Press releases

• Ukrainians tend to feel unsafe rather than safe. The further east, the less safe citizens feel and the less satisfied they are with their lives. City residents, women, and older people feel especially unprotected.
  The key security problems that citizens see are not so much crime as poverty, corruption, and economic crises.
  Among possible crimes, Ukrainians fear most becoming victims of financial fraud and scams, hooligan attacks on the street, and robbery. Almost half of young women fear becoming victims of sex-related crimes.
• Despite the fact that citizens relatively rarely contact law-enforcement agencies, Ukrainians in general have a negative attitude toward them; courts are trusted the least. Only 12% contacted the police during the year. Two thirds of respondents did not have to observe any actions by law-enforcement officers in the current year in which human rights were violated.
• Importantly, the level of trust in law-enforcement agencies at the local level is significantly higher than at the central level. Similarly, Ukrainians evaluate the level of security in their own locality much better than the level of security in the country as a whole. In addition, people who contacted law-enforcement agencies and obtained a positive result have a significantly better attitude toward them afterward.
• The key problems of the Ukrainian police are corruption, public distrust, low morality of officers, high dependence on higher authorities, and low level of professional training. At the same time, according to the majority, these problems are not new and arose either during the Soviet period or in the early years of independence. More than 80% emphasize that the Ukrainian law-enforcement system needs reforms, including 51% who say they are urgent.
• An absolute majority of respondents (65%) believe that control over compliance with the law in the country is a shared responsibility of citizens and law-enforcement agencies.
• Almost 70% of respondents expressed readiness to help police officers in the performance of their professional duties, but only 14% under any circumstances, while about half would do so only if it does not harm their own interests or those of their relatives. Notably, in regions where local police are trusted most (the West), the highest readiness to help was also recorded. In contrast, in the East and South fewer people were willing to help.
• Only every third witness of offenses committed by others during the past year, and only every sixth witness of bribery, abuse of state funds and property, reported this to the relevant authorities. People usually do not contact law-enforcement agencies because of lack of faith that criminals will be punished, fear that the police will not protect witnesses from criminals, and fear of being turned from a witness into a suspect.
• Almost 60% of respondents believe that the Ukrainian police will cope with maintaining public order during EURO-2012 next year.
• Only 21% of respondents have a positive attitude toward the idea of renaming the militia to police, 43% have a negative attitude, and 36% are undecided.
• According to the results of a study conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” at the end of December 2011, 42% of Ukrainians are satisfied with their lives (only 10% fully satisfied), while 54% are not satisfied (including 20% fully dissatisfied). Another 4% were undecided.
  Residents of Western Ukraine are the most satisfied with their lives, residents of Southern and Eastern Ukraine less so. The younger the respondents, the more satisfied they are with their lives. City residents are more optimistic; likewise, men feel more satisfied than women.
• According to the latest Eurobarometer data published in October 2011, on average 81% of EU residents are satisfied with their lives (one quarter fully satisfied) and only 18% are dissatisfied. By this indicator Ukraine is behind every EU country, most of all Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, and Ireland. At the same time, Ukraine is closest in life-satisfaction levels to Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Portugal, Lithuania, and Latvia. Starting from Estonia, the gap increases sharply to Ukraine’s disadvantage.

SENSE OF PERSONAL SAFETY

• Only 7% of Ukrainians feel completely safe, and 31% feel rather safe walking alone after dark in their neighborhood. At the same time, 54% feel unsafe, and 8% are undecided.
  By this indicator, Ukraine also trails all EU countries, most of all Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Slovenia, while being closest to Bulgaria and Lithuania.
• Residents of villages feel much safer than city residents. Older people and women feel the least protected.
  People feel safest in Western Ukraine, and least protected in the South and especially the East, where only one quarter feel rather safe, while 60% feel rather unsafe walking alone after dark.
• Only 4% believe that the level of safety in their locality improved over the past year, 61% say it stayed the same, and 28% say it worsened.
  Only 6% believe road safety improved, 51% say it did not change, and 37% say it worsened.
  Only 2% think overall safety in the country improved, 41% say it did not change, and 48% say it worsened.
• Two thirds of those who feel completely safe are satisfied with their lives, while 60% of those who feel unsafe are dissatisfied.

FACTORS OF INSECURITY

• The most important security problems for Ukrainians are poverty (66%), corruption (53%), economic and financial crises (40%), street crime (35%), and environmental degradation (23%).
  Less important are organized crime (14%), natural disasters and technological catastrophes (10%), civil conflicts (6%), cybercrime (6%), terrorism (4%), nuclear disasters (4%), religious and national extremism (3%), illegal immigration (3%), and border insecurity (2%).
• Eurobarometer data (November 2011) show that for EU citizens the main threats are economic and financial crises (33%), terrorism (25%), poverty (24%), organized crime (22%), and corruption (18%).
  Compared with the EU, Ukrainians rate poverty (66 vs 24%) and corruption (53 vs 18%) much higher as threats. They also rate street crime as a bigger threat, while they fear organized crime, cybercrime, terrorism, religious extremism, and illegal immigration less.
• 63% fear becoming victims of financial fraud, 61% fear hooligan attacks, 60% fear home or car robbery, and 57% fear street robbery.
  About 30% fear sexual crimes. Almost half fear being convicted for a crime they did not commit.
  Women fear all these threats more than men, especially sexual crimes (almost 50%). Fear is higher in cities, in the East and South, and among middle-aged and older people. Youth fear sexual crimes the most.

TRUST IN LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

• About a third could not assess the Security Service of Ukraine, customs, and tax authorities; a quarter could not assess the prosecutor’s office; one sixth could not assess courts and traffic police; and only one tenth could not assess the militia.
  Overall, attitudes toward law-enforcement are more negative than positive.
• Among law-enforcement agencies, the Security Service of Ukraine is trusted the most (16% fully trust it), while courts are trusted the least (only 8% fully trust them).
  Compared with a similar survey in Russia (Levada Center, autumn 2011), trust in law-enforcement is higher in Russia than in Ukraine, but in both countries courts are trusted least.
• Trust in local police is higher than in national police. 29% completely distrust local police, but 41% completely distrust the police overall.
  Two thirds did not observe any police actions violating human rights during the year. Among those who did: 17% saw rudeness, 13% abuse of office, 12% bribery, 7% cruelty, 7% falsification of cases, 4% refusal to accept complaints.
• Only 12% contacted law-enforcement during the year; only half resolved their issue. 10% contacted traffic police; about 70% of those resolved their issue.
  Those who received positive outcomes trust police more.
• PROBLEMS OF THE UKRAINIAN POLICE
• Main obstacles: corruption (64%), public distrust (39%), low morality (39%), dependence on higher authorities (34%), low professional training (31%).
  Over 80% say reforms are needed; 51% say urgently.

COOPERATION WITH LAW-ENFORCEMENT

• 65% believe law enforcement is a shared responsibility of citizens and authorities.
  70% are ready to help police, but mostly only if it does not harm their interests.
• Only one third of witnesses to crimes and one sixth of witnesses to corruption reported them. Main reasons: lack of faith in punishment (56%), fear of reprisals (48%), and fear of becoming a suspect (47%).
• OTHER QUESTIONS
• Almost 60% believe police will ensure order during EURO-2012.
  Only 21% support renaming militia to police; 43% oppose; 36% undecided.
  30% agree that Ukraine is becoming a “police state”, 36% disagree, 34% undecided.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, conducted at the end of December 2011, the level of political activity of Lviv residents remains at a relatively high level: 50% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 28% would rather take part than not.
  The highest level of voter mobilization is among Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held at the end of December 2011, 20.7% of Lviv residents would support the Batkivshchyna party (data are given among those who intend to take part in the elections).
  Somewhat fewer Lviv residents would support Svoboda (17.1%) and Front for Change (16%).
  The UDAR party would be supported by 6.2% of voters, Civic Position by 4.5%, the Party of Regions by 3.9%, Our Ukraine by 3.3%, the Communist Party and For Ukraine! by 1% each.
  Other parties would be supported by about 4.8% of voters.
  10% of voters would not support any party, 11.6% are undecided.
• Compared to November, the changes are minimal. Due to growth in support compared to September, Batkivshchyna continues to hold leadership in the rankings in Lviv. The ratings of Svoboda, Front for Change, and UDAR did not change in December. At the same time, the number of the “undecided” continued to grow (from 7% in September, 11% in November to 12% in December) and “against all” (from 6% in September, 8% in November to 10% in December).
• The signing in early December of the Law on the Election of People’s Deputies gave a formal start to election campaigns in single-member districts, including in Lviv. In this connection, during December four “signal” surveys were conducted in four electoral districts of Lviv in order to understand whom Lviv residents remember from previous elections, whom they trust among new politicians, etc.
• Key methodological points that were taken into account in preparing and conducting the study:
• When forming the list of potential candidates, primarily the experience of politicians running in the respective districts was taken into account. In isolated cases, information from experts and the media was used. In addition, the list ensured maximum representation of candidates from the main parties.
• In each district, both the rating and the electoral attractiveness of potential candidates were measured. The latter indicator was calculated using a separate scale, which made it possible to identify both “core” supporters and “potential” supporters who may vote for a candidate. This also made it possible to show the overall positive and negative attitudes toward local politicians.
• In each Lviv district, its own list of candidates was studied. At the same time, in order to more fully study public opinion, the electoral attractiveness of three “universal” candidates — opinion leaders representing different socio-political groups — was also measured in each district: the incumbent mayor Andriy Sadovyi, who conducts active political activity but is not clearly aligned with any party and has not declared any intention to run; the leader of Svoboda Oleh Tyahnybok, who conducts active political activity clearly aimed at parliamentary elections; and the rector of Lviv National University Ivan Vakarchuk, who is not actively involved in politics but enjoys a high level of public trust.

