime — the East and Donbas.

Criteria for choosing candidates

• The criteria for choosing candidates complement the overall picture of expectations from these local elections.
• Thus, the majority of respondents (59%) will look for a candidate with managerial and хозяйственный experience when choosing a mayor or village head.
  For 37% it is important that the candidate is able to solve their concrete social problems — this criterion is three times more important than the candidate’s ability to solve problems of the respondent’s building.
  For 35% an unblemished reputation is important,
  for 32% — openness and accessibility of the candidate to ordinary people,
  for 28% — the candidate’s political experience.
  Party affiliation is an important criterion for only 9% of respondents, and the content of the candidate’s election program — only for 16%.
• Managerial experience is most important in the West and North, the ability to solve concrete social problems — in Donbas as well as in the East and South, and an unblemished reputation — in the Center.

Expectations of election fraud

• Almost 60% of Ukrainians expect fraud in the local elections on October 31, 2010, including 31% who expect significant fraud that will affect election results, and 28% who expect minor fraud.
• Residents of Northern and Western Ukraine are most concerned about possible fraud.
  Accordingly, these are voters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna and Front for Change.
  The fewest expect fraud in Donbas — accordingly, voters of the Party of Regions.
• Among respondents who expect significant fraud, almost half think it will be in favor of the Party of Regions, 9% — in favor of Batkivshchyna.
  At the same time, 27% believe that all political forces will resort to fraud.
• Among those who expect minor fraud, fewer point to the Party of Regions — 30%, while more point to Batkivshchyna — 17%.
  A quarter of respondents in this group think all political forces will engage in fraud.
• More than half of respondents in Western, Central and Northern Ukraine who also believe that there will be fraud point to the Party of Regions, and almost every tenth — to Batkivshchyna.
• About 80% of voters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna think so, 63% of Front for Change, half of Strong Ukraine, and one third of the Communist Party.
• It is interesting that about half of Party of Regions voters also believe that there will be fraud in these local elections, including 13% who expect significant fraud.
  These respondents do not blame any specific party — two thirds of them say all political forces will engage in fraud.

General expectations regarding election results

• The above-mentioned sentiments clearly influence answers to the next question.
  Thus, 54% of respondents think that as a result of the 2010 local elections the President will strengthen his position more, and only 16% think it will be the opposition.
  Another 31% could not decide.
• At the same time, only 32% believe it will be better for the country if the President strengthens his position as a result of the 2010 local elections, and 31% believe it will be better if the opposition strengthens its position.
  37% of respondents could not answer this question.
• Residents of the South are most in favor of strengthening the President’s position.
  Somewhat less so in Donbas and the East — here almost half of respondents could not decide what would be better for the country.
• Strengthening of the opposition is most supported in Western, Northern and Central Ukraine.
• The overwhelming majority of Party of Regions voters (over 70%) believe that it is the President who will strengthen his position and that this will indeed be better for the country.
  Among Batkivshchyna voters only 40% are confident in an opposition victory.
  The rest of the opposition parties feel even less confident.
• Voters of Strong Ukraine are in an interesting position: one third believe it would be better for the country if the President strengthens his position as a result of the local elections, while a quarter, on the contrary, favor strengthening the opposition.
  This contradiction is easily explained by regional specifics — in the East and South, Strong Ukraine voters see the party more as part of the authorities, while in the West — as part of the opposition.

• Seventeen percent of Ukrainians surveyed in September consider a presidential system of government to be the optimal model for Ukraine, one third support a presidential–parliamentary system, one quarter favor a parliamentary–presidential model, 5% support a parliamentary system, 4% a dictatorship, while 18% were unable to decide on this issue. Compared to the survey conducted in April 2010, support for a presidential system declined by one and a half times, from 26% to 17%, while support for a parliamentary–presidential system increased from 16% to 23%. The growth in support for stronger presidential authority is observed only in Donbas, whereas in all other regions support for either a parliamentary–presidential or a parliamentary model has increased.
• The strongest supporters of strengthening presidential power are voters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine, while the strongest opponents are voters of Batkivshchyna and Front for Change. Respondents were also asked to indicate what they consider to be the optimal way of appointing the Prime Minister. According to 18% of respondents, the President should appoint the Head of Government directly without parliamentary approval. Almost one third support the current procedure, under which the parliamentary majority proposes a candidate to the President, after which the President submits the nominee to parliament for a final vote. Eight percent believe the parliament should appoint the Prime Minister directly without presidential approval, while 29% would prefer to elect the Prime Minister in nationwide elections. Fourteen percent were unable to decide.
• If elections for Prime Minister were held in the near future and Viktor Yanukovych did not run because he is President and Yulia Tymoshenko did not run because she is the opposition leader, 20.6% would support Serhiy Tihipko, 17.2% Mykola Azarov and 12.5% Arseniy Yatsenyuk. A further 2.8% would vote for Rinat Akhmetov, 1.9% for Viktor Yushchenko, 0.8% for Yurii Yekhanurov, 0.7% for Borys Kolesnikov, 0.4% for Yurii Boiko and 0.3% for Andrii Kliuyev. Eight percent would support another candidate, 18% would not support any candidate or would not vote, and 16.8% were undecided.
• Compared to March 2010, support for Serhiy Tihipko almost halved from 39.4% to 20.6%, while support for Arseniy Yatsenyuk declined from 14.9% to 12.5%. At the same time, support for Mykola Azarov increased from 15.6% to 17.2%, while support for other candidates remained largely unchanged. Tihipko has the strongest support in the North, Center and East, while Azarov is most popular in the South and Donbas.
• Thirty-one percent of respondents support abolishing the constitutional amendments adopted in 2004, which were in force for the past five years, even though this would significantly increase the President’s powers, while 50% oppose this idea. For 9% it makes no difference what happens to the Constitution, and one in five respondents were unable to decide. Positive assessments of abolishing the 2004 political reform outweigh negative ones only in Donbas and only among Party of Regions supporters, but this does not mean the issue is purely electoral. One quarter of residents of Western and Central Ukraine also support abolishing the 2004 reform, as do 15% of Batkivshchyna voters and about one quarter of voters of Svoboda and Front for Change. At the same time, 20% of Party of Regions supporters and more than 40% of Communist Party and Strong Ukraine voters oppose abolishing the 2004 reform.
• A more detailed analysis of the results confirms that a significant share of Ukrainian citizens currently have a poor understanding of constitutional models and the political reform. One quarter of supporters of a presidential system believe that appointing the Prime Minister through parliament is optimal, even though this is not part of that model. More than one quarter of supporters of a presidential system also oppose abolishing the 2004 reform, even though such a step would in fact lead to a presidential system. Conversely, almost one in ten supporters of parliamentary–presidential and parliamentary models support abolishing the 2004 reform. These inconsistencies in respondents’ answers indicate low awareness of the issue and an inability to make a clear choice. At the same time, subjective factors play a significant role in shaping views, as respondents may support a presidential system but not trust the current President, or support a parliamentary system while having little confidence in parliament itself.
• All of these factors confirm that changing the constitutional model is a highly sensitive and controversial issue for Ukraine and requires extensive public information efforts. Moreover, putting this issue on the agenda could generate social instability. One third of respondents believe that changing the President’s powers should require early presidential elections, 45% oppose this, and 22% are undecided. Nearly 60% of respondents have a negative attitude toward extending the term of the current Verkhovna Rada until 2015, while only 19% support this idea and 22% are undecided. The largest share of supporters of postponing parliamentary elections is found in the South and Donbas, although even there negative assessments exceed positive ones. It is also notable that voters of the Party of Regions show the highest level of uncertainty both regarding the need for early presidential elections in case of changes to presidential powers and regarding extending the term of the current parliament, indicating ambivalence toward these initiatives.

