Press releases

• The Rating Group launched a new project entitled “Traits of Politicians,” intended to serve as a mirror through which politicians can see themselves through the eyes of voters, their direct employers. The project was introduced at the beginning of a new political season that was expected to be highly consequential. For this reason, the analysis was based on data collected in May and June 2011, that is, before the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, before possible new turns in the Gongadze case, before the unification processes between Serhiy Tihipko and the Party of Regions, before renewed attempts to consolidate the opposition, and before many other important developments. The next wave of the study, planned for October–November, may reveal different sides of these politicians, but that will be another story.
• At this stage the focus was on the traits of politicians whose parties, at the beginning of summer, formed the top five in national ratings: Viktor Yanukovych, Yulia Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatseniuk, Serhiy Tihipko and Oleh Tyahnybok. Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are perceived first and foremost as strong leaders, with 20 percent and 26 percent of respondents respectively associating them with this quality. On this dimension they outperform Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok by at least two times. Importantly, both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are regarded as strong leaders both in Western Ukraine and in Donbas.
• Yanukovych is most strongly associated with having a team of professionals, a trait attributed to him by 14 percent of respondents, far ahead of all others. Other qualities more often attributed to him than to his competitors include being religious, being reliable and being able to find compromises with political opponents. Tymoshenko, by contrast, is more often described as speaking in a clear and understandable way, caring about people like the respondents themselves and being able to defend the state. Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are equally perceived as representing Ukraine well abroad, fulfilling their promises and caring about family values. Serhiy Tihipko is primarily associated with knowing how to manage the economy, while Arseniy Yatseniuk is mainly associated with being able to bring change and with having an effective program for the country’s development. Oleh Tyahnybok is most strongly associated with patriotism and with caring about national traditions and culture.
• At the same time, respondents also attribute negative traits to these politicians. A significant proportion believe that Yanukovych cares only about power, and nearly as many say the same about Tymoshenko, while somewhat smaller shares express this view about Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok. These perceptions are widespread both in the West and in Donbas. For example, nearly a quarter of respondents in the West and more than forty percent in Donbas think that Tymoshenko cares only about power, while almost thirty percent in Donbas and nearly half in the West think the same about Yanukovych. Only one to three percent of respondents believe that any of these five politicians can be described as honest. Instead, a substantial share believes that Tymoshenko lies, followed closely by Yanukovych, while smaller but still notable shares say the same about Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok. Roughly forty percent of residents of the South, East and Donbas think that Tymoshenko lies, whereas about forty percent of residents of the West, North and Center think that Yanukovych lies. About a quarter of respondents consider Yanukovych and Tymoshenko corrupt, while smaller proportions say this about Tihipko, Yatseniuk and Tyahnybok.
• An especially interesting dimension of the study concerns how voters of each party perceive their own leaders. Supporters of the Party of Regions view Yanukovych primarily as a strong leader with a professional team, who knows how to manage the economy and who keeps his promises. Supporters of Batkivshchyna see Tymoshenko primarily as a strong leader who represents Ukraine well internationally, speaks clearly and fulfills her promises. Thus, in the eyes of their own voters, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko share the core traits of being strong leaders and promise keepers, although Tymoshenko scores higher on both. Yanukovych is more closely associated with professional management and economic competence, while Tymoshenko is associated with communication skills and international representation. Yanukovych is also perceived as more reliable, more religious and more inclined to compromise, whereas Tymoshenko is more often seen as able to protect the state and to care about family values.
• Supporters of Tihipko and Yatseniuk share the view that both politicians know how to manage the economy, can bring change and have development programs, but neither is strongly valued for leadership qualities. Tihipko is more often valued for having a professional team and for keeping promises, while Yatseniuk is more appreciated for speaking clearly and being reliable, although he is seen as lacking a strong team.
• For Svoboda voters, Tyahnybok is above all a patriot, a defender of national traditions, a strong leader and an agent of change. He is perceived as religious in a way similar to Yanukovych, as speaking clearly and keeping promises in a way similar to Tymoshenko, and as change-oriented in a way similar to Yatseniuk. At the same time, he is not seen as able to manage the economy, as capable of compromise, or as having an effective development program.
• Overall, the findings suggest that Ukrainian politicians appear both very similar and very different at the same time.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

• ‍According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, residents of Ivano-Frankivsk region believe that executive authorities have significantly more power than local self-government. Only 17% think that local self-government has more authority to solve socio-economic problems in the region, while 28% believe this role belongs to the central executive authorities and 31% to the local executive authorities. Another 6% believe that all branches of government have equal powers, and 19% either could not answer or did not understand the question.
• At the same time, a majority of respondents (60%) believe that local self-government should have more authority to resolve socio-economic problems in the region. Only 4% think more powers should belong to the central government and 20% to local executive authorities. Support for greater powers of the local executive branch is highest in the regional capital.
• Trust in local self-government bodies is significantly higher (40%) than trust in central executive authorities (2%) and local executive authorities (9%). Another 13% trust all branches equally, while 19% do not trust any authority — a figure that is again highest in the regional center.
• Satisfaction with government declines as the level of authority increases. Residents are most satisfied with village and town councils (60%), followed by district councils (44%), the Ivano-Frankivsk City Council (42%) and the mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk (40%). The lowest levels of satisfaction are recorded for the Regional Council (32%) and the Regional State Administration (30%).
  However, in terms of the balance between positive and negative assessments, the mayor and the city council of Ivano-Frankivsk have the worst balance: 52% and 46% respectively are dissatisfied with their work. Dissatisfaction with the Regional Council and Regional Administration is lower, at 40% and 42% respectively. Pensioners express the highest levels of satisfaction with all levels of local government.
• The main problems facing local self-government in Ivano-Frankivsk region are perceived to be:
  • lack of independence in decision-making (30%)
  • weak accountability of local officials to the community (27%)
  • insufficient authority over the distribution of locally collected funds (27%)
  • weak legislative framework (25%)
  • insufficient control over budget distribution (23%)
  • interference by executive authorities (20%)
  • limited ability of citizens to be elected (17%)
  • poor staffing capacity (16%)
  • duplication of functions between executive bodies and self-government (13%)
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• In the regional capital, staffing problems and weak accountability are seen as the most acute, while in rural areas the biggest problems are limited control over finances and interference from executive authorities. Men, middle-aged people and those with higher education are more aware of these problems.
• Seventy-four percent of residents support the idea of electing the head of the Regional State Administration, while only 13% oppose it. Support is highest in the regional capital.

‍PRIORITIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

• ‍Residents believe the main priorities of local government should be road repairs (52%), reducing unemployment (51%), controlling price growth (44%), fighting corruption and restoring agriculture (38%), supporting vulnerable groups (33%), industrial recovery (31%), healthcare (27%), youth support (27%) and controlling utility tariffs (26%).
• Less frequently mentioned priorities include protection of culture and language (21%), combating alcoholism and drug addiction (21%), attracting investment (20%), solving landfill problems (19%), supporting SMEs (17%), fighting crime (16%), protecting democracy (16%) and environmental protection (13%). Fewer than 10% consider housing, education, transport, government transparency or tourism as top priorities.
• Perceptions vary by location. In Ivano-Frankivsk city, corruption, industrial recovery, utility tariffs, crime, education, SMEs and tourism are more pressing. In other towns unemployment, inflation, healthcare and the environment dominate. In villages, agriculture and social support are most important.
• Only 6–10% of respondents are satisfied with job creation, agriculture, industry, roads and SME development. Fewer than 15% are satisfied with corruption control, social assistance or utility services. About 20% are satisfied with healthcare and government openness, while the highest satisfaction is with tourism (36%) and education (42%).
• An index of satisfaction shows that residents are:
  • mostly satisfied with education and tourism
  • moderately satisfied with government openness
  • dissatisfied with healthcare, SMEs, social protection, corruption control and utilities
  • very dissatisfied with job creation, industry, agriculture and road quality
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

• ‍Over 90% believe they can exercise their voting rights. Freedom of speech is considered accessible by 86%, freedom of assembly by 83%, freedom of association by 81%, local referenda by 76% and the right to be elected by 72%. City residents have more opportunities to exercise rights than rural residents, except for being elected. Higher education and older age increase perceived rights awareness.

‍DISCRIMINATION

• ‍Discrimination is generally perceived as low. The highest levels are reported for political views (15%) and gender (14%), followed by religion (10%), language (9%), nationality (8%) and race (7%). Discrimination is felt more in the regional capital and among young and highly educated people.

‍PROTEST MOOD

• ‍Fifty percent of residents are ready to participate in protests, while 37% are not. Readiness is similar in cities and villages and highest among supporters of UDAR, Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, Front for Change and Our Ukraine. Men, middle-aged, educated and economically active citizens are most protest-oriented.

‍PERSONAL TRUST RATINGS

• ‍The most trusted regional leaders are:
  • Mykhailo Vyshyvaniuk, Head of the Regional Administration (34%)
  • Oleksandr Sych, Head of the Regional Council (33%)
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• Other trusted figures include Ihor Nasalyk (19%), Mykhailo Paliychuk (15%), Zinovii Shkutiak (14%) and Roman Tkach (14%).