DISTRICT #1 (Sykhiv, part of Lychakiv district)

• Currently there are two leaders of electoral sympathy in the district: Yurii Mykhalchyshyn (Svoboda) – 15% and Andrii Shkil (Batkivshchyna) – 13%.
  Somewhat fewer voters are currently ready to vote for Taras Chornovil (7%), Oleksandr Sheika (6%), Andrii Parubii (6%), and Dmytro Dobrodomov (5%).
  Even fewer would support Volodymyr Hirniak (3%), Ihor Rudnytskyi (2%), Volodymyr Zahorskyi (2%), and Oleh Matsekh (2%).
  Other candidates would be supported by about 12% of district voters, 15% would not support anyone, and 15% are undecided.
• For Mykhalchyshyn, with a rating of 15%, 8% are firmly ready to vote and 14% could consider voting for him, meaning his total potential is 22%.
  For Shkil, with 13%, 8% are firm supporters and 19% are potential, giving him a total of 27%, meaning he may overtake Mykhalchyshyn.
• Several other politicians have high electoral attractiveness: Parubii can grow from 6% to 15%, Dobrodomov from 5% to 15%, and Sheika from 6% to 12%.
  The leader of the anti-rating is Taras Chornovil (almost 60% would not vote for him under any circumstances).
• In the 2002 parliamentary elections in this district, Chornovil won decisively with 66%.
  Recent electoral experience includes Sheika (Front for Change) who received 9% in 2010 regional elections, Zahorskyi (Party of Regions) with 7%, and Pavlo Sobol (Pora) with 4%, none of whom retained their results.

DISTRICT #2 (Zaliznychnyi, part of Shevchenkivskyi district)

• Currently there is one clear leader of electoral sympathies in the district: Iryna Farion (Svoboda) – 21%.
• Significantly fewer voters are currently ready to support Vasyl Kuibida (7%), Yurii Pidlisnyi (6%), Roman Ilyk (6%), and Yaroslav Hinka (5%).
• Even fewer are ready to vote for Petro Khobzei (3%), Mykola Kniazhytskyi (2%), Oleh Sorochkin (2%), and Petro Kachura (2%).
  Other candidates would be supported by about 6% of district voters, 11% would not support anyone, and 31% are undecided.For Farion, with a rating of 21%, 12% are firmly ready to vote and 14% may consider voting for her, meaning she has a potential of 26%.
• For Kuibida, with 7%, 4% are firm supporters and 12% are potential, giving him 16% total.
• The remaining politicians have much weaker chances: Ilyk and Pidlisnyi can increase from 6% to 9%, Hinka from 5% to 8%.Thus, Farion, who won the 2010 regional council elections in single-member district No. 2 with 31%, can currently confirm her leadership in parliamentary elections as well.
• Kuibida’s potential corresponds to his 16% result in the 2010 local elections.
• Pidlisnyi (Front for Change), who received 8% in 2010, and Khobzei (Our Ukraine), who received about 5%, have also confirmed their potential.At the same time, Petro Kachura, who won this district in the 2002 parliamentary elections with 41%, is currently supported by only 2%.
• Mykola Kniazhytskyi, who had 14% in 2002, now also has only 2%.
• Andrii Senyshyn, who had 13% in 2002, now has 1%.
• Since these politicians do not have either strong positive or strong negative images, voters have simply forgotten them.Among party supporters, the greatest chances to attract voters have Hinka (electorally attractive to 92% of UDAR supporters), Farion (77%), Pidlisnyi (47% among Front for Change) and Khobzei (47% among Our Ukraine).
• Farion and Kuibida can attract the largest share of undecided voters — 15% and 12% respectively.
• Kuibida can also attract about one quarter of Front for Change and Batkivshchyna supporters.
  ‍

DISTRICT #3 (Frankivskyi and Halytskyi districts)There is no clearly expressed leader here; instead, there is a tight group of contenders — a true “group of death.”Six candidates have roughly equal support:

• Stepan Kubiv (9%), Petro Pylypenko (8%), Stepan Kurpil (7%), Petro Pysarchuk (7%), Taras Stetskiv (7%), and Viktor Pynzenyk (6%).Less support goes to Vira Liaskovska (4%), Petro Adamyk (2%), and Yaroslav Kendzor (2%).
• About 10% support other candidates, 16% would support none, and 24% are undecided.Potential growth:It is notable that Pylypenko, who won the 2010 regional election with 27%, now has only 8%.
• Stetskiv (34% in 2002) and Kurpil (21% in 2002) are now both at 7%.
• Pynzenyk, who won the district in 1998 with 47%, now has 6%.
• Although Stetskiv and Pynzenyk have the highest positive image, voters say this is no longer enough to vote for them.Party transfer potential:
  • Pysarchuk is attractive to 70% of Party of Regions supporters
  • Kubiv to 56% of Front for Change
  • Pylypenko to 51% of Svoboda
  • Stetskiv and Pynzenyk attract many undecided voters
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DISTRICT #4 (Pustomyty district, parts of Lychakiv and Shevchenkivskyi)

• Two clear leaders:
  Bohdan Dubnevych – 21% and Oleh Hudyma – 13%.
  Then Yaroslav Mudryi (Svoboda) – 8%, Mykhailo Kadykalo (Front for Change) – 6%.Dubnevych has the strongest core: 17% firm + 14% potential = 31%.
  Hudyma: 13% → 21%,
  Mudryi: 8% → 16%,
  Kadykalo: 6% → 11%.

SINGLE OPPOSITION CANDIDATE

• 63% support the idea of a unified opposition candidate.
• Highest in District #2, lowest in #3.34% would vote for a candidate backed by Batkivshchyna + Front for Change + Svoboda.
• 37% would decide depending on the person.
• Support for a UDAR + Civic Position candidate is smaller but has growth potential.

PUBLIC FIGURE POTENTIAL

• Support potential:
  • Andriy Sadovyi – 31–37%
  • Oleh Tyahnybok – 23–35%
  • Ivan Vakarchuk – 28–32%
  Only Dubnevych, Farion, and Shkil approach these levels.

• Kubiv from 9% to 17%
• Pylypenko from 8% to 14%
• Kurpil from 7% to 13%
• Pysarchuk from 7% to 11%
• Stetskiv from 7% to 13%
• Pynzenyk from 6% to 14%
• Liaskovska from 4% to 13%