• As of September, Viktor Yanukovych continues to hold the leading position in the presidential рейтинґ, however compared to a similar survey conducted in June, his support among all respondents declined by one and a half times, falling from 38.2% to 26%. Yulia Tymoshenko ranks second, and since June her rating has increased by about a quarter, from 13.2% to 16.8%. It would be incorrect to claim that the incumbent President has begun to lose support dramatically; rather, the observed trends indicate the end of the so-called “honeymoon period” of the authorities, when ratings were driven primarily by inflated public expectations. Likewise, it would be inaccurate to speak of a fundamental surge in support for Yulia Tymoshenko, as the current dynamics reflect mainly the return of her own voters who had previously become disillusioned after her defeat in the presidential election.
• These developments are also reflected in regional dynamics. Tymoshenko has begun to restore her positions in her core regions — the West, Center and North — although her support there still remains below the level recorded in the first round of the presidential election. In these same regions Yanukovych has started to lose ground, while significantly greater risks for him are concentrated in his traditional strongholds — the East, South and Donbas — where the share of disappointed voters is growing and a gradual reorientation toward left-wing politicians and political forces is taking place.
• As a result, both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are gradually returning to the balance of support observed in the middle of the previous year, with a gap of about 10 percentage points, which was ultimately recorded in the first round of the presidential election. The situation is repeating itself, though with one difference: last year the third position was held by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (until December), whereas today it is occupied by Serhiy Tihipko. Tihipko’s rating overall has not shown sharp fluctuations, while at the same time demonstrating a slight downward trend, declining from 13.6% in March and 13.4% in April to 11.8% in June and 11.1% in September.
• Further down the presidential rating are Arseniy Yatsenyuk with 4.2%, Petro Symonenko with 3.1%, Oleh Tyahnybok with 1.8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko with 1.7%, Viktor Yushchenko with 1.5% and Volodymyr Lytvyn with 1.3%. Another candidate would be supported by 1.5% of respondents, 10.9% would not support any candidate, 10.9% remain undecided, and 9.3% would not take part in the election.
• At the party level, the situation largely mirrors the same trends. The Party of Regions remains the leader of public sympathies, although over the past several months its rating among all respondents has declined from 35.2% in June to 24.4% in September. Batkivshchyna ranks second, with its support rising from 12.4% in June, when it was measured as the BYuT bloc, to 15.5% in September, when it was measured as Batkivshchyna. Third place is held by Strong Ukraine led by Serhiy Tihipko, whose party rating follows the same gradual downward trend as his personal support, decreasing from 12.7% in March and 10.7% in April to 9.2% in June and 8.8% in September.
• The ratings of Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s Front for Change have largely stabilized at 3.5%, while compared to June the support for two ideologically opposite forces has grown, namely the Communist Party of Ukraine, from 2.5% to 3.8%, and Svoboda, from 1.7% to 3.0%. The former are attempting to offer an alternative for voters disappointed with the authorities on the left flank while still remaining part of the governing system, whereas the latter seek to attract those disappointed with the opposition on the right flank. The growth in their ratings indicates the effectiveness of this strategy. It is these six political forces — the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Strong Ukraine, Front for Change, the Communist Party and Svoboda — that would enter parliament if elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday.
• Further down the party ranking are Our Ukraine with 1.4%, Volodymyr Lytvyn’s People’s Party with 1.0%, Anatolii Hrytsenko’s Civic Position with 0.9%, Vitalii Klitschko’s UDAR with 0.9%, the Socialist Party with 0.5%, Nataliia Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialist Party with 0.4% and For Ukraine! led by Viacheslav Kyrylenko with 0.4%. Other parties together would receive 1.1%, 11.5% of respondents would not support any party, 13.3% are undecided, and 9.7% would not participate in the elections.

• The leaders of preferences in the presidential rating are Viktor Yanukovych (20% among all respondents), Yuliya Tymoshenko (18%) and Serhiy Tihipko (12%).
  They are followed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (5%), while Petro Symonenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Oleh Tyahnybok each have about 2%. Support for Viktor Yushchenko is below 1%.
  At the same time, almost every sixth resident of Vinnytsia does not intend to support any candidate, and every tenth is undecided.
• The situation at the party level (elections to the Verkhovna Rada) practically reproduces this configuration, with the difference that the Party of Regions (20%), Batkivshchyna (17%) and Front for Change (5%) have support at the level of their leaders’ ratings, Strong Ukraine (7%) has lower support, while Svoboda (3%) and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (3%) have higher support.
• In the local elections, the situation is somewhat different.
  It should be noted immediately that the survey was conducted under the version of the local election law in force at that time, and some parties were excluded from the ballot for the city council elections.
  The electorate of the Party of Regions is mobilized worse in local elections than in parliamentary ones, while Batkivshchyna supporters are, on the contrary, more mobilized. Accordingly, among respondents who intend to participate in the local elections, Batkivshchyna becomes the leader, while the Socialist Party, Svoboda and Our Ukraine also gain support.
• Thus, in the elections to the Vinnytsia City Council the leaders are Batkivshchyna (24%) and the Party of Regions (22%).
  They are followed by the Socialist Party (5%), Svoboda (5%), Our Ukraine (3%) and the Communist Party (3%).
  10% do not support any party, 20% are undecided — among them, in particular, most supporters of Strong Ukraine and Front for Change. These parties were not included on the ballot, while their parliamentary-election ratings are 7% and 5% respectively.
• In total, 41% of city residents said they will definitely participate in the local elections on October 31, and 29% rated the likelihood of their participation as high.
• The actions of the local authorities are generally recognized by respondents as effective in the following areas:
  public transport services (efficiency index — the difference between positive and negative evaluations — is +64),
  waste collection and removal (+58),
  maintenance of roads and sidewalks (+52),
  urban improvement and landscaping (+51%).
• Relatively effective:
  water supply and sewerage (+30),
  development of culture and spirituality (+12),
  heating supply (+9),
  construction of children’s and sports playgrounds (+3).
• Low effectiveness:
  education (–11) and assistance to low-income groups (–36).
• Ineffective:
  medical services for city residents (–49),
  fight against corruption (–63),
  creation of new jobs (–65),
  tariff policy in the housing and utilities sector (–71).

• Declared voter activity of Ivano-Frankivsk residents in the local elections is 58%, in addition another 21% rated the probability of their participation in voting on October 31 as high.
• The leaders of preferences in the elections to the City Council are Svoboda (26.1% among all respondents) and Batkivshchyna (19.2%).
• Next come Our Ukraine (8.9%), the Party of Regions (5.4%), Strong Ukraine (3.4%), the People’s Movement (Rukh) (2.9%), People’s Self-Defense (2.9%), the Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP) (2.1%), the People’s Party (1.9%), Pora (1.8%), and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) (1.8%).
• Other parties — 5.7%, support none — 4.5%, undecided — 10.8%.
• Among those who will take part in voting in the local elections, party ratings are as follows: Svoboda – 27.1%, Batkivshchyna – 21.6%, Our Ukraine – 9.2%, Party of Regions – 6.2%, Strong Ukraine – 4%, People’s Movement (Rukh) – 2.5%, People’s Self-Defense – 2.9%, UNP – 2.5%, People’s Party – 1.9%, Pora – 2.1%, KUN – 2.2%.
• Svoboda is also leading, although with a smaller margin, in the Verkhovna Rada rating — 21.6% versus 18.6% for Batkivshchyna. Front for Change is supported by 8.3%, Our Ukraine by 7.1%, the Party of Regions by 6.4%, Strong Ukraine by 3.9%, For Ukraine! by 3%. The remaining parties have support of less than 2% of voters. Against all — 4.9%, undecided on which party to vote for the Verkhovna Rada — 8.8% of respondents.
• As of the beginning of August 2010, Yuliya Tymoshenko leads the presidential rating (31.6%). Next come Arseniy Yatsenyuk (13.4%), Oleh Tyahnybok (11.1%), Serhiy Tihipko (7.9%), and Viktor Yanukovych (6%).
• Viktor Yushchenko lost the most support since the presidential elections (from 17% to 6%). Other politicians have hardly changed their positions, except Yuliya Tymoshenko, who declined (from 36% to 32%), and Oleh Tyahnybok, who gained (from 7% to 11%). The number of respondents who do not support any candidate has also increased (from 2.6% to 8%).

General assessment of the situation

• Residents of Lviv Oblast overall evaluate the changes in Ukraine in general and in Lviv Oblast in particular quite pessimistically. At the same time, they assess developments in the oblast slightly more positively than those in the country as a whole.
• Only 9% of respondents believe that the general situation in Ukraine is improving, 40% think it has not changed, and 43% believe it is deteriorating. Likewise, only 9% believe the situation in Lviv Oblast is improving, 45% say it has not changed, and 38% say it is deteriorating.
• It is worth noting that residents of Lviv city feel more optimistic than residents of the rest of the oblast. An interesting pattern emerges: Lviv city residents rate developments in the region almost twice as positively as developments in Ukraine, while rural residents, on the contrary, rate changes in the country more positively than changes in the oblast.
• The most confident and satisfied with developments are supporters of Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. The most disappointed are supporters of Civic Position (A. Hrytsenko), BYuT, Our Ukraine, and Svoboda.

Parliamentary election ratings

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday, the winner in Lviv Oblast would be the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) with 24.8%.
• Second place would go to Svoboda (13.4%), followed by Front for Change (7.8%), Our Ukraine (7.2%), Party of Regions (5.2%), Civic Position (A. Hrytsenko) (2.8%), and Strong Ukraine (2.6%).
• About 1% each would support UDAR (V. Klitschko), the Lytvyn Bloc, the People’s Movement (Rukh), KUN, and For Ukraine! (V. Kyrylenko).
• Other parties together account for about 3%, 7.2% would vote for none, and 22% would not vote or are undecided.
• Compared to November of last year, the largest losses were recorded by Our Ukraine (from 19% to 7%), BYuT (from 28% to 25%), and Front for Change (from 9% to 7%). Meanwhile, Svoboda increased from 9% to 13%, Civic Position from 0.6% to 2.8%, and the number of undecided voters nearly doubled.
• Support for the Party of Regions remains stable at 5–6%, while Strong Ukraine (Tihipko) rose after the elections but by June had fallen back to around 3%.
• Lviv Oblast Council election ratingsLeading parties are BYuT (22.5%), Svoboda (16.3%), Front for Change (7.2%), and Our Ukraine (7.1%).
• They are followed by the Party of Regions (4.8%), Strong Ukraine (2.6%), and Civic Position (2%).About 1% each support For Ukraine! (Kyrylenko), People’s Movement, and the Lytvyn Bloc.
• Other parties total about 4%, 6.7% would vote for none, and 24% are undecided or would not vote.Compared to parliamentary elections, nearly all parties lose support at the local level except Svoboda, Our Ukraine, Strong Ukraine, People’s Movement, and

For Ukraine!, while the number of undecided voters increases.