‍ELECTORAL MOOD

• If parliamentary elections were held in July 2011, Batkivshchyna would win in the region overall, while Svoboda would win in Ivano-Frankivsk city.
• ‍Regional parliamentary support (among decided voters):
  Batkivshchyna 30.8%, Svoboda 20.9%, Front for Change 16%, Our Ukraine 3.5%, UDAR 3%, Party of Regions 3%, Civic Position 2.1%, others below 2%.
• ‍Presidential support in the region:
  Yulia Tymoshenko 30%, Arseniy Yatseniuk 23.4%, Oleh Tyahnybok 14.5%, Vitaliy Klitschko 7.2%, Viktor Yushchenko 3.3%, Viktor Yanukovych 3.1%.
• ‍Ivano-Frankivsk city parliamentary vote:
  Svoboda 26.5%, Batkivshchyna 21.8%, Front for Change 17.7%.
• Svoboda remains dominant in the city, while Tyahnybok’s personal rating is lower than his party’s. Yatseniuk and Tymoshenko have significantly improved their positions. Klitschko is rapidly gaining trust, while Party of Regions and Our Ukraine have declined sharply.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in early June 2011, 40% of respondents planned to spend their summer vacation at home, while 10% intended to stay in another city or village in Ukraine. At the same time, 17% of Ukrainians planned to отдых at the Black Sea, 8% at the Azov Sea, 5% in the Carpathians, 2% in Transcarpathia, and 3% abroad. Meanwhile, one in six Ukrainians was unlikely to have any vacation at all this summer.
• For 45% of respondents, the most preferred place for recreation is the sea, 22% prefer a river or lake, 14% a forest, 7% the mountains, and 4% other places, while 8% could not decide. Thus, more than two thirds of Ukrainians prefer to relax near water. However, only about one third of those who most prefer the sea will be able to afford a trip to the Black Sea this year, 13% to the Azov Sea and 4% abroad, while more than half will be forced to stay mostly at home.
• Among favorite types of recreation, 39% of respondents named going to the sea and 24% trips to nature. Nineteen percent like spending time at a dacha or garden plot, 15% going to health resorts, 14% educational recreation involving excursions, sightseeing and museums, and 13% travel. Fishing was named by 14%, hiking by 4%, mountain recreation by 4%, and hunting by 2%.
• The most preferred mode of transport for travel among Ukrainians is the car at 45%, followed by the train at 27% and the bus at 22%. Only 6% like to travel by bicycle, 5% by airplane, 2% by motorcycle and 1% by hitchhiking, while 6% do not like to travel by any of these modes of transport.
• Women are more likely than men to prefer the sea, while men more often prefer rivers. Fishing is the second most popular leisure activity among men at 26%, but one of the least popular among women at 3%. Women also more often choose dacha and sanatorium vacations, while men more often choose nature trips, hiking, mountains and hunting. Although travel is more popular among men, women are more likely to prefer educational tourism. Men more often prefer to travel by car, bicycle and motorcycle, while women more often choose trains and buses.
• Only 35% of men plan to stay at home this summer compared to 43% of women, and men more often plan trips to the sea and the Carpathians. The sea is the most popular destination among young people and those of middle age, while rivers and forests are more popular among older and elderly people, and the mountains are more popular among young people. The older the respondents, the more likely they are to stay at home this summer, from only 25% among the young to nearly 60% among the elderly. Older people are also more likely not to have any vacation at all, with only 10% among young people and nearly one quarter among the elderly. Thus, Ukrainian pensioners, although formally “on rest,” often either cannot afford to rest or simply do not have the opportunity to do so.
• One quarter of young people plan to go to the Black Sea this summer, 13% to the Azov Sea and 4% abroad, while among pensioners only 5% plan to visit the Black Sea and less than 1% the Azov Sea. The older the respondents, the more popular sanatoriums and dacha or garden vacations become. Educational recreation is equally popular among young, middle-aged and older adults, while travel, hiking and mountain trips are much more popular among young people. Nature trips are more popular among middle-aged people, and fishing and hunting among those aged 40–59.
• Travel by car is more popular among young and middle-aged people, while train and bus travel is more common among older respondents. Motorcycles and hitchhiking are almost exclusively preferred by young people, and nearly one quarter of pensioners do not like to travel by any means at all. People with higher education more often choose cars, trains and airplanes, while those with higher incomes primarily prefer cars. The higher the level of education, the more popular educational tourism, travel, mountains and sea holidays become. Dacha vacations, fishing and hunting are most popular among people with secondary education, while sanatorium treatment is most common among those with the lowest level of education, typically older people with lower incomes.
• People with relatively lower incomes are more likely to choose dacha vacations and fishing, while those with higher incomes prefer the sea, travel, mountains and educational tourism. At the same time, nature trips are popular among both poorer and wealthier people. As a result, more affluent citizens are much more likely to spend the summer at the sea, with about one quarter going to the Black Sea, 18% to the Azov Sea and 5% abroad, and to travel around Ukraine, while less affluent people will mostly stay at home or not have any vacation at all. One in five unemployed respondents said they would not have any vacation this summer.
• Residents of the South, East and Donbas are most likely to spend their summer at the sea, with people in the South and East favoring the Black Sea and those in Donbas the Azov Sea. The Black and especially the Azov Sea are least attractive to residents of the West. Almost half of residents of the West and Center plan to stay at home, although in the West many will go to the Carpathians, which for many is essentially their home region, while in the Center many will simply not have any vacation. The fewest people planning to work all summer live in the North, where many plan to travel within the country. Urban residents more often plan sea vacations and travel, while rural residents are more likely to stay at home.
• The sea is most popular in Donbas and then in the South, rivers and lakes in the Center, forests in the North, Donbas and West, and mountains only in the West. Fishing is most popular in the Center and least popular in Donbas. Nature trips are most popular in the West and Center, where they are even more popular than the sea. Residents of the West also travel more than others and least prefer dacha vacations. Sanatoriums are most attractive in the Center and Donbas, while residents of Donbas and the East are more attracted than others to educational tourism involving excursions and museums. As for transport, most residents of the West, Center and South prefer cars, while those in Donbas prefer trains. Bicycles and airplanes are most popular in the North, buses in the Center and Donbas.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in late May 2011, 41% of respondents feel that freedom of speech in Ukraine has been curtailed since the presidential elections. At the same time, 43% do not feel such a rollback of freedom of speech, while another 17% were unable to give a clear answer. Concern about the restriction of freedom of speech is highest in Western Ukraine at 61%, followed by the Center at 47%, the North at 40% and Donbas at 37%. These perceptions are most common among people of middle age, with relatively higher levels of education and income, and men are more sensitive to this issue than women. In terms of political preferences, this concern is most widespread among supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position and Batkivshchyna, about two thirds of whom believe that freedom of speech is being restricted. Slightly fewer, but still more than half, of Front for Change and Our Ukraine supporters share this view. By contrast, only 14% of Party of Regions supporters perceive negative trends in freedom of speech, although among supporters of other pro-government parties such as the People’s Party, the Communist Party and Strong Ukraine this share is roughly twice as high.
• Overall, according to current public assessments, the situation with freedom of speech in Ukraine has stabilized in recent months. In May 2011 the indicator stood at the same level as in September 2010 at 41%, and was slightly lower than in January 2011, when it reached 46%. However, compared with April 2010 the situation remains worrying. One year earlier, immediately after the presidential elections, only 19% of respondents felt that freedom of speech was being restricted, whereas by May 2011 this share had more than doubled to 41%. Since last September, perceptions of declining freedom of speech have increased only in Donbas, remained almost unchanged in the South, West and Center, and declined in the East and North.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had been held in late May 2011, 32% of respondents said they would definitely take part and another 35% said they would rather take part. Presidential elections would generate slightly higher turnout, with 36% saying they would definitely vote and another 36% saying they would rather vote. The most mobilized voters remain supporters of Civic Position, Svoboda, UDAR and Batkivshchyna.
• If parliamentary elections had taken place in late May 2011, 22.8% of likely voters would have supported the Party of Regions, 18.8% Batkivshchyna, 9.3% Front for Change, 5.5% Svoboda, 5.5% Strong Ukraine, 4.5% the Communist Party and 4% UDAR led by Vitali Klitschko. A further 2.2% would have voted for Civic Position, 1.2% for the People’s Party and 1.1% for Our Ukraine. Other parties would have received 4.4% of the vote, 11.7% would have voted “against all parties,” and 9% were undecided. Under these conditions, with a 3% electoral threshold, seven parties would enter parliament: the Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Front for Change, Svoboda, Strong Ukraine, the Communist Party and UDAR. If the threshold were raised to 5%, only five parties would enter parliament, excluding the Communists and UDAR.
• If a presidential election had been held in late May 2011, 22.5% of likely voters would have voted for Viktor Yanukovych, 18.4% for Yuliya Tymoshenko, 10.1% for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 7.1% for Serhiy Tihipko, 5% for Vitali Klitschko, 3.6% for Oleh Tiahnybok, 2.9% for Petro Symonenko and 2.8% for Anatoliy Hrytsenko. Other candidates would have been supported by 6.8% of voters, 8.7% would have voted “against all,” and 12.1% were undecided.
• The key trend is the continued growth of the group that does not support any party, rising from 7% in December of the previous year to 10% in March and to 12% in May. Among all respondents, the share of those who would vote “against all” is even higher, exceeding 14%, and more than half of them intend to participate in elections in order to express this position. Compared with March, the share of undecided voters also increased to 9%. Against this background, the ratings of Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions fell the most, from 26% to 23%, with the greatest losses in their core regions in the South and Donbas, where the number of undecided voters and those voting “against all” continues to grow. Yuliya Tymoshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk also lost some support, although party ratings remained largely unchanged. In the West, where Batkivshchyna lost the most, Yatsenyuk improved his position, while in the Center and North he recorded slight losses. Svoboda’s position remained stable at around 5–6%. Against the backdrop of weakening positions of most leaders, Vitali Klitschko nearly doubled his support from 3% to 5%, and UDAR from 2% to 4%, especially in the West, North and South. Serhiy Tihipko strengthened his position somewhat in the South and Donbas, raising his overall rating from 6% to 7%.