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in December 2011, for 48% of respondents the most favorite winter holiday is New Year, while for 41% it is Christmas. Another 5% prefer St. Nicholas Day the most, and 2% – Old New Year. Only 1% of respondents do not like any of the winter holidays, and 2% were unable to determine which holiday they prefer.
• Regionally, Christmas is significantly more popular in the West of the country (66%). In the Center, New Year and Christmas are equally popular, while in the North, South, Donbas and East New Year is the most favorite holiday, as noted by up to 60% of respondents. The older the respondents are, the more they value Christmas; younger respondents prefer New Year. Men tend to prefer New Year, while women prefer Christmas. Religious respondents are much more likely to look forward to Christmas than New Year, especially Greek Catholics (73%), followed by Orthodox believers of the Moscow Patriarchate (49%) and the Kyiv Patriarchate (42%). Believers who do not associate themselves with any denomination (58%) and non-believers (73%) are much more likely to prefer New Year.
• 44% of respondents plan to put up a real Christmas tree at home for New Year, about a quarter plan to use an artificial tree, 15% will limit themselves to New Year decorative compositions, and 18% will most likely have neither a tree nor a decoration. The latter category is mostly represented by older people: almost 40% of respondents aged over 60 do not plan to decorate their homes for the winter holidays. At the same time, almost 60% of respondents aged 18–39 plan to put up a real tree, while almost 40% will use an artificial tree or a decorative composition. The tradition of installing a real tree is most widespread in the West, South and Donbas, while artificial trees are most common in the North (especially Kyiv) and in the Center. New Year decorative compositions are most popular in the East, where a large share of the population lives in urban areas.
• Respondents were also asked what they would wish for the Ukrainian state in 2012. The most common wishes were citizens’ welfare (68%), economic growth (62%) and stability (53%). Other frequently mentioned wishes included reducing corruption (46%), peace (45%), improving public health (44%) and responsible government (43%). 29% wished for fair elections, almost the same share wished for a qualitatively new government (29%) and national unity (28%). 24% wished for improvements in culture and education, and 21% wished for successful hosting of EURO 2012. Effective socio-economic reforms and new political leadership were equally important wishes, each receiving 20%. Smaller shares mentioned repayment of external debt (17%), democratic development (16%), stronger international reputation (14%), strengthening independence (14%), higher birth rates (14%), responsible citizens (13%), sports achievements (12%), a qualitatively new opposition (11%) and secure borders (9%).
• Age differences in responses were minimal, but regional differences were observed. Residents of the East and Donbas more often wished for welfare, economic growth, stability, reduced corruption and improved public health. Residents of the Center more often wished for peace. Residents of the North more often wished for external debt repayment, higher birth rates, sports achievements, new political leaders and a qualitatively new opposition. Donbas residents more often wished for a qualitatively new and responsible government. Residents of the West more often wished for national unity, spiritual development, democratic development, stronger international reputation and stronger independence. Residents of the East more often wished for effective socio-economic reforms. At the same time, respondents from the West, North and East were united by the wish to improve culture and education. Respondents from the East and West were united by the wish for successful hosting of EURO 2012. The wish for fair elections united respondents across all regions of the country.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if parliamentary elections in Ukraine had taken place in December 2011, 36% of respondents would have definitely participated and another 37% would have rather participated. The highest level of voter mobilization was recorded among supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and the Communist Party of Ukraine.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in December 2011, 20.3% of respondents (among those who intended to vote) would have supported Batkivshchyna, 19.4% – the Party of Regions, 11.3% – Front for Change, 8.1% – the Communist Party, 5% – UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, and 4.4% – Svoboda. Another 2.3% would have supported Civic Position, 1.2% – the People’s Party, and 1% – Our Ukraine. Other parties would have received 3.5%. Around 9.4% would have voted against all parties, and 14% were undecided.
• At the same time, respondents most wanted to see Front for Change (33%), Batkivshchyna (28%), the Party of Regions (21%), UDAR (21%), Svoboda (16%), the Communist Party (15%) and Civic Position (15%) represented in the next parliament. Fewer than 10% wanted to see other political forces represented. The highest perceived chances of passing the 5% electoral threshold were attributed to the Party of Regions (56%), Batkivshchyna (45%), Front for Change (41%), the Communist Party (23%), Svoboda (17%) and UDAR (14%). Only 7% believed Civic Position could pass the threshold, although twice as many respondents wanted to see it in parliament.
• Regional preferences differed. Residents of Western Ukraine most wanted to see Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and Svoboda in parliament. Residents of the Center and North preferred Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and UDAR. Residents of the South preferred the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, while residents of the East preferred Front for Change and the Party of Regions. In Donbas, respondents most wanted to see the Party of Regions, the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party.
• About 31% expected that the next parliament would form a pro-presidential majority, while 39% expected an opposition majority, and 30% were undecided. Pro-presidential majority expectations were more common in the East and Donbas, while opposition majority expectations dominated in the West, North and Center.
• If presidential elections had taken place in December 2011, 18.9% would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 18.9% – Yulia Tymoshenko, 12.8% – Arsenii Yatseniuk, 6% – Petro Symonenko, 5.5% – Vitalii Klitschko, 3.9% – Anatolii Hrytsenko, 3.7% – Oleh Tyahnybok and 2.7% – Serhii Tihipko. Around 5% would have supported other candidates, 7.8% would have voted against all candidates, and 14.5% were undecided.
• The key trend of the month was the growth of support for the Communist Party (from 5% in November to 8% in December), primarily in the East, Donbas and the Center. At the same time, with Batkivshchyna remaining stable (around 20%), the Party of Regions lost its leading position mainly due to voter shifts toward the Communist Party. There were also signs of gradual fragmentation of support among traditional political leaders, with moderate growth recorded for Front for Change and Svoboda, while UDAR remained close to the electoral threshold. The personal rating of Anatolii Hrytsenko also increased, although it remained significantly higher than the rating of his party, Civic Position.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in December 2011, two thirds of Ukrainian families have a tradition of giving presents on St. Nicholas Day. At the same time, 29% do not follow this tradition, while 1% are not familiar with this holiday. Another 6% of respondents were unable to say whether such a tradition exists in their families.
• The tradition is most widespread in Western Ukraine, where it is practiced by 90% of families. It is less common in the North (67%) and the Center (62%), and even less so in the South (56%), the East (52%), and the Donbas (51%).
• The custom of giving presents on St. Nicholas Day is more prevalent among religious people, especially Greek Catholics (92%), as well as among Orthodox believers of the Kyiv Patriarchate (73%) and the Moscow Patriarchate (58%). Almost half of non-believers do not observe this tradition.
• Women, young people, and respondents of middle age are more likely than others to maintain the tradition of giving gifts on St. Nicholas Day.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in late November and early December 2011, political engagement in Lviv remained relatively high. Almost half of residents said they would definitely participate in parliamentary elections and another 30% said they were likely to do so. Voter mobilization was strongest among supporters of Svoboda, the Party of Regions, and Batkivshchyna, while supporters of Front for Change, UDAR, and Civic Position were somewhat less mobilized.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place at that time, Batkivshchyna would have received the largest share of support among likely voters in Lviv, followed closely by Svoboda and Front for Change. Civic Position, UDAR, the Party of Regions, Our Ukraine, and the Communist Party would have attracted smaller shares, while a notable proportion of voters were either undecided or said they would not support any party. In a hypothetical presidential election held at the beginning of December, Yulia Tymoshenko would have led with 20% of the vote among likely voters, narrowly ahead of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, followed by Oleh Tiahnybok, Vitali Klitschko, and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, while Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko trailed far behind.
• Among national politicians, Vitali Klitschko enjoyed the highest level of trust in Lviv, and his trust rating had increased over the previous month. Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko were also viewed relatively positively, with Hrytsenko’s trust growing enough to surpass that of Oleh Tiahnybok, whose ratings remained stable. Attitudes toward Yulia Tymoshenko continued to improve, with distrust declining substantially over the previous six months, although her trust was still lower than that of Klitschko and Yatsenyuk. Viktor Yushchenko recorded a historically low level of trust and a record-high level of distrust, while Serhiy Tihipko and Viktor Yanukovych also faced overwhelming distrust, with Yanukovych’s negative ratings remaining stable over the year.
• The data pointed to several important trends. In November, Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna regained leadership in the ratings, driven in part by improving public attitudes toward the former prime minister. At the same time, the steady growth of Front for Change stalled for the first time in a year and a half, and Yatsenyuk lost his lead in the presidential ranking. Support for Klitschko and Hrytsenko continued to rise, increasingly at the expense of Yatsenyuk. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions gained some support by absorbing former Tihipko voters, while Tihipko’s own ratings continued to fall. Growing dissatisfaction with Viktor Yushchenko also contributed to the decline of Our Ukraine. The share of undecided voters and those who would vote “against all” also increased over the month.
• At the local level, a majority of Lviv residents were satisfied with the performance of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, and dissatisfaction had declined slightly over the month. The head of the regional council, Oleh Pankevych, remained poorly known, with more than 40% unable to evaluate his performance, and a similar pattern was observed for the newly appointed head of the regional state administration, Mykhailo Kostiuk, whose work most respondents could not yet assess.

• According to a survey conducted by Rating Group in early November 2011, 45% of respondents felt that freedom of speech in Ukraine had been curtailed since the presidential election, while 32% said they did not perceive such restrictions and 22% were undecided. This was the worst indicator recorded over the previous two years: only about one third of Ukrainians did not sense a deterioration in freedom of speech, and just 9% of them were fully confident in that view. After a temporary improvement at the beginning of 2011, perceptions clearly worsened again toward the end of the year. For comparison, in April 2010 nearly two thirds of citizens did not feel any rollback of freedom of speech, meaning that within a year and a half this share had fallen by half.
• Negative trends were more often reported by middle-aged respondents and by those with relatively higher levels of education, and men were more sensitive to the issue than women. Over the preceding six months, the sharpest increase in concern about freedom of speech was recorded in the North of the country, particularly in Kyiv. In the North, West, Center, and South, the number of people who perceived restrictions on freedom of speech exceeded the number of those who did not, a pattern especially visible among supporters of Civic Position, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, UDAR, and the Front for Change. By contrast, in the East and in Donbas, most respondents did not perceive a rollback of freedom of speech, a view that was particularly common among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party.

