Press releases

• According to the results of studies conducted by the Rating Group over the last three years, the number of respondents who intend not to support any party (vote “against all”) in elections to the Verkhovna Rada has been steadily increasing.
  Thus, in mid-2009 about 8% of voters intended to vote “against all”; on the eve of the presidential election — 5%. In the first round of the presidential election, 2.2% voted “against all”, and in the second round — 4.4%.
• Immediately after the presidential election, the share of “against all” decreased to 2%, and from summer 2010 it has been rising continuously: June 2010 — 5%, October 2010 — 8%, March 2011 — 10%, May 2011 — 12%, and finally September 2011 — 13% of voters. It should be noted that these figures are calculated among respondents who intend to take part in elections. Among all respondents, the share of “against all” is even higher.
• Also, since October of last year, the number of respondents who do not intend to vote at all increased from 16% to 26%.
• The number of voters who intend to vote but have not yet decided has also increased. However, whereas in 2009–2010 the number of undecided voters consistently exceeded the number of “against all”, in 2011 the number of “against all” voters for the first time consistently exceeds the number of undecided.
• The results of the analysis indicate that the ranks of “against all”, non-voters, and the undecided have been filled mostly by former supporters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine.
• This is confirmed by the structure of the “protest” electorate, more than half of which comes from the South-East, namely the East and Donbas.
  In turn, the West contributes one quarter of the undecided, and Donbas also contributes about one quarter of this group.
• Men are more inclined to vote “against all” or to ignore elections, while women are more likely to be undecided. “Against all” is most common in cities, while the undecided are more common in villages. A significant part of the “against all” group and non-voters consists of young people. Non-working citizens are more inclined to vote “against all” or not vote at all, while working people are more likely to be undecided. The undecided have higher levels of education and income than the “against all” group.
• Only one in five (21%) of those who intend to come to the polls and vote “against all” considers the possibility of changing their position and voting for a specific party in the next elections. More than half do not even consider such a possibility, and 27% have not yet decided.
• If under the new election law they are not allowed to vote “against all”, then 35% of them intend to ignore the elections, 42% have not yet decided, and the rest may vote for specific parties, most often for Front for Change (5.4%), the Party of Regions (4.8%), the Communist Party (3%), UDAR (2.8%), and Civic Position (1.8%).
• It should be noted that none of the leading politicians can count on more than 15% trust from the “against all” category. The greatest chances of gaining at least part of their sympathy are V. Klitschko (14%), A. Yatsenyuk (13%), and A. Hrytsenko (11%). The least trusted by the “against all” group are V. Yushchenko (1%), O. Tyahnybok (3%), and Y. Tymoshenko (5%).
• The undecided are less categorical in their attitudes toward politicians. One third trust V. Klitschko, almost one in five trust A. Yatsenyuk, V. Yanukovych, and A. Hrytsenko, and one in six trust Y. Tymoshenko.
• People who vote “against all” do so because they do not believe politicians (52%) and do not trust political power as such (45%).
  One third vote “against all” because they are disappointed in their previous preferences, express protest (31%), have no one to vote for (29%), or do not want their vote to be stolen (23%).
  At the same time, one in five believes their vote does not matter, 8% do not know whom to vote for, 6% do not understand politics, and 4% vote “against all” because others do so.
• According to 69% of respondents, voting “against all” is a conscious choice (a principled position); only 20% believe it is an unwillingness to take responsibility for one’s choice, while 11% are undecided.
  The view that it is a conscious choice is most common in the North (76%) and Donbas (74%).
  Besides the vast majority of the “against all” group itself (88%), this view is also shared by those who will not vote (72%) and supporters of the Communist Party (72%).
  The opinion that it reflects an unwillingness to take responsibility is most widespread among supporters of Svoboda (32%), the Party of Regions (27%), and Batkivshchyna (26%).
• At the same time, 65% of respondents believe that the position “not to go to elections” is also a conscious choice, while only 23% see it as an unwillingness to take responsibility; 12% are undecided.
  Again, the view of a conscious choice is most strongly shared by the “against all” group (81%) and by those who do not intend to vote (70%).
  The view that it reflects unwillingness to take responsibility is most common among supporters of Batkivshchyna (28%), Svoboda (32%), and the Party of Regions (32%).
• Thus, the positions “not to vote” and “against all” are quite similar.
  However, those who do not intend to vote do so mainly because there is no one to vote for, whereas the “against all” group primarily does not trust political power as such. This is the key difference between these two categories — and it represents a clear and quite dangerous signal not only to the government, but also to the opposition and to society as a whole.

• According to the results of a study conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating”, only 19% of respondents believe that the merger of the party Strong Ukraine with the Party of Regions is more beneficial for S. Tihipko, while almost as many (16%) believe it is more beneficial for the Party of Regions. At the same time, the majority (44%) believe that the merger is beneficial for both sides, and only 3% believe it is beneficial for neither.
• Another 18% were unable to decide on this issue.
• Supporters of V. Yanukovych tend to believe that the merger is more beneficial for S. Tihipko, whereas supporters of Tihipko himself believe it benefits the Party of Regions.
• It should be emphasized that after the announcement of the merger of Strong Ukraine with the Party of Regions, only 3% of respondents improved their attitude toward S. Tihipko, 54% did not change their attitude, and 33% actually worsened their attitude toward the politician. Another 10% could not determine whether their attitude had changed.
• The greatest deterioration in attitudes toward Tihipko was recorded in the West (39%), North (38%), and Center (37%), as well as in the East (33%) and the South (31%). Only in the Donbas did attitudes barely worsen (16%), where the majority (61%) did not change their attitude. The strongest decline in support for Tihipko occurred among supporters of A. Hrytsenko (60%) and Y. Tymoshenko (55%), as well as O. Tyahnybok (43%), A. Yatsenyuk (41%), and those in the “against all” category (41%).
• Only 4% of respondents in the Donbas, 4% in the East, and 3% in the South improved their attitude toward Tihipko. Among Yanukovych’s supporters, only about one in ten improved their attitude toward Tihipko after the merger, and the same share worsened it, while the majority (70%) did not change their view. Among Tihipko’s own supporters, only one in ten improved their attitude, while a quarter worsened it and 60% did not change their opinion.As a result, since May 2011 overall trust in Tihipko has declined from 23% to 18%, while distrust has increased from 70% to 74%. Currently, the highest levels of trust in the Vice Prime Minister are in the South (23%), East (20%), and Donbas (20%).
• The most negative attitudes are found in the West, where 82% do not trust Tihipko — even more than those who distrust Yanukovych (75%).
• Currently, about 60% of Yanukovych’s supporters trust Tihipko, as do one quarter of V. Klychko’s supporters and one in six supporters of V. Lytvyn. At the same time, about 90% of supporters of A. Hrytsenko, A. Yatsenyuk, O. Tyahnybok, and Y. Tymoshenko, as well as almost 90% of supporters of P. Symonenko and those in the “against all” category, do not trust him.Since mid-last year, when Tihipko was the national leader in trust (over 60%) and even outpaced Yanukovych, his level of trust has fallen by more than three times.By almost all indicators, Tihipko has returned to the level of two years ago — October 2009, when he launched his presidential campaign.
• According to a late-September survey by the Rating Group, almost half of Tihipko’s supporters would vote for Yanukovych in a presidential election, one in five for Yatsenyuk, and one in ten for Klychko. On this basis, it can be assumed that:
  • a part of Tihipko’s supporters has already joined the Party of Regions, which in particular has contributed to the stabilization of its ratings amid the continued decline of Yanukovych’s rating;
  • another part remains undecided, contributing to the growth of the “undecided” (from 9% to 11%) and “against all” (from 12% to 13%) groups;
  • another part has become disillusioned and moved to support Front for Change and UDAR, whose ratings have increased since May.
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• Taking this into account and considering the experience of the second round of the 2010 presidential election, it can be assumed that the likely flow of voters from Strong Ukraine will be approximately 60 to 40 in favor of the Party of Regions, among those Tihipko supporters who will actually vote.
• One more interesting point: in December 2010, Front for Change first overtook Strong Ukraine in the rankings and took third place nationally. On average, each of these parties held the third position for no longer than one year, and the average duration of the so-called “honeymoon” period (peak ratings) was about eight months.

• According to the results of a study by the Rating Group, as of early October 2011, the level of political activity among residents of Lviv remains relatively high: 44% would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 49% in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. Another about 30% would rather take part in the elections than not.
  The highest level of voter mobilization is observed among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday, 18.2% of Lviv residents would support Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda each. Data are presented among those who intend to participate in the elections.
  UDAR would be supported by 7.2%, Civic Position by 6%, Our Ukraine by 5.8%, the Party of Regions by 4.1%, the Communist Party by 1.5%, and 1.4% each would support the European Party, For Ukraine!, and the People’s Party. Other parties would be supported by about 4% of voters. 5.6% would not support any party, and 7.3% are undecided.
• If presidential elections were held in early October, 22.1% of Lviv residents would vote for Arseniy Yatsenyuk (data among those who intend to vote).
  Yulia Tymoshenko would be supported by 18.6%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 12.4%, Vitali Klitschko by 7.8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 6.8%, Viktor Yushchenko by 4.7%, Viktor Yanukovych by 4.7%, and Serhiy Tihipko by 3.4%. Other candidates would be supported by 8.6% of voters. About 6% would not support any candidate, and 5% are undecided.
• Over the past six months, the level of trust in Lviv has worsened for almost all politicians except Yulia Tymoshenko, who is trusted more and distrusted less.
  Thus, Vitali Klitschko enjoys the highest level of trust in the city (51% trust him, 34% do not). Since May, his trust level has not changed.
  Arseniy Yatsenyuk is trusted by 47% of Lviv residents and distrusted by 42%. Since May, his trust level has declined from 54% to 47%, while distrust has risen from 35% to 42%.
  Oleh Tyahnybok is trusted by 40% and distrusted by 49%. Since May, his trust level fell from 47% to 40%, and distrust increased from 40% to 49%.
  Yulia Tymoshenko is trusted by 37% of Lviv residents and distrusted by 53%. Since May, her trust level improved from 35% to 37%, while distrust decreased from 56% to 53%. She has the highest level of complete trust among all politicians (14%).
  Anatolii Hrytsenko is trusted by 38% and distrusted by 41%. Since May, his trust level declined from 40% to 38%, while distrust rose from 39% to 41%.
  Viktor Yushchenko is trusted by 17% and distrusted by 74%. Since May, his trust fell from 22% to 17%, while distrust rose from 68% to 74%.
  Serhiy Tihipko is trusted by 12% and distrusted by 76%. After the announcement of the merger of Strong Ukraine with the Party of Regions, his trust level fell from 19% to 12%, while distrust rose from 71% to 76%.
  Only 8% of Lviv residents trust Viktor Yanukovych, while 84% do not. Since May, trust in the President has not changed.