• Presidential election ratings in Lviv Oblast
• The leading candidates are:
  • Yuliya Tymoshenko – 25.7%
  • Arseniy Yatseniuk – 10.6%
  • Oleh Tyahnybok – 10.5%
  Followed by:
  • Viktor Yushchenko – 6.8%
  • Viktor Yanukovych – 6%
  • Serhiy Tihipko – 5%
  • Anatoliy Hrytsenko – 2.9%
  ‍
• Tymoshenko, Yatseniuk and especially Tihipko have higher personal ratings than their parties, while for Svoboda and Our Ukraine, party support exceeds the personal rating of their leaders.Trust in national-level politicians
• The leaders in trust (sum of “trust” and “rather trust”) in Lviv Oblast are:
  • Oleh Tyahnybok – 46%
  • Arseniy Yatseniuk – 43%
  • Yuliya Tymoshenko – 42%
  ‍
• Next group:
  • Serhiy Tihipko – 29%
  • Anatoliy Hrytsenko – 28%
  • Volodymyr Kyrylenko – 28%
  ‍
• Trust levels:
  • Viktor Yushchenko – 21%
  • Yuriy Kostenko – 19%
  • Viktor Yanukovych – 11%
  • Mykola Azarov – 11%
  • Volodymyr Lytvyn – 9%
  ‍
• Tyahnybok is the only politician with a positive Trust Index (+2%), improving by 12 points over six months.
• Hrytsenko improved by 25 points (largest growth), Tihipko by 23 points.
• Yanukovych’s index improved by 10 points, while Lytvyn’s worsened by 16 points.
• Yushchenko’s Trust Index declined the most (–28 points).Satisfaction with regional authorities
• Only 19% are satisfied with the head of the Lviv Oblast Council Myroslav Senyk, while 43% are dissatisfied.
• Only 13% are satisfied with Governor Vasyl Horbal, while 45% are dissatisfied.
• Compared to November, satisfaction with the head of the Oblast Council fell from 29% to 19%, and with the Governor from 32% to 13%.
• Main priorities of local authorities, according to respondents:
  • Fighting corruption (44%)
  • Reducing unemployment (34%)
  • Road repairs (27%)
  • Fighting crime (26%)
  • Containing inflation (25%)
  • Agriculture development (23%)
  Attitudes toward key political issues
  • 70% support electing local councils by majoritarian system rather than party lists
  • Only 7% support canceling Bandera’s Hero of Ukraine title, 77% oppose
  • Only 9% support extending the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, 82% oppose
  • Only 13% support granting regional language status to minority languages
  • 20% support joint ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system with Russia and Europe
  • 62% believe freedom of speech is being restricted under Yanukovych
  • 51% believe pressure on business is increasing
  National identity markers
  • Only 4% would support making Russian a second state language
  • 57% support NATO membership (down from 60%)
  • 15% support joining the Single Economic Space (EEC)
  • 66% support EU membership (down from 74%)

• The highest position in the presidential рейтинг continues to be held by the incumbent head of state Viktor Yanukovych — 38.2% among all respondents. Yuliia Tymoshenko, on the contrary, continues to lose support month by month (13.2% among all respondents, compared to 17.1% in April and 22.4% in March).
• Support for Serhii Tihipko also declined somewhat (11.8% in June, compared to 13.4% in April and 13.8% in March). The general downward trend also extended to Arsenii Yatseniuk (4.3% in June compared to 5.2% in April).
• The results of the others have practically not changed: Petro Symonenko — 2.1%, Oleh Tiahnybok — 1.8%, Volodymyr Lytvyn — 1%, Anatolii Hrytsenko — 0.9%, Viktor Yushchenko — 0.9%.
• About 2% would vote for other candidates, 8.2% would vote for none, 9.5% would not take part in the elections, and 8.5% are undecided about their support.
• Dynamic indicators by regions of Ukraine show that support for Yanukovych is growing in Donbas and the South of Ukraine, remains stable in the North, while in the East, the Center, and especially in the West of Ukraine, there are tendencies toward a decline in support for the incumbent head of state.
• The level of support for Tymoshenko continues to decline in the Center, the North, and the East, while remaining stable in the West, where a sharp decline occurred in previous months.
• Tihipko experienced his main losses in the West, the East, and the South. However, he gained support in the North.
• Among those who intend to take part in voting, the results are as follows:
  Yanukovych (46%), Tymoshenko (15.8%), Tihipko (13.2%), Yatseniuk (5.1%), Symonenko (2.1%), Tiahnybok (2.1%), Lytvyn (1.1%), Yushchenko (1.1%), Hrytsenko (1%).
  Others — 1.6%, would vote for none — 4.4%, and 6.7% are undecided.
• In June, there is a general tendency toward a decline in party ratings and, accordingly, an increase in the number of undecided citizens.
• The rating of support for political parties in June (among all respondents) is as follows:
  Party of Regions — 35.2%, BYuT — 12.4%, Strong Ukraine — 9.2%, Front for Change — 3.6%.
  Then follow Communist Party of Ukraine — 2.5%, Svoboda — 1.7%, UDAR (Vitali Klitschko) — 1.5%, and the Lytvyn Bloc — 1.3%.
  All other political forces together — 2%.
  6.9% would vote against all, 10.5% would not take part in the elections, and 12.3% are undecided.
• Since March, the losses are: Party of Regions — 1%, Strong Ukraine — 3%, BYuT — 10%, Front for Change — 1%, Our Ukraine — 1%.
• Among those who intend to take part in voting, the results are as follows:
  Party of Regions — 44.1%, BYuT — 15.1%, Strong Ukraine — 10.6%, Front for Change — 4.5%, Communist Party — 2.9%, Svoboda — 2%, UDAR (Klitschko) — 1.8%, Our Ukraine — 1%, other parties — 2.4%.
  Would vote for none — 5.2%, undecided — 9.1%.

• About 40% of the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 and over intend to follow the course of events of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Thus, 22% intend to follow most of the matches, from the group stage through to the final; 8% — the playoff matches and the final; and 9% — only the final.
• More than others, people in Western, Northern, and Central Ukraine intend to follow the Championship. Slightly fewer — in the East, South, and Donbas. It is notable that the number of big-football fans is practically the same in cities and in villages.
• By age — these are young people and middle-aged people, predominantly with a high level of education.
• Almost two thirds of men and almost every fifth woman will follow the Championship.
• According to political sympathies, the Championship interests supporters of Oleh Tyahnybok, Anatolii Hrytsenko, and Volodymyr Lytvyn the most. It interests supporters of Yuliia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych the least.
• The majority of respondents will support the national teams of Brazil (30%), Italy (24%), Germany (23%), and England (20%). Slightly fewer — the teams of Spain (15%), France (15%), and Argentina (14%).
• It is pleasant to note that practically every national team has found its supporters at the Championship. 7% will support Portugal, 4% — the Netherlands, 3% each — the USA and Greece, 2% each — Uruguay, Australia, and Paraguay. The teams with the fewest supporters are those from the East: Japan, Korea, and North Korea.
• Thus, the West will support Brazil, Italy, and England; the Center, North, and East — Brazil, Italy, and Germany; the South — Brazil and Germany; Donbas — Brazil, Italy, and Argentina.
• For youth, the favorite is Italy; older people will support in a more classical way — Brazil and Germany.
• Men and women will support the national teams of Italy and England in equal measure. But for the teams of Spain, Brazil, and Argentina, supporters will be predominantly men.
• In villages people will support Brazil, England, and Argentina; in cities — Spain and Italy.
• For supporters of Anatolii Hrytsenko, the unquestioned favorite is Spain; of Volodymyr Lytvyn — Argentina and England; of Oleh Tyahnybok — Brazil and Argentina; of Serhii Tihipko — Italy, England, and formerly France; of Petro Symonenko — Brazil; of Arsenii Yatseniuk — Germany and Spain; of Yuliia Tymoshenko — England and Italy; of Viktor Yanukovych — Brazil and Germany.
• The majority of surveyed fans bet on a victory of the Brazilian national team (20%). Almost twice fewer bet on Italy (12%), Germany (11%), and England (10%). Then come Spain (8%) and Argentina (7%).
• France disappointed 5% of respondents who had bet on it. 3% bet on a victory of Portugal and 1% — of the Netherlands. It should be noted that among supporters of the Brazilian team there are the most people who are confident specifically in its victory at the World Cup (51%). Next in confidence in the victory of their favorite team come supporters of England (47%), Italy (45%), Spain (45%), Argentina (42%), Portugal (41%), and Germany (40%).
• Another interesting fact: on the victory of such teams as Spain, Argentina, and Germany, football experts bet more — respondents who intend to follow the entire Championship; at the same time, everyone bets on the victory of Brazil.
• In addition, it is quite possible that by the end of the Championship, when the circle of favorites narrows, fans’ sympathies will change. And if, for example, the Brazilian team reaches the final, it is not a fact that the majority of citizens will support it, since European teams in general have more supporters in Ukraine.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF THE MYKOLA AZAROV GOVERNMENT