• Rating Group was inspired to conduct this study by the results of a reader survey carried out by the American magazine Motor Trend on the most irritating factors on the road. Of course, these studies are different, primarily because of their different methodologies, and therefore they are not directly comparable, but for identifying certain trends such a comparison is possible.
• According to the results of the study by the Sociological Group “Rating”, less than one third of Ukraine’s adult population aged 18 and over drive a car; among them, less than one quarter are active drivers. The remaining respondents (about 70%) do not drive at all. In the structure of Ukrainian drivers, men dominate significantly (over 80%) as well as middle-aged people aged 30–49 (about 50%). By occupation, the largest groups are office employees (23%) and workers (32%), with equal shares of people with higher education (40%) and secondary specialized education (40%).
• Thus, drivers are most irritated on the road by those fellow drivers who cut in front of others (63%), park in a way that obstructs traffic (51%), do not use turn signals when turning or changing lanes (46%), and blind others with high beams at night (42%).
• Drivers are also irritated by those who drive in the middle of the road or between lanes (35%), refuse to let other cars pass (35%), exceed the speed limit (34%), talk on a mobile phone while driving (25%), are aggressive and swear or gesture behind the wheel (24%), and do not turn on red when a green arrow is allowed (22%).
• Ukrainian drivers are much less irritated by slow drivers (13%), drivers who play loud music in their cars (14%), those who drive dirty cars in good weather (9%), smoke while driving (9%), or constantly let other cars go ahead of them (5%). Only 3% of Ukrainian drivers say that nothing and no one irritates them on the road.
• Compared to the results of the Motor Trend survey, American and Ukrainian drivers are equally irritated by drivers who talk on a mobile phone while driving.
• At the same time, Ukrainian drivers are much more irritated by those who cut in, do not use turn signals, and do not turn on red when a green arrow is allowed, and are much less irritated by slow drivers. Thus, the origin and mental roots of the saying “The slower you go, the farther you’ll get” appear quite logical.
• A few more interesting points. Drivers who speed, talk on mobile phones, smoke, and play loud music irritate passengers more than drivers. At the same time, passengers are almost not irritated at all by slow drivers. Passengers are also more than three times less irritated by drivers who cut in front of others. Obviously, passengers simply do not fully understand this problem as such.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group in November 2011, 13% of respondents consider a presidential system to be optimal for Ukraine, 34% support a presidential-parliamentary form of government, 26% a parliamentary-presidential system, 5% a parliamentary system, 2% a dictatorship, and 21% could not decide on this issue.

TRENDS:

• Support for a presidential system in Ukraine has been gradually declining: from 24% in October 2009 and 26% in April 2010 to 16% in March 2011 and to 13% in November 2011. A presidential-parliamentary system has been consistently supported by about one third of respondents.
• These trends closely mirror the dynamics of Viktor Yanukovych’s approval ratings: from 36% in October 2009 and 44% in April 2010 to 26% in March 2011 and 20% in November 2011.
• Against this background, support for parliamentary-presidential and parliamentary forms of government is increasing (a three-year peak is recorded): from 22% in October 2009 and 20% in April 2010 to 25% in March 2011 and 31% in November 2011.
• Among the strongest supporters of strengthening presidential power in Ukraine are voters of the Party of Regions, Svoboda, and UDAR. Among the strongest supporters of strengthening parliamentary powers are voters of Batkivshchyna and the Communist Party, and again Svoboda.
• A pro-presidential system is most strongly supported by residents of the North, the Donbas, and the West, while a pro-parliamentary system is most strongly supported in the Center and the East. The largest share of undecided respondents is in the South.

• According to the results of the study conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held at the beginning of November 2011, 33% of respondents would definitely have taken part in them and another 33% would rather have taken part. Electoral activity for the presidential election is slightly higher: 35% would definitely have participated and another 33% would rather have participated. The most mobilized voters are supporters of Batkivshchyna, the Communist Party (CPU), and the Party of Regions.

RESULTS:

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held at the beginning of November 2011, 22% of respondents (among those who would have taken part in the elections) would have voted for the Party of Regions, 19.9% for Batkivshchyna, 9.8% for Front for Change, 5.4% for the Communist Party, 4.7% for UDAR of Vitalii Klychko, and 3.3% for Svoboda.
• Another 1.9% of voters would have supported Civic Position, 1.2% the People’s Party, and 1.1% Nasha Ukraina. Other parties would have been supported by 4.3% of voters, 13.2% would have supported no party (“against all”), and 13.2% would have been undecided.
• Thus, if elections had taken place at the beginning of November and the electoral threshold had remained at 3%, six parties would have entered parliament: the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, the Communist Party, UDAR, and Svoboda. If the threshold were increased to 4%, five parties would enter parliament, and if raised to 5%, only four.
• If a presidential election had been held at the beginning of November 2011, 20.1% of respondents (among those who would have voted) would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 19.3% Yulia Tymoshenko, 11.1% Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 5.5% Vitali Klitschko, 5.2% Petro Symonenko, 2.8% Oleh Tyahnybok, 2.2% Serhiy Tihipko, and 2.6% Anatolii Hrytsenko. Other candidates would have been supported by nearly 5%, 11.9% would have voted “against all”, and 14.3% were undecided.
• TRENDS:
  • Despite the fact that the Party of Regions’ rating has stabilized (22%), support for Viktor Yanukovych continues to decline (from 23% in May to 21% in September and 20% in November).
  • At the same time, support for Yulia Tymoshenko (up to 19%) and Batkivshchyna (up to 20%) has increased — the improving attitude toward Tymoshenko recorded recently in the West, North, and Center of the country is turning into electoral gains.
  • As a result, the gap between first and second place in the presidential rating has narrowed to 1%, and in the party rating to 2%.
  • It is also worth noting the stability of the Communists (5%) and Civic Position (2%).
  • In contrast, Front for Change (10%) and UDAR (5%) have lost their growth momentum. Svoboda (3%) has also been unable to stop its downward trend.
  • The number of respondents who support no party (13%) and those who are undecided (13%) continues to grow.
  ‍
• All data are presented among respondents who intend to take part in the elections.

• Rating Group continues to study public attitudes toward the Tymoshenko case (the first results were presented at the end of September 2011).
  One month after the verdict was announced, the majority of Ukrainians continue to recognize Yulia Tymoshenko’s guilt in the “gas case”, but at the same time consider this case to be more political and insist that the former Prime Minister should be free.
• Opinions on whether the former Prime Minister should have the right to participate in the 2012 elections, and whether the statements of European politicians constitute interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, are almost evenly divided.
• The dynamics indicate that the Tymoshenko case is moving from the economic or anti-corruption sphere clearly into the ideological one.
• In the opinion of the majority, the final decision in this case belongs to the President, not to the courts or the prosecutor’s office.
• As one month earlier, respondents consider Yulia Tymoshenko rather guilty (44%) of abuse of power or official authority during the signing of the 2009 gas agreements with Russia than not guilty (36%). One in five has not decided on this issue.
• At the same time, only one quarter (24%) of respondents support the prison sentence in the Tymoshenko case regarding the 2009 gas agreements. A majority (52%) insist on mitigation or cancellation of the sentence.
  Thus, 12% support a suspended sentence or amnesty after the court decision on imprisonment;
  21% believe that the 2009 gas agreements were unfavorable for Ukraine, but that criminal liability should be removed from Tymoshenko;
  another 18% believe that all charges against the former Prime Minister should be dropped.
  22% of respondents are undecided on this issue.
• As one month earlier, only about one quarter (27%) believe that the criminal case against Yulia Tymoshenko is rather the enforcement of the rule of law, while a majority (54%) see it as political persecution. Another 19% are undecided.
• More than half (51%) also consider the new criminal case against Yulia Tymoshenko—regarding the transfer of the debts of the EESU corporation to the state budget of Ukraine—to be political persecution. Only 28% believe that this new case is rather the enforcement of the law.
• Thus, in public perception the Tymoshenko case is becoming increasingly political and may intensify regional polarization. This is indicated, in particular, by regional dynamics.
  Only in the Donbas and the South has the number of people who consider Tymoshenko guilty increased. In all other regions, including the East, it has decreased, and accordingly the number of those who do not recognize her guilt has increased.
  Only in the Donbas does the number of those who support imprisonment exceed the number of those who insist on mitigation or cancellation of the sentence. In all other regions the opposite is true.
  The view that this is political persecution dominates in all regions except the Donbas.
• Opinions on whether Yulia Tymoshenko should be allowed to participate in the 2012 parliamentary elections are almost evenly split: 42% believe she should, and 40% believe she should not. 18% are undecided.
• In the West, North, and Center, more people agree that the former Prime Minister should be allowed to participate in the next elections; in the East, South, and Donbas, more believe that she should not.
• The right of Yulia Tymoshenko to participate in the next elections is supported by 100% of Batkivshchyna supporters, about 60% of Svoboda, Civic Position, and Front for Change supporters, more than half of UDAR supporters, one third of those voting “against all” and the undecided, and only 9% of Party of Regions supporters.
• A majority of respondents (41%) believe that the final decision in the Tymoshenko case (whether she will be released or not) depends only on President Viktor Yanukovych.
• Far fewer believe that the final decision depends on the courts (19%) or the Prosecutor General’s Office (10%). Even fewer believe it depends on the Verkhovna Rada (5%) or the Security Service of Ukraine (3%).
  2% believe it depends on none of the above, and 16% are undecided.
• Only residents of the Donbas and supporters of the Party of Regions believe that the final decision depends more on the courts; all other respondents believe it depends more on the President.
• A majority (46%) believe that after a change of power, criminal cases will also be opened against representatives of the current authorities. Only one third disagree. Another 21% are undecided.
• Interestingly, the least likely to believe that criminal cases will be opened against today’s authorities after a change of power are supporters of the Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna, while the most likely to believe this are supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, and UDAR.
• 40% of respondents believe that comments by European Union politicians on the Tymoshenko verdict do not constitute interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Slightly fewer (36%) consider it interference. One quarter could not answer.
• At the same time, 40% view the comments of EU politicians on the Tymoshenko verdict positively, and 31% view them negatively. For 15% it is irrelevant, and another 15% are undecided.
• The position of those who see this as interference is not categorical, since only two thirds of them view the EU politicians’ comments negatively. At the same time, one in ten of them views the EU statements positively, and more than one in ten is indifferent.
• The most positive attitudes toward EU politicians commenting on the Tymoshenko case are found in the North, West, and Center—this includes over 80% of Batkivshchyna supporters, almost 60% of Svoboda and Civic Position supporters, and almost 50% of Front for Change and UDAR supporters.
• The most negative attitudes are in the Donbas, South, and East—including over 60% of Party of Regions supporters and over 40% of Communist Party supporters.