TRENDS:

• In early October 2011, three political forces — Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, and Svoboda — jointly topped the party rating with 18% each. The rating of Batkivshchyna fluctuates between 18–20%, the rating of Front for Change has slightly increased, while Svoboda suffered the most noticeable losses, with its support falling from 24% to 18%.
• A reshuffle also occurred in the presidential ranking. While Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating remained almost unchanged (19%), Arseniy Yatsenyuk rose from 19% to 22% and became the leader. Oleh Tyahnybok, with a stable 12%, remains in third place.
• The growth of trust in Yulia Tymoshenko (and the decline in distrust) has not yet translated into growth for Batkivshchyna, so only expected trends can be discussed.
• The ratings of Vitali Klitschko (8%) and Anatolii Hrytsenko (7%) remained stable, but their parties’ ratings increased, almost for the first time approaching the leaders’ personal ratings.
  UDAR gained the most — its rating doubled from 3% to 7% since May, largely at the expense of Svoboda.
• Our Ukraine, after a record low in March, has been gradually restoring support, also in parallel with the decline of Svoboda. The party has now reached its pre–local election level (6%).
• The rating of Civic Position continues to grow: at the beginning of the year it stood at about 2%, in March 4%, in May 5%, and in October 6%.
• The Party of Regions also gained slightly, partly due to voter transfers from Strong Ukraine, which was not included on the ballot. Tihipko’s personal rating fell from 5% to 3%, and trust in him declined from 19% to a record low of 12%.
• 56% of Lviv residents are satisfied with the performance of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, while 35% are dissatisfied.
  October marks the highest level of dissatisfaction with the mayor over the past year. At the same time, positive evaluations have remained stable within the margin of error: 57% in December last year, 59% in February, 56% in March, 59% in May, and 56% again in October.
• 27% of Lviv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Head of the Regional State Administration, Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk, while 40% are dissatisfied. Since May, satisfaction with his performance rose from 18% to 27%, and dissatisfaction declined from 45% to 40%. For the first time, he surpassed both of his predecessors (Mykhailo Kmit and Vasyl Horbal) in positive ratings.
• Almost one quarter of Lviv residents are satisfied with the performance of the Head of the Regional Council, Oleh Pankevych, while 36% are dissatisfied.
  As before, Lviv residents are least informed about his activity: over 40% were unable to evaluate it. This figure has improved (from 62% at the beginning of the year to 41%), but slowly. Since May, satisfaction rose from 19% to 23%, but dissatisfaction also increased from 30% to 36%.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in late September 2011, 27% of Ukrainians described relations between Ukraine and Russia as warm, including 5% who called them friendly, 12% good-neighborly, and 10% fairly warm. At the same time, 46% assessed the relations as cool, including 23% as cool, 21% as tense, and 2% as hostile. In addition, 20% of respondents described the relations as neutral, while 7% were undecided.
• Relations between Ukraine and Russia are viewed most positively in the South of the country, where 40% describe them as warm, and most negatively in the Donbas, the West, and the East, where only 22% do so.
• In gas-related matters, perceptions are much more negative. Only 5% of Ukrainians describe relations with Russia in the gas sphere as warm, including 1% friendly, 2% good-neighborly, and 2% fairly warm. In contrast, 76% describe them as cool and primarily tense, including 26% cool, 43% tense, and 7% hostile. Another 12% describe gas relations as neutral, while 9% are undecided. Overall, Ukrainians see relations between the two neighboring states as more cool than warm, and in the gas sector as clearly tense and even hostile.
• It should be noted that Russians assess Ukrainian-Russian relations in a very similar way, although somewhat more mildly. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in Russia in August 2011, 28% of Russians described relations between Ukraine and Russia as warm, including 5% friendly, 11% good-neighborly, and 12% fairly warm, while 39% described them as cool, including 26% cool, 11% tense, and 2% hostile. Another 27% assessed the relations as neutral, and 7% were undecided. Other Levada Center surveys show that Russians currently view relations with Ukraine better than in 2006–2007, but worse than in 2003 and significantly worse than in 1999–2000, when about 50% described them as warm, compared to only 28% today.
• Fifty-six percent of Ukrainians support signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the European Union, while 26% oppose it and 18% are undecided. The strongest supporters of the agreement are residents of the North, West, and also the East, as well as supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, Batkivshchyna, and the UDAR party.
• At the same time, 53% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 28% oppose it, and 19% are undecided. Support for the Customs Union is strongest in the East, the Donbas, and the South, as well as among supporters of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions.
• At least 30% of Ukrainians simultaneously support both joining the Customs Union and signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU, particularly in the North and the East, where this share reaches 40%. There are also those who oppose both options, accounting for 4% of respondents, most notably in the Center, where this reaches 9%. Given these mixed attitudes, respondents were asked directly which option would be more beneficial for Ukraine. According to their answers, signing a Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU is seen as more beneficial by 39%, while joining the Customs Union is preferred by 34%; 27% could not decide.
• As a result, the West, North, and Center are more inclined toward the EU agreement, while the Donbas, South, and East lean more toward the Customs Union. However, 14% of Batkivshchyna supporters also favor joining the Customs Union, and 14% of Communist Party supporters favor the EU agreement. Similarly, 27% of Party of Regions supporters back the EU agreement, while 22% of Front for Change supporters favor the Customs Union. The younger the respondents, the more they support the EU agreement, from 47% among those aged 18–29 to 27% among pensioners, while support for the Customs Union increases with age, from 27% among young people to 43% among pensioners.
• On gas issues, the majority of Ukrainians, 60%, believe that Ukraine pays Russia a price for gas that is above the market level and inflated. Only 13% believe the price is market-based, and 1% think it is below market level, while 26% are undecided, mainly residents of the Donbas and the East. In all regions, most respondents, especially in the North, view the gas price as inflated. Even in the South, 48% share this view, although a quarter of respondents there believe the price is market-based and 3% say it is below market level.
• Accordingly, 70% believe that Ukraine should seek a reduction in the gas price, and most of them, 53%, think this should be done without making any concessions. Only 9% would accept selling Ukraine’s gas transmission system to Russia in exchange for a lower price, 5% would accept a merger between Naftogaz and Gazprom, and 3% would accept joining the Customs Union. At the same time, 7% believe Ukraine should not demand anything and should simply fulfill the ten-year gas contract signed with Russia in 2009, particularly residents of the South and supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. Another 23% are undecided.
• Despite this confidence in the need to lower gas prices, Ukrainians see Ukraine’s negotiating position with Russia as weak. Sixty percent believe Russia’s position in gas negotiations is currently stronger, 17% think the positions are equal, and only 6% believe Ukraine’s position is stronger, while 18% are undecided. The strongest perception of Russia’s advantage is in the North, where complaints about high gas prices are also most common. Only 26% of Ukrainians believe Ukraine will be able to persuade Russia to lower the gas price in the near future, while 53% do not believe this, and 21% are undecided.
• If Russia refuses to lower the price, 44% believe Ukraine should develop its own gas fields, including shale gas, 37% think Ukraine should look for other suppliers, 32% support switching to alternative energy sources, and 31% would raise the transit fee for Russian gas transported to Europe. Smaller shares favor promoting energy efficiency in industry at 26% and among households at 21%, increasing Russia’s lease payments for its military presence in Crimea at 23%, involving Europe in the negotiations at 20%, shortening the term of Russia’s fleet in Crimea at 15%, or challenging the gas agreement in international courts at 12%. Some respondents also suggest restricting imports of Russian goods, rejecting Russian as a state language, intensifying cooperation with NATO, or leaving the CIS.
• If the gas price were lowered as a result of negotiations, 48% of Ukrainians say their attitude toward Russia’s leadership would improve and 51% would view Ukraine’s leadership more positively. Conversely, if the price were raised, 44% say their attitude toward Russia’s leadership would worsen and 48% toward Ukraine’s leadership, especially in the East and the Donbas, where attitudes toward Ukraine’s leadership would deteriorate more sharply.
• About 60% of Ukrainians are familiar to some extent with President Yanukovych’s statement of September 3, 2011, in Dushanbe criticizing pressure from Russia in gas negotiations. Only 14% are well informed, 21% know about it in general terms, 22% have heard something, and nearly 40% have heard nothing. Among those who had heard of the statement, 60% liked it and 22% did not. However, after the statement, 63% did not change their attitude toward the president, 17% improved their view, and 8% worsened it.

• In a hypothetical “second-round” runoff, only Arsenii Yatseniuk currently defeats Viktor Yanukovych, while Yuliia Tymoshenko and Vitalii Klitschko are almost tied with him but trail slightly.

Yanukovych vs Tymoshenko

• According to a survey by the Sociological Group “Rating,” if a presidential election had taken place in late September 2011 and Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliia Tymoshenko had advanced to the second round, 31.8% of respondents who intended to vote would have supported the incumbent president, 31.4% would have supported the former prime minister, 26.8% would not have supported either candidate, and 10% were undecided.
• Looking at the dynamics, in December 2010 Yanukovych was supported by 40% in a runoff against Tymoshenko; in March 2011 by 33%; in May 2011 by 34%; and in September 2011 by 32%. Tymoshenko, in turn, was supported by 30% in December 2010, 33% in March 2011, 32% in May 2011, and 31% in September 2011.
• Recall that in the most recent presidential election Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the second round (49% to 45%). Thus, both politicians have seen declining support in head-to-head contests, but the decline has been more pronounced for the incumbent.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the South (52%) and the Donbas (51%), somewhat less so in the East (42%) and the North (27%). Tymoshenko is strongest in the West (49%), the Center (43%), and the North (41%). Among voters of other politicians, Yanukovych is most supported by supporters of Serhii Tihipko (57%), Petro Symonenko (25%), and undecided voters (21%). Tymoshenko is supported by backers of Anatolii Hrytsenko (51%), Oleh Tiahnybok (40%), and Arsenii Yatseniuk (39%). Most supporters of Vitalii Klitschko do not support either of the two.

Yanukovych vs Yatseniuk

• If Yanukovych and Yatseniuk had reached the second round in late September 2011, 29.3% would have supported Yanukovych, 34.6% Yatseniuk, 25.1% neither candidate, and 11% were undecided.
• In December 2010, Yanukovych led Yatseniuk 39% to 31%. By March 2011 it was 32% to 34%, in May 2011 32% to 32%, and in September 2011 29% to 35%. This shows a decline for Yanukovych and a rise for Yatseniuk.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the South (51%) and Donbas (48%), weaker in the East (41%) and North (23%). Yatseniuk is strongest in the West (61%), Center (41%), and North (38%). Yanukovych is backed in this matchup mainly by supporters of Tihipko (50%), Symonenko (23%), and undecided voters (18%). Yatseniuk is supported by voters of Hrytsenko (60%), Tymoshenko (59%), Tiahnybok (51%), and Klitschko (33%).
• Yatseniuk performs better against Yanukovych than Tymoshenko does, thanks to stronger support in the West and greater backing from voters of Tiahnybok and Klitschko. Notably, Tymoshenko’s supporters are more willing to support Yatseniuk against Yanukovych than Yatseniuk’s supporters are to support Tymoshenko.

Yanukovych vs Tiahnybok

• If Yanukovych and Oleh Tiahnybok had faced each other in a second round in late September 2011, 32.3% would have voted for Yanukovych, 16.8% for Tiahnybok, 38.2% for neither, and 12.7% were undecided.
• Yanukovych’s support in this matchup fell from 40% in December 2010 to 34% in March 2011, 36% in May 2011, and 32% in September 2011. Tiahnybok’s support fluctuated between 19% and 22%, ending at 17% in September 2011.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the Donbas (54%) and South (52%). Tiahnybok is strongest in the West (41%) and North (17%). Yanukovych is supported mainly by Tihipko’s voters (53%), Symonenko’s voters (23%), and undecided voters (23%). Tiahnybok is supported by voters of Hrytsenko (34%), Tymoshenko (30%), and Yatseniuk (26%). Most Klitschko supporters choose neither.

Yanukovych vs Klitschko

• If Yanukovych and Klitschko had reached the second round in late September 2011, 29.6% would have supported Yanukovych, 28.3% Klitschko, 28.3% neither, and 13.8% were undecided.
• In May 2011 Yanukovych led Klitschko 34% to 24%; by September 2011 this had narrowed to 30% to 28%, showing a decline for Yanukovych and growth for Klitschko.
• Yanukovych is strongest in the Donbas (53%) and South (50%). Klitschko is strongest in the West (45%), North (39%), Center (33%), and East (18%). Yanukovych is backed mainly by voters of Tihipko (47%), Symonenko (24%), and undecided voters (18%). Klitschko is supported by voters of Tiahnybok (57%), Hrytsenko (49%), Yatseniuk (46%), and Tymoshenko (40%).
• Importantly, none of these second-round pairings manage to attract the “against all” voters: more than 80% of them remain with their original choice.
• For reference, in the first round Yanukovych would have received 21%, Tymoshenko 18%, Yatseniuk 11.7%, Klitschko 6.6%, Symonenko 5.5%, Tiahnybok 3.5%, Tihipko 2.9%, and Hrytsenko 2.6%. “Against all” would be 10.7%, and 12.6% would be undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had taken place in late September 2011, 32% of respondents would definitely have taken part, and another 34% would probably have participated. Voter engagement in a presidential election would have been slightly higher: 33% said they would definitely vote and another 35% said they would probably do so. The most mobilized voters are supporters of Svoboda, UDAR, and Batkivshchyna.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in late September 2011, 21.9% of those who said they would vote would have supported the Party of Regions, 18.9% Batkivshchyna, 11% the Front for Change, 5.7% the Communist Party, 5.4% UDAR led by Vitalii Klitschko, and 4.2% Svoboda. A further 1.7% would have voted for Civic Position, 1.6% for the People’s Party, and 0.8% each for Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party. Other parties would have been supported by 4.2% of voters, including the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, which was measured for the first time and received 0.2%. “Against all” would have been chosen by 12.6% of respondents, while 11.3% were undecided.
• If elections had been held in late September and the electoral threshold had remained at 3% or 4%, six parties would have entered parliament: the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, the Front for Change, the Communist Party, UDAR, and Svoboda.
• If a presidential election had taken place in late September 2011, 21% of likely voters would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 18% Yuliia Tymoshenko, 11.7% Arsenii Yatseniuk, 6.6% Vitalii Klitschko, 5.5% Petro Symonenko, 3.5% Oleh Tiahnybok, 2.9% Serhii Tihipko, and 2.6% Anatolii Hrytsenko. Nearly 5% would have supported other candidates, 10.7% would have voted “against all,” and 12.6% were undecided.
• Compared to May, the ratings of the main leaders remained largely unchanged. The stability of the Party of Regions was partly due to voter transfers from Strong Ukraine, while Batkivshchyna maintained a high level of voter mobilization driven by court proceedings involving its leader. At the same time, the Front for Change increased its support from 9.3% to 11%, the Communist Party from 4.5% to 5.7%, and UDAR from 4% to 5.4%. The leaders of these parties also improved their positions: Arsenii Yatseniuk rose from 10.1% to 11.7%, Vitalii Klitschko from 5% to 6.6%, and Petro Symonenko from 2.9% to 5.5%. Klitschko for the first time reached fourth place in the presidential рейтинги. It is worth recalling that he had already gained support in May, rising from 3% to 5%.
• At the same time, Svoboda lost ground, falling from 5.5% to 4.2%, although its leader Oleh Tiahnybok remained stable at 3.5%. The biggest losses were recorded for Serhii Tihipko, whose rating dropped by half since May to around 3%.
• The share of respondents who do not support any party continues to grow, rising from 7% in December of the previous year to 10% in March, 12% in May, and 13% in September. The proportion of undecided voters also increased from 8% in March to 9% in May and 11% in September. One of the main reasons for the growth of the “undecided” and “against all” groups is the decision of Strong Ukraine not to run independently.
• All data are presented for respondents who said they intended to take part in elections.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, Yulia Tymoshenko is more often seen as guilty in the “gas case” than not guilty. At the same time, however, the overwhelming majority of respondents tend to believe that the case against Tymoshenko is politically motivated and therefore insist on either closing the case or mitigating the sentence.
• Forty-six percent of respondents believe that Yulia Tymoshenko is rather guilty of the crimes she is accused of by the Prosecutor’s Office, namely abuse of power or official authority during the signing of the 2009 gas agreements with Russia. Thirty-four percent consider her rather not guilty, while 20 percent were unable to decide. Tymoshenko is more often considered guilty than not guilty in the East, Donbas, and the South of Ukraine, while in the West the opposite view prevails, where the former Prime Minister is more often seen as not guilty. In the North and the Center of Ukraine, opinions are almost evenly split. More than 70 percent of supporters of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and the People’s Party insist on her guilt, as do almost half of the supporters of the UDAR party. At the same time, almost half of supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, and Civic Position, and nearly 95 percent of supporters of Batkivshchyna, believe Tymoshenko is not guilty of the crimes she is accused of.
• At the same time, only 26 percent of respondents believe that the criminal case against Tymoshenko is rather an enforcement of the rule of law, whereas the majority, 54 percent, insist that it is political persecution by the authorities. Another 20 percent were undecided. Compared to January 2011, the share of respondents who viewed the Tymoshenko case as an enforcement of the law decreased from 36 to 26 percent, while the share who see it as political persecution increased from 46 to 54 percent. The perception of political persecution dominates in all regions except Donbas, where opinions are almost evenly split and the share of undecided respondents is the highest. A quarter of Party of Regions supporters, and nearly 40 percent of supporters of the Communist Party, UDAR, and the People’s Party agree that the Tymoshenko case is political persecution. Among supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, and Civic Position, this view is shared by nearly 80 percent, as well as by about half of those who would vote “against all”.
• Only 28 percent of respondents believe that when signing the 2009 gas agreements with Russia, Tymoshenko acted primarily in Ukraine’s interests. Four percent believe she acted primarily in Russia’s interests, and 44 percent believe she acted in her own personal interests. Another quarter were unable to decide. About one third of supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change, and Civic Position believe Tymoshenko acted in Ukraine’s interests, while a similar share believe she acted in her own interests. Interestingly, the largest share of those who believe Tymoshenko acted in Russia’s interests is found among supporters of Svoboda, where at least one in ten holds this view. Only in the West and the Center of Ukraine does the share of those who believe she acted in Ukraine’s interests exceed the share of those who think she acted in her own interests.
• Only 24 percent of respondents believe that the verdict in the Tymoshenko case over the 2009 gas agreements should be imprisonment following a court decision. Eleven percent support a suspended sentence or amnesty after a guilty verdict. Meanwhile, 22 percent believe that the 2009 gas agreements were unfavorable for Ukraine but that criminal responsibility should be lifted from Tymoshenko, and another 20 percent believe all charges against the former Prime Minister should be dropped. Thus, the majority of respondents insist on either closing the criminal case, which is supported by 42 percent, or mitigating the sentence, supported by 11 percent. Twenty-two percent were unable to decide. Support for Tymoshenko’s imprisonment is highest in Donbas, at 39 percent, around 30 percent in the South and East, about one in five in the North, and around 10 percent in the Center and West. The strongest demand for closing the criminal case is found in the West and North of Ukraine, where more than half of respondents support this option.
• Only 13 percent of respondents are personally ready to take part in protest actions demanding Tymoshenko’s release from detention or prison, while 78 percent are not ready to support such protests and 9 percent were undecided. Support for protests demanding her release is highest among supporters of Batkivshchyna, at 60 percent, and Svoboda, at 30 percent. Regionally, about a quarter in the West, almost 20 percent in the North, and more than 10 percent in the Center would support such protests.