• 49% of citizens gave a positive assessment of the first 100 days of the Azarov government (almost the same number — 53% — gave a positive assessment of the first 100 days of President Viktor Yanukovych), 39% gave a negative assessment, and another 22% did not determine their assessment.
• Positive assessments exceeded negative ones in all regions except the West. Thus, in Donbas, 75% assessed positively and 8% negatively; in the South — 69% versus 17%; in the East — 46% versus 22%; in the North — 42% versus 40%; in the Center — 39% versus 37%; in the West — 30% versus 47%.
• 43% of citizens believe that the activity of the Azarov government was more effective than the activity of the Tymoshenko government. The opposite view is held by only 15%. Another 20% believe that both governments were sufficiently ineffective, and 2% — that both governments were effective. 20% did not determine their position on this issue.
• By regions, in all regions except the West, the activity of the Azarov government was rated better than that of the Tymoshenko government. Thus, in Donbas 77% of respondents pointed to the Azarov government versus 1% — the Tymoshenko government; in the South — 66% versus 6%; in the East — 39% versus 7%; in the North — 33% versus 22%; in the Center — 32% versus 20%; in the West — 20% versus 31%.
• It is worth noting that not in all spheres the actions of the government were recognized as effective. This may indicate a certain advance credit in assessments of the government’s activity. There are grounds to believe that successes in certain spheres are perceived by citizens as a kind of investment in the future, but the further it goes, the more they will ask about success in each specific sphere.
• Thus, the actions of the government were recognized as maximally effective in such spheres as the expansion of economic cooperation with Russia (efficiency index — the difference between positive and negative values — is +42) and the adoption of the State Budget (+10).
• Relatively effective can be considered such spheres as increasing wages and pensions (–6), preparation of the economic reform plan (–8), stabilization of the socio-economic situation (–16) and support for industry (–24).
• Among the low-effectiveness actions of the Cabinet of Ministers, one can note raising the level of education in the country (–31), ensuring price stability (–34), and support for small and medium-sized business (–34).
• Among the ineffective actions of the government one can single out combating unemployment (–41), support for villages (–41), fighting corruption (–45), operation of housing and communal services (–52), and raising the level of healthcare in the country (–57).
  The government’s activity in such spheres as expansion of economic cooperation with Russia, adoption of the State Budget, and raising wages and pensions was recognized as effective or relatively effective in all regions, including the West.
• Activity in such spheres as fighting corruption, housing and communal services, and raising the level of healthcare was recognized as ineffective in all regions, including Donbas and the South.

SATISFACTION WITH THE ACTIVITY OF POLITICIANS

• In general, residents of Ukraine are satisfied with the activity of politicians in power, but at the same time every fifth believes that it is still too early to give them assessments.
• Thus, 49% of respondents are satisfied to some extent with the activity of President Viktor Yanukovych, 26% are not satisfied, 19% believe that it is too early to give an assessment, 3% do not see his activity, and 4% could not determine their assessment of Yanukovych.
• The satisfaction index with Yanukovych’s activity (defined as the difference between positive and negative assessments) (+24) over the last two months improved by 4 points. The index increased the most in the North (+5 points), the East (+7), and Donbas (+8). It decreased in the West (–3) and the South (–3), and in the other regions it almost did not change.
• 47% are satisfied with the activity of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, 27% are not satisfied, 19% believe it is too early to give an assessment, 4% do not see his activity, and 5% did not determine their view.
• The satisfaction index with Azarov’s activity (+19) over the last two months improved by 7 points. The index grew the most in the North (+13), the Center (+10), and Donbas (+10). In the other regions it almost did not change.
• The activity of opposition politicians is mostly evaluated negatively by citizens.
• Thus, only 14% are satisfied with Yuliia Tymoshenko’s activity in opposition, 61% are dissatisfied, 9% believe it is too early to give an assessment, 12% do not see any activity at all, and 5% did not determine their attitude.
• The satisfaction index with Tymoshenko’s activity in opposition (–48) over the last two months worsened by 11 points.
• 16% are satisfied with Arsenii Yatseniuk’s activity in opposition, 49% are dissatisfied, 13% believe it is too early to give an assessment, 14% do not see any activity at all, and 8% did not determine their view.
• The satisfaction index with Yatseniuk’s activity in opposition (–33) over the last two months worsened by the same 11 points.

LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT, THE GOVERNMENT, AND PARLIAMENT

• In general, Ukrainians assess the level of cooperation between the President and the government higher than the level of cooperation between the President and the Verkhovna Rada, and between the government and the Verkhovna Rada.
• Thus, 43% of respondents assessed the level of cooperation between the President and the government as high, 36% as medium, 9% as low, and 12% could not determine.
• The level of cooperation between the President and the Verkhovna Rada is assessed as high by 29%, medium by 43%, low by 13%, and 14% could not determine.
• The level of cooperation between the government and the Verkhovna Rada was assessed as high by 24%, medium by 45%, low by 14%, and 17% could not determine.
• It is worth noting that among respondents who negatively assess the first 100 days of the government, no more than one quarter assessed cooperation between different institutions of power as low.
• The level of cooperation between the President and the government is assessed as high by the majority of residents of the South and the North (53% and 52% respectively), as well as by a relative majority of residents of Donbas and the West (48% and 43% respectively). At the same time, only about one third of residents of the Center and the East gave a “high” assessment (34% and 31% respectively). Regional features of assessments of cooperation between the President and the Verkhovna Rada are similar to those above.

REFORMS

• 87% of respondents indicated the need to carry out reforms in the country aimed at modernizing the socio-economic system; the opposite opinion — only 4%; 9% did not determine.
• The need for reforms aimed at modernizing the political system was noted somewhat less often — by 74%; 12% held the opposite opinion; 14% did not determine.
• The need for reforms was noted in all regions without exception.
• The spheres in which reforms are most needed, in the opinion of respondents, are healthcare (77%), agriculture (66%), housing and communal services (62%), pension system (58%), industry (54%), education (48%), judicial system (44%), tax system (42%), and law-enforcement system (41%).
• According to respondents, reforms are least needed in sports (17%).
• It is worth noting that respondents usually indicated those spheres in which the government’s efficiency indices were lower than others.
• The spheres in which, in respondents’ opinion, the government will achieve the greatest success in reforms are the pension system (33%) and industry (33%).
• Somewhat less often respondents mentioned energy (26%), education (26%), small and medium-sized business (25%), healthcare (24%), tax system (24%), electoral system (24%), judicial system (22%), local self-government (22%), agriculture (21%), and housing and communal services (21%). The least respondents expect effective reforms in ecology (9%), science (10%), and culture (10%).
• Only one third of respondents are familiar with the provisions of the reform program “Prosperous Society. Competitive Economy. Effective State”, presented by President Viktor Yanukovych in June 2010. At the same time, half of them have heard something but cannot say anything specific. Two thirds of respondents know nothing about such a program.
• The best informed about the reform program are in the North, and the least informed — in the South.
• At least half of those who are informed about the reform program “Prosperous Society. Competitive Economy. Effective State” believe in the success of its implementation.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF POLITICIANS IN POWER

• Overall, respondents are more satisfied with the activities of politicians in power than with those of politicians in the opposition. Thus, 41% of respondents are satisfied with the activities of President V. Yanukovych, 21% are not satisfied, and 32% believe it is still too early to give an assessment.
  36% are satisfied with the activities of Prime Minister M. Azarov, 24% are not satisfied, and 32% believe it is still too early to give an assessment.
• Both the Prime Minister and the President received the highest ratings in the South and Donbas, as well as in Eastern Ukraine. These are primarily supporters of the Party of Regions, the CPU, as well as Strong Ukraine of S. Tigipko and the Lytvyn Bloc.
• 42% are satisfied with the activities of Vice Prime Minister S. Tigipko, 15% are not satisfied, and 29% believe it is still too early to give an assessment. The geography of support for his activities is more or less even, except for the West, where only 27% are satisfied with his activities. The greatest support for the Vice Prime Minister’s activities comes from supporters of Strong Ukraine, the Party of Regions, the CPU, and the Lytvyn Bloc.
• As we can see, all three — V. Yanukovych, S. Tigipko, and M. Azarov — have a positive balance of support. S. Tigipko is the only politician who has a positive balance of support in all regions. It is worth noting that about one third of respondents believe it is still too early to give an assessment of these politicians. In particular, the activities of V. Yanukovych and M. Azarov have not yet been assessed in any way by about one quarter of Party of Regions supporters. Likewise, 29% of Strong Ukraine supporters have not yet given any assessment of S. Tigipko’s activities in government.
• On the one hand, this indicates a certain “hidden” credit of trust and potential for growth in positive assessments, and on the other hand, if politicians do not demonstrate appropriate performance in the positions entrusted to them within the next few months, there may be an increase in negative assessments.
• 31% are satisfied with the activities of V. Lytvyn as Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, 38% are not satisfied, and 15% believe it is still too early to give an assessment. 10% of respondents do not see V. Lytvyn’s activities at all. The Speaker’s activities are primarily supported in the South and Donbas. In addition to supporters of the Lytvyn Bloc, his activities were positively assessed by supporters of the Party of Regions and the CPU.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF POLITICIANS IN THE OPPOSITION