Simferopol, Ukraine – Today, IRI released its survey of Crimean public opinion (PDF).  The poll, conducted September 20 – October 2, 2011, is a comprehensive analysis of attitudes regarding the Crimean economic, social and political landscape.
 
IRI’s 2011 survey reveals that Crimeans have become increasingly concerned about inflation and corruption, while Russian language issues and relations with Russia dropped in issues of concern since IRI’s 2009 survey.  Since that time, the Yanukovych administration has filled many administrative positions in Crimea with officials from the Donbas region in the eastern part of the country.  IRI’s 2011 survey shows that only seven percent of respondents support such actions.  Seventy-seven percent were in favor of the international community suspending visas and freezing assets abroad for Ukrainian officials, including judges, who are engaged in corrupt practices.

This is the second survey IRI has conducted in Crimea.  The first survey was conducted in November 2009.  This poll is part of IRI’s democratic development program in Ukraine, and was designed to enable leaders to identify citizen priorities, appropriately manage expectations, better inform the electorate of their progress and help foster the ongoing integration process of Crimea into Ukraine.

The randomly selected sample consists of 1,200 Crimean residents older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote and is representative of the general population by age, gender and education.  The margin of error for the national sample does not exceed + 2.8 percent.

Crimea is a distinct area of Ukraine, whose residents’ attitudes are influenced by their historical and cultural connection to Russia and tend to differ from residents in the rest of Ukraine.  Its ethnic composition of Ukrainians, Tatars and Russians further complicates the integration of Crimea into the wider social and political context of Ukraine.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Rating Group at the end of September 2011, the greatest sources of joy for adults aged 18+ are family (66%), children (53%), and friends (41%).
  Completing the top five of the “JOY RATING” are money (31%) and watching television (27%).
• For one in five, work brings joy. Almost one in five also finds joy in being in nature, travel, music, birthdays, and giving and receiving gifts.
  One in six gets joy from pets and from housework and household chores. Slightly fewer respondents gain joy from vacations/holidays (14%), food (13%), sex (13%), cinema (12%), books (12%), and the Internet (10%).
• Less than 10% of respondents get joy from prayer (church), shopping, singing, sports, and victories of their favorite team. Less than 5% get joy from dancing, studying, theater, solitude, alcohol, and gambling.
  Only 3% of respondents say that nothing brings them joy in life.
• It should be noted that compared to a similar survey conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” two years earlier, in 2011 people feel less joy only from watching television, going to the cinema, and vacations/holidays.
  For all other areas, feelings have either not changed or improved — the largest “increase in joy” is seen in work, sex, and the Internet, as well as birthdays and gifts, pets, and victories of favorite teams.
• At the same time, over the two years the number of people who feel joy from solitude has increased significantly — now 5%.
  In addition, over the two years people have begun to feel less joy from television and more from the Internet.
• As of the end of September 2011, the happiest appear to be residents of the North (especially Kyiv), the West, and the Center. The least joyful are residents of the Donbas.
• The WEST clearly leads in joy derived from family and children, work, songs, and prayer (church). As two years ago, prayer (church) brings the greatest joy to Greek Catholics.
• Residents of the CENTER receive relatively more joy from birthdays and gifts, as well as from housework and pets. By these criteria, the Center is very similar to the SOUTH, which in addition is the absolute leader in joy from watching television.
• Residents of the EAST are the absolute leaders in joy from money — here the saying “better to have a hundred friends than a hundred rubles” works less, because the East is the only region where people gain more joy from money than from friends. At the same time, people here like to spend time in nature and derive much more joy from vacations and travel than in other regions. They also enjoy birthdays and gifts, shopping, and food.
• Music, cinema, books, and theater bring significantly more joy to residents of the NORTH (especially Kyiv).
• Family brings joy equally to city and village residents. At the same time, friends, money, travel, books, and the Internet appeal more to city dwellers, while children, gifts, housework, church, and songs bring more joy to village residents.
• Family, children, gifts, housework, pets, books, theater, shopping, singing, and prayer bring more joy to women, while friends, money, work, television, food, the Internet, sports, victories of favorite teams, alcohol, and gambling bring more joy to men. As two years ago, sex brings significantly more joy to men than to women.
• Sadly, with age people feel less joy. The older people are, the less joy they feel from friends, money, travel, music, cinema, sex, shopping, dancing, and sports. The older people are, the less they enjoy birthdays. At the same time, they increasingly enjoy housework, television, and church. Nevertheless, older people enjoy books more than the young.
• Middle-aged people enjoy solitude more than others; they also derive more joy from giving gifts, books, theater, and being in nature. They also find work more joyful than others.
• As two years ago, young people continue to be less joyful than others about children (since they are still children themselves) and family, while enjoying friends, music, travel, the Internet, cinema, sex, dancing, and sports much more than others.
• Using correlation analysis of respondents’ answers, we attempt to construct a kind of JOY MATRIX and identify related types of joy.
• Thus, if “BIRTHDAYS” bring joy, then people also enjoy receiving and giving gifts and get more pleasure than others from shopping. As two years ago, they like receiving gifts more than giving them. Note that respondents who enjoy shopping also have a very positive attitude toward money, which is logical.
• The second — the most “ACTIVE” group of related joys — includes work, vacations/holidays, friends, food, money, sex, travel, and the Internet.
  This group contrasts with the “INACTIVE” one, which includes prayer, songs, and housework and household chores. For the latter, joy from pets is often a related type of joy.
• Sports, dancing, victories of a favorite team, and studying form the related joys in the “SPORT” group.
• The next — the “ART” group — includes cinema, music, books, and theater.
• Joy from “SOLITUDE” correlates most strongly with joy from being in nature. This group is close to and often overlaps with the “ART” group.
• People who feel joy from family also feel joy from children, and vice versa. This group is conditionally called the “FAMILY” group.
• In the “GAMBLING” group, alcohol and gambling are closely related sources of joy.