• According to the latest survey conducted by the Rating Group, 60% of Lviv residents believe that 9 May should be commemorated primarily as a Day of Remembrance for the victims of the war, while 28% see it mainly as Victory Day. Another 12% were undecided. Support for commemorating 9 May as a Day of Remembrance is highest among young people. In terms of political preferences, this interpretation is most strongly supported by voters of Our Ukraine, Svoboda and the Front for Change, where more than 70% share this view, while two thirds of voters of the Party of Regions and all supporters of the Communist Party of Ukraine see it primarily as Victory Day.
• Eighty-three percent of Lviv residents agreed with the statement that a planned provocation took place in Lviv on 9 May, which led to clashes, while only 7% disagreed and 11% were undecided. This view was shared even by two thirds of Communist Party supporters and nearly 60% of Party of Regions voters. More than half of respondents, 52%, believe that pro-Russian parties were the main culprits behind the clashes, while about one third place responsibility on the President, nearly the same share on the Verkhovna Rada, and another third on law enforcement agencies. One in five respondents blamed political strategists. At the same time, 15% believe that Svoboda and other nationalist forces were primarily responsible for the clashes, 11% blame the head of the regional state administration and 8% the mayor.
• Almost 40% of Lviv residents support the actions of Mayor Andriy Sadovyi during the events of 9 May in Lviv, while fewer, 30%, do not. A similar share, nearly 40%, support the actions of Svoboda, while roughly the same proportion oppose them. The actions of the head of the regional state administration on 9 May are supported by only 17% of Lviv residents and opposed by 45%. Support for the police is even lower, with only 11% approving their actions and nearly 70% disapproving. The actions of pro-Russian parties on 9 May are supported by just 1% of Lviv residents, while more than 80% do not support them.
• Activists of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Russia proposed holding a joint action in Lviv on 22 June. In response to the question of how Lviv residents should react if such an event takes place, only 3% suggested expressing support, while 24% said it should be ignored, meaning neither supported nor protested. At the same time, 47% proposed a peaceful protest and 14% a radical protest, including the use of force. Eleven percent were undecided. Supporters of Svoboda, Our Ukraine, the Front for Change and Batkivshchyna are the most ready to protest on 22 June, while only about 30% of Party of Regions supporters and 20% of Communist Party supporters are willing to support the action. Young people are the most critical of the possible action, with nearly 20% ready for radical protest and another 50% for peaceful protest.
• Thirty-five percent of Lviv residents support the initiative to dismiss the head of the regional state administration, 29% oppose it and 36% are undecided. Support for the resignation is strongest among supporters of Civic Position, Svoboda and Batkivshchyna, while the strongest opposition comes from supporters of Strong Ukraine and the Party of Regions.
• Recent surveys indicate a continued rise in protest moods in society. In December of the previous year only 42% of Lviv residents agreed that revolutionary sentiments were emerging in Ukraine, in March this rose to 57%, and in May it reached 63%. Only 26% of city residents do not perceive revolutionary moods, compared to 40% in December and 32% in March. In December only 32% believed that revolutionary sentiments could soon turn into mass protests similar to those of November 2004, in March this figure rose to 46%, and in May it exceeded half at 56%. The share who did not believe in such a development fell from 44% in December to 42% in March and to just 32% in May.
• Forty-three percent of Lviv residents say they are personally ready to take part in protest actions, while 48% are not. The most protest-oriented groups are supporters of Svoboda, UDAR and Civic Position. Protest readiness is high not only among young people, where about half are ready to protest, but also among middle-aged residents, also close to half, and at least one third of older people. In general, men are more likely to be ready to protest than women, as are those with relatively higher incomes and higher levels of education. At the same time, a high protest potential is also observed among people with average incomes, meaning that both workers and managers, civil servants and entrepreneurs could support protests. People who currently have a job are more willing to protest than the unemployed, as the risk of losing a job is more mobilizing than not having one at all, and they are even more inclined to protest than students.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, as of May 2011 the level of political engagement among Lviv residents remains relatively high. If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 43% of Lviv residents would definitely take part and 49% would do so in presidential elections, while about another 30% would rather participate than not. The highest level of mobilization is observed among supporters of Svoboda, Front for Change and Batkivshchyna.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held next Sunday, 23.7% of Lviv residents who intend to vote would support Svoboda. Batkivshchyna would receive 19.7%, Front for Change 15.8%, Civic Position 4.9%, Our Ukraine 4.8%, Strong Ukraine 4.4%, the Party of Regions 3.2%, UDAR 2.5% and the European Party 1.9%. Other parties together would be supported by 8% of voters. About 6.3% would support no party at all, while 4.9% would be undecided.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 20.4% of Lviv residents who intend to vote would support Yuliya Tymoshenko. Arseniy Yatsenyuk would receive 18.6%, Oleh Tyahnybok 12.9%, Vitali Klitschko 8%, Anatolii Hrytsenko 7.2%, Viktor Yushchenko 5.1%, Serhiy Tihipko 4.9% and Viktor Yanukovych 2.7%, while other candidates together would be supported by 7%. About 5% would not support any candidate and 7% would be undecided.
• Among national-level politicians, Arseniy Yatsenyuk enjoys the highest level of trust in the city. Over the past two months, trust in the Front for Change leader increased from 48% to 54%. Half of Lviv residents, 51%, trust Vitali Klitschko, while only 30% distrust him, and since March his trust level has grown from 43% to 51%. Trust in Anatolii Hrytsenko has also risen slightly, from 38% in March to 40% in May, and compared with September of the previous year, the share of Lviv residents who trust him has almost doubled from 23% to 40%, while 39% do not trust him. Oleh Tyahnybok is trusted by 47% and distrusted by 41%, and over the past three months his trust rating has declined from 51% to 47% while distrust has grown from 35% to 40%. Trust in Yuliya Tymoshenko has increased since March from 31% and stabilized at the level recorded in February 2011 and September 2010, at 35%. After reaching a record low in March at 18%, trust in Viktor Yushchenko in May returned to the level seen in February 2011 and September 2010, at 22%. Trust in Viktor Yanukovych continues to deteriorate, with only 8% trusting the head of state, and just 1% trusting him fully, compared to 3% in March, while 86% of Lviv residents do not trust him. Serhiy Tihipko is trusted by 19% and distrusted by 61%.
• As in March, Yuliya Tymoshenko continues to lead the presidential race in Lviv in May, and the rating of Batkivshchyna has grown over two months from 18% to 20%. The rating of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, at around 19%, and that of Front for Change, at around 15%, have remained stable throughout 2011. Oleh Tyahnybok’s rating has declined over the past two months from 17% to 13%, and support for Svoboda in parliamentary elections has also slightly decreased from 27% to 24%, bringing the party back to levels seen in mid-2010. Despite the fact that support for UDAR has remained relatively stable over the past six months at 3–4%, Vitali Klitschko’s personal rating has almost doubled over the last two months to a record 8%. This sharp rise in Klitschko’s support likely prevents Arseniy Yatsenyuk from taking first place in the presidential rating, even though Yatsenyuk currently leads in trust. Anatolii Hrytsenko continues to make progress, with his personal rating reaching 7% in May compared to 3% six months earlier, while Civic Position rose to 5% from 2%. After a record low of 2% in March, Our Ukraine has recovered to about 5%, while the ratings of the Party of Regions and Viktor Yanukovych have declined to record lows of about 3%.
• Among local politicians, Andriy Sadovyi enjoys the highest level of trust at 57%, while 34% do not trust him, and his trust level has remained stable over the past six months. Petro Pysarchuk is trusted by 27% and distrusted by 54%, with trust rising slightly since December from 24% to 27% and distrust declining from 56% to 54%. Oleh Pankevych is trusted by 20% and distrusted by 27%, and compared to December his trust rating as head of the regional council has nearly doubled from 11% to 20%, while the share of those unfamiliar with him has declined from 35% to 21%. Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk is trusted by 17% and distrusted by 45%, and while his trust level has barely changed since March, his distrust has risen from 30% to 45%, and the share of respondents unfamiliar with him has fallen from 17% to 7%. Vasyl Pavliuk is trusted by 12% and distrusted by 22%, and compared to December his trust level has increased from 8% to 12%, although nearly half of Lviv residents still do not know him.
• If mayoral elections were held next Sunday, 52.2% of Lviv residents who intend to vote would support Andriy Sadovyi. Petro Pysarchuk would receive 13.5%, Volodymyr Hirniak 4.6% and Yurii Mykhalchyshyn 3.1%, while other candidates together would receive about 12%. About 4.5% would support no candidate and 9.4% would be undecided. Over the past two months the rating of the incumbent mayor Andriy Sadovyi has increased the most, from 47% to 52%, as has that of his main rival in the previous election, Petro Pysarchuk, from 12% to 14%.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in April 2011, 44% of respondents support granting the Russian language the status of a state language, while 47% oppose it. In 2009, more than 50% of citizens consistently supported granting Russian this status; in 2010 support declined to 46–47%, and in 2011 it fell further to 44%. At the same time, opposition to making Russian a second state language has steadily increased: from 40% in 2009 to 46% in 2010 and to 47–48% in 2011. The share of undecided respondents on this issue has remained almost unchanged at 7–8%.
• Support for granting Russian the status of a second state language is highest in Donbas, the South, and the East, particularly among supporters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, and to a lesser extent among supporters of Strong Ukraine and UDAR.
• In 2010, 44–45% of respondents consistently supported the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus, while roughly the same proportion opposed it. In January 2011, support rose to 48%, but by April 2011 it declined to 47%. At the same time, the share of those opposing such a union continued to fall—from 44% in January to 40% in April—while the number of undecided respondents increased from 8% to 13%.
• Support for a union with Russia and Belarus is strongest in Donbas, the South, and the East. Supporters of the Communist Party back the idea of a single state with Russia even more strongly than they support granting Russian the status of a state language. Around 70% of supporters of the Party of Regions support both bilingualism and the unification of Ukraine with Russia into a single state. The strongest opponents of these ideas are supporters of Svoboda, as well as those of the Front for Change, Civic Position, and Batkivshchyna.
• Against this background, public support for European integration has declined to approximately its 2009 level. In October 2009, 51% supported Ukraine’s accession to the European Union; this rose to 52% in April 2010, 57% in September 2010, and 56% in January 2011, but fell back to 51% by April 2011. About 30% oppose EU accession.
• Notably, 37% of those who support the creation of a single state with Russia and Belarus also support Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This view is held by about one in four residents of Donbas, the South, and the East. For these respondents, economic considerations—primarily expectations of improved living standards—outweigh ideological ones.
• The higher the level of education and the younger the respondent, the more likely they are to support EU accession and the less likely they are to support a union with Russia and Belarus or the granting of Russian the status of a second state language.
• Public attitudes toward NATO membership have also deteriorated. In October 2009, 22% supported Ukraine joining NATO; this increased to 24% in April 2010 and 26% in September 2010, but fell to 24% in January 2011 and to 22% by April 2011. More than 60% oppose NATO membership. Strong support for NATO exists only in Western Ukraine, where about half of respondents favor joining. Among party supporters, NATO membership is most strongly backed by Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Front for Change.
• Support for extending the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042 has continued to decline—from 46% in September 2010 to 42% in January 2011 and to 41% in April 2011—while opposition has stabilized at 41%. The number of undecided respondents has increased from 13% to 18%. Support is highest in the South (73%), followed by Donbas (56%) and the East (52%). Younger respondents tend to oppose the extension, while older respondents are more likely to support it.
• Support for creating a gas consortium to share ownership of Ukraine’s gas transit system between Russia, the EU, and Ukraine has fallen sharply, from 36% in March 2010 to 27% in April 2011, while opposition has risen from 35% to 56%. Support is highest in Donbas, the South, and the East, particularly among Communist Party supporters.
• Support for revoking President Yushchenko’s decree awarding Stepan Bandera the title Hero of Ukraine declined slightly from 53% in March 2010 to 51% in April 2011, while opposition increased from 28% to 32%. Eighteen percent remain undecided.
• Twenty-seven percent of respondents support recognizing the OUN–UPA as participants in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence (72% in Western Ukraine), while 49% oppose it (73% in the South). Over the past year, support for recognition has increased from 20% to 27%, while opposition has fallen from 61% to 49%. Support is highest among Svoboda supporters (nearly 90%), and about half of supporters of the Front for Change, Civic Position, and Batkivshchyna.
• Fifty-eight percent of respondents agree that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people; 29% disagree and 13% are undecided. Support for this view declined from 61% in March 2010 to 53% in January 2011 but rose again to 58% by April 2011. Nearly 90% of Western Ukrainians, about 70% in the North and Center, and about half in the East agree with this characterization. Even around 40% of Party of Regions supporters and 30% of Communist Party supporters agree.
• Fifty-five percent of respondents view positively the initiative to display Soviet red flags alongside the Ukrainian state flag on Victory Day (May 9), while 30% view it negatively and 15% are undecided. Support is highest in the South (86%) and Donbas (75). It is strongest among Communist Party supporters (over 90%) and Party of Regions supporters (75%), and lowest among Svoboda supporters.
• Eighty-three percent of respondents view positively the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR; only 5% view it negatively and 12% are undecided. Support is highest in Donbas, the Center, and the East, and lowest in the South, particularly in Crimea. Sixty percent believe Crimea should retain autonomous status within Ukraine, 23% support making it a regular oblast, 2% support a Crimean Tatar autonomy, and only 4% favor transferring Crimea to Russia.
• Half of respondents believe a unitary state is the optimal form of government for Ukraine, while one quarter favor a federation and one quarter are undecided. Support for a unitary state is strongest in the West, North, and Center, while support for a federal system is highest in Donbas and the South. Donbas is the only region where federalism is supported by more people than unitarism.