• 18% positively assessed the activities of Y. Tymoshenko, 54% negatively, and 11% believe it is too early to give an assessment.
  19% are satisfied with the activities of A. Yatseniuk in the opposition, 40% are not satisfied, and 16% believe it is still too early to give an assessment.
  Only 3% are satisfied with the activities of V. Yushchenko in the opposition, 66% are not satisfied, and only 7% believe it is too early to give an assessment of his activities.
• At the same time, 11% of respondents believe that the activities of Y. Tymoshenko in the opposition are not visible at all. For A. Yatseniuk this figure is 16%, and for V. Yushchenko — 19%.
• The greatest satisfaction with the activities of Y. Tymoshenko and A. Yatseniuk is in the Center, the North, and the West, with an advantage in favor of the leader of BYuT. At the same time, the activities of A. Yatseniuk were assessed more positively in the South-Eastern regions.
• It should be emphasized that Y. Tymoshenko has a positive balance of support only among supporters of BYuT, while 8% of them assessed her activities in the opposition negatively, 17% believe it is too early to give an assessment, and another 5% do not see any activity at all.
• A. Yatseniuk has a positive balance of support not only among supporters of Front for Change, but also among supporters of the Lytvyn Bloc and Our Ukraine. In addition, BYuT supporters rated A. Yatseniuk’s activities in the opposition better than Front for Change supporters rated Y. Tymoshenko’s activities.
• At the same time, 7% of Front for Change supporters assessed A. Yatseniuk’s activities in the opposition negatively, 22% believe it is too early to give an assessment, and another 10% do not see any activity at all.
• V. Yushchenko does not have a positive balance of support even among supporters of Our Ukraine — only 18% of them are satisfied with his actions in the opposition and 19% are not satisfied. One third of supporters of Our Ukraine, Svoboda, and Front for Change do not see any activity of V. Yushchenko in the opposition.

PRIORITY TASKS FOR THE AUTHORITIES

• The ranking of priority tasks for the authorities is headed by the fight against unemployment (51%), increasing wages (49%) and pensions (40%), and reducing the level of corruption (38%).
• In addition, about one third see among the key tasks of the authorities: stabilization of prices, ensuring the stability of the hryvnia, improving the level of healthcare, and support for agriculture. About one quarter mention support for industry and affordable housing for citizens.
• One in six demands that the authorities ensure control over the state apparatus, support small and medium-sized businesses, prevent the split of the country, and improve relations with Russia.
• One in ten calls for raising the level of education in the country and reforming housing and communal services.
• Only about 7% of respondents see among the priority tasks of the authorities granting the Russian language the status of a second state language, 5% — transitioning the army to a professional basis, and 4% — continuing the country’s course toward European integration.
• It is worth emphasizing certain demographic features of respondents’ answers. Thus, the fight against unemployment and the growth of wages are key priorities for the authorities in all regions. The fight against corruption is especially relevant for the West and the North. Price stabilization is more relevant for Donbas, and stabilization of the hryvnia for the West. Improving healthcare is most demanded in the North, South, and Donbas. Affordable housing is demanded in the West, North, and East.
• Support for industrial development is a special priority for Donbas. Reform of housing and communal services is a priority for Donbas, the East, and the North. The Russian language as a state language is among the special priorities for the authorities only for residents of the South (as is improving relations with Russia), while for the West the priority is preventing the split of the country.
• Youth among the key priorities for the authorities highlight: fighting unemployment and corruption, wage growth, support for small and medium-sized businesses, affordable housing, and raising the level of education. Older respondents, especially those of retirement age, see among the priorities of the authorities: growth of pensions, improvement of healthcare, and better relations with Russia.
• It is interesting that pensioners emphasize the need to stabilize prices for basic goods and services, while youth emphasize stabilization of the hryvnia.
• Respondents with higher levels of education emphasize the need to reduce corruption, support small and medium-sized businesses, ensure affordable housing, and reform tax legislation. Growth of pensions is among the priorities for the least educated citizens.

PRIORITY TASKS FOR THE OPPOSITION

• The main priority tasks for the opposition are seen by most as ensuring control over the authorities’ fulfillment of their promises (46%), preventing deterioration of citizens’ living standards (43%), ensuring control over the authorities’ use of budget funds (40%), and exposing cases of corruption in the new government (38%).
• Also, about one quarter of respondents see among the opposition’s priority tasks preventing the split of the country, almost one in five — defending freedom of speech, and almost one in ten — protecting business from pressure by the authorities, protecting the Ukrainian language as the sole state language, and counteracting the usurpation of power.
• Up to 10% of respondents also named among such tasks uniting the opposition for more effective resistance to the authorities, preserving their own political teams, and ensuring broader rights for the opposition.
• Only 6% of respondents named among the main tasks of the opposition the defense of the country’s European integration course and resistance to a possible rollback of democracy.
• Different forms of protest by the opposition (rallies, early elections, impeachment) were supported by only 3% of respondents.
• It is also worth emphasizing certain demographic features of respondents’ answers. Control over the authorities’ fulfillment of their promises is seen as one of the main tasks of the opposition by residents of the West, North, South, and Donbas. Residents of the East see preventing deterioration of living standards as the main task of the opposition.
• Residents of the North and East also emphasize among opposition priorities control over the use of budget funds and exposing corruption. Protection of the Ukrainian language as the sole state language is seen as a key priority of the opposition in the West. In addition, preventing the split of the country and defending freedom of speech are highlighted there.
• Securing broader rights for the opposition is most often recommended in the North, while defending the European integration course and resisting the rollback of democracy are most emphasized in the West. Almost one in ten residents of the Center advises the opposition to unite for more effective resistance to the authorities.
• The largest share of those undecided about the opposition’s tasks was found in Donbas (23%), and the smallest in the West (6%).
• Analysis of respondents’ answers gives grounds to state that people, based on their own problems and feelings, set essentially identical tasks for both the authorities and the opposition. If among the key tasks for the authorities respondents highlighted the fight against unemployment and increasing wages and pensions, then for the opposition — ensuring control over the authorities’ fulfillment of promises and preventing deterioration of citizens’ living standards. If people demand from the authorities to reduce the level of corruption, then from the opposition — to ensure control over the use of budget funds and to expose cases of corruption in the new government. If respondents advise the authorities to support small and medium-sized businesses, then the opposition — to protect business from pressure by the authorities, and so on.
• Thus, most respondents see the role of the authorities and the opposition in the country as interconnected institutions that increase each other’s effectiveness and, if they perform their functions, ensure the main current priorities of citizens: JOBS and WELL-BEING.

• In the opinion of the relative majority of respondents, the most optimal form of government for Ukraine is presidential-parliamentary (35%) or presidential (26%).
  According to 16% of respondents, the most optimal is parliamentary-presidential, 4% — parliamentary, and 3% — dictatorship. Another 16% did not decide on this issue.
• Compared with a similar survey conducted in October 2009 — on the eve of the Presidential election — support for the presidential-parliamentary and presidential forms of government has somewhat increased, while support for the parliamentary-presidential, parliamentary, and dictatorship forms has somewhat decreased. This occurred primarily due to changes in attitudes toward this issue among residents of the South and Donbas after V. Yanukovych’s victory in the Presidential election.
• At the same time, in the West and especially in the North of the country, attitudes toward the presidential-parliamentary and presidential forms of government have worsened, in particular among supporters of BYuT. This happened primarily due to Y. Tymoshenko’s defeat in the Presidential election.
• At the same time, supporters of Our Ukraine and Svoboda remain the biggest supporters of the presidential (from 38% to 44%) as well as the presidential-parliamentary (from 32% to 37%) form of government in Ukraine, surpassing even supporters of the Party of Regions in this indicator.
• Regarding supporters of the Party of Regions, it should be noted that after V. Yanukovych was elected President, the number of supporters among them of the parliamentary-presidential and parliamentary forms has almost halved.
• Supporters of S. Tihipko, like supporters of Y. Tymoshenko, consider mixed systems the most optimal: either presidential-parliamentary (45%) or parliamentary-presidential (19%).
• The parliamentary-presidential form of government is most strongly supported by supporters of the Lytvyn Bloc (35%).
• Communists, on the other hand, traditionally sympathize most with dictatorship (8%). However, despite the fact that party leader P. Symonenko advocated the abolition of the institution of the President in Ukraine, supporters of the CPU continue to consider presidential (36%) or presidential-parliamentary (23%) the most optimal forms of government for Ukraine.
• Respondents with higher education and young people aged 18–29 support the parliamentary-presidential form of government more than others (20%).
• The presidential form was most strongly supported by respondents with a low level of education (36%) and pensioners (31%).