• According to the results of studies conducted by the Rating Group over the last three years, the number of respondents who intend not to support any party (vote “against all”) in elections to the Verkhovna Rada has been steadily increasing.
  Thus, in mid-2009 about 8% of voters intended to vote “against all”; on the eve of the presidential election — 5%. In the first round of the presidential election, 2.2% voted “against all”, and in the second round — 4.4%.
• Immediately after the presidential election, the share of “against all” decreased to 2%, and from summer 2010 it has been rising continuously: June 2010 — 5%, October 2010 — 8%, March 2011 — 10%, May 2011 — 12%, and finally September 2011 — 13% of voters. It should be noted that these figures are calculated among respondents who intend to take part in elections. Among all respondents, the share of “against all” is even higher.
• Also, since October of last year, the number of respondents who do not intend to vote at all increased from 16% to 26%.
• The number of voters who intend to vote but have not yet decided has also increased. However, whereas in 2009–2010 the number of undecided voters consistently exceeded the number of “against all”, in 2011 the number of “against all” voters for the first time consistently exceeds the number of undecided.
• The results of the analysis indicate that the ranks of “against all”, non-voters, and the undecided have been filled mostly by former supporters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine.
• This is confirmed by the structure of the “protest” electorate, more than half of which comes from the South-East, namely the East and Donbas.
  In turn, the West contributes one quarter of the undecided, and Donbas also contributes about one quarter of this group.
• Men are more inclined to vote “against all” or to ignore elections, while women are more likely to be undecided. “Against all” is most common in cities, while the undecided are more common in villages. A significant part of the “against all” group and non-voters consists of young people. Non-working citizens are more inclined to vote “against all” or not vote at all, while working people are more likely to be undecided. The undecided have higher levels of education and income than the “against all” group.
• Only one in five (21%) of those who intend to come to the polls and vote “against all” considers the possibility of changing their position and voting for a specific party in the next elections. More than half do not even consider such a possibility, and 27% have not yet decided.
• If under the new election law they are not allowed to vote “against all”, then 35% of them intend to ignore the elections, 42% have not yet decided, and the rest may vote for specific parties, most often for Front for Change (5.4%), the Party of Regions (4.8%), the Communist Party (3%), UDAR (2.8%), and Civic Position (1.8%).
• It should be noted that none of the leading politicians can count on more than 15% trust from the “against all” category. The greatest chances of gaining at least part of their sympathy are V. Klitschko (14%), A. Yatsenyuk (13%), and A. Hrytsenko (11%). The least trusted by the “against all” group are V. Yushchenko (1%), O. Tyahnybok (3%), and Y. Tymoshenko (5%).
• The undecided are less categorical in their attitudes toward politicians. One third trust V. Klitschko, almost one in five trust A. Yatsenyuk, V. Yanukovych, and A. Hrytsenko, and one in six trust Y. Tymoshenko.
• People who vote “against all” do so because they do not believe politicians (52%) and do not trust political power as such (45%).
  One third vote “against all” because they are disappointed in their previous preferences, express protest (31%), have no one to vote for (29%), or do not want their vote to be stolen (23%).
  At the same time, one in five believes their vote does not matter, 8% do not know whom to vote for, 6% do not understand politics, and 4% vote “against all” because others do so.
• According to 69% of respondents, voting “against all” is a conscious choice (a principled position); only 20% believe it is an unwillingness to take responsibility for one’s choice, while 11% are undecided.
  The view that it is a conscious choice is most common in the North (76%) and Donbas (74%).
  Besides the vast majority of the “against all” group itself (88%), this view is also shared by those who will not vote (72%) and supporters of the Communist Party (72%).
  The opinion that it reflects an unwillingness to take responsibility is most widespread among supporters of Svoboda (32%), the Party of Regions (27%), and Batkivshchyna (26%).
• At the same time, 65% of respondents believe that the position “not to go to elections” is also a conscious choice, while only 23% see it as an unwillingness to take responsibility; 12% are undecided.
  Again, the view of a conscious choice is most strongly shared by the “against all” group (81%) and by those who do not intend to vote (70%).
  The view that it reflects unwillingness to take responsibility is most common among supporters of Batkivshchyna (28%), Svoboda (32%), and the Party of Regions (32%).
• Thus, the positions “not to vote” and “against all” are quite similar.
  However, those who do not intend to vote do so mainly because there is no one to vote for, whereas the “against all” group primarily does not trust political power as such. This is the key difference between these two categories — and it represents a clear and quite dangerous signal not only to the government, but also to the opposition and to society as a whole.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating”, only 19% of respondents believe that the merger of the party Strong Ukraine with the Party of Regions is more beneficial for S. Tihipko, while almost as many (16%) believe it is more beneficial for the Party of Regions. At the same time, the majority (44%) believe that the merger is beneficial for both sides, and only 3% believe it is beneficial for neither.
• Another 18% were unable to decide on this issue.
• Supporters of V. Yanukovych tend to believe that the merger is more beneficial for S. Tihipko, whereas supporters of Tihipko himself believe it benefits the Party of Regions.
• It should be emphasized that after the announcement of the merger of Strong Ukraine with the Party of Regions, only 3% of respondents improved their attitude toward S. Tihipko, 54% did not change their attitude, and 33% actually worsened their attitude toward the politician. Another 10% could not determine whether their attitude had changed.
• The greatest deterioration in attitudes toward Tihipko was recorded in the West (39%), North (38%), and Center (37%), as well as in the East (33%) and the South (31%). Only in the Donbas did attitudes barely worsen (16%), where the majority (61%) did not change their attitude. The strongest decline in support for Tihipko occurred among supporters of A. Hrytsenko (60%) and Y. Tymoshenko (55%), as well as O. Tyahnybok (43%), A. Yatsenyuk (41%), and those in the “against all” category (41%).
• Only 4% of respondents in the Donbas, 4% in the East, and 3% in the South improved their attitude toward Tihipko. Among Yanukovych’s supporters, only about one in ten improved their attitude toward Tihipko after the merger, and the same share worsened it, while the majority (70%) did not change their view. Among Tihipko’s own supporters, only one in ten improved their attitude, while a quarter worsened it and 60% did not change their opinion.As a result, since May 2011 overall trust in Tihipko has declined from 23% to 18%, while distrust has increased from 70% to 74%. Currently, the highest levels of trust in the Vice Prime Minister are in the South (23%), East (20%), and Donbas (20%).
• The most negative attitudes are found in the West, where 82% do not trust Tihipko — even more than those who distrust Yanukovych (75%).
• Currently, about 60% of Yanukovych’s supporters trust Tihipko, as do one quarter of V. Klychko’s supporters and one in six supporters of V. Lytvyn. At the same time, about 90% of supporters of A. Hrytsenko, A. Yatsenyuk, O. Tyahnybok, and Y. Tymoshenko, as well as almost 90% of supporters of P. Symonenko and those in the “against all” category, do not trust him.Since mid-last year, when Tihipko was the national leader in trust (over 60%) and even outpaced Yanukovych, his level of trust has fallen by more than three times.By almost all indicators, Tihipko has returned to the level of two years ago — October 2009, when he launched his presidential campaign.
• According to a late-September survey by the Rating Group, almost half of Tihipko’s supporters would vote for Yanukovych in a presidential election, one in five for Yatsenyuk, and one in ten for Klychko. On this basis, it can be assumed that:
  • a part of Tihipko’s supporters has already joined the Party of Regions, which in particular has contributed to the stabilization of its ratings amid the continued decline of Yanukovych’s rating;
  • another part remains undecided, contributing to the growth of the “undecided” (from 9% to 11%) and “against all” (from 12% to 13%) groups;
  • another part has become disillusioned and moved to support Front for Change and UDAR, whose ratings have increased since May.
  ‍
• Taking this into account and considering the experience of the second round of the 2010 presidential election, it can be assumed that the likely flow of voters from Strong Ukraine will be approximately 60 to 40 in favor of the Party of Regions, among those Tihipko supporters who will actually vote.
• One more interesting point: in December 2010, Front for Change first overtook Strong Ukraine in the rankings and took third place nationally. On average, each of these parties held the third position for no longer than one year, and the average duration of the so-called “honeymoon” period (peak ratings) was about eight months.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, as of early October 2011, the level of political activity among residents of Lviv remains relatively high: 44% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 49% in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. Another about 30% would rather take part in the elections than not.
  The highest level of voter mobilization is observed among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday, 18.2% of Lviv residents would support Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda each. Data are presented among those who intend to participate in the elections.
  UDAR would be supported by 7.2%, Civic Position by 6%, Our Ukraine by 5.8%, the Party of Regions by 4.1%, the Communist Party by 1.5%, and 1.4% each would support the European Party, For Ukraine!, and the People’s Party. Other parties would be supported by about 4% of voters. 5.6% would not support any party, and 7.3% are undecided.
• If presidential elections were held in early October, 22.1% of Lviv residents would vote for Arseniy Yatsenyuk (data among those who intend to vote).
  Yulia Tymoshenko would be supported by 18.6%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 12.4%, Vitali Klitschko by 7.8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 6.8%, Viktor Yushchenko by 4.7%, Viktor Yanukovych by 4.7%, and Serhiy Tihipko by 3.4%. Other candidates would be supported by 8.6% of voters. About 6% would not support any candidate, and 5% are undecided.
• Over the past six months, the level of trust in Lviv has worsened for almost all politicians except Yulia Tymoshenko, who is trusted more and distrusted less.
  Thus, Vitali Klitschko enjoys the highest level of trust in the city (51% trust him, 34% do not). Since May, his trust level has not changed.
  Arseniy Yatsenyuk is trusted by 47% of Lviv residents and distrusted by 42%. Since May, his trust level has declined from 54% to 47%, while distrust has risen from 35% to 42%.
  Oleh Tyahnybok is trusted by 40% and distrusted by 49%. Since May, his trust level fell from 47% to 40%, and distrust increased from 40% to 49%.
  Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 37% of Lviv residents and distrusted by 53%. Since May, her trust level improved from 35% to 37%, while distrust decreased from 56% to 53%. She has the highest level of complete trust among all politicians (14%).
  Anatolii Hrytsenko is trusted by 38% and distrusted by 41%. Since May, his trust level declined from 40% to 38%, while distrust rose from 39% to 41%.
  Viktor Yushchenko is trusted by 17% and distrusted by 74%. Since May, his trust fell from 22% to 17%, while distrust rose from 68% to 74%.
  Serhiy Tihipko is trusted by 12% and distrusted by 76%. After the announcement of the merger of Strong Ukraine with the Party of Regions, his trust level fell from 19% to 12%, while distrust rose from 71% to 76%.
  Only 8% of Lviv residents trust Viktor Yanukovych, while 84% do not. Since May, trust in the President has not changed.