• The Rating Group launched a new project entitled “Traits of Politicians,” intended to serve as a mirror through which politicians can see themselves through the eyes of voters, their direct employers. The project was introduced at the beginning of a new political season that was expected to be highly consequential. For this reason, the analysis was based on data collected in May and June 2011, that is, before the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, before possible new turns in the Gongadze case, before the unification processes between Serhiy Tihipko and the Party of Regions, before renewed attempts to consolidate the opposition, and before many other important developments. The next wave of the study, planned for October–November, may reveal different sides of these politicians, but that will be another story.
• At this stage the focus was on the traits of politicians whose parties, at the beginning of summer, formed the top five in national ratings: Viktor Yanukovych, Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatseniuk, Serhiy Tihipko and Oleh Tyahnybok. Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are perceived first and foremost as strong leaders, with 20 percent and 26 percent of respondents respectively associating them with this quality. On this dimension they outperform Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok by at least two times. Importantly, both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are regarded as strong leaders both in Western Ukraine and in Donbas.
• Yanukovych is most strongly associated with having a team of professionals, a trait attributed to him by 14 percent of respondents, far ahead of all others. Other qualities more often attributed to him than to his competitors include being religious, being reliable and being able to find compromises with political opponents. Tymoshenko, by contrast, is more often described as speaking in a clear and understandable way, caring about people like the respondents themselves and being able to defend the state. Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are equally perceived as representing Ukraine well abroad, fulfilling their promises and caring about family values. Serhiy Tihipko is primarily associated with knowing how to manage the economy, while Arseniy Yatseniuk is mainly associated with being able to bring change and with having an effective program for the country’s development. Oleh Tyahnybok is most strongly associated with patriotism and with caring about national traditions and culture.
• At the same time, respondents also attribute negative traits to these politicians. A significant proportion believe that Yanukovych cares only about power, and nearly as many say the same about Tymoshenko, while somewhat smaller shares express this view about Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok. These perceptions are widespread both in the West and in Donbas. For example, nearly a quarter of respondents in the West and more than forty percent in Donbas think that Tymoshenko cares only about power, while almost thirty percent in Donbas and nearly half in the West think the same about Yanukovych. Only one to three percent of respondents believe that any of these five politicians can be described as honest. Instead, a substantial share believes that Tymoshenko lies, followed closely by Yanukovych, while smaller but still notable shares say the same about Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok. Roughly forty percent of residents of the South, East and Donbas think that Tymoshenko lies, whereas about forty percent of residents of the West, North and Center think that Yanukovych lies. About a quarter of respondents consider Yanukovych and Tymoshenko corrupt, while smaller proportions say this about Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok.
• An especially interesting dimension of the study concerns how voters of each party perceive their own leaders. Supporters of the Party of Regions view Yanukovych primarily as a strong leader with a professional team, who knows how to manage the economy and who keeps his promises. Supporters of Batkivshchyna see Tymoshenko primarily as a strong leader who represents Ukraine well internationally, speaks clearly and fulfills her promises. Thus, in the eyes of their own voters, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko share the core traits of being strong leaders and promise keepers, although Tymoshenko scores higher on both. Yanukovych is more closely associated with professional management and economic competence, while Tymoshenko is associated with communication skills and international representation. Yanukovych is also perceived as more reliable, more religious and more inclined to compromise, whereas Tymoshenko is more often seen as able to protect the state and to care about family values.
• Supporters of Tihipko and Yatseniuk share the view that both politicians know how to manage the economy, can bring change and have development programs, but neither is strongly valued for leadership qualities. Tihipko is more often valued for having a professional team and for keeping promises, while Yatseniuk is more appreciated for speaking clearly and being reliable, although he is seen as lacking a strong team.
• For Svoboda voters, Tyahnybok is above all a patriot, a defender of national traditions, a strong leader and an agent of change. He is perceived as religious in a way similar to Yanukovych, as speaking clearly and keeping promises in a way similar to Tymoshenko, and as change-oriented in a way similar to Yatseniuk. At the same time, he is not seen as able to manage the economy, as capable of compromise, or as having an effective development program.
• Overall, the findings suggest that Ukrainian politicians appear both very similar and very different at the same time.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

• ‍According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, residents of Ivano-Frankivsk region believe that executive authorities have significantly more power than local self-government. Only 17% think that local self-government has more authority to solve socio-economic problems in the region, while 28% believe this role belongs to the central executive authorities and 31% to the local executive authorities. Another 6% believe that all branches of government have equal powers, and 19% either could not answer or did not understand the question.
• At the same time, a majority of respondents (60%) believe that local self-government should have more authority to resolve socio-economic problems in the region. Only 4% think more powers should belong to the central government and 20% to local executive authorities. Support for greater powers of the local executive branch is highest in the regional capital.
• Trust in local self-government bodies is significantly higher (40%) than trust in central executive authorities (2%) and local executive authorities (9%). Another 13% trust all branches equally, while 19% do not trust any authority — a figure that is again highest in the regional center.
• Satisfaction with government declines as the level of authority increases. Residents are most satisfied with village and town councils (60%), followed by district councils (44%), the Ivano-Frankivsk City Council (42%) and the mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk (40%). The lowest levels of satisfaction are recorded for the Regional Council (32%) and the Regional State Administration (30%).
  However, in terms of the balance between positive and negative assessments, the mayor and the city council of Ivano-Frankivsk have the worst balance: 52% and 46% respectively are dissatisfied with their work. Dissatisfaction with the Regional Council and Regional Administration is lower, at 40% and 42% respectively. Pensioners express the highest levels of satisfaction with all levels of local government.
• The main problems facing local self-government in Ivano-Frankivsk region are perceived to be:
  • lack of independence in decision-making (30%)
  • weak accountability of local officials to the community (27%)
  • insufficient authority over the distribution of locally collected funds (27%)
  • weak legislative framework (25%)
  • insufficient control over budget distribution (23%)
  • interference by executive authorities (20%)
  • limited ability of citizens to be elected (17%)
  • poor staffing capacity (16%)
  • duplication of functions between executive bodies and self-government (13%)
  ‍
• In the regional capital, staffing problems and weak accountability are seen as the most acute, while in rural areas the biggest problems are limited control over finances and interference from executive authorities. Men, middle-aged people and those with higher education are more aware of these problems.
• Seventy-four percent of residents support the idea of electing the head of the Regional State Administration, while only 13% oppose it. Support is highest in the regional capital.

‍PRIORITIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

• ‍Residents believe the main priorities of local government should be road repairs (52%), reducing unemployment (51%), controlling price growth (44%), fighting corruption and restoring agriculture (38%), supporting vulnerable groups (33%), industrial recovery (31%), healthcare (27%), youth support (27%) and controlling utility tariffs (26%).
• Less frequently mentioned priorities include protection of culture and language (21%), combating alcoholism and drug addiction (21%), attracting investment (20%), solving landfill problems (19%), supporting SMEs (17%), fighting crime (16%), protecting democracy (16%) and environmental protection (13%). Fewer than 10% consider housing, education, transport, government transparency or tourism as top priorities.
• Perceptions vary by location. In Ivano-Frankivsk city, corruption, industrial recovery, utility tariffs, crime, education, SMEs and tourism are more pressing. In other towns unemployment, inflation, healthcare and the environment dominate. In villages, agriculture and social support are most important.
• Only 6–10% of respondents are satisfied with job creation, agriculture, industry, roads and SME development. Fewer than 15% are satisfied with corruption control, social assistance or utility services. About 20% are satisfied with healthcare and government openness, while the highest satisfaction is with tourism (36%) and education (42%).
• An index of satisfaction shows that residents are:
  • mostly satisfied with education and tourism
  • moderately satisfied with government openness
  • dissatisfied with healthcare, SMEs, social protection, corruption control and utilities
  • very dissatisfied with job creation, industry, agriculture and road quality
  ‍

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

• ‍Over 90% believe they can exercise their voting rights. Freedom of speech is considered accessible by 86%, freedom of assembly by 83%, freedom of association by 81%, local referenda by 76% and the right to be elected by 72%. City residents have more opportunities to exercise rights than rural residents, except for being elected. Higher education and older age increase perceived rights awareness.

‍DISCRIMINATION

• ‍Discrimination is generally perceived as low. The highest levels are reported for political views (15%) and gender (14%), followed by religion (10%), language (9%), nationality (8%) and race (7%). Discrimination is felt more in the regional capital and among young and highly educated people.

‍PROTEST MOOD

• ‍Fifty percent of residents are ready to participate in protests, while 37% are not. Readiness is similar in cities and villages and highest among supporters of UDAR, Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and Our Ukraine. Men, middle-aged, educated and economically active citizens are most protest-oriented.

‍PERSONAL TRUST RATINGS

• ‍The most trusted regional leaders are:
  • Mykhailo Vyshyvaniuk, Head of the Regional Administration (34%)
  • Oleksandr Sych, Head of the Regional Council (33%)
  ‍
• Other trusted figures include Ihor Nasalyk (19%), Mykhailo Paliychuk (15%), Zinovii Shkutiak (14%) and Roman Tkach (14%).

‍ELECTORAL MOOD

• If parliamentary elections were held in July 2011, Batkivshchyna would win in the region overall, while Svoboda would win in Ivano-Frankivsk city.
• ‍Regional parliamentary support (among decided voters):
  Batkivshchyna 30.8%, Svoboda 20.9%, Front for Change 16%, Our Ukraine 3.5%, UDAR 3%, Party of Regions 3%, Civic Position 2.1%, others below 2%.
• ‍Presidential support in the region:
  Yulia Tymoshenko 30%, Arseniy Yatseniuk 23.4%, Oleh Tyahnybok 14.5%, Vitaliy Klitschko 7.2%, Viktor Yushchenko 3.3%, Viktor Yanukovych 3.1%.
• ‍Ivano-Frankivsk city parliamentary vote:
  Svoboda 26.5%, Batkivshchyna 21.8%, Front for Change 17.7%.
• Svoboda remains dominant in the city, while Tyahnybok’s personal rating is lower than his party’s. Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko have significantly improved their positions. Klitschko is rapidly gaining trust, while Party of Regions and Our Ukraine have declined sharply.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in early June 2011, 40% of respondents planned to spend their summer vacation at home, while 10% intended to stay in another city or village in Ukraine. At the same time, 17% of Ukrainians planned to отдых at the Black Sea, 8% at the Azov Sea, 5% in the Carpathians, 2% in Transcarpathia, and 3% abroad. Meanwhile, one in six Ukrainians was unlikely to have any vacation at all this summer.
• For 45% of respondents, the most preferred place for recreation is the sea, 22% prefer a river or lake, 14% a forest, 7% the mountains, and 4% other places, while 8% could not decide. Thus, more than two thirds of Ukrainians prefer to relax near water. However, only about one third of those who most prefer the sea will be able to afford a trip to the Black Sea this year, 13% to the Azov Sea and 4% abroad, while more than half will be forced to stay mostly at home.
• Among favorite types of recreation, 39% of respondents named going to the sea and 24% trips to nature. Nineteen percent like spending time at a dacha or garden plot, 15% going to health resorts, 14% educational recreation involving excursions, sightseeing and museums, and 13% travel. Fishing was named by 14%, hiking by 4%, mountain recreation by 4%, and hunting by 2%.
• The most preferred mode of transport for travel among Ukrainians is the car at 45%, followed by the train at 27% and the bus at 22%. Only 6% like to travel by bicycle, 5% by airplane, 2% by motorcycle and 1% by hitchhiking, while 6% do not like to travel by any of these modes of transport.
• Women are more likely than men to prefer the sea, while men more often prefer rivers. Fishing is the second most popular leisure activity among men at 26%, but one of the least popular among women at 3%. Women also more often choose dacha and sanatorium vacations, while men more often choose nature trips, hiking, mountains and hunting. Although travel is more popular among men, women are more likely to prefer educational tourism. Men more often prefer to travel by car, bicycle and motorcycle, while women more often choose trains and buses.
• Only 35% of men plan to stay at home this summer compared to 43% of women, and men more often plan trips to the sea and the Carpathians. The sea is the most popular destination among young people and those of middle age, while rivers and forests are more popular among older and elderly people, and the mountains are more popular among young people. The older the respondents, the more likely they are to stay at home this summer, from only 25% among the young to nearly 60% among the elderly. Older people are also more likely not to have any vacation at all, with only 10% among young people and nearly one quarter among the elderly. Thus, Ukrainian pensioners, although formally “on rest,” often either cannot afford to rest or simply do not have the opportunity to do so.
• One quarter of young people plan to go to the Black Sea this summer, 13% to the Azov Sea and 4% abroad, while among pensioners only 5% plan to visit the Black Sea and less than 1% the Azov Sea. The older the respondents, the more popular sanatoriums and dacha or garden vacations become. Educational recreation is equally popular among young, middle-aged and older adults, while travel, hiking and mountain trips are much more popular among young people. Nature trips are more popular among middle-aged people, and fishing and hunting among those aged 40–59.
• Travel by car is more popular among young and middle-aged people, while train and bus travel is more common among older respondents. Motorcycles and hitchhiking are almost exclusively preferred by young people, and nearly one quarter of pensioners do not like to travel by any means at all. People with higher education more often choose cars, trains and airplanes, while those with higher incomes primarily prefer cars. The higher the level of education, the more popular educational tourism, travel, mountains and sea holidays become. Dacha vacations, fishing and hunting are most popular among people with secondary education, while sanatorium treatment is most common among those with the lowest level of education, typically older people with lower incomes.
• People with relatively lower incomes are more likely to choose dacha vacations and fishing, while those with higher incomes prefer the sea, travel, mountains and educational tourism. At the same time, nature trips are popular among both poorer and wealthier people. As a result, more affluent citizens are much more likely to spend the summer at the sea, with about one quarter going to the Black Sea, 18% to the Azov Sea and 5% abroad, and to travel around Ukraine, while less affluent people will mostly stay at home or not have any vacation at all. One in five unemployed respondents said they would not have any vacation this summer.
• Residents of the South, East and Donbas are most likely to spend their summer at the sea, with people in the South and East favoring the Black Sea and those in Donbas the Azov Sea. The Black and especially the Azov Sea are least attractive to residents of the West. Almost half of residents of the West and Center plan to stay at home, although in the West many will go to the Carpathians, which for many is essentially their home region, while in the Center many will simply not have any vacation. The fewest people planning to work all summer live in the North, where many plan to travel within the country. Urban residents more often plan sea vacations and travel, while rural residents are more likely to stay at home.
• The sea is most popular in Donbas and then in the South, rivers and lakes in the Center, forests in the North, Donbas and West, and mountains only in the West. Fishing is most popular in the Center and least popular in Donbas. Nature trips are most popular in the West and Center, where they are even more popular than the sea. Residents of the West also travel more than others and least prefer dacha vacations. Sanatoriums are most attractive in the Center and Donbas, while residents of Donbas and the East are more attracted than others to educational tourism involving excursions and museums. As for transport, most residents of the West, Center and South prefer cars, while those in Donbas prefer trains. Bicycles and airplanes are most popular in the North, buses in the Center and Donbas.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in late May 2011, 41% of respondents feel that freedom of speech in Ukraine has been curtailed since the presidential elections. At the same time, 43% do not feel such a rollback of freedom of speech, while another 17% were unable to give a clear answer. Concern about the restriction of freedom of speech is highest in Western Ukraine at 61%, followed by the Center at 47%, the North at 40% and Donbas at 37%. These perceptions are most common among people of middle age, with relatively higher levels of education and income, and men are more sensitive to this issue than women. In terms of political preferences, this concern is most widespread among supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position and Batkivshchyna, about two thirds of whom believe that freedom of speech is being restricted. Slightly fewer, but still more than half, of Front for Change and Our Ukraine supporters share this view. By contrast, only 14% of Party of Regions supporters perceive negative trends in freedom of speech, although among supporters of other pro-government parties such as the People’s Party, the Communist Party and Strong Ukraine this share is roughly twice as high.
• Overall, according to current public assessments, the situation with freedom of speech in Ukraine has stabilized in recent months. In May 2011 the indicator stood at the same level as in September 2010 at 41%, and was slightly lower than in January 2011, when it reached 46%. However, compared with April 2010 the situation remains worrying. One year earlier, immediately after the presidential elections, only 19% of respondents felt that freedom of speech was being restricted, whereas by May 2011 this share had more than doubled to 41%. Since last September, perceptions of declining freedom of speech have increased only in Donbas, remained almost unchanged in the South, West and Center, and declined in the East and North.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held in late May 2011, 32% of respondents said they would definitely take part and another 35% said they would rather take part. Presidential elections would generate slightly higher turnout, with 36% saying they would definitely vote and another 36% saying they would rather vote. The most mobilized voters remain supporters of Civic Position, Svoboda, UDAR and Batkivshchyna.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in late May 2011, 22.8% of likely voters would have supported the Party of Regions, 18.8% Batkivshchyna, 9.3% Front for Change, 5.5% Svoboda, 5.5% Strong Ukraine, 4.5% the Communist Party and 4% UDAR led by Vitali Klitschko. A further 2.2% would have voted for Civic Position, 1.2% for the People’s Party and 1.1% for Our Ukraine. Other parties would have received 4.4% of the vote, 11.7% would have voted “against all parties,” and 9% were undecided. Under these conditions, with a 3% electoral threshold, seven parties would enter parliament: the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Svoboda, Strong Ukraine, the Communist Party and UDAR. If the threshold were raised to 5%, only five parties would enter parliament, excluding the Communists and UDAR.
• If a presidential election had been held in late May 2011, 22.5% of likely voters would have voted for Viktor Yanukovych, 18.4% for Yuliya Tymoshenko, 10.1% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 7.1% for Serhiy Tihipko, 5% for Vitali Klitschko, 3.6% for Oleh Tiahnybok, 2.9% for Petro Symonenko and 2.8% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko. Other candidates would have been supported by 6.8% of voters, 8.7% would have voted “against all,” and 12.1% were undecided.
• The key trend is the continued growth of the group that does not support any party, rising from 7% in December of the previous year to 10% in March and to 12% in May. Among all respondents, the share of those who would vote “against all” is even higher, exceeding 14%, and more than half of them intend to participate in elections in order to express this position. Compared with March, the share of undecided voters also increased to 9%. Against this background, the ratings of Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions fell the most, from 26% to 23%, with the greatest losses in their core regions in the South and Donbas, where the number of undecided voters and those voting “against all” continues to grow. Yuliya Tymoshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk also lost some support, although party ratings remained largely unchanged. In the West, where Batkivshchyna lost the most, Yatsenyuk improved his position, while in the Center and North he recorded slight losses. Svoboda’s position remained stable at around 5–6%. Against the backdrop of weakening positions of most leaders, Vitali Klitschko nearly doubled his support from 3% to 5%, and UDAR from 2% to 4%, especially in the West, North and South. Serhiy Tihipko strengthened his position somewhat in the South and Donbas, raising his overall rating from 6% to 7%.

• According to the latest survey conducted by the Rating Group, 60% of Lviv residents believe that 9 May should be commemorated primarily as a Day of Remembrance for the victims of the war, while 28% see it mainly as Victory Day. Another 12% were undecided. Support for commemorating 9 May as a Day of Remembrance is highest among young people. In terms of political preferences, this interpretation is most strongly supported by voters of Our Ukraine, Svoboda and the Front for Change, where more than 70% share this view, while two thirds of voters of the Party of Regions and all supporters of the Communist Party of Ukraine see it primarily as Victory Day.
• Eighty-three percent of Lviv residents agreed with the statement that a planned provocation took place in Lviv on 9 May, which led to clashes, while only 7% disagreed and 11% were undecided. This view was shared even by two thirds of Communist Party supporters and nearly 60% of Party of Regions voters. More than half of respondents, 52%, believe that pro-Russian parties were the main culprits behind the clashes, while about one third place responsibility on the President, nearly the same share on the Verkhovna Rada, and another third on law enforcement agencies. One in five respondents blamed political strategists. At the same time, 15% believe that Svoboda and other nationalist forces were primarily responsible for the clashes, 11% blame the head of the regional state administration and 8% the mayor.
• Almost 40% of Lviv residents support the actions of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi during the events of 9 May in Lviv, while fewer, 30%, do not. A similar share, nearly 40%, support the actions of Svoboda, while roughly the same proportion oppose them. The actions of the head of the regional state administration on 9 May are supported by only 17% of Lviv residents and opposed by 45%. Support for the police is even lower, with only 11% approving their actions and nearly 70% disapproving. The actions of pro-Russian parties on 9 May are supported by just 1% of Lviv residents, while more than 80% do not support them.
• Activists of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Russia proposed holding a joint action in Lviv on 22 June. In response to the question of how Lviv residents should react if such an event takes place, only 3% suggested expressing support, while 24% said it should be ignored, meaning neither supported nor protested. At the same time, 47% proposed a peaceful protest and 14% a radical protest, including the use of force. Eleven percent were undecided. Supporters of Svoboda, Our Ukraine, the Front for Change and Batkivshchyna are the most ready to protest on 22 June, while only about 30% of Party of Regions supporters and 20% of Communist Party supporters are willing to support the action. Young people are the most critical of the possible action, with nearly 20% ready for radical protest and another 50% for peaceful protest.
• Thirty-five percent of Lviv residents support the initiative to dismiss the head of the regional state administration, 29% oppose it and 36% are undecided. Support for the resignation is strongest among supporters of Civic Position, Svoboda and Batkivshchyna, while the strongest opposition comes from supporters of Strong Ukraine and the Party of Regions.
• Recent surveys indicate a continued rise in protest moods in society. In December of the previous year only 42% of Lviv residents agreed that revolutionary sentiments were emerging in Ukraine, in March this rose to 57%, and in May it reached 63%. Only 26% of city residents do not perceive revolutionary moods, compared to 40% in December and 32% in March. In December only 32% believed that revolutionary sentiments could soon turn into mass protests similar to those of November 2004, in March this figure rose to 46%, and in May it exceeded half at 56%. The share who did not believe in such a development fell from 44% in December to 42% in March and to just 32% in May.
• Forty-three percent of Lviv residents say they are personally ready to take part in protest actions, while 48% are not. The most protest-oriented groups are supporters of Svoboda, UDAR and Civic Position. Protest readiness is high not only among young people, where about half are ready to protest, but also among middle-aged residents, also close to half, and at least one third of older people. In general, men are more likely to be ready to protest than women, as are those with relatively higher incomes and higher levels of education. At the same time, a high protest potential is also observed among people with average incomes, meaning that both workers and managers, civil servants and entrepreneurs could support protests. People who currently have a job are more willing to protest than the unemployed, as the risk of losing a job is more mobilizing than not having one at all, and they are even more inclined to protest than students.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, as of May 2011 the level of political engagement among Lviv residents remains relatively high. If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 43% of Lviv residents would definitely take part and 49% would do so in presidential elections, while about another 30% would rather participate than not. The highest level of mobilization is observed among supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday, 23.7% of Lviv residents who intend to vote would support Svoboda. Batkivshchyna would receive 19.7%, Front for Change 15.8%, Civic Position 4.9%, Our Ukraine 4.8%, Strong Ukraine 4.4%, the Party of Regions 3.2%, UDAR 2.5% and the European Party 1.9%. Other parties together would be supported by 8% of voters. About 6.3% would support no party at all, while 4.9% would be undecided.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 20.4% of Lviv residents who intend to vote would support Yuliya Tymoshenko. Arseniy Yatsenyuk would receive 18.6%, Oleh Tyahnybok 12.9%, Vitali Klitschko 8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.2%, Viktor Yushchenko 5.1%, Serhiy Tihipko 4.9% and Viktor Yanukovych 2.7%, while other candidates together would be supported by 7%. About 5% would not support any candidate and 7% would be undecided.
• Among national-level politicians, Arseniy Yatsenyuk enjoys the highest level of trust in the city. Over the past two months, trust in the Front for Change leader increased from 48% to 54%. Half of Lviv residents, 51%, trust Vitali Klitschko, while only 30% distrust him, and since March his trust level has grown from 43% to 51%. Trust in Anatolii Hrytsenko has also risen slightly, from 38% in March to 40% in May, and compared with September of the previous year, the share of Lviv residents who trust him has almost doubled from 23% to 40%, while 39% do not trust him. Oleh Tyahnybok is trusted by 47% and distrusted by 41%, and over the past three months his trust rating has declined from 51% to 47% while distrust has grown from 35% to 40%. Trust in Yuliya Tymoshenko has increased since March from 31% and stabilized at the level recorded in February 2011 and September 2010, at 35%. After reaching a record low in March at 18%, trust in Viktor Yushchenko in May returned to the level seen in February 2011 and September 2010, at 22%. Trust in Viktor Yanukovych continues to deteriorate, with only 8% trusting the head of state, and just 1% trusting him fully, compared to 3% in March, while 86% of Lviv residents do not trust him. Serhiy Tihipko is trusted by 19% and distrusted by 61%.
• As in March, Yuliya Tymoshenko continues to lead the presidential race in Lviv in May, and the rating of Batkivshchyna has grown over two months from 18% to 20%. The rating of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, at around 19%, and that of Front for Change, at around 15%, have remained stable throughout 2011. Oleh Tyahnybok’s rating has declined over the past two months from 17% to 13%, and support for Svoboda in parliamentary elections has also slightly decreased from 27% to 24%, bringing the party back to levels seen in mid-2010. Despite the fact that support for UDAR has remained relatively stable over the past six months at 3–4%, Vitali Klitschko’s personal rating has almost doubled over the last two months to a record 8%. This sharp rise in Klitschko’s support likely prevents Arseniy Yatsenyuk from taking first place in the presidential rating, even though Yatsenyuk currently leads in trust. Anatolii Hrytsenko continues to make progress, with his personal rating reaching 7% in May compared to 3% six months earlier, while Civic Position rose to 5% from 2%. After a record low of 2% in March, Our Ukraine has recovered to about 5%, while the ratings of the Party of Regions and Viktor Yanukovych have declined to record lows of about 3%.
• Among local politicians, Andriy Sadovyi enjoys the highest level of trust at 57%, while 34% do not trust him, and his trust level has remained stable over the past six months. Petro Pysarchuk is trusted by 27% and distrusted by 54%, with trust rising slightly since December from 24% to 27% and distrust declining from 56% to 54%. Oleh Pankevych is trusted by 20% and distrusted by 27%, and compared to December his trust rating as head of the regional council has nearly doubled from 11% to 20%, while the share of those unfamiliar with him has declined from 35% to 21%. Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk is trusted by 17% and distrusted by 45%, and while his trust level has barely changed since March, his distrust has risen from 30% to 45%, and the share of respondents unfamiliar with him has fallen from 17% to 7%. Vasyl Pavliuk is trusted by 12% and distrusted by 22%, and compared to December his trust level has increased from 8% to 12%, although nearly half of Lviv residents still do not know him.
• If mayoral elections were held next Sunday, 52.2% of Lviv residents who intend to vote would support Andriy Sadovyi. Petro Pysarchuk would receive 13.5%, Volodymyr Hirniak 4.6% and Yurii Mykhalchyshyn 3.1%, while other candidates together would receive about 12%. About 4.5% would support no candidate and 9.4% would be undecided. Over the past two months the rating of the incumbent mayor Andriy Sadovyi has increased the most, from 47% to 52%, as has that of his main rival in the previous election, Petro Pysarchuk, from 12% to 14%.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in April 2011, 44% of respondents support granting the Russian language the status of a state language, while 47% oppose it. In 2009, more than 50% of citizens consistently supported granting Russian this status; in 2010 support declined to 46–47%, and in 2011 it fell further to 44%. At the same time, opposition to making Russian a second state language has steadily increased: from 40% in 2009 to 46% in 2010 and to 47–48% in 2011. The share of undecided respondents on this issue has remained almost unchanged at 7–8%.
• Support for granting Russian the status of a second state language is highest in Donbas, the South, and the East, particularly among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, and to a lesser extent among supporters of Strong Ukraine and UDAR.
• In 2010, 44–45% of respondents consistently supported the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus, while roughly the same proportion opposed it. In January 2011, support rose to 48%, but by April 2011 it declined to 47%. At the same time, the share of those opposing such a union continued to fall—from 44% in January to 40% in April—while the number of undecided respondents increased from 8% to 13%.
• Support for a union with Russia and Belarus is strongest in Donbas, the South, and the East. Supporters of the Communist Party back the idea of a single state with Russia even more strongly than they support granting Russian the status of a state language. Around 70% of supporters of the Party of Regions support both bilingualism and the unification of Ukraine with Russia into a single state. The strongest opponents of these ideas are supporters of Svoboda, as well as those of the Front for Change, Civic Position, and Batkivshchyna.
• Against this background, public support for European integration has declined to approximately its 2009 level. In October 2009, 51% supported Ukraine’s accession to the European Union; this rose to 52% in April 2010, 57% in September 2010, and 56% in January 2011, but fell back to 51% by April 2011. About 30% oppose EU accession.
• Notably, 37% of those who support the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This view is held by about one in four residents of Donbas, the South, and the East. For these respondents, economic considerations—primarily expectations of improved living standards—outweigh ideological ones.
• The higher the level of education and the younger the respondent, the more likely they are to support EU accession and the less likely they are to support a union with Russia and Belarus or the granting of Russian the status of a second state language.
• Public attitudes toward NATO membership have also deteriorated. In October 2009, 22% supported Ukraine joining NATO; this increased to 24% in April 2010 and 26% in September 2010, but fell to 24% in January 2011 and to 22% by April 2011. More than 60% oppose NATO membership. Strong support for NATO exists only in Western Ukraine, where about half of respondents favor joining. Among party supporters, NATO membership is most strongly backed by Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Front for Change.
• Support for extending the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has continued to decline—from 46% in September 2010 to 42% in January 2011 and to 41% in April 2011—while opposition has stabilized at 41%. The number of undecided respondents has increased from 13% to 18%. Support is highest in the South (73%), followed by Donbas (56%) and the East (52%). Younger respondents tend to oppose the extension, while older respondents are more likely to support it.
• Support for creating a gas consortium to share ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system between Russia, the EU, and Ukraine has fallen sharply, from 36% in March 2010 to 27% in April 2011, while opposition has risen from 35% to 56%. Support is highest in Donbas, the South, and the East, particularly among Communist Party supporters.
• Support for revoking President Yushchenko’s decree awarding Stepan Bandera the title Hero of Ukraine declined slightly from 53% in March 2010 to 51% in April 2011, while opposition increased from 28% to 32%. Eighteen percent remain undecided.
• Twenty-seven percent of respondents support recognizing the OUN–UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence (72% in Western Ukraine), while 49% oppose it (73% in the South). Over the past year, support for recognition has increased from 20% to 27%, while opposition has fallen from 61% to 49%. Support is highest among Svoboda supporters (nearly 90%), and about half of supporters of the Front for Change, Civic Position, and Batkivshchyna.
• Fifty-eight percent of respondents agree that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people; 29% disagree and 13% are undecided. Support for this view declined from 61% in March 2010 to 53% in January 2011 but rose again to 58% by April 2011. Nearly 90% of Western Ukrainians, about 70% in the North and Center, and about half in the East agree with this characterization. Even around 40% of Party of Regions supporters and 30% of Communist Party supporters agree.
• Fifty-five percent of respondents view positively the initiative to display Soviet red flags alongside the Ukrainian state flag on Victory Day (May 9), while 30% view it negatively and 15% are undecided. Support is highest in the South (86%) and Donbas (75). It is strongest among Communist Party supporters (over 90%) and Party of Regions supporters (75%), and lowest among Svoboda supporters.
• Eighty-three percent of respondents view positively the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR; only 5% view it negatively and 12% are undecided. Support is highest in Donbas, the Center, and the East, and lowest in the South, particularly in Crimea. Sixty percent believe Crimea should retain autonomous status within Ukraine, 23% support making it a regular oblast, 2% support a Crimean Tatar autonomy, and only 4% favor transferring Crimea to Russia.
• Half of respondents believe a unitary state is the optimal form of government for Ukraine, while one quarter favor a federation and one quarter are undecided. Support for a unitary state is strongest in the West, North, and Center, while support for a federal system is highest in Donbas and the South. Donbas is the only region where federalism is supported by more people than unitarism.

Readiness for protest

• 40% of respondents say they are personally ready to defend their rights and interests by taking part in protest actions, 52% say they are not ready, and 8% could not answer.
• The highest readiness for protest is observed in Western Ukraine (51%), Northern Ukraine (45%), and Central Ukraine (43%). A significant share of citizens are also willing to protest in the East (36%), Donbas (33%), and the South (29%). Among voters, the highest readiness for protest is found among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna, as well as Civic Position and Front for Change. The lowest readiness is among supporters of the Party of Regions.
• Readiness to protest is highest among employed citizens, people with middle and above-average incomes, and those with higher levels of education. These respondents come from a wide age range, with roughly equal shares among younger, middle-aged, and older groups, except pensioners. Men are more likely to be ready to protest than women. By religious affiliation, Greek Catholics and believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) are the most willing to protest, while believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) are the least willing.

Government actions that could trigger protests

• Social issues are much more likely to mobilize people for protest than political or ideological ones.
• The main issues that could push citizens into the streets (rallies, demonstrations, pickets) are:
  • price increases (38%)
  • non-payment of wages (32%)
  • increases in utility tariffs (29%)
  • mass layoffs (26%)
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• Less mobilizing, but still significant, are:
  • raising the retirement age (18%)
  • introduction of paid healthcare (14%)
  • increased spending on senior officials (13%)
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• Further potential triggers include:
  • rollback of democracy (9%)
  • violations of political rights and freedoms (8%)
  • higher tuition fees (8%)
  • surrendering national interests in relations with Russia (7%)
  • lifting the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land (6%)
  • political repression against the opposition (4%)
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• At the same time, 34% of respondents say they would not participate in protests under any circumstances. This means that not all of the 52% who initially said they were not ready to protest are categorical — some of them could still join protests if, above all, their social rights were violated.
• Regionally:
  • price increases would most strongly mobilize the Center
  • higher utility tariffs the North
  • wage arrears and job cuts the East and North
  • raising the retirement age and lifting the land-sale moratorium the South
  • paid healthcare the North
  • restrictions on democracy, freedom of speech, political rights, and the surrender of national interests the West
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• Donbas remains the most restrained region: almost half of respondents there would not protest under any circumstances. Still, about one-third would protest, especially over price increases, utility tariffs, job losses, and unpaid wages.

Protests in case of a court ban

• Among those who are ready to protest, half say they would take part even if the authorities banned protests through the courts. Another 27% would participate only if protests were officially permitted.
• The most confident and determined protesters — those ready to demonstrate even in case of a ban — are residents of the West, North, and East. Among voters, these are supporters of Civic Position, Svoboda, and Batkivshchyna.

Attitudes toward a new Maidan

• If a new Maidan were to take place in Kyiv in the near future, 36% of respondents would support it, 47% would not, and 17% are undecided. Support is highest in the West, North, and Center, but even in the South and Donbas nearly one in five would support a new Maidan. Among voters, supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna are the most supportive.

Who should organize a new Maidan?

• A relative majority of respondents (39%) believe that for a Maidan to be successful, it should be organized and led by politicians. 34% believe people can organize protests on their own without political leaders, and 27% are undecided.
• Among those who support a new Maidan, 53% would prefer politicians to lead it, 37% would rely on themselves, and 10% are undecided.
• Trust in political leadership for organizing a Maidan is highest in the North, especially Kyiv and the Kyiv region, and somewhat lower in the West. Among party supporters, those of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, UDAR, and Front for Change are the most inclined to trust politicians to lead a new Maidan.

Leaders of a new Maidan

• Among those who support a new Maidan:
  • 38% believe Yuliya Tymoshenko could lead it
  • 20% — Arseniy Yatseniuk
  • 15% — Oleh Tyahnybok
  • 14% — Vitalii Klychko
  • 8% — Anatoliy Hrytsenko
  • 8% — other politicians
  ‍
• At the same time, 13% say no politician could lead a new Maidan, and 16% are undecided.
• Yuliya Tymoshenko is seen as the most likely leader in all regions — most strongly in the West and least in the South. Supporters of each party primarily want their own party leader to lead a Maidan, but nearly one in five supporters of Svoboda, UDAR, and Front for Change would also see Tymoshenko as one of the leaders. Civic Position and Communist Party supporters are the least inclined to see Tymoshenko in that role.

Willingness to stay on Maidan

• Among those who support a new Maidan, a relative majority (47%) say that if they participated, they would protest as long as necessary until demands were met.
  ‍
• 5% would stay about a month, 8% about a week, while one in five would take part for only one day or a few days.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, almost one third of Lviv residents aged 16 and older would like to start their own business: 11% definitely would and another 20% would rather do so. Among working-age residents of Lviv, nearly 40% express an interest in starting their own business. At the same time, 58% of respondents do not want to engage in entrepreneurial activity, 5% already have their own business, and 6% were unable to decide.
• The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the greater their willingness to start a business. Among young people aged 16–25, more than half would like to engage in entrepreneurship, while among those aged 56 and older, 90% do not want to do so. Among men, the share willing to start their own business is about one third higher than among women. By occupation, the highest interest in entrepreneurship is observed among the unemployed and students, and the lowest among office workers and pensioners. The desire to run one’s own business is expressed by twice as many unmarried respondents as married ones, 52% versus 27%. At the same time, respondents who already have children show a stronger desire to open their own business than those who do not. The higher the income of respondents, the stronger their inclination to start a business, and among the wealthiest respondents the largest share of those who already own a business is found, especially in the 46–55 age group.
• When asked what attracts them more in entrepreneurship, profits or independence, opinions are almost evenly split. Among those who would like to start a business, 48% say they are mainly attracted by potential profits, while 43% primarily value independence and autonomy in decision-making, and 9% are undecided. Independence is valued most by respondents aged 26–35, those with higher education and women, while men and respondents of above-average and older age tend to focus more on profits.
• Unfortunately, only 5% of those who would like to start a business assess their chances of doing so in the next one or two years as significant. Nearly half, 48%, describe their chances as low, and 34% say they have no chance at all. This means that although about 190,000 Lviv residents would like to have their own business, in reality only about 6,000 new entrepreneurs may appear in the city over the next one or two years. This indicates a massive gap between the number of those who would like to start a business and those who believe they will actually do so in the near future, a difference of more than thirtyfold. Symbolically, a similar gap exists between the incomes of the rich and the poor in Ukraine, whereas in Europe this gap does not exceed tenfold. This further confirms that the real path to Europe lies through the creation of a middle class in Ukraine, and the example of Lviv shows that the reserves for this are far from negligible.
• The main obstacles to starting a business named by those who would like to engage in entrepreneurship are the lack of start-up capital, cited by 60%, and high taxes, cited by 51%. About one third are restrained by the overall economic crisis at 35%, high levels of competition at 29% and bureaucratic barriers to doing business at 28%. One in five mentioned uncertainty about profitability at 22%, fear of pressure from regulatory authorities at 21% and a lack of entrepreneurial experience at 19%. Less frequently mentioned obstacles include fear of criminal interference at 14%, lack of necessary knowledge and skills at 12%, lack of confidence in one’s own abilities at 10%, unwillingness to take risks at 9%, lack of ideas at 8% and age or health issues at 4%.
• It is noteworthy that among Lviv residents who rate their chances of starting a business as high, concerns about lack of start-up capital and lack of business experience are much less widespread than among those who consider their chances minimal or nonexistent. Lack of start-up capital is most worrying for people aged 26–35, high taxes and high competition for those aged 16–25, bureaucratic barriers for middle-aged respondents, while the overall crisis is a concern across all age groups. Women are more likely than men to be restrained by high taxes, bureaucratic barriers, lack of confidence and unwillingness to take risks, while men more often point to the general economic crisis, high competition, lack of entrepreneurial experience and insufficient skills. While lack of start-up capital is an equally important obstacle for respondents with different levels of education, more educated respondents are more concerned about bureaucratic barriers, pressure from regulatory authorities, possible criminal influence, and the lack of experience and skills.

Assessment of current developments

• Only 9% of Lviv residents believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the right direction (this view is held mainly by supporters of the Party of Regions), while 71% believe they are moving in the wrong direction.
• The situation in Lviv itself is assessed more positively than the situation in the country: 24% of Lviv residents believe that developments in the city are moving in the right direction, while 45% believe they are moving in the wrong direction. Supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna are the most satisfied with the situation in Lviv.
• Only 8% of Lviv residents say that their own and their family’s financial situation has improved over the past few years. 30% say it has remained unchanged, while 59% say it has worsened.
• Over the last six months the picture is even worse: only 4% of Lviv residents report an improvement in their financial situation, while 69% say it has deteriorated.
• According to respondents, the three most serious municipal problems in Lviv are:
  • poor performance of housing and utility services (ZhEKs) – 45%
  • dilapidated condition of residential buildings – 38%
  • poor condition of city roads – 37%
  ‍
• Other frequently mentioned problems include:
  • dirty streets – 27%
  • poor performance of healthcare institutions – 23%
  ‍
• Less frequently mentioned were:
  • poor public transport – 16%
  • traffic congestion – 15%
  • preservation of architectural heritage – 14%
  • poor water supply – 14%
  • street crime – 13%
  • lack of playgrounds and sports facilities – 12%
  • poor street lighting – 11%
  • poor heating supply – 8%
  • poor performance of educational institutions – 6%
  ‍

Protest moods

• 57% of city residents agree with the statement that revolutionary sentiments are building up in Ukraine, while only 32% disagree. Compared to December of the previous year, the share of those who believe revolutionary moods are growing increased by one third — from 42% to 57%.
• The strongest support for this view comes from supporters of Civic Position, Our Ukraine, UDAR, the “against all” category, and Svoboda. The weakest support is among supporters of the Party of Regions.
• 46% of Lviv residents believe that in the near future these revolutionary moods could turn into mass protest actions similar to those of November 2004, while 42% do not believe this. Compared to December, belief in a possible new Maidan increased almost 1.5 times — from 32% to 46%.
• 60% of respondents agree with the statement that a policy of “Russification” is being pursued in Ukraine; only 27% disagree.
• The “Russification” thesis is most strongly supported by supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, Front for Change, Our Ukraine, and those who chose “against all”.
• According to respondents, Russification is most evident in:
  • television – 71%
  • education – 61%
  ‍
• It is also perceived in:
  • culture – 46%
  • the press – 43%
  • radio – 36%
  • book publishing – 28%
  • cinema and theatre – 27%
  • official paperwork in state institutions – 22%
  ‍
• 85% of Lviv residents do not support the idea of separating Western Ukraine into a separate state. Only 9% support this idea, and just 3% support it strongly.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, as of March 2011 the level of voter mobilization in Lviv remains relatively high: 43% of Lviv residents would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 48% in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. Another roughly one-third would probably participate rather than abstain.
• The highest level of mobilization in parliamentary elections is observed among Svoboda voters, while in presidential elections it is highest among supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko. The lowest mobilization is recorded among residents who have not decided on their choice and among those who would vote “against all”.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 26.8% of Lviv voters would support Svoboda (figures are given among those who intend to vote). Batkivshchyna would receive 18.1%, Front for Change 14.8%, the Party of Regions 4.4%, Civic Position 3.8%, UDAR 3.6%, Strong Ukraine 3.3%, Our Ukraine 2.1%, the European Party 1.6%, and the People’s Movement 1%. Each of the remaining parties would receive less than 1%, together accounting for over 5%. About 7.2% would not support any party, while 8.2% are undecided.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 22.4% of Lviv voters would vote for Yuliya Tymoshenko (among those intending to vote). Arseniy Yatseniuk would receive 19.4%, Oleh Tyahnybok 17.4%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko 6.8%, Serhiy Tihipko 4.1%, Viktor Yanukovych 3.6%, Viktor Yushchenko 3.3%, and Vitalii Klychko 3.3%. Other candidates together would receive more than 6%. About 8% would not support any candidate, and 6% are undecided.
• Trends
• For the first time in the past six months, Yuliya Tymoshenko has taken the lead in the presidential race in Lviv. This result is driven by the very high mobilization of her supporters. Compared to February, her rating rose from 18% to 22%, while the party’s rating remained almost unchanged. Arseniy Yatseniuk ranks second at 19%, essentially unchanged from February. Oleh Tyahnybok ranks third, having slightly improved his position from 15% to 17%, though still below his December level.
• The strongest growth is shown by Anatoliy Hrytsenko, whose rating rose dynamically and reached 7% in March for the first time. Vitalii Klychko’s rating remains around 3–4%. Viktor Yushchenko continues to lose support, falling to 3% for the first time. Viktor Yanukovych and Serhiy Tihipko are also losing support, both dropping to around 4%.
• Svoboda remains the leader in the party rating, with stable support of 26–27%, which restrains the growth of Batkivshchyna (18–19%) and Front for Change (15%). In the case of Svoboda, the party’s rating significantly exceeds the leader’s, while for Batkivshchyna and Front for Change the opposite is true.
• Civic Position and UDAR have gained slightly, with their ratings rising to about 4%. The Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine remain at low levels (3–4%). Our Ukraine has fallen to 2% for the first time.
• Among national-level politicians, Oleh Tyahnybok continues to enjoy the highest level of trust in Lviv, with 50% trusting him and 41% not trusting him. Trust in Arseniy Yatseniuk declined from 55% to 48%, and trust in Yuliya Tymoshenko from 35% to 31%, although this did not affect their electoral positions. Vitalii Klychko is trusted by 43% of Lviv residents and not trusted by 38%. Tyahnybok, Yatseniuk and Klychko are the only national politicians who have a positive balance of trust in the city.
• Anatoliy Hrytsenko is trusted by 38% and not trusted by 42%. Viktor Yushchenko is trusted by 18% and not trusted by 73%. Viktor Yanukovych is trusted by only 8% and not trusted by 86%, representing record-low trust and record-high distrust for both politicians over the past several years. Serhiy Tihipko is trusted by 17% and not trusted by 72%.
• Among local politicians, the highest level of trust is held by Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, whom 57% trust and 32% do not trust. These figures have not changed since December. Petro Pysarchuk is trusted by 23% and not trusted by 56%, also largely unchanged. Vasyl Kuibida is trusted by 18% and not trusted by 58%.
• Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk is trusted by 16% and not trusted by 30%, while 17% do not know him and 38% could not define their attitude toward the head of the regional administration. Oleh Pankevych is trusted by 15% and not trusted by 27%, with trust rising since December, though 34% do not know him and 24% are undecided. Volodymyr Pavliuk is trusted by 9% and not trusted by 31%, while 45% do not know him and 16% are undecided.
• If the mayoral election in Lviv were held next Sunday, 46.7% of voters would support Andriy Sadovyi (among those intending to vote). Petro Pysarchuk would receive 12.2%, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn 5.4%, and Vasyl Hirniak 5%. Other candidates together would receive about 9%. About 9.4% would not support any candidate and 12.2% are undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group in March 2011, 16% of respondents consider a presidential system to be the optimal form of government for Ukraine, 30% support a presidential–parliamentary system, 21% a parliamentary–presidential system, 4% a parliamentary system, 4% a dictatorship, while 25% were unable to decide.

Trends

• Support for a pro-presidential form of government (the combined share of those supporting presidential and presidential–parliamentary systems) has been gradually declining since its peak in April 2010. In October 2009, 58% supported a pro-presidential system; in April 2010 this rose to 61%, but fell to 50% in September 2010 and to 46% by March 2011.
• These trends closely mirror changes in trust in Viktor Yanukovych: in October 2009, 41% fully or somewhat trusted him; in April 2010 this increased to 55%, but declined to 39% in September 2010 and to 28% in March 2011.
• Growth in support for a pro-parliamentary system (the combined share supporting parliamentary–presidential and parliamentary systems) has also slowed. In October 2009, 22% supported such a system; in April 2010 – 20%; in September 2010 – 28%; and in March 2011 – 25%.
• At the same time, the share of respondents who are unable to determine which system of government is optimal has been steadily increasing: from 15% in October 2009, to 16% in April 2010, 18% in September 2010, and 25% in March 2011.
• Support for dictatorship as an optimal form of government has remained stable at around 4%.
• The strongest supporters of strengthening presidential power are voters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine, while the strongest supporters of strengthening parliamentary powers are voters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Civic Position.
• The most noticeable growth in support for strengthening parliament was recorded only in Eastern Ukraine. No region showed growth in support for strengthening presidential power. The number of undecided respondents increased in Donbas, the South, the Center, the North, and the West.