• 18% of surveyed citizens felt that under the new government in Ukraine there is already a curtailment of freedom of speech.
  Two thirds did not feel any curtailment of freedom of speech, and another 16% did not decide on this issue.
• The greatest sense of pressure was felt in the West (38%), the North (24%), and the Center (18%).
• Among supporters of political forces, this includes: Our Ukraine (51%), Svoboda (45%), Front for Change (40%), and BYuT (36%).
• At the same time, 83% of supporters of the Party of Regions, 77% of supporters of the CPU, and 61% of supporters of Serhii Tihipko’s Strong Ukraine did not feel any curtailment of freedom of speech in Ukraine.
• Those most concerned about pressure on freedom of speech are middle-aged respondents (from 20% to 24%); the least concerned are pensioners (15%) and youth (17%).
• Curtailment of freedom of speech was felt mainly by respondents with higher education (18%) and secondary specialized education (20%).

• Compared to the survey conducted in March of this year, the level of support for the incumbent President V. Yanukovych remains stable — 38.4% of respondents are ready to vote for him if the presidential election were held next Sunday. The personal rating of Y. Tymoshenko continues to decline — 17.1% in April compared to 22.4% in March.
• The ratings of S. Tigipko and A. Yatseniuk compared to March have almost not changed — 13.4% are ready to vote for S. Tigipko and 5.2% for A. Yatseniuk.
• The ratings of other politicians have undergone minor changes: support for P. Symonenko increased slightly to 2.6% and for O. Tyahnybok to 1.6%, while support for V. Yushchenko decreased to 1.3%. In addition, about 1% of respondents are ready to support V. Lytvyn and A. Hrytsenko. Other candidates would be supported by about 1% of respondents, 4.6% would support none, and 13.4% of respondents would not participate in the elections or were undecided.
• In Western Ukraine, simultaneously with the decline in support for Y. Tymoshenko and V. Yushchenko, as of mid-April support for V. Yanukovych continues to grow (11.1% in the first round, 12.4% in March, and 15.5% in April). At the same time, in the West the number of undecided voters and those who support other candidates, in particular O. Tyahnybok and A. Hrytsenko, has almost doubled.
• It is also worth noting that, compared with the first round of the presidential elections, Y. Tymoshenko suffered the largest electoral losses in the North (about 13%), in the West (9%), and in Central Ukraine (8%).
• In contrast, V. Yanukovych over two months additionally gained almost 9% of supporters in the Center, 5% in the North, and 4% in the West.
• As of April, less than two thirds of voters are ready to vote for political forces that are currently represented in parliament. At the same time, about 20% intend to support new political forces. The rest are undecided or do not support any political force.
• Thus, among all respondents, party ratings are as follows: Party of Regions — 38.5%, BYuT — 18.1%, Strong Ukraine (S. Tigipko) — 10.7%, Front for Change (A. Yatseniuk) — 4%, CPU (P. Symonenko) — 2.7%, Svoboda (O. Tyahnybok) — 1.7%, Our Ukraine (V. Yushchenko) — 1.4%, Lytvyn Bloc — 1.3%. The remaining parties scored less than 1%, “against all” — 3.6%, undecided or not planning to vote — 16.2%.
• Compared to March, the largest decrease was recorded for BYuT (from 22 to 18.1%), and the largest increase for the Party of Regions (from 36.3 to 38.5%).
• It should be noted that tendencies toward a decline in the overall support for Strong Ukraine of S. Tigipko (from 12.1 to 10.7%) have emerged, primarily in Western and Central Ukraine. At the same time, Tigipko’s positions have not changed or have even improved in the South and Donbas — it is quite possible that the factor of a “relatively stable Tigipko” somewhat restrains the expected growth of the Party of Regions’ ratings.

• 28% of respondents believe that the overall situation in Lviv is improving. At the same time, 21% say the situation is worsening, while a relative majority (44%) believe the situation in the city remains unchanged.
• Overall, 46.5% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi (42.1% are dissatisfied). Regarding the performance of the Head of the Regional State Administration Mykhailo Kmit and the Head of the Regional Council Mykhailo Senyk, 18% of respondents are satisfied with their work, while more than 40% are dissatisfied. At the same time, more than 40% of respondents could not assess the performance of the heads of the RSA and the Regional Council.
• Regarding the situation in various areas of city life, according to respondents, over the last four years the greatest improvement occurred in water supply — three quarters of respondents (74%) believe so. General improvement was noted in the cultural life of the city (56%), street lighting (52%), city cleaning (48%), heating supply, preservation of historical heritage (46%), and the operation of public transport (37%).
• Opinions on road repairs are divided: 33% noted improvement, while 35% noted deterioration.
• The worst evaluations were given to the work of housing maintenance offices (ZhEKs) and healthcare institutions (34% and 33%, respectively, said the situation had worsened). Changes were least noticeable in healthcare: 47% believe the situation there has not changed over the past four years.
• Regarding reform in the area with the weakest improvement — ZhEKs — opinions were almost evenly split:
  30% believe the authorities should focus on restoring order in the existing ZhEKs,
  29% believe the authorities, while supporting ZhEKs, should focus on creating homeowners’ associations (HOAs),
  25% believe ZhEKs should be abolished soon and housing maintenance transferred exclusively to HOAs.
  Another 8% are indifferent, and another 8% were unable to answer. Older people more often support keeping ZhEKs, while younger respondents more often support developing HOAs.
• If mayoral elections were held in March, Andriy Sadovyi would win — 34.4% of Lviv residents would vote for the incumbent mayor. Petro Pysarchuk would place second (16%), and Vasyl Kuibyda third (15.5%). The remaining candidates would be within the margin of error. 12.3% were undecided.
• In a hypothetical second round, Sadovyi would also win:
  against Pysarchuk — 46% to 23%,
  against Kuibyda — 42% to 25%.
  In both cases, 16% would vote for neither candidate.
• Support for candidates varies by demographics:
  44% of young people (18–29) would vote for Sadovyi,
  Pysarchuk is strongest among ages 40–49 (23%),
  Kuibyda among voters aged 60+ (24%).
• Respondents with higher education more often supported Sadovyi and Pysarchuk than Kuibyda. Support for Sadovyi is evenly distributed across denominations, while support for Pysarchuk and Kuibyda is somewhat higher among believers of the Moscow Patriarchate.
• A relative majority (40%) believe the mayor should be non-partisan. 22% think the mayor must belong to a political party. 26% do not care, and 12% were undecided.
• In parliamentary preferences in Lviv:
  BYuT — 24.5%
  Svoboda — 12.4%
  Our Ukraine — 9.6%
  Strong Ukraine — 9.1%
  Front for Change — 8.8%
  Party of Regions — 6%
  Klitschko Bloc — about 3%
  Hrytsenko’s Civic Initiative — about 3%
• For Lviv City Council:
  Svoboda — 15%
  BYuT — 14.4%
  Sadovyi Bloc — 8%
  Our Ukraine — 7%
  Pysarchuk Bloc “Native City” — 5.5%
  Front for Change — 4.8%
  Strong Ukraine — 4.5%
  Party of Regions — 4.4%
  Kuibyda Bloc — 3.6%
  Klitschko Bloc — 3.1%
  10% were undecided.
• Only three national politicians have a positive trust balance in Lviv:
  Arseniy Yatsenyuk (+13),
  Oleh Tyahnybok (+6),
  Serhiy Tihipko (+4).
• Trust and distrust in Yuliya Tymoshenko are almost equal (44.8% vs 48.1%).
  Yatsenyuk leads in overall trust (48.3%).
  Tymoshenko and Tyahnybok lead in full trust (15% and 13%).
• Trust in former President Viktor Yushchenko stands at 29.5%, distrust at 63.7%.
  The least trusted are Volodymyr Lytvyn and President Viktor Yanukovych — 75%.
• Expectations from the recent presidential election are mostly negative or neutral:
  33.9% expect economic deterioration,
  46.1% expect greater political confrontation,
  37.8% expect deeper national division.
• Only 24.4% expect economic improvement,
  17.6% expect reduced political conflict,
  15.1% expect national unity.
• 57% believe the mayor should cooperate with the new authorities solely in the city’s interest.
  15.6% advise him to oppose the new government.
  10.4% believe he should openly support it.
  17% were undecided.