TRENDS:

• In early October 2011, three political forces — Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda — jointly topped the party rating with 18% each. The rating of Batkivshchyna fluctuates between 18–20%, the rating of Front for Change has slightly increased, while Svoboda suffered the most noticeable losses, with its support falling from 24% to 18%.
• A reshuffle also occurred in the presidential ranking. While Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating remained almost unchanged (19%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk rose from 19% to 22% and became the leader. Oleh Tyahnybok, with a stable 12%, remains in third place.
• The growth of trust in Yulia Tymoshenko (and the decline in distrust) has not yet translated into growth for Batkivshchyna, so only expected trends can be discussed.
• The ratings of Vitali Klitschko (8%) and Anatolii Hrytsenko (7%) remained stable, but their parties’ ratings increased, almost for the first time approaching the leaders’ personal ratings.
  UDAR gained the most — its rating doubled from 3% to 7% since May, largely at the expense of Svoboda.
• Our Ukraine, after a record low in March, has been gradually restoring support, also in parallel with the decline of Svoboda. The party has now reached its pre–local election level (6%).
• The rating of Civic Position continues to grow: at the beginning of the year it stood at about 2%, in March 4%, in May 5%, and in October 6%.
• The Party of Regions also gained slightly, partly due to voter transfers from Strong Ukraine, which was not included on the ballot. Tihipko’s personal rating fell from 5% to 3%, and trust in him declined from 19% to a record low of 12%.
• 56% of Lviv residents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, while 35% are dissatisfied.
  October marks the highest level of dissatisfaction with the mayor over the past year. At the same time, positive evaluations have remained stable within the margin of error: 57% in December last year, 59% in February, 56% in March, 59% in May, and 56% again in October.
• 27% of Lviv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Head of the Regional State Administration, Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk, while 40% are dissatisfied. Since May, satisfaction with his performance rose from 18% to 27%, and dissatisfaction declined from 45% to 40%. For the first time, he surpassed both of his predecessors (Mykhailo Kmit and Vasyl Horbal) in positive ratings.
• Almost one quarter of Lviv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Head of the Regional Council, Oleh Pankevych, while 36% are dissatisfied.
  As before, Lviv residents are least informed about his activity: over 40% were unable to evaluate it. This figure has improved (from 62% at the beginning of the year to 41%), but slowly. Since May, satisfaction rose from 19% to 23%, but dissatisfaction also increased from 30% to 36%.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in late September 2011, 27% of Ukrainians described relations between Ukraine and Russia as warm, including 5% who called them friendly, 12% good-neighborly, and 10% fairly warm. At the same time, 46% assessed the relations as cool, including 23% as cool, 21% as tense, and 2% as hostile. In addition, 20% of respondents described the relations as neutral, while 7% were undecided.
• Relations between Ukraine and Russia are viewed most positively in the South of the country, where 40% describe them as warm, and most negatively in the Donbas, the West, and the East, where only 22% do so.
• In gas-related matters, perceptions are much more negative. Only 5% of Ukrainians describe relations with Russia in the gas sphere as warm, including 1% friendly, 2% good-neighborly, and 2% fairly warm. In contrast, 76% describe them as cool and primarily tense, including 26% cool, 43% tense, and 7% hostile. Another 12% describe gas relations as neutral, while 9% are undecided. Overall, Ukrainians see relations between the two neighboring states as more cool than warm, and in the gas sector as clearly tense and even hostile.
• It should be noted that Russians assess Ukrainian-Russian relations in a very similar way, although somewhat more mildly. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in Russia in August 2011, 28% of Russians described relations between Ukraine and Russia as warm, including 5% friendly, 11% good-neighborly, and 12% fairly warm, while 39% described them as cool, including 26% cool, 11% tense, and 2% hostile. Another 27% assessed the relations as neutral, and 7% were undecided. Other Levada Center surveys show that Russians currently view relations with Ukraine better than in 2006–2007, but worse than in 2003 and significantly worse than in 1999–2000, when about 50% described them as warm, compared to only 28% today.
• Fifty-six percent of Ukrainians support signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the European Union, while 26% oppose it and 18% are undecided. The strongest supporters of the agreement are residents of the North, West, and also the East, as well as supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, Batkivshchyna, and the UDAR party.
• At the same time, 53% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 28% oppose it, and 19% are undecided. Support for the Customs Union is strongest in the East, the Donbas, and the South, as well as among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions.
• At least 30% of Ukrainians simultaneously support both joining the Customs Union and signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU, particularly in the North and the East, where this share reaches 40%. There are also those who oppose both options, accounting for 4% of respondents, most notably in the Center, where this reaches 9%. Given these mixed attitudes, respondents were asked directly which option would be more beneficial for Ukraine. According to their answers, signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU is seen as more beneficial by 39%, while joining the Customs Union is preferred by 34%; 27% could not decide.
• As a result, the West, North, and Center are more inclined toward the EU agreement, while the Donbas, South, and East lean more toward the Customs Union. However, 14% of Batkivshchyna supporters also favor joining the Customs Union, and 14% of Communist Party supporters favor the EU agreement. Similarly, 27% of Party of Regions supporters back the EU agreement, while 22% of Front for Change supporters favor the Customs Union. The younger the respondents, the more they support the EU agreement, from 47% among those aged 18–29 to 27% among pensioners, while support for the Customs Union increases with age, from 27% among young people to 43% among pensioners.
• On gas issues, the majority of Ukrainians, 60%, believe that Ukraine pays Russia a price for gas that is above the market level and inflated. Only 13% believe the price is market-based, and 1% think it is below market level, while 26% are undecided, mainly residents of the Donbas and the East. In all regions, most respondents, especially in the North, view the gas price as inflated. Even in the South, 48% share this view, although a quarter of respondents there believe the price is market-based and 3% say it is below market level.
• Accordingly, 70% believe that Ukraine should seek a reduction in the gas price, and most of them, 53%, think this should be done without making any concessions. Only 9% would accept selling Ukraine’s gas transmission system to Russia in exchange for a lower price, 5% would accept a merger between Naftogaz and Gazprom, and 3% would accept joining the Customs Union. At the same time, 7% believe Ukraine should not demand anything and should simply fulfill the ten-year gas contract signed with Russia in 2009, particularly residents of the South and supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. Another 23% are undecided.
• Despite this confidence in the need to lower gas prices, Ukrainians see Ukraine’s negotiating position with Russia as weak. Sixty percent believe Russia’s position in gas negotiations is currently stronger, 17% think the positions are equal, and only 6% believe Ukraine’s position is stronger, while 18% are undecided. The strongest perception of Russia’s advantage is in the North, where complaints about high gas prices are also most common. Only 26% of Ukrainians believe Ukraine will be able to persuade Russia to lower the gas price in the near future, while 53% do not believe this, and 21% are undecided.
• If Russia refuses to lower the price, 44% believe Ukraine should develop its own gas fields, including shale gas, 37% think Ukraine should look for other suppliers, 32% support switching to alternative energy sources, and 31% would raise the transit fee for Russian gas transported to Europe. Smaller shares favor promoting energy efficiency in industry at 26% and among households at 21%, increasing Russia’s lease payments for its military presence in Crimea at 23%, involving Europe in the negotiations at 20%, shortening the term of Russia’s fleet in Crimea at 15%, or challenging the gas agreement in international courts at 12%. Some respondents also suggest restricting imports of Russian goods, rejecting Russian as a state language, intensifying cooperation with NATO, or leaving the CIS.
• If the gas price were lowered as a result of negotiations, 48% of Ukrainians say their attitude toward Russia’s leadership would improve and 51% would view Ukraine’s leadership more positively. Conversely, if the price were raised, 44% say their attitude toward Russia’s leadership would worsen and 48% toward Ukraine’s leadership, especially in the East and the Donbas, where attitudes toward Ukraine’s leadership would deteriorate more sharply.
• About 60% of Ukrainians are familiar to some extent with President Yanukovych’s statement of September 3, 2011, in Dushanbe criticizing pressure from Russia in gas negotiations. Only 14% are well informed, 21% know about it in general terms, 22% have heard something, and nearly 40% have heard nothing. Among those who had heard of the statement, 60% liked it and 22% did not. However, after the statement, 63% did not change their attitude toward the president, 17% improved their view, and 8% worsened it.

• In a hypothetical “second-round” runoff, only Arsenii Yatseniuk currently defeats Viktor Yanukovych, while Yuliia Tymoshenko and Vitalii Klitschko are almost tied with him but trail slightly.

Yanukovych vs Tymoshenko

• According to a survey by the Sociological Group “Rating,” if a presidential election had taken place in late September 2011 and Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliia Tymoshenko had advanced to the second round, 31.8% of respondents who intended to vote would have supported the incumbent president, 31.4% would have supported the former prime minister, 26.8% would not have supported either candidate, and 10% were undecided.
• Looking at the dynamics, in December 2010 Yanukovych was supported by 40% in a runoff against Tymoshenko; in March 2011 by 33%; in May 2011 by 34%; and in September 2011 by 32%. Tymoshenko, in turn, was supported by 30% in December 2010, 33% in March 2011, 32% in May 2011, and 31% in September 2011.
• Recall that in the most recent presidential election Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the second round (49% to 45%). Thus, both politicians have seen declining support in head-to-head contests, but the decline has been more pronounced for the incumbent.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the South (52%) and the Donbas (51%), somewhat less so in the East (42%) and the North (27%). Tymoshenko is strongest in the West (49%), the Center (43%), and the North (41%). Among voters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by supporters of Serhii Tihipko (57%), Petro Symonenko (25%), and undecided voters (21%). Tymoshenko is supported by backers of Anatolii Hrytsenko (51%), Oleh Tiahnybok (40%), and Arsenii Yatseniuk (39%). Most supporters of Vitalii Klitschko do not support either of the two.