Readiness for protest

• 40% of respondents say they are personally ready to defend their rights and interests by taking part in protest actions, 52% say they are not ready, and 8% could not answer.
• The highest readiness for protest is observed in Western Ukraine (51%), Northern Ukraine (45%), and Central Ukraine (43%). A significant share of citizens are also willing to protest in the East (36%), Donbas (33%), and the South (29%). Among voters, the highest readiness for protest is found among supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna, as well as Civic Position and Front for Change. The lowest readiness is among supporters of the Party of Regions.
• Readiness to protest is highest among employed citizens, people with middle and above-average incomes, and those with higher levels of education. These respondents come from a wide age range, with roughly equal shares among younger, middle-aged, and older groups, except pensioners. Men are more likely to be ready to protest than women. By religious affiliation, Greek Catholics and believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) are the most willing to protest, while believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) are the least willing.

Government actions that could trigger protests

• Social issues are much more likely to mobilize people for protest than political or ideological ones.
• The main issues that could push citizens into the streets (rallies, demonstrations, pickets) are:
  • price increases (38%)
  • non-payment of wages (32%)
  • increases in utility tariffs (29%)
  • mass layoffs (26%)
  ‍
• Less mobilizing, but still significant, are:
  • raising the retirement age (18%)
  • introduction of paid healthcare (14%)
  • increased spending on senior officials (13%)
  ‍
• Further potential triggers include:
  • rollback of democracy (9%)
  • violations of political rights and freedoms (8%)
  • higher tuition fees (8%)
  • surrendering national interests in relations with Russia (7%)
  • lifting the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land (6%)
  • political repression against the opposition (4%)
  ‍
• At the same time, 34% of respondents say they would not participate in protests under any circumstances. This means that not all of the 52% who initially said they were not ready to protest are categorical — some of them could still join protests if, above all, their social rights were violated.
• Regionally:
  • price increases would most strongly mobilize the Center
  • higher utility tariffs the North
  • wage arrears and job cuts the East and North
  • raising the retirement age and lifting the land-sale moratorium the South
  • paid healthcare the North
  • restrictions on democracy, freedom of speech, political rights, and the surrender of national interests the West
  ‍
• Donbas remains the most restrained region: almost half of respondents there would not protest under any circumstances. Still, about one-third would protest, especially over price increases, utility tariffs, job losses, and unpaid wages.

Protests in case of a court ban

• Among those who are ready to protest, half say they would take part even if the authorities banned protests through the courts. Another 27% would participate only if protests were officially permitted.
• The most confident and determined protesters — those ready to demonstrate even in case of a ban — are residents of the West, North, and East. Among voters, these are supporters of Civic Position, Svoboda, and Batkivshchyna.

Attitudes toward a new Maidan

• If a new Maidan were to take place in Kyiv in the near future, 36% of respondents would support it, 47% would not, and 17% are undecided. Support is highest in the West, North, and Center, but even in the South and Donbas nearly one in five would support a new Maidan. Among voters, supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna are the most supportive.

Who should organize a new Maidan?

• A relative majority of respondents (39%) believe that for a Maidan to be successful, it should be organized and led by politicians. 34% believe people can organize protests on their own without political leaders, and 27% are undecided.
• Among those who support a new Maidan, 53% would prefer politicians to lead it, 37% would rely on themselves, and 10% are undecided.
• Trust in political leadership for organizing a Maidan is highest in the North, especially Kyiv and the Kyiv region, and somewhat lower in the West. Among party supporters, those of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, UDAR, and Front for Change are the most inclined to trust politicians to lead a new Maidan.

Leaders of a new Maidan

• Among those who support a new Maidan:
  • 38% believe Yuliya Tymoshenko could lead it
  • 20% — Arseniy Yatseniuk
  • 15% — Oleh Tyahnybok
  • 14% — Vitalii Klychko
  • 8% — Anatoliy Hrytsenko
  • 8% — other politicians
  ‍
• At the same time, 13% say no politician could lead a new Maidan, and 16% are undecided.
• Yuliya Tymoshenko is seen as the most likely leader in all regions — most strongly in the West and least in the South. Supporters of each party primarily want their own party leader to lead a Maidan, but nearly one in five supporters of Svoboda, UDAR, and Front for Change would also see Tymoshenko as one of the leaders. Civic Position and Communist Party supporters are the least inclined to see Tymoshenko in that role.

Willingness to stay on Maidan

• Among those who support a new Maidan, a relative majority (47%) say that if they participated, they would protest as long as necessary until demands were met.
  ‍
• 5% would stay about a month, 8% about a week, while one in five would take part for only one day or a few days.

• According to a study conducted by the Rating Group, almost one third of Lviv residents aged 16 and older would like to start their own business: 11% definitely would and another 20% would rather do so. Among working-age residents of Lviv, nearly 40% express an interest in starting their own business. At the same time, 58% of respondents do not want to engage in entrepreneurial activity, 5% already have their own business, and 6% were unable to decide.
• The younger the respondents and the higher their level of education, the greater their willingness to start a business. Among young people aged 16–25, more than half would like to engage in entrepreneurship, while among those aged 56 and older, 90% do not want to do so. Among men, the share willing to start their own business is about one third higher than among women. By occupation, the highest interest in entrepreneurship is observed among the unemployed and students, and the lowest among office workers and pensioners. The desire to run one’s own business is expressed by twice as many unmarried respondents as married ones, 52% versus 27%. At the same time, respondents who already have children show a stronger desire to open their own business than those who do not. The higher the income of respondents, the stronger their inclination to start a business, and among the wealthiest respondents the largest share of those who already own a business is found, especially in the 46–55 age group.
• When asked what attracts them more in entrepreneurship, profits or independence, opinions are almost evenly split. Among those who would like to start a business, 48% say they are mainly attracted by potential profits, while 43% primarily value independence and autonomy in decision-making, and 9% are undecided. Independence is valued most by respondents aged 26–35, those with higher education and women, while men and respondents of above-average and older age tend to focus more on profits.
• Unfortunately, only 5% of those who would like to start a business assess their chances of doing so in the next one or two years as significant. Nearly half, 48%, describe their chances as low, and 34% say they have no chance at all. This means that although about 190,000 Lviv residents would like to have their own business, in reality only about 6,000 new entrepreneurs may appear in the city over the next one or two years. This indicates a massive gap between the number of those who would like to start a business and those who believe they will actually do so in the near future, a difference of more than thirtyfold. Symbolically, a similar gap exists between the incomes of the rich and the poor in Ukraine, whereas in Europe this gap does not exceed tenfold. This further confirms that the real path to Europe lies through the creation of a middle class in Ukraine, and the example of Lviv shows that the reserves for this are far from negligible.
• The main obstacles to starting a business named by those who would like to engage in entrepreneurship are the lack of start-up capital, cited by 60%, and high taxes, cited by 51%. About one third are restrained by the overall economic crisis at 35%, high levels of competition at 29% and bureaucratic barriers to doing business at 28%. One in five mentioned uncertainty about profitability at 22%, fear of pressure from regulatory authorities at 21% and a lack of entrepreneurial experience at 19%. Less frequently mentioned obstacles include fear of criminal interference at 14%, lack of necessary knowledge and skills at 12%, lack of confidence in one’s own abilities at 10%, unwillingness to take risks at 9%, lack of ideas at 8% and age or health issues at 4%.
• It is noteworthy that among Lviv residents who rate their chances of starting a business as high, concerns about lack of start-up capital and lack of business experience are much less widespread than among those who consider their chances minimal or nonexistent. Lack of start-up capital is most worrying for people aged 26–35, high taxes and high competition for those aged 16–25, bureaucratic barriers for middle-aged respondents, while the overall crisis is a concern across all age groups. Women are more likely than men to be restrained by high taxes, bureaucratic barriers, lack of confidence and unwillingness to take risks, while men more often point to the general economic crisis, high competition, lack of entrepreneurial experience and insufficient skills. While lack of start-up capital is an equally important obstacle for respondents with different levels of education, more educated respondents are more concerned about bureaucratic barriers, pressure from regulatory authorities, possible criminal influence, and the lack of experience and skills.

Assessment of current developments

• Only 9% of Lviv residents believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the right direction (this view is held mainly by supporters of the Party of Regions), while 71% believe they are moving in the wrong direction.
• The situation in Lviv itself is assessed more positively than the situation in the country: 24% of Lviv residents believe that developments in the city are moving in the right direction, while 45% believe they are moving in the wrong direction. Supporters of Svoboda and Batkivshchyna are the most satisfied with the situation in Lviv.
• Only 8% of Lviv residents say that their own and their family’s financial situation has improved over the past few years. 30% say it has remained unchanged, while 59% say it has worsened.
• Over the last six months the picture is even worse: only 4% of Lviv residents report an improvement in their financial situation, while 69% say it has deteriorated.
• According to respondents, the three most serious municipal problems in Lviv are:
  • poor performance of housing and utility services (ZhEKs) – 45%
  • dilapidated condition of residential buildings – 38%
  • poor condition of city roads – 37%
  ‍
• Other frequently mentioned problems include:
  • dirty streets – 27%
  • poor performance of healthcare institutions – 23%
  ‍
• Less frequently mentioned were:
  • poor public transport – 16%
  • traffic congestion – 15%
  • preservation of architectural heritage – 14%
  • poor water supply – 14%
  • street crime – 13%
  • lack of playgrounds and sports facilities – 12%
  • poor street lighting – 11%
  • poor heating supply – 8%
  • poor performance of educational institutions – 6%
  ‍

Protest moods

• 57% of city residents agree with the statement that revolutionary sentiments are building up in Ukraine, while only 32% disagree. Compared to December of the previous year, the share of those who believe revolutionary moods are growing increased by one third — from 42% to 57%.
• The strongest support for this view comes from supporters of Civic Position, Our Ukraine, UDAR, the “against all” category, and Svoboda. The weakest support is among supporters of the Party of Regions.
• 46% of Lviv residents believe that in the near future these revolutionary moods could turn into mass protest actions similar to those of November 2004, while 42% do not believe this. Compared to December, belief in a possible new Maidan increased almost 1.5 times — from 32% to 46%.
• 60% of respondents agree with the statement that a policy of “Russification” is being pursued in Ukraine; only 27% disagree.
• The “Russification” thesis is most strongly supported by supporters of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, Front for Change, Our Ukraine, and those who chose “against all”.
• According to respondents, Russification is most evident in:
  • television – 71%
  • education – 61%
  ‍
• It is also perceived in:
  • culture – 46%
  • the press – 43%
  • radio – 36%
  • book publishing – 28%
  • cinema and theatre – 27%
  • official paperwork in state institutions – 22%
  ‍
• 85% of Lviv residents do not support the idea of separating Western Ukraine into a separate state. Only 9% support this idea, and just 3% support it strongly.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, as of March 2011 the level of voter mobilization in Lviv remains relatively high: 43% of Lviv residents would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 48% in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. Another roughly one-third would probably participate rather than abstain.
• The highest level of mobilization in parliamentary elections is observed among Svoboda voters, while in presidential elections it is highest among supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko. The lowest mobilization is recorded among residents who have not decided on their choice and among those who would vote “against all”.
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 26.8% of Lviv voters would support Svoboda (figures are given among those who intend to vote). Batkivshchyna would receive 18.1%, Front for Change 14.8%, the Party of Regions 4.4%, Civic Position 3.8%, UDAR 3.6%, Strong Ukraine 3.3%, Our Ukraine 2.1%, the European Party 1.6%, and the People’s Movement 1%. Each of the remaining parties would receive less than 1%, together accounting for over 5%. About 7.2% would not support any party, while 8.2% are undecided.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 22.4% of Lviv voters would vote for Yuliya Tymoshenko (among those intending to vote). Arseniy Yatseniuk would receive 19.4%, Oleh Tyahnybok 17.4%, Anatoliy Hrytsenko 6.8%, Serhiy Tihipko 4.1%, Viktor Yanukovych 3.6%, Viktor Yushchenko 3.3%, and Vitalii Klychko 3.3%. Other candidates together would receive more than 6%. About 8% would not support any candidate, and 6% are undecided.
• Trends
• For the first time in the past six months, Yuliya Tymoshenko has taken the lead in the presidential race in Lviv. This result is driven by the very high mobilization of her supporters. Compared to February, her rating rose from 18% to 22%, while the party’s rating remained almost unchanged. Arseniy Yatseniuk ranks second at 19%, essentially unchanged from February. Oleh Tyahnybok ranks third, having slightly improved his position from 15% to 17%, though still below his December level.
• The strongest growth is shown by Anatoliy Hrytsenko, whose rating rose dynamically and reached 7% in March for the first time. Vitalii Klychko’s rating remains around 3–4%. Viktor Yushchenko continues to lose support, falling to 3% for the first time. Viktor Yanukovych and Serhiy Tihipko are also losing support, both dropping to around 4%.
• Svoboda remains the leader in the party rating, with stable support of 26–27%, which restrains the growth of Batkivshchyna (18–19%) and Front for Change (15%). In the case of Svoboda, the party’s rating significantly exceeds the leader’s, while for Batkivshchyna and Front for Change the opposite is true.
• Civic Position and UDAR have gained slightly, with their ratings rising to about 4%. The Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine remain at low levels (3–4%). Our Ukraine has fallen to 2% for the first time.
• Among national-level politicians, Oleh Tyahnybok continues to enjoy the highest level of trust in Lviv, with 50% trusting him and 41% not trusting him. Trust in Arseniy Yatseniuk declined from 55% to 48%, and trust in Yuliya Tymoshenko from 35% to 31%, although this did not affect their electoral positions. Vitalii Klychko is trusted by 43% of Lviv residents and not trusted by 38%. Tyahnybok, Yatseniuk and Klychko are the only national politicians who have a positive balance of trust in the city.
• Anatoliy Hrytsenko is trusted by 38% and not trusted by 42%. Viktor Yushchenko is trusted by 18% and not trusted by 73%. Viktor Yanukovych is trusted by only 8% and not trusted by 86%, representing record-low trust and record-high distrust for both politicians over the past several years. Serhiy Tihipko is trusted by 17% and not trusted by 72%.
• Among local politicians, the highest level of trust is held by Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, whom 57% trust and 32% do not trust. These figures have not changed since December. Petro Pysarchuk is trusted by 23% and not trusted by 56%, also largely unchanged. Vasyl Kuibida is trusted by 18% and not trusted by 58%.
• Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk is trusted by 16% and not trusted by 30%, while 17% do not know him and 38% could not define their attitude toward the head of the regional administration. Oleh Pankevych is trusted by 15% and not trusted by 27%, with trust rising since December, though 34% do not know him and 24% are undecided. Volodymyr Pavliuk is trusted by 9% and not trusted by 31%, while 45% do not know him and 16% are undecided.
• If the mayoral election in Lviv were held next Sunday, 46.7% of voters would support Andriy Sadovyi (among those intending to vote). Petro Pysarchuk would receive 12.2%, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn 5.4%, and Vasyl Hirniak 5%. Other candidates together would receive about 9%. About 9.4% would not support any candidate and 12.2% are undecided.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group in March 2011, 16% of respondents consider a presidential system to be the optimal form of government for Ukraine, 30% support a presidential–parliamentary system, 21% a parliamentary–presidential system, 4% a parliamentary system, 4% a dictatorship, while 25% were unable to decide.

Trends

• Support for a pro-presidential form of government (the combined share of those supporting presidential and presidential–parliamentary systems) has been gradually declining since its peak in April 2010. In October 2009, 58% supported a pro-presidential system; in April 2010 this rose to 61%, but fell to 50% in September 2010 and to 46% by March 2011.
• These trends closely mirror changes in trust in Viktor Yanukovych: in October 2009, 41% fully or somewhat trusted him; in April 2010 this increased to 55%, but declined to 39% in September 2010 and to 28% in March 2011.
• Growth in support for a pro-parliamentary system (the combined share supporting parliamentary–presidential and parliamentary systems) has also slowed. In October 2009, 22% supported such a system; in April 2010 – 20%; in September 2010 – 28%; and in March 2011 – 25%.
• At the same time, the share of respondents who are unable to determine which system of government is optimal has been steadily increasing: from 15% in October 2009, to 16% in April 2010, 18% in September 2010, and 25% in March 2011.
• Support for dictatorship as an optimal form of government has remained stable at around 4%.
• The strongest supporters of strengthening presidential power are voters of the Party of Regions and Strong Ukraine, while the strongest supporters of strengthening parliamentary powers are voters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Civic Position.
• The most noticeable growth in support for strengthening parliament was recorded only in Eastern Ukraine. No region showed growth in support for strengthening presidential power. The number of undecided respondents increased in Donbas, the South, the Center, the North, and the West.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group in March 2011, the five biggest threats facing the country were identified as: economic decline (named by 53% of respondents), rising unemployment (47%), devaluation of the hryvnia (23%), abuse of power by the authorities (23%), and population degradation (18%).
• Further down the ranking of perceived threats are deterioration of healthcare (15%), rising crime (13%), environmental disasters (13%), mass emigration of Ukrainians abroad (11%), national division (9%), demographic crisis (9%), possible loss of independence (9%), the threat of civil war (8%), and deterioration in the level of education (7%).
• In addition, 6% of respondents fear losing control over Ukraine’s gas transit system, 5% fear an unconstitutional coup, 3% fear a military threat from Russia, 2% fear terrorism, and 1% fear a military threat from the West. Only 2% of Ukrainians say they do not feel any threats at all.
• Trends
• Over the past year (the previous survey was conducted in March 2010), concern about economic decline has slightly decreased nationwide, from 56% to 53%. This trend is seen in all regions except Donbas, where the share of those fearing economic decline increased from 60% to 67%.
• Fears of environmental disasters (from 15% to 13%), national division (from 14% to 9%), loss of control over the gas transit system (from 8% to 6%), and an unconstitutional coup (from 8% to 5%) have also declined.
• At the same time, Ukrainians have become more concerned about rising unemployment (from 42% to 47%), population degradation (from 16% to 18%), mass emigration abroad (from 7% to 11%), demographic crisis (from 6% to 9%), the threat of civil war (from 5% to 8%), and deterioration in the education system (from 5% to 7%).
• As a year earlier, about one quarter of Ukrainians continue to fear devaluation of the hryvnia and abuse of power by the authorities, while almost one in six fear declining healthcare and rising crime.
• In Western Ukraine, the strongest increases were recorded in fears of rising unemployment, abuse of power, population degradation, and environmental disasters, while concerns about hryvnia devaluation, national division, loss of independence, and a military threat from Russia declined.
• In Central Ukraine, the biggest increases were in fears of unemployment, deterioration of healthcare, mass emigration, demographic crisis, civil war, and worsening education. At the same time, fears of hryvnia devaluation, abuse of power, rising crime, and national division declined.
• In the North, fears of unemployment and hryvnia devaluation increased most, while concern about environmental disasters and national division decreased.
• In the East, fears of unemployment, deterioration of healthcare, and declining education increased, while concern about abuse of power and population degradation declined.
• In the South, fears of worsening healthcare, population degradation, and civil war increased most, while fears of abuse of power, national division, and a military threat from the West declined.
• In Donbas, the biggest increases were in fears of hryvnia devaluation, rising crime, and the demographic crisis, while concern about environmental disasters declined.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, if parliamentary elections had taken place in March 2011, 29% of respondents would definitely have taken part and another 36% would probably have participated. Voter mobilization for a presidential election is traditionally higher: if a presidential election had been held in March, 32% of respondents would definitely have voted and a further 37% would probably have done so. The most mobilized voters are supporters of Svoboda, Civic Position, and the Communist Party, while the least mobilized are supporters of Strong Ukraine and UDAR. Almost half of those who do not support any party or are undecided say they would not take part in the elections.
• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada had been held in March 2011, 26.2% of those who intended to vote would have supported the Party of Regions, 19.7% would have voted for Batkivshchyna, 9.3% for the Front for Change, 6.0% for Svoboda, 5.6% for Strong Ukraine, and 4.6% for the Communist Party. A further 1.9% would have supported Civic Position and UDAR each, 1.3% the People’s Party, and 1.2% Our Ukraine. Other parties together would have received 4.3% of the vote. About 10.4% would have voted against all parties and 7.6% were undecided.
• If a presidential election had taken place in March 2011, 26% of likely voters would have supported Viktor Yanukovych, 20.3% Yulia Tymoshenko, 11.2% Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 6.4% Serhiy Tihipko, 4.2% Oleh Tyahnybok, and 3.5% Petro Symonenko. Vitaliy Klitschko and Anatoliy Hrytsenko would each have received 2.8%, Viktor Yushchenko 1.7%, and Volodymyr Lytvyn 1.2%. Other candidates together would have received 2.6%. Around 8.8% would have voted against all candidates and 8.5% were undecided.
• Over the past months, support for Viktor Yanukovych has continued to decline, from 32% in December of the previous year to 26% in March, and support for the Party of Regions has also fallen from 30% to 26%. Since the presidential election Yanukovych has lost up to one third of his supporters, or about 10 percentage points, and compared with his peak support in March–June 2010 he has lost almost half, or around 20 points. The largest losses were recorded in the Center, the North, and the South. Compared to December, the positions of Yulia Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna have remained almost unchanged at around 20% of the electorate, with Tymoshenko gaining only in Western Ukraine. Since March of the previous year her rating has declined from 24% to 20%.
• Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the Front for Change have shown modest growth, rising from 8% to 11% and from 7% to 9% respectively. Their strongest support is in the West, North, and Center, with gains also recorded in the South. Support for Serhiy Tihipko and Strong Ukraine continues to fall and has halved over the year, from about 13% in spring 2010 to 6% in March 2011. Support for Svoboda has remained stable at around 6% over the last four months and has tripled over the year. The Communist Party has also shown slight improvement, rising to 5%. UDAR and Civic Position are close to passing the 3% threshold, each with around 2% support, while their leaders enjoy slightly higher ratings of about 3%. The share of voters who do not support any party has increased by almost one and a half times, from 7% in October to 10% in March, compared with only around 2% immediately after the presidential election.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Sociological Group, as of February voter mobilization in Lviv remains relatively high: 45% of Lviv residents would definitely take part in parliamentary elections and 49% in presidential elections if they were held next Sunday. Another 35% and 34%, respectively, would rather participate than not.
• The highest level of mobilization for parliamentary elections is among supporters of Svoboda, while in presidential elections it is highest among supporters of Yuliya Tymoshenko. The lowest level of mobilization is found among those who have not yet decided on their choice and among those who intend to vote “against all.”
• If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, 26.1% of those who intend to vote would support Svoboda. Batkivshchyna would receive 19%, Front for Change 14.6%, the Party of Regions 4.3%, Our Ukraine 4.1%, Strong Ukraine 3.9%, Civic Position 3.5%, UDAR 2.4%, Za Ukrainu! 1.6%, the European Party 1.4%, and Pora 1.1%. Each of the remaining parties would receive less than 1%, together more than 4%. About 6% would not support any party, and 8.2% are undecided.
• If presidential elections were held next Sunday, 20.3% of likely voters would support Arsenii Yatsenyuk. Yuliya Tymoshenko would be supported by 18.3%, Oleh Tyahnybok by 14.7%, Serhiy Tihipko by 6.1%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 5.8%, Viktor Yushchenko by 5.3%, Viktor Yanukovych by 5.2%, and Vitalii Klychko by 3.6%. More than 5% would support other candidates. About 5% would not support any candidate, and 10.2% are undecided.

Trends

• Over the past year, Svoboda has gained the most, with its rating more than doubling and making it the absolute favorite in Lviv. The first wave of growth came in mid-2010, when its support rose from 14% to 22%. The second wave coincided with the local elections, when its rating grew from 22% in September to 29% in December. At the same time, victory in local elections and control of the city council bring risks associated with high voter expectations and the strengthening of other parties. As a result, Svoboda’s rating declined slightly from 29% in December to 26% in February, with Oleh Tyahnybok’s losses in the presidential rating being more noticeable.
• Batkivshchyna, after suffering its biggest decline due to non-participation in the local elections, has been gradually recovering. From 26% in March last year it fell to 14% in November, but by February it rose to 19%, securing a firm second place in Lviv. Yuliya Tymoshenko’s rating stabilized at 18–19%, about one and a half times lower than her result in the 2010 presidential election.
• Front for Change has been dynamically recovering and attracting new supporters. After its ratings dropped to about 7% in the second half of last year, and after a modest local election result (9.8%), by February the party reached 15%, firmly securing third place in Lviv and gaining strong growth prospects. This is reinforced by the rising personal rating of its leader Arsenii Yatsenyuk, who in February topped the presidential ranking in Lviv with 20%, compared to 11% in the 2010 presidential election.
• Over the year, Viktor Yushchenko’s rating fell from 32% (first round of the 2010 presidential election) to 5%, and Our Ukraine from 19% to 4%. The biggest crises came in the first half of last year and during the local elections. Recently the situation has stabilized somewhat, and the party’s support is close to its local election result, suggesting it has reached an “electoral bottom.”
• In recent months the Party of Regions has experienced the sharpest decline, to about 4%, nearly half of its local election result and almost three times lower than before the presidential election. Viktor Yanukovych’s personal ratings follow the same trend.
• Serhiy Tihipko has slightly recovered to about 6%, and his party to about 4%, though these remain far below their post-presidential election levels. Support for Anatolii Hrytsenko continues to grow, now twice as high as in the presidential election, while Civic Position has slightly improved to 3%. Vitalii Klychko and UDAR, however, do not yet show a stable rating, having lost some support after the local elections.
• Small but stable support is recorded for the European Party, Za Ukrainu!, and UNP. Pora and the People’s Movement, however, cannot repeat their local election results.
• About 6% of voters intend to support no party, similar to the share in the local elections.
• The highest trust among Lviv residents is enjoyed by Arsenii Yatsenyuk and Oleh Tyahnybok, with more than half trusting them and about one third distrusting them. Trust in both has increased over the past year. Trust in Yuliya Tymoshenko remains around 35%, while distrust has declined slightly. Viktor Yushchenko is trusted by 22% and distrusted by 67%. Trust in Viktor Yanukovych fell from 15% to 9%, while distrust rose to 80%, with 62% saying they completely distrust him.
• More than half of Lviv residents are generally satisfied with the results of the last local elections, although the number of those “completely satisfied” is declining. Evaluations of the mayor’s election are clearer than those of the city council. About 59% are satisfied with Mayor Andriy Sadovyi’s performance, while 31% are dissatisfied, with dissatisfaction gradually increasing.
• Around 60% of Lviv residents have not yet formed an opinion about the head of the regional state administration Mykhailo Tsymbaliuk; 16% assess his work positively and 26% negatively. Similar uncertainty surrounds the head of the regional council Oleh Pankevych.

• Rating Group continues to present the results of a company-funded special project “Charity the Ukrainian Way.” In December, Issue No. 1, “Helping during the New Year holidays,” was released. According to the survey conducted by Rating Group, about 7% of respondents engage in charitable activities on a regular basis, at least once a month, while another 16% do so several times a year. Thus, no more than one quarter of the adult population of Ukraine engages in charity at least once a year. Another 16% have done so several times in the past, while 61% have never engaged in charitable activities.
• The share of respondents who stated that they have never been involved in charity ranges from about one half in the West and South to more than 70% in Donbas and the East. Those who have never engaged in charity are most common among people aged 18–29 and 30–39. These are predominantly people with lower levels of education and income, mostly unmarried, slightly more often men than women, and by social status mainly homemakers, students, workers, and the unemployed.
• When asked which areas most require charitable support, respondents most often named orphanages (64%), homeless children (62%), and children with disabilities (58%). Somewhat less often they mentioned elderly people in need of assistance (42%), nursing homes (41%), severe diseases (37%), low-income families (32%), and adults with disabilities (26%). Further down the list were homeless adults (18%), healthcare development (17%), human rights protection (11%), people begging on the streets (11%), animal protection (10%), youth in need of support (10%), and gifted youth (9%). These were followed by the church (8%), environmental protection (8%), drug and alcohol addiction (7%), and people with psychological disorders (5%). At the bottom of the list were education and science (4%), prisoners (3%), people repressed by the authorities (3%), art and culture (2%), national minority issues (1%), and other causes (1%), while 1% of respondents could not decide. Overall, among all areas in need of charity, the unquestionable leader is the category of children.
• The analysis also shows that donors themselves can be grouped. Based on responses to the question “In which of these areas have you personally engaged in charity?”, a “charity matrix” was constructed that identifies clusters of correlated activities, forming eight psychological groups: those helping children with disabilities, orphanages, adults with disabilities, nursing homes, and people with severe diseases; those donating to the church and to people begging on the streets; those helping homeless children and homeless adults; those supporting low-income families and elderly people in need; those contributing to education and science, gifted youth, art and culture, and healthcare development; those supporting animal and environmental protection; those helping people with psychological disorders and those affected by drug and alcohol addiction; and those engaged in human rights protection and support for youth in need.
• The areas that respondents say most need charitable support differ sharply from the areas in which they actually provide help. Although the lists were identical, in practice the most common form of charity is giving alms on the street, reported by 40% of those who have ever engaged in charity. This is followed by helping homeless children (33%), donating to the church (30%), and helping elderly people in need (29%). Somewhat less often respondents donate to orphanages (25%), children with disabilities (24%), and low-income families (21%), as well as to causes related to severe diseases (15%), homeless adults (14%), nursing homes (11%), and adults with disabilities (10%). No more than 5% help in the remaining categories, including healthcare development (5%), youth in need (4%), animal protection (4%), and human rights protection (3%). Support for people with psychological disorders, environmental protection, and gifted youth is reported by no more than 2%.
• The most popular form of charity in Western Ukraine is donations to the church (58%), while in the Center it is support for homeless children (51%). Giving alms is most common in the North (54%), East (39%), South (36%), and Donbas (27%). Support for elderly people is most widespread in the South and Donbas, including donations to nursing homes and homeless adults. Donations to healthcare development are most common in the North, primarily Kyiv, support for orphanages in the East, and for severe diseases in the Center.
• Overall, the findings suggest that the most active forms of charity are giving alms and donating to the church, as in these areas the number of people who actually donate is more than twice the number who consider these causes the most in need. By contrast, the least active areas of charity are drug and alcohol addiction, education and science, gifted youth, healthcare development, environmental protection, and nursing homes. Other under-supported areas include people repressed by the authorities, people with psychological disorders, adults and children with disabilities, human rights protection, orphanages, severe diseases, animal protection, art and culture, and prisoners. At the same time, in many of these less active areas, choices to donate were made consciously, as nine out of ten respondents who supported gifted youth, nursing homes, children with disabilities, or orphanages also believe these causes are among those most in need of support. These results again raise a set of questions about the apparent contradiction between people’s stated priorities and their actual charitable behavior.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group, almost 40% of Lviv residents aged 16 and older consider themselves football supporters. In particular, 6% identify themselves as football fans, 13% as active supporters, and 22% as non-active supporters. The rest do not consider themselves football supporters.
• It is worth noting that, according to a nationwide survey conducted in October 2009, one in three Ukrainians considered themselves football supporters: 5% as fans, 10% as active supporters, and 18% as non-active. This suggests that the increase in the number of football supporters in Lviv occurred over the past year, when FC Karpaty reached the group stage of the UEFA Europa League.
• Based on demographic characteristics, a “portrait of the Lviv football supporter” was developed. Football supporters in Lviv are primarily young, well-educated, and unmarried residents. Half of all students surveyed consider themselves football fans. Middle-aged residents are not far behind, with almost half identifying as supporters, and even among elderly respondents about one third consider themselves football supporters. Among those who are employed, there are more supporters than among the unemployed (48% versus 34%). Among men, supporters are three times more numerous than among women (65% versus 21%). The highest share of supporters is found among voters of Our Ukraine and Svoboda, and the lowest among supporters of Front for Change.
• Among clubs of the Ukrainian Premier League, Lviv residents most strongly support their home team Karpaty (87%), followed by Dynamo Kyiv (46%) and Shakhtar Donetsk (26%). Political divisions are noticeably softened on the football field. Although Shakhtar is most often supported by voters of the Party of Regions, about one quarter of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Our Ukraine voters also support the Donetsk club. At the same time, around half of Party of Regions voters support Karpaty, and almost one third support Dynamo. Among Shakhtar supporters there are significantly more Dynamo supporters (63%) than there are Shakhtar supporters among Dynamo fans (35%). At the same time, more than 90% of both Dynamo and Shakhtar supporters also support Karpaty. Among Karpaty supporters the largest shares are voters of Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, while Dynamo is most popular among supporters of Front for Change.
• The dominant factor in choosing a favorite team among Lviv residents is the team’s local origin, reflecting the idea of “supporting our own.” If two Lviv clubs were to compete in the Premier League next season, only 46% would support only Karpaty and 4% only FC Lviv, while almost 40% would support both Lviv teams.
• Almost 70% of football supporters in Lviv, and more than 80% of Karpaty supporters, gave a positive assessment of the work of Karpaty head coach Oleh Kononov in 2010. Only 10% rated his work negatively, including 8% among Karpaty supporters. Thirteen percent of football supporters in Lviv, and 14% of Karpaty supporters, considered Karpaty’s performance in the 2010 Europa League to be clearly successful, while 54% and 59%, respectively, described it as rather successful since the team reached the group stage. At the same time, 15% of football supporters in Lviv and 12% of Karpaty supporters considered the performance rather unsuccessful, given the last place in the group, and 6% called it an outright failure. Overall, the coach’s performance was assessed somewhat more positively than the club’s results.
• Nevertheless, 76% of football supporters in Lviv, and 82% of Karpaty supporters, believe that Karpaty will again play in the Europa League next season.

• According to a survey conducted by the Rating Group (Ukraine) in December 2010, about 46% of Ukrainians regret the collapse of the Soviet Union. In turn, according to a survey conducted by the Levada Center (Russia) in November 2010, an even larger share of Russians – 56% – regret the breakup of the USSR. At the same time, 36% of Ukrainians and 30% of Russians do not regret it, while 18% of Ukrainians and 16% of Russians were unable to answer the question.
• In both Ukraine and Russia, a clear age pattern is observed: the younger the respondents, the less likely they are to regret the collapse of the USSR. In Ukraine, 19% of young people and 69% of pensioners regret the Soviet Union; in Russia the corresponding figures are 17% and 83%.
• In Ukraine, additional demographic patterns are also evident. Regionally, the highest levels of regret are found in Donbas (65%), the South (58%), and the East (55%), while the lowest level is in Western Ukraine (18%). Nostalgia for the USSR is more common among women (49%) than men (42%), among urban residents (48%) than rural residents (40%), and among believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (59%) and atheists (47%) than among believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (41%) and Greek Catholics (17%). Regret is also more prevalent among respondents whose native language is Russian (57%) than among those whose native language is Ukrainian (37%) or both languages (49%), and among ethnic Russians (69%) compared to ethnic Ukrainians (43%). In addition, the higher the level of education, the less likely respondents are to regret the collapse of the Soviet Union.
• A majority of respondents in Russia (53%) and a large share in Ukraine (41%) believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been avoided. By contrast, 32% of Russians and 34% of Ukrainians are convinced that the breakup of the state was inevitable. Notably, the proportion of respondents who could not answer this question is much higher in Ukraine (25%) than in Russia (15%), which may indicate a lower level of public discussion and different approaches to history in the two countries. Moreover, about half of Ukrainians aged 18–29 were unable to answer the question of whether the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable or could have been avoided.
• It is also noteworthy that around 70% of respondents who regret the collapse of the USSR believe it could have been avoided, whereas the majority of those who do not regret it (62%) believe that the breakup was inevitable.
• When asked what form of relations between the former Soviet republics they would personally support, Russians most often chose the option of several republics uniting into closer unions, whereas among Ukrainians the most popular model was the independent existence of all republics. Specifically, 26% of Russians and only 18% of Ukrainians support the unification of several republics into closer unions. The restoration of the USSR in its former form is supported by 15% of both Ukrainians and Russians. A closer union of all former Soviet republics along the lines of the European Union is supported by 19% of Russians and 15% of Ukrainians. The preservation of the CIS in its current form is supported by 17% of Russians and only 10% of Ukrainians. The independent existence of all republics is supported by 27% of Ukrainians and only 13% of Russians. Another 12% of Russians and 15% of Ukrainians were unable to give an answer.
• Support for restoring the USSR is strongest in Donbas (25%) and Eastern Ukraine (26%). Support for uniting several republics into closer unions is highest in the South (35%). Support for a closer union of all former Soviet republics along the lines of the European Union is highest in the North (21%). Support for the independent existence of all republics is strongest in the West (59%), the Center (31%), and the North (30%).
• According to the Ukrainian survey, the younger respondents are and the higher their level of education, the more likely they are to support the independent existence of all former Soviet republics. Respondents who regret the collapse of the Soviet Union most strongly support the restoration of the USSR in its former form (31%), the unification of several republics into closer unions (28%), and a closer union of all former Soviet republics along the lines of the European Union (18%). In contrast, the majority of those who do not regret the Soviet Union (53%) believe that the most appropriate option is the independent existence of all former republics.
• This release is based on the results of surveys conducted by the Rating Sociological Group (Ukraine) in December 2010 (2,000 respondents, margin of error not exceeding 3%) and by the Levada Center (Russia) in November 2010 (1,593 respondents, margin of error not exceeding 3.4%).

• If elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were held at the end of December, the largest shares of the vote in Lviv would go to Svoboda (28.8% among those intending to participate in the elections), Batkivshchyna (16.6%), and Front for Change (12%). Compared with November, the ratings of Svoboda increased slightly from 27% to 28.8% and those of Batkivshchyna from 13.9% to 16.6%, while Front for Change declined from 13.2% to 12%. They are followed by the Party of Regions (7.2%), Our Ukraine (5.5%), Strong Ukraine (3.2%), UDAR of Vitali Klitschko (3.1%), Civic Position (2.2%), and the European Party (2.1%). About 6% of voters support other parties, 5.8% do not support any party, and 7.5% remain undecided.
• Forty percent of Lviv residents believe that parliamentary elections should take place in March 2011, while 22% favor October 2012, with the rest undecided. Supporters of Front for Change, Svoboda, and Batkivshchyna are most in favor of elections in 2011, whereas supporters of the Party of Regions, Strong Ukraine, and Our Ukraine more often favor elections in 2012.
• The presidential ranking in Lviv looks somewhat different. Oleh Tiahnybok (19.5%) and Yuliia Tymoshenko (19.2%) share the lead, with Arsenii Yatseniuk close behind at 15.2%. Compared with the previous month, the positions of Tiahnybok increased from 18.2% to 19.5% and Tymoshenko from 16.5% to 19.2%, while Yatseniuk declined from 17% to 15.2%. They are followed by Viktor Yanukovych (7.4%), Viktor Yushchenko (6.8%), Vitali Klitschko (4%), Serhii Tihipko (3.4%), and Anatolii Hrytsenko (3.4%). About 4% support other candidates, 6.8% support none, and 10% are undecided.
• Among local politicians, Andrii Sadovyi enjoys the highest level of trust in Lviv (58%), followed by Oleh Tiahnybok (54%). Both have a positive Trust Index of +26. Petro Pysarchuk is trusted by almost a quarter of residents, while 57% do not trust him. Former regional governor Vasyl Horbal is trusted by only one in ten residents, while 51% do not trust him. The newly appointed regional council head Oleh Pankevych and city council secretary Vasyl Pavliuk remain little known, as around 60% of respondents either do not know them or cannot form an opinion.
• Overall, Lviv residents are satisfied with the results of the 2010 local elections: 58% are satisfied with the outcome of the mayoral election (28% dissatisfied), and 55% are satisfied with the city council election results (26% dissatisfied). Satisfaction with the mayoral election is highest among supporters of Andrii Sadovyi and Serhii Kubiv, as well as among voters of Batkivshchyna, Our Ukraine, and Front for Change. Satisfaction with the city council election is highest among supporters of Yurii Mykhalchyshyn and Andrii Sadovyi, as well as among voters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change.
• Regarding the mayor’s positioning toward the central government, 17% of respondents believe the mayor should support the opposition and oppose the President and the government, 44% think he should cooperate with the new authorities solely in the interests of the city, and 12% believe he should politically support the President and the government. Compared with March of this year, the share of those favoring cooperation exclusively in the city’s interests declined from 57% to 44%, while the share of those who find it difficult to answer increased.
• In light of the results of the latest local elections in Lviv, 42% of residents believe that responsibility for the city’s development lies equally with the Svoboda party, which won the city council elections, and with Andrii Sadovyi, who won the mayoral race. Another 30% think Sadovyi bears the main responsibility, and 8% assign it primarily to Svoboda, while 5% believe that neither bears responsibility. According to 41% of respondents, Sadovyi and Svoboda will cooperate but not without conflicts; 20% expect exclusively constructive cooperation, and 15% expect constant conflict. Expectations of constructive cooperation are highest among Sadovyi and Svoboda voters, although even among them about 10% expect only constant conflicts. The lowest expectations of productive relations are found among supporters of the Party of Regions, Strong Ukraine, and voters for Petro Pysarchuk and Serhii Kubiv.
• Twenty-nine percent of Lviv residents believe the overall situation in the city is improving, 39% say it is unchanged, and 21% say it is worsening. Compared with March 2010, these assessments have hardly changed. Residents most often say that the situation has improved over the past year in road repairs (66%), water supply and street lighting (50%), cultural life (48%), and city cleaning (47%). They give somewhat lower ratings to the preservation of historical heritage, heating supply, and public transport, where 36%, 35%, and 31% respectively report improvements. The worst assessments are for housing maintenance services and healthcare facilities, with nearly one-third saying conditions in these areas have worsened over the past year.
• Regarding protest moods, 41% of Lviv residents agree that revolutionary sentiments are growing in Ukraine, including 7% who definitely agree and 34% who rather agree than disagree. At the same time, 39% disagree with this statement, including 16% who definitely disagree and 23% who rather disagree, while 19% are undecided. Supporters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change are most likely to agree that revolutionary moods are rising. One third of Lviv residents believe that such sentiments could soon result in mass protests similar to those of November 2004, while 45% do not believe so and 24% are undecided. The most radical expectations are again found among supporters of Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Front for Change.