Language issue

• About 57% of respondents expect that President V. Yanukovych will fulfill his promise to grant the Russian language the status of a second state language. Of these, 12% expect this in the coming months, 24% during 2010, and 21% over the next few years.
  At the same time, about 20% of respondents believe that Yanukovych will never fulfill this promise. For every tenth respondent it does not matter, and another one in six is undecided.
• The highest expectations of Yanukovych fulfilling this promise are in the South and Donbas, slightly lower in the East, and the lowest in the Center, North, and West. It is worth noting that supporters of the Communist Party (CPU) expect corresponding actions from the President in a shorter time frame than supporters of the Party of Regions. At the same time, the number of respondents who do not believe in the fulfillment of this promise among CPU supporters is three times higher than among Party of Regions supporters.
• The greatest disbelief in Yanukovych fulfilling his promise is in the West (33%), and at the same time this region has the largest share of those who expect action in the next few months (16%).
• 49% of respondents support the initiative of the Party of Regions to legally give local councils the right to determine themselves the language of education in schools and universities, official paperwork, etc.
  38% do not support it, and 13% are undecided.
• In Donbas, 81% support this initiative, while in the West, 71% oppose it. Accordingly, on one side are supporters of the Party of Regions and CPU, and on the other — Our Ukraine, Svoboda, BYuT, and Front for Change.
• It is worth noting that almost two-thirds of respondents believe that such actions would in practice mean granting Russian the status of a second state language in those regions. Characteristically, in this regard the views of Party of Regions supporters and the radicals of Our Ukraine and Svoboda coincide.
• Overall, 54% support granting Russian the status of a second state language, 39% are against, and 7% are undecided.
• The language issue is currently the largest potential source of protests in possible ideological confrontation.
• About 6% of respondents are ready to personally participate in protest actions if a decision is made to grant Russian state status, and another 13% would support a political force that undertakes such protests.
  At the same time, only 2% are ready to go out in support of this decision, and another 13% would support a political force that initiates such actions.
• Meanwhile, about two-thirds of respondents stated that they would not participate in any actions, either of protest or support, and would not support political forces that organize them.
• Residents of the West are far more determined to defend their position on language than residents of Donbas. Almost one in five in the West is ready to go out into the streets in protest, and one in three would support a political force that organizes such actions. The most radical are supporters of Svoboda (one in three personally ready to protest), Our Ukraine (one in five), and BYuT (one in six).
  In contrast, only 4% of Party of Regions supporters are ready to go out in support of granting Russian second state status.
• Issue of extending the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine
• 41% of respondents support keeping the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine after 2017, 38% oppose it, and 21% are undecided.
• The strongest supporters of extending the fleet’s presence are residents of the South and Donbas, and almost 70% of Party of Regions and CPU supporters. However, only 2% of Party of Regions supporters and 4% of CPU supporters are personally ready to go out in support.
  Only 13% of Party of Regions supporters would support a political force that organizes such actions.
• At the same time, one in ten residents of the West is ready for open protests. Again, mainly supporters of Svoboda and Our Ukraine, and somewhat fewer BYuT and Front for Change.
• Among supporters of the Lytvyn Bloc and Strong Ukraine (S. Tihipko), opinions are split evenly: about 40% for and 40% against. Their readiness for any actions is low.
• Issue of canceling President Yushchenko’s decree granting Hero of Ukraine to S. Bandera
• 53% support canceling the decree, 28% oppose it, 19% are undecided.
• Although fewer oppose the cancellation than oppose the fleet’s presence, the level of protest remains the same.
  One in ten residents of the West is ready to participate in protests if the decree is canceled.
• More than half of Svoboda supporters and slightly fewer of Our Ukraine are the most radical.
  In contrast, communists are the most ready to support cancellation — one in ten is ready to participate.
• It should be noted that supporters of BYuT and Front for Change are much less radical about defending Bandera’s title than on language or the fleet issue. Moreover, one quarter of them are ready to support cancellation of the decree.
• Issue of creating a gas transportation consortium
• About 35% support Yanukovych’s initiative to create a gas transit consortium, about 35% oppose it, and about 30% are undecided.
• This issue appears to be viewed more through a political rather than economic lens, which explains the high share of undecided respondents.
• Support is highest in Donbas and the South, opposition is highest in the West, Center, and North.
  The highest share of undecided is in the East (41%).
• In the North and Center, opponents of the consortium outnumber supporters almost two to one, making resistance here stronger than on the language issue.
• The most radical opponents are supporters of Svoboda, BYuT, and Our Ukraine.
  Among Strong Ukraine supporters, the number of supporters equals the number of opponents.
• Issue of recognition of the Holodomor
• A majority (60%) believe that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was genocide against the Ukrainian people.
  25% hold the opposite view, 14% are undecided.
• Among Communist Party supporters, negative responses prevail (37% say genocide, 58% say no).
  Among Party of Regions supporters, positive and negative are equal (40% vs 40%).
  However, in the South, East, and Donbas overall, positive evaluations prevail.
• The strongest defenders of the genocide interpretation are residents of the West, the weakest — Donbas.
• The strongest opponents are believers of the UOC–MP, although even among them supporters exceed opponents (44% vs 39%).
  The strongest supporters are Greek Catholics (95% vs 2%) and UOC–KP believers (62% vs 16%).
• The genocide thesis is least supported by respondents whose native language is Russian (34% for, 45% against).
  Among Ukrainian-speaking respondents, 81% support, 10% oppose.
  Among those who consider both languages native: 53% for, 32% against.

• More than half of respondents (56%) feel the threat of economic decline of the country. Remaining practically unchanged over the past six months, economic decline continues to lead in the so-called ranking of threats. Somewhat less frequently (41%) respondents pointed to growth of unemployment. This indicator is consistently second in the ranking, and over the past several months these fears have increased, especially in the industrial south-eastern regions of the country.
• As a result of stabilization in the financial sector, the sense of threat of devaluation of the hryvnia decreased (from 31% in October last year to 24% in March this year).
• After the presidential elections, the feeling of threat from abuse of power by the authorities decreased (in August last year almost 40% of Ukrainians felt this threat, while in March this year only a quarter did). After the victory of V. Yanukovych, the sense of threat from abuse of power in the south-eastern regions decreased twofold.
• Over the last six months, the sense of threat of social degradation of the population decreased (from 21% to 16%), nevertheless this threat remains fifth in the ranking.
• Next in the ranking of threats are environmental disasters (15%), deterioration of medical services (15%), and growth of crime (14%).
• Compared to October last year, citizens’ fears of the country splitting and loss of independence have almost doubled. This is especially relevant for the West, where one in five expects an усилення of the country’s split, one in four — loss of independence, one in ten — loss of Ukraine’s control over the gas transit system, an anti-constitutional coup, and a military threat from Russia.
• The strengthening of ideological threats is characteristic of supporters of most opposition parties. Moreover, among them there is a gradual shift from economic to ideological threats.
• For example, among BYuT supporters, against the background of increased feelings of a split of the country and loss of independence, fears of economic decline and devaluation of the hryvnia decreased.
• Meanwhile, among Party of Regions supporters, feelings of threat from economic decline, growth of unemployment, deterioration of medical services, environmental disasters, etc. have increased.
• Only about one quarter of the population expressed readiness, under certain circumstances, to support unpopular reforms.
• Steps by the authorities aimed at saving state funds through limiting certain benefits, raising tariffs, etc., are supported under any circumstances by only 3% of respondents.
  17% are ready to support them if the authorities prove these steps are really necessary for the country.
  Another 7% are ready to support them if these reforms do not directly affect them.
• Meanwhile, 61% are not ready to support unpopular reforms:
  – 18% because they do not believe the authorities will limit themselves as well as the people;
  – 8% because they do not believe in the effectiveness of such measures;
  – 35% because of rejection of unpopular reforms as such.
• The strongest resistance to unpopular reforms exists in the South and East, while the greatest readiness to support them is in the North.
• Supporters of different political forces relate to such reforms almost equally negatively, although somewhat higher readiness can be seen among supporters of Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s Front for Change, and greater uncertainty among the electorate of the CPU and Party of Regions.
• Despite the low level of support for unpopular reforms, 45% of respondents expect such steps from the new government. The most — in the West, North, and Center (about 50%), and the least — in the South (32%). It should be noted that supporters of the Party of Regions, Strong Ukraine, and CPU expect unpopular steps from the new authorities the least.
• The study shows a certain relationship: people who better understand the threat of economic decline are more inclined to support unpopular reforms. At the same time, only half of them expressed readiness to support such decisions.
• If the authorities take such unpopular steps, 7% of Ukraine’s residents are ready to participate in mass protests, and another 13% would support a political force that demands cancellation of such decisions.
• The most ready to personally participate in protests are residents of the West, North, East, and South, as well as supporters of the CPU, BYuT, and Strong Ukraine. Thus, protest against unpopular reforms does not have a single political, ideological, or regional vector.
• About 6% are ready to actively support a political force that advocates unpopular reforms. Meanwhile, 54% of Ukrainians will not participate in any actions, either in support or protest, and one in five could not decide.
• Among possible reforms, the greatest support was for those that do not affect most people: abolition of privileges for civil servants (43%) and reducing their numbers (34%).
• Much lower support was given to: stricter responsibility for non-payment of utilities (14.7%), cuts to budget-sector employees (13.8%), paid health insurance (12.1%), higher taxes on business (11.1%), and cuts to transport benefits (8.6%).
• Almost no support was given to: raising utility tariffs (0.9%), raising gas prices (0.9%), raising public transport fares (1.5%), partial cancellation of benefits for Chernobyl victims (1.6%), reducing childbirth payments (2.1%), partial cancellation of benefits for “children of war” (2.5%), raising retirement age (2.5%), freezing pension increases (3.4%), freezing salary increases (3.5%), and allowing banks to seize collateral from borrowers (3.5%).
• 31% said they support none of the reforms, and another 10% were undecided.
• Only 38% believe in the capacity of the new parliamentary coalition, while 43% do not. The strongest belief is among Party of Regions supporters (66%), as well as among CPU (48%), Lytvyn Bloc (33%), and Strong Ukraine (33%) — mainly in the South, Donbas, and East.
  Among opposition supporters, the least faith is among Our Ukraine (8%), BYuT (17%), and Front for Change (24%) — mainly in the West, Center, and North.
• Opinions on early parliamentary elections are split evenly: 41% in favor, 41% against. The strongest support is among Party of Regions supporters (47%). Yanukovych’s electorate is much more mobilized: 75% are ready to vote if elections were held next Sunday, compared to 64% of BYuT, 61% of Front for Change, and 57% of Strong Ukraine supporters.
  The least supportive are CPU and Lytvyn Bloc supporters.
• Only 31% support postponing local elections, 41% oppose, 28% undecided. Support is highest among coalition parties: Party of Regions (52%), Lytvyn Bloc (51%), CPU (49%), Strong Ukraine (43%). The lowest support is among Front for Change (19%) and BYuT (19%).