Yanukovych vs Yatseniuk

• If Yanukovych and Yatseniuk had reached the second round in late September 2011, 29.3% would have supported Yanukovych, 34.6% Yatseniuk, 25.1% neither candidate, and 11% were undecided.
• In December 2010, Yanukovych led Yatseniuk 39% to 31%. By March 2011 it was 32% to 34%, in May 2011 32% to 32%, and in September 2011 29% to 35%. This shows a decline for Yanukovych and a rise for Yatseniuk.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the South (51%) and Donbas (48%), weaker in the East (41%) and North (23%). Yatseniuk is strongest in the West (61%), Center (41%), and North (38%). Yanukovych is backed in this matchup mainly by supporters of Tihipko (50%), Symonenko (23%), and undecided voters (18%). Yatseniuk is supported by voters of Hrytsenko (60%), Tymoshenko (59%), Tiahnybok (51%), and Klitschko (33%).
• Yatseniuk performs better against Yanukovych than Tymoshenko does, thanks to stronger support in the West and greater backing from voters of Tiahnybok and Klitschko. Notably, Tymoshenko’s supporters are more willing to support Yatseniuk against Yanukovych than Yatseniuk’s supporters are to support Tymoshenko.

Yanukovych vs Tiahnybok

• If Yanukovych and Oleh Tiahnybok had faced each other in a second round in late September 2011, 32.3% would have voted for Yanukovych, 16.8% for Tiahnybok, 38.2% for neither, and 12.7% were undecided.
• Yanukovych’s support in this matchup fell from 40% in December 2010 to 34% in March 2011, 36% in May 2011, and 32% in September 2011. Tiahnybok’s support fluctuated between 19% and 22%, ending at 17% in September 2011.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the Donbas (54%) and South (52%). Tiahnybok is strongest in the West (41%) and North (17%). Yanukovych is supported mainly by Tihipko’s voters (53%), Symonenko’s voters (23%), and undecided voters (23%). Tiahnybok is supported by voters of Hrytsenko (34%), Tymoshenko (30%), and Yatseniuk (26%). Most Klitschko supporters choose neither.

Yanukovych vs Klitschko

• If Yanukovych and Klitschko had reached the second round in late September 2011, 29.6% would have supported Yanukovych, 28.3% Klitschko, 28.3% neither, and 13.8% were undecided.
• In May 2011 Yanukovych led Klitschko 34% to 24%; by September 2011 this had narrowed to 30% to 28%, showing a decline for Yanukovych and growth for Klitschko.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the Donbas (53%) and South (50%). Klitschko is strongest in the West (45%), North (39%), Center (33%), and East (18%). Yanukovych is backed mainly by voters of Tihipko (47%), Symonenko (24%), and undecided voters (18%). Klitschko is supported by voters of Tiahnybok (57%), Hrytsenko (49%), Yatseniuk (46%), and Tymoshenko (40%).
• Importantly, none of these second-round pairings manage to attract the “against all” voters: more than 80% of them remain with their original choice.
• For reference, in the first round Yanukovych would have received 21%, Tymoshenko 18%, Yatseniuk 11.7%, Klitschko 6.6%, Symonenko 5.5%, Tiahnybok 3.5%, Tihipko 2.9%, and Hrytsenko 2.6%. “Against all” would be 10.7%, and 12.6% would be undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had taken place in late September 2011, 32% of respondents would definitely have taken part, and another 34% would probably have participated. Voter engagement in a presidential election would have been slightly higher: 33% said they would definitely vote and another 35% said they would probably do so. The most mobilized voters are supporters of Svoboda, UDAR, and Batkivshchyna.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in late September 2011, 21.9% of those who said they would vote would have supported the Party of Regions, 18.9% Batkivshchyna, 11% the Front for Change, 5.7% the Communist Party, 5.4% UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, and 4.2% Svoboda. A further 1.7% would have voted for Civic Position, 1.6% for the People’s Party, and 0.8% each for Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party. Other parties would have been supported by 4.2% of voters, including the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, which was measured for the first time and received 0.2%. “Against all” would have been chosen by 12.6% of respondents, while 11.3% were undecided.
• If elections had been held in late September and the electoral threshold had remained at 3% or 4%, six parties would have entered parliament: the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, the Front for Change, the Communist Party, UDAR, and Svoboda.
• If a presidential election had taken place in late September 2011, 21% of likely voters would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 18% Yuliia Tymoshenko, 11.7% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 6.6% Vitalii Klitschko, 5.5% Petro Symonenko, 3.5% Oleh Tiahnybok, 2.9% Serhii Tihipko, and 2.6% Anatolii Hrytsenko. Nearly 5% would have supported other candidates, 10.7% would have voted “against all,” and 12.6% were undecided.
• Compared to May, the ratings of the main leaders remained largely unchanged. The stability of the Party of Regions was partly due to voter transfers from Strong Ukraine, while Batkivshchyna maintained a high level of voter mobilization driven by court proceedings involving its leader. At the same time, the Front for Change increased its support from 9.3% to 11%, the Communist Party from 4.5% to 5.7%, and UDAR from 4% to 5.4%. The leaders of these parties also improved their positions: Arsenii Yatseniuk rose from 10.1% to 11.7%, Vitalii Klitschko from 5% to 6.6%, and Petro Symonenko from 2.9% to 5.5%. Klitschko for the first time reached fourth place in the presidential рейтинги. It is worth recalling that he had already gained support in May, rising from 3% to 5%.
• At the same time, Svoboda lost ground, falling from 5.5% to 4.2%, although its leader Oleh Tiahnybok remained stable at 3.5%. The biggest losses were recorded for Serhii Tihipko, whose rating dropped by half since May to around 3%.
• The share of respondents who do not support any party continues to grow, rising from 7% in December of the previous year to 10% in March, 12% in May, and 13% in September. The proportion of undecided voters also increased from 8% in March to 9% in May and 11% in September. One of the main reasons for the growth of the “undecided” and “against all” groups is the decision of Strong Ukraine not to run independently.
• All data are presented for respondents who said they intended to take part in elections.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, Yulia Tymoshenko is more often seen as guilty in the “gas case” than not guilty. At the same time, however, the overwhelming majority of respondents tend to believe that the case against Tymoshenko is politically motivated and therefore insist on either closing the case or mitigating the sentence.
• Forty-six percent of respondents believe that Yulia Tymoshenko is rather guilty of the crimes she is accused of by the Prosecutor’s Office, namely abuse of power or official authority during the signing of the 2009 gas agreements with Russia. Thirty-four percent consider her rather not guilty, while 20 percent were unable to decide. Tymoshenko is more often considered guilty than not guilty in the East, Donbas, and the South of Ukraine, while in the West the opposite view prevails, where the former Prime Minister is more often seen as not guilty. In the North and the Center of Ukraine, opinions are almost evenly split. More than 70 percent of supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and the People’s Party insist on her guilt, as do almost half of the supporters of the UDAR party. At the same time, almost half of supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, and Civic Position, and nearly 95 percent of supporters of Batkivshchyna, believe Tymoshenko is not guilty of the crimes she is accused of.
• At the same time, only 26 percent of respondents believe that the criminal case against Tymoshenko is rather an enforcement of the rule of law, whereas the majority, 54 percent, insist that it is political persecution by the authorities. Another 20 percent were undecided. Compared to January 2011, the share of respondents who viewed the Tymoshenko case as an enforcement of the law decreased from 36 to 26 percent, while the share who see it as political persecution increased from 46 to 54 percent. The perception of political persecution dominates in all regions except Donbas, where opinions are almost evenly split and the share of undecided respondents is the highest. A quarter of Party of Regions supporters, and nearly 40 percent of supporters of the Communist Party, UDAR, and the People’s Party agree that the Tymoshenko case is political persecution. Among supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, and Civic Position, this view is shared by nearly 80 percent, as well as by about half of those who would vote “against all”.
• Only 28 percent of respondents believe that when signing the 2009 gas agreements with Russia, Tymoshenko acted primarily in Ukraine’s interests. Four percent believe she acted primarily in Russia’s interests, and 44 percent believe she acted in her own personal interests. Another quarter were unable to decide. About one third of supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, and Civic Position believe Tymoshenko acted in Ukraine’s interests, while a similar share believe she acted in her own interests. Interestingly, the largest share of those who believe Tymoshenko acted in Russia’s interests is found among supporters of Svoboda, where at least one in ten holds this view. Only in the West and the Center of Ukraine does the share of those who believe she acted in Ukraine’s interests exceed the share of those who think she acted in her own interests.
• Only 24 percent of respondents believe that the verdict in the Tymoshenko case over the 2009 gas agreements should be imprisonment following a court decision. Eleven percent support a suspended sentence or amnesty after a guilty verdict. Meanwhile, 22 percent believe that the 2009 gas agreements were unfavorable for Ukraine but that criminal responsibility should be lifted from Tymoshenko, and another 20 percent believe all charges against the former Prime Minister should be dropped. Thus, the majority of respondents insist on either closing the criminal case, which is supported by 42 percent, or mitigating the sentence, supported by 11 percent. Twenty-two percent were unable to decide. Support for Tymoshenko’s imprisonment is highest in Donbas, at 39 percent, around 30 percent in the South and East, about one in five in the North, and around 10 percent in the Center and West. The strongest demand for closing the criminal case is found in the West and North of Ukraine, where more than half of respondents support this option.
• Only 13 percent of respondents are personally ready to take part in protest actions demanding Tymoshenko’s release from detention or prison, while 78 percent are not ready to support such protests and 9 percent were undecided. Support for protests demanding her release is highest among supporters of Batkivshchyna, at 60 percent, and Svoboda, at 30 percent. Regionally, about a quarter in the West, almost 20 percent in the North, and more than 10 percent in the Center would support such protests.