• According to the results of the conducted survey, in the second round of the presidential election Viktor Yanukovych was supported by 67% of Petro Symonenko’s supporters, 40% of Serhiy Tihipko’s, 25% of Volodymyr Lytvyn’s, 16% of Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s, and 8% of Viktor Yushchenko’s. Yulia Tymoshenko was supported by 76% of Oleh Tyahnybok’s supporters, 60% of Viktor Yushchenko’s, 50% of Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s, 40% of Volodymyr Lytvyn’s, 33% of Serhiy Tihipko’s, and 13% of Petro Symonenko’s. About one quarter of the supporters of Viktor Yushchenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Volodymyr Lytvyn voted against both candidates.
• It is interesting that 21% of voters who voted for Viktor Yanukovych in the second round actually voted against Yulia Tymoshenko. The highest number of such voters was in the Center, North, and East. Conversely, one quarter of voters who voted for Yulia Tymoshenko actually voted against Viktor Yanukovych. The largest share of such voters was in the North and East.
• Thus, in the second round of the presidential election, about one quarter of voters (6.7 million Ukrainians) voted not for, but rather against: either against Tymoshenko, or against Yanukovych, or against both simultaneously. The rest — about 70% — voted for a specific candidate.
• As of today, at least one quarter of voters from the category of those who voted “against” support Serhiy Tihipko, one in ten support Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and one in ten remain “against all.” At the same time, about 18% of them now support the incumbent president, and 7% support his opponent in the election.
• As of early March, the politicians’ ratings are as follows (among all respondents):
  Viktor Yanukovych – 38.2%, Yulia Tymoshenko – 22.4%, Serhiy Tihipko – 13.6%, Arseniy Yatsenyuk – 5%, Viktor Yushchenko – 2.1%, Petro Symonenko – 1.7%, Volodymyr Lytvyn – 1.2%, Oleh Tyahnybok – 1.1%.
  Other politicians – 1.1%, against all – 4%, will not participate in the elections – 5.7%, undecided – 4.2%.
• Compared to the first round of the elections, support for the now-incumbent President Viktor Yanukovych increased most significantly.
• The rating of Yulia Tymoshenko has almost not changed: 22% among all respondents and 25% among those who will participate in the elections. At the same time, there were small changes in the structure of Tymoshenko’s electorate: support slightly increased in the West at the expense of some supporters primarily of Viktor Yushchenko, remained unchanged in the North, and slightly decreased in the Center due to shifts to Serhiy Tihipko. In addition, support for Yulia Tymoshenko decreased in the East, South, and Donbas, where Viktor Yanukovych strengthened his positions.
• The rating of Serhiy Tihipko has not changed (about 13%): losses of supporters in the Donbas and South are currently compensated by flows from Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Viktor Yushchenko in the West, Center, and North. Support for Tihipko in the East is stable and is about 20%.
• Since January, Viktor Yushchenko has lost more than half of his support (from 5% to 2%). Arseniy Yatsenyuk has also slightly declined (from 7% to 5%).
• At present, the electorate of Viktor Yanukovych is significantly more mobilized than that of other politicians, and this explains the electoral gap between Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. Thus, about 75% of Party of Regions supporters declared readiness to participate in snap parliamentary elections. This is the highest indicator; for comparison, supporters of BYuT are mobilized only at 64%, Front for Change at 61%, and Strong Ukraine at 57%.
• As of early March, the situation with party ratings looks as follows (among all respondents):
  Party of Regions – 36%, BYuT – 22%, Strong Ukraine (Tihipko) – 12%, Front for Change (Yatsenyuk) – 5%, Communist Party – 2.7%, Our Ukraine (Yushchenko) – 1.9%, Lytvyn Bloc – 1.7%, Svoboda – 1.7%.
  Others – less than 1%, against all – 3.2%, undecided or will not vote – 11%.
• Analyzing the structure of party electorates, the following trends can be noted.
• BYuT and Front for Change have almost identical regional structures (one third of supporters live in the West, one quarter in the Center and North). Our Ukraine, and especially Svoboda, are oriented mostly toward the West.
• The Communist Party and the Party of Regions are traditionally oriented toward the South-Eastern regions.
• The structure of Strong Ukraine’s supporters is the most universal: half come from the so-called “orange” regions (with a slight bias toward the North), and half from the so-called “blue-white” regions (with a strong dominance of the East).
• Strong Ukraine and Svoboda have the highest share of supporters with higher education. These two forces are also the most oriented toward youth. The oldest voters dominate in the Communist Party and Our Ukraine. Based on the data, it can be assumed that Svoboda’s supporters are “new nationalists,” while Our Ukraine’s supporters are “old nationalists.”
• Among supporters of Svoboda, the Communist Party, and Our Ukraine, men dominate. In the rest, women dominate.
• Voters of the Party of Regions, Communist Party, and Strong Ukraine mainly live in cities, while BYuT and the Lytvyn Bloc mainly live in villages.
• The Russian-speaking population dominates only among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, which also have the largest share of ethnic Russians. Again, the structure of Strong Ukraine is the most universal also in terms of native language: half identify Ukrainian as native, half identify Russian or both Ukrainian and Russian.
• In the structures of BYuT and Front for Change, UOC-KP believers dominate. At the same time, among BYuT supporters there are slightly more Greek Catholics and fewer UOC-MP believers, while Front for Change has fewer Greek Catholics and more UOC-MP believers.
• The largest share of Greek Catholics is among supporters of Svoboda and Our Ukraine (where it is the dominant faith).
• UOC-MP believers dominate among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions; there is also a significant number of believers who do not belong to any confession or consider themselves non-believers (atheists).
• At the same time, it should be noted that in the structures of both the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, almost one in five voters belongs to the UOC-KP.
• Among supporters of Strong Ukraine, there are approximately equal shares of UOC-KP believers, UOC-MP believers, and believers who do not belong to any confession.

• If in March 2010 elections for Prime Minister had been held in Ukraine and Viktor Yanukovych (as President of the country) and Yulia Tymoshenko (as leader of the opposition) had not run for this position, Serhiy Tihipko would have won a convincing victory (39.4%). It should be noted that support for Tihipko for the post of Prime Minister is three times higher than his rating in the presidential election (13.05%).
• In second place would be the current head of government Mykola Azarov (15.6%), and in third place Arseniy Yatsenyuk (14.9%).
• Next in the ranking were former President Viktor Yushchenko (3.4%), Rinat Akhmetov (2.1%), Borys Kolesnikov (0.8%), Yuriy Yekhanurov (0.8%), Yuriy Boyko (0.2%) and Andriy Klyuyev (0.1%). 3.9% of respondents would support another candidate, 8% would support none, and 11% were undecided.
• Respondents in all regions except Donbas gave first place to Tihipko, while in Donbas he shared first place with Azarov. Yatsenyuk received his highest support in the West.
• While supporters of Strong Ukraine, Front for Change, and Our Ukraine gave overwhelming preference to their leaders — respectively Tihipko (86%), Yatsenyuk (82.4%), and Yushchenko (56.8%) — supporters of the Party of Regions were almost evenly split between Tihipko (37.6%) and Azarov (35.3%).
• Azarov won only among Communist Party supporters — 29.6% versus 25.9% for Tihipko.
• Tihipko was preferred by 39.6% of BYuT supporters, 24.2% of Svoboda, and 16.2% of Our Ukraine supporters.
• In turn, Yatsenyuk received 23.5% of the “votes” of BYuT supporters, 39.4% of Svoboda, and 18.9% of Our Ukraine.
• The highest support for the current Vice Prime Minister was recorded among young people and those of middle age. The higher the level of education, the higher the level of support for Tihipko for Prime Minister.
• It is interesting that Rinat Akhmetov is also seen as Prime Minister mainly by young people.
• Azarov and Tihipko received more support in cities, while Yatsenyuk and Yushchenko — in villages.
• Unlike Tihipko, who received fairly even support among respondents by native language and nationality, Azarov was supported by five times fewer Ukrainian-speaking respondents than Russian-speaking ones, and by 2.5 times fewer Ukrainians than Russians.
• Yatsenyuk, on the contrary, has significantly greater support among Ukrainian-speaking people and Ukrainians.
• (!) Note: the fieldwork ended on March 10, that is, on the eve of the official appointment of Azarov as Prime Minister and Tihipko as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine.