Press releases

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group on June 8–12, 2019, public support for early parliamentary elections increased significantly over the course of one month, rising from 72% in May to 88% in June. At the time of the survey, only 8% of respondents held the opposite view, compared to 18% in May.
• Two thirds of respondents (67%) believe that the newly elected parliament will be more effective than the previous one. At the same time, 82% are convinced that the appeal lodged by a group of Members of Parliament to the Constitutional Court against President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decree on dissolving parliament and calling early elections is not so much a defense of legality as an attempt by MPs to extend their mandates for at least a few additional months. Only 9% of respondents disagree with this interpretation.
• Support for early elections, confidence in the effectiveness of the future parliament, and the view that MPs are attempting to prolong their powers by challenging the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada enjoy broad backing across all age groups, regions, and electoral segments. The main exception is supporters of the party “European Solidarity,” the majority of whom oppose early elections, believe that the future parliament will be less effective, and consider the appeal to the Constitutional Court to be a legitimate defense of constitutional order.
• A majority of respondents (58%) believe that the President’s decree on dissolving parliament corresponds both to the Constitution and to public sentiment. Another 20% think that while the decree does not comply with the Constitution, it does reflect public moods. Only 6% consider it illegal and inconsistent with societal expectations. The largest share of those who view the decree as both constitutional and aligned with public opinion is found in southern Ukraine (67%), while the lowest share is in the western regions (50%). From an electoral perspective, supporters of the “Servant of the People” party are most convinced that the decree complies with both the law and public expectations (72%), whereas this view is least common among supporters of “European Solidarity” (7%). Nearly half of the latter group believe that although the decree is unlawful, it nevertheless corresponds to public expectations.
• If the Constitutional Court were to declare President Zelenskyy’s decree on dissolving parliament unconstitutional, 63% of respondents believe that parliamentary elections should still be held on July 21, 2019, as stipulated in the presidential decision. Another 20% argue that in such a case elections should be held according to the regular schedule in October 2019, while only 7% support holding elections in September. Regionally, support for holding elections specifically on July 21 is highest in the South (71%) and relatively lower in the Center (57%). Among supporters of the most popular political parties, the majority favor holding early elections in July. As in previous questions, the main opposition to this scenario comes from supporters of “European Solidarity,” 70% of whom prefer elections to be held as scheduled in October 2019.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group during June 6–9, 2019, 69% of respondents stated they were definitely ready to take part in voting in the early elections to the Verkhovna Rada scheduled for July 21, 2019. Another 15% said they were rather ready to participate, 12% said they would not vote, and 4% were undecided.
• The leader of electoral preferences among political parties is the Servant of the People party, which is supported by 47.5% of those who intend to vote and have made up their minds. At present, the Opposition Platform – For Life (10.4%), European Solidarity (7.9%), Batkivshchyna (7.5%), and the Voice party (6.4%) also clear the electoral threshold. The Strength and Honor party is supported by 4.3%, the Radical Party by 2.5%, and the Civic Position party by 2.4%. The ratings of other political parties are below 2%.
• Regarding the so-called “second choice,” 10.6% of voters could vote for the Servant of the People party if the party they currently support does not take part in the elections; 7.8% could support Batkivshchyna; 6.7% the Voice party; 6.6% the Opposition Platform – For Life; 5.7% the Strength and Honor party; 3.9% the Civic Position party; and 3.1% European Solidarity. All other parties account for less than 3%.
• A quarter of respondents said they were planning a vacation in the second half of July 2019. At the same time, 80% of them believe they will be able to vote. Fourteen percent stated the opposite, and another 6% were undecided.
• One third plan to spend their vacation at their place of residence, 37% said they plan to visit another region of Ukraine, 18% plan to go abroad, and 18% have not yet decided. Relatively more people planning a vacation in the second half of July are found among supporters of European Solidarity and Servant of the People, as well as among those who do not intend to take part in voting at all.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group between May 29 and June 3, 2019, 34% of respondents stated that Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while 37% held the opposite view and 29% were undecided. The positive dynamics of public sentiment continued. Relatively more optimistic assessments of the country’s situation were recorded among residents of the Center and South, the youngest respondents, as well as supporters of the political parties “Servant of the People” and “Strength and Honor.” In contrast, supporters of “European Solidarity” and “Opposition Platform – For Life” were the most pessimistic on this issue.
• An absolute majority of respondents (88%) expected radical changes in the country. Only 4% supported stabilizing the situation so that it would not worsen, while 5% favored a return to the past. The demand for change was characteristic of the overwhelming majority of respondents across all age, regional, and electoral groups.
• Half of those surveyed were satisfied with the performance of the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while only 11% expressed dissatisfaction. At the same time, 39% had not yet been able to assess the work of the new Head of State. Satisfaction with the performance of former President Petro Poroshenko was reported by 16% of respondents, while more than 80% were dissatisfied. The work of Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman was positively assessed by 19% and negatively by 76%. More than 90% of respondents were dissatisfied with the performance of the Verkhovna Rada.
• The leader in electoral preferences among political parties was “Servant of the People,” supported by 48.2% of those who intended to vote and had decided on their choice. At the time of the survey, the electoral threshold was also being overcome by “Opposition Platform – For Life” (10.7%), “European Solidarity” (7.8%), “Batkivshchyna” (6.9%), and the party “Voice” (5.6%). Support for other parties included “Strength and Honor” (4.3%), “Civic Position” (3.0%), and the Radical Party (2.4%), while all other political forces received less than 2%.
• The party with the highest negative rating was “European Solidarity,” as 52% of voters stated that they would not vote for it under any circumstances.
• When asked about the main motivation guiding their choice of a political party, 47% of respondents said it would be the party’s ability to bring change to the country. Another 30% stated they would vote based on a party’s ability to establish order. One in five respondents said they were motivated by the presence of many new faces in the party or by its representatives’ ability to combat corruption. For 14–15%, the key motives were the party’s support for social justice and the presence of a strong leader.
• Support for a pro-Western orientation continued to prevail. A total of 62% supported Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (22% opposed), while 53% supported joining NATO (31% opposed). When choosing among several vectors of economic integration, 57% favored EU membership, 24% supported equal distance from both Russia and the West, and 10% favored joining the Customs Union. Support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration was noticeably stronger in the central and western regions, as well as among voters of “European Solidarity,” the party “Voice,” and “Civic Position.”
• Two thirds of respondents supported Ukrainian as the sole state language. At the same time, 21% favored granting Russian the status of a state language, and another 11% supported granting it official status. The highest support for elevating the status of the Russian language was found among residents of the East, those who regularly use Russian in daily communication, and supporters of “Opposition Platform – For Life.”
• A total of 65% of respondents considered Russia an aggressor toward Ukraine, while 27% held the opposite view. More than 60% supported diplomatic approaches to resolving the war in Donbas, with 38% favoring a cessation of hostilities and freezing the conflict, and 22% supporting granting these territories autonomous or federal status within Ukraine. Only 5% supported full separation of the occupied territories, while 18% favored continuing military action until full restoration of Ukrainian control over all of Donbas.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group on May 16–21, 2019, 30% of respondents stated that Ukraine is moving in the right direction, while 49% expressed the opposite view. The dynamics of public sentiment have continued to shift in a positive direction since the beginning of the year. Relatively more respondents with optimistic views about the state of affairs in the country are found among residents of Western Ukraine, the youngest age group, and supporters of the BPP “Solidarity” party and the party of S. Vakarchuk.
• The demand for radical changes in the country continues to grow, with 87% of respondents expressing support for such changes. Only 5% favor stabilizing the situation in order to avoid deterioration, and 6% support a return to the past. The demand for change is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of representatives of all age, regional, and electoral groups.
• More than 70% of respondents support the idea of dissolving parliament and holding early elections to the Verkhovna Rada. The highest level of support is observed in the South and East of the country, where it exceeds 80%. At the same time, in other macro-regions, no fewer than 60% support the dissolution of parliament. A certain divergence in attitudes toward early elections is observed among supporters of the BPP Solidarity party, the majority of whom oppose this initiative.
• The leader of electoral preferences among political parties is the Servant of the People party, supported by 43.8% of those who intend to vote and have made up their minds. The Opposition Platform – For Life is supported by 10.5%, BPP Solidarity by 8.8%, Batkivshchyna by 7.3%, the Strength and Honor party led by I. Smeshko by 5.1%, the party of S. Vakarchuk by 4.6%, the Radical Party of O. Lyashko by 3.3%, and the Opposition Bloc by 3.2%. The ratings of other parties are below 3%.
• The Servant of the People party leads in all macro-regions. The Opposition Platform – For Life and the Opposition Bloc hold strong positions in the south-eastern regions. Other parties that retain chances of entering parliament are more competitive in the central and western parts of the country.
• The Servant of the People party is also the leader of the so-called “second choice.” An additional 11.4% of respondents who intend to vote would support it if their current preferred party did not take part in the elections. In such a case, 7.1% could vote for the Opposition Platform – For Life, 6.4% for the party of S. Vakarchuk, 5.1% for Batkivshchyna, 4.9% for the Strength and Honor party, 4.3% for the Opposition Bloc, 3.7% for the Radical Party, 3.6% for Civic Position, and 3.1% for BPP Solidarity.
• The party with the highest negative rating is BPP Solidarity: 51.9% of respondents said they would not vote for it under any circumstances.
• Fifty-eight percent of respondents said that in parliamentary elections they would look for an alternative among new parties, while 26% are ready to vote for parties already represented in parliament. The demand for “traditional parties” is relatively higher among supporters of forces currently represented in the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, even among these groups, between 24% and 40% are ready to cast their votes for “new” political projects.
• Support for a party’s socio-economic initiatives is the main motive for choosing a political force among respondents (59%). Fourteen percent vote primarily based on sympathy for the party leader, and 10% based on ideological principles. The leadership factor is relatively more important among supporters of the Radical Party, while ideology plays a greater role among supporters of BPP Solidarity. At the same time, nearly two thirds of voters of these political forces say they will vote primarily based on the party’s socio-economic initiatives.

• The Social Monitoring Center, the Oleksandr Yaremenko Ukrainian Institute for Social Research, and the Rating Group conducted a nationwide sociological study on current public issues titled “Your Opinion: May 2019.” The survey was carried out from April 30 to May 10, 2019, in all 24 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv. A total of 3,000 respondents were interviewed. The method of data collection was face-to-face individual interviews at the respondent’s place of residence: 1,500 interviews using paper questionnaires and 1,500 using tablet-based questionnaires. Standard errors at a 95% confidence level and variable ratios from 0.1:0.9 to 0.5:0.5 range between 1.10% and 1.83%.
• According to the survey results, 11.5% of respondents did not participate at all in voting during the 2019 presidential elections, while 4.6% refused to answer this question. In total, nearly 84% of respondents reported that they took part in voting in at least one round of the 2019 presidential elections. Participation in the first round on March 31, 2019, was confirmed by 78.9% of respondents, and the same share reported voting in the second round on April 21, 2019. Voting in both rounds was reported by 74% of respondents. Around 5% voted only on March 31, while 4.9% voted only on April 21.
• Self-reported levels of support for candidates in the presidential elections on March 31 and April 21 are close to the official results of the Central Election Commission, with the exception of a higher-than-official level of support for Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the first round. Support for him was reported by 31.5% of all respondents, or 39.9% among those who confirmed participation in voting on March 31, 2019.
• When asked about hypothetical parliamentary elections held the following Sunday, 79.2% said they would vote, including 49.3% who would definitely participate and 29.9% who would probably participate. Residents of regional centers reported higher readiness to vote, while rural residents showed lower readiness. Men and young voters aged 18–29 expressed below-average intentions to participate. Those who did not vote in the presidential elections are the least likely to vote in parliamentary elections, with fewer than one third of them expressing any readiness to participate.
• Among voters, party support in the first half of May 2019 is as follows. “Servant of the People” (Volodymyr Zelenskyy) is supported by 29.5% of all respondents, or 39.9% among those who have decided and intend to vote. “Opposition Platform – For Life” (Yuriy Boyko, Vadym Rabinovych, Viktor Medvedchuk) is supported by 8.1% (10.9%), “Petro Poroshenko Bloc ‘Solidarity’” by 7.8% (10.6%), “Batkivshchyna” by 6.7% (9.1%), “Strength and Honor” by 3.8% (5.1%), “Civic Position” by 3.7% (5.0%), “Opposition Bloc – Party of Peace and Development” by 2.6% (3.5%), the Radical Party of Oleh Liashko by 2.4% (3.3%), “Svoboda” by 1.8% (2.4%), “Samopomich” by 1.5% (2.0%), and the party of Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 0.7% (0.9%). Six political parties cross the 5% electoral threshold.
• If parliamentary elections were held at that time, the results would indicate significant renewal. Among current parliamentary parties, only the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” “Batkivshchyna,” and “Opposition Platform – For Life” would enter the new parliament. New or relatively unfamiliar political forces with strong chances include “Servant of the People,” “Strength and Honor,” and “Civic Position.” The Radical Party of Oleh Liashko and “Samopomich” would not overcome the 5% threshold. The party with the highest anti-rating is the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity,” with 43.9% stating they would never vote for it.
• Proposed projects of political party unification tested by researchers are currently unattractive to the electorate. After the presidential elections, public opinion demonstrates a high level of optimism: 49.7% expect improvements in Ukraine in the coming months, 20.9% expect deterioration, and nearly 30% are uncertain.
• Less than a quarter of voters (22.3%) give the newly elected President no more than 100 days to demonstrate effectiveness, another 26.2% give six months, and 35.5% give one year. Overall, more than 80% of voters say they will form a final judgment of the President within one year based on actions and results.
• One of the key expectations and disappointments of the Revolution of Dignity was a change in the system of power. Accordingly, the most frequently cited first step expected from the President is the removal of immunity from MPs, judges, and the President himself, mentioned by 53.7% of respondents. Issues related to resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine ranked second and third, including initiating direct negotiations in the “Ukraine–Russia–so-called DPR–so-called LPR” format to stop the fighting and return Donbas (40.9%), and ensuring the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war and detainees (38.4%). Dissolving the current parliament and holding early parliamentary elections was named by 38.1%.
• About one third (33.7%) emphasized the need to ensure stability of the national currency and banking system. Lowering salaries of top officials was supported by 30.6%. Accelerating investigations into major corruption cases was mentioned by 25.8%, while 25.4% supported initiating a public discussion on the immediate replacement of the Prosecutor General, the head of the Security Service, the Prime Minister, and the current Cabinet.
• The range of perceived challenges is broad. More than half consider the following issues very important: a ceasefire in Donbas (88.4%), return of Ukrainian POWs and detainees (84.3%), current prices and inflation (84.5%), wages and pensions (82.8%), utility tariffs (84.5%), the armed conflict in the East and reintegration of Donbas (80.2%), social protection (76.4%), healthcare quality (76.1%), employment and unemployment (75.7%), enrichment of oligarchs and impoverishment of ordinary people (74.4%), corruption and cronyism (73.7%), tax burden (65.9%), crime and street safety (61.4%), labor migration and demographic changes (60.9%), and the return of Crimea (53.9%).
• Regarding the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Free Trade Area, 23.7% noted a positive impact on Ukraine’s economic situation, 25.9% saw both positive and negative effects, 12.3% indicated a negative impact, 20% saw no impact, and 18.2% were undecided. If a referendum were held, 57% would vote for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, 19.3% for restoring pragmatic economic relations with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other CIS countries, 13.6% would not participate, and 10.1% were undecided.
• Asked about Ukraine’s future path, 43.1% favor European integration and closer economic and cultural ties with EU countries, 37.8% support a development strategy focused primarily on internal resources, and 12.3% favor restoring economic and cultural ties with Russia. In a hypothetical referendum on NATO membership versus non-aligned status, 48.9% would vote for NATO membership, 23.2% for non-alignment, 16% would not participate, and 11.8% were undecided.
• Attitudes toward most well-known politicians are predominantly negative. Exceptions include Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with 64.6% positive and 13.9% negative attitudes; Anatolii Hrytsenko (33.5% positive, 26.9% negative); Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (31.0% positive, 24.1% negative); and Ihor Smeshko (28.6% positive, 17.4% negative, with 26.2% not knowing him). The top five politicians voters would like to see in the next parliament are Anatolii Hrytsenko (29.3%), Yuriy Boyko (26.7%), Ihor Smeshko (23.6%), Sviatoslav Vakarchuk (22.4%), and Yuliia Tymoshenko (21.1%).
• The ten politicians whose public actions over the past month were most memorable to voters are Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, Oleh Liashko, Yuriy Boyko, Anatolii Hrytsenko, Volodymyr Groysman, Vadym Rabinovych, Oleksandr Vilkul, Nadiia Savchenko, and Viktor Medvedchuk.
• Nearly half of respondents (49.2%) believe that the issue of the status of the non-government-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions should be decided by a nationwide referendum. A majority (65.3%) agree that Ukraine should make compromises for the sake of restoring peace and returning territories. Three quarters believe the President should engage in direct dialogue with Russia to achieve peace, while 55.4% also support dialogue with the leaders of the so-called “L/DNR.” The most supported solution for the non-controlled territories is granting them a special autonomous status within Ukraine (39.9%), followed by acknowledging temporary non-return and isolating them (18.5%), and continuing military actions to restore control (17.3%), the latter being most supported in western Ukraine.
• Language policy and restrictions on Russian media products remain sources of regional division. Among Ukrainian TV channels, the most trusted are STB, 1+1, Ukraine, ICTV, Inter, Novyi Kanal, 112, and TET. The main TV sources of socio-political information are 1+1, Ukraine, ICTV, Inter, 112, STB, and Novyi Kanal.
• Attitudes toward May 9 remain largely traditional, with 83% recognizing it as an important holiday. A majority (56.8%) believe its importance has increased, although in western Ukraine 44% reported a decrease in its significance. Nearly 70% do not support moving the celebration to May 8.

• According to the survey conducted by the Rating Group at the end of the second week of April 2019, 48% of respondents expect an improvement in the situation in the country as a result of the presidential elections.
• When answering the question “Which of these candidates will you vote for in the second round of the Presidential election in Ukraine?”, 52% said they would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi, while 19% said they would vote for Petro Poroshenko. Another 19% were undecided, and 10% stated that they did not intend to vote. Among those who intend to participate in the second round, 58% would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi, 22% for Petro Poroshenko, and 20% were undecided. Among respondents who intend to vote in the second round and have made their choice, 73% would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi and 27% for Petro Poroshenko.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads his opponent in all age groups. He is also the frontrunner among residents of the East, South, and Center of the country. In the West, as in the previous survey, the positions of the two candidates are nearly equal.
• Sixty-two percent of respondents believe that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will become the next President of Ukraine, while 17% believe Petro Poroshenko will win. Another 22% were undecided. Among the electoral groups of candidates who achieved significant results in the first round, a relative majority is convinced that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will become the next head of state. Among supporters of Petro Poroshenko, half are convinced that their candidate will win, while slightly more than a quarter believe that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will prevail.
• Answering a follow-up question regarding the level of confidence in their choice and participation in voting, 72% of those who intend to take part in the second round stated that they are fully confident in their choice and their intention to come to polling stations on April 21, 2019. Another 22% said that although they are not confident in their choice, they will still come and vote. Only 2% stated that they are unsure of their choice and are unlikely to come to vote. Overall voter mobilization among supporters of both candidates who advanced to the second round exceeds 80%.
• Forty-eight percent of respondents expect an improvement in the situation in the country as a result of the presidential elections. Twenty-five percent have no expectations of change, while 10% expect deterioration. Relatively more respondents who believe in an optimistic post-election scenario are found among residents of the South and East, younger respondents, and voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• Half of the respondents believe that the new team of the President of Ukraine should be given at least one year to demonstrate positive results. At the same time, a quarter want to see achievements within six months, 14% expect results within three months, and 8% expect immediate changes. Among younger respondents and residents of the South and Center, there are somewhat more people who are willing to wait a year or longer to see the results of the future head of state’s work.
• Seventy-six percent of respondents state that a situation in which their close relatives, family members, or acquaintances support a different candidate than they do in this election is completely normal. At the same time, 9% consider such a situation a mistake but say they will not try to influence others’ choices, while the same share say they will try to persuade their close ones to change their opinion. The latter position is most common among supporters of Petro Poroshenko (22%).
• Twenty-eight percent of respondents are convinced that these elections have rather united the country, while 24% believe that the divide has instead deepened. At the same time, one third of respondents state that these presidential elections have neither divided nor united Ukraine. The highest share of those who see consolidating processes is among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi (38%), although every fifth of them still sees a possibility of division. Among supporters of Petro Poroshenko, one third see the elections as potentially divisive, while only 17% see them as unifying.

• According to the survey conducted by the Rating Group based on the results of the first week of April 2019, about 30% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the right direction, while 55% hold the opposite view. After the first round of the presidential election, positive assessments of the country’s direction of development almost doubled. Residents of the West and the Center of the country assess the state of affairs in the country more optimistically.
• Eighty-three percent of respondents believe that the country today needs radical changes. Only 6% are convinced that everything should remain as it is, as long as it does not get worse, while 7% favor a return to the past. Expectations of radical change dominate among representatives of all regional, age, and electoral groups.
• Fifty-two percent of respondents expect an improvement in the situation in the country as a result of the presidential elections. After the first round of the presidential election, positive expectations increased by one and a half times. At the same time, 25% have no expectations of change, while another 7% expect deterioration. Relatively more respondents who believe in an optimistic post-election scenario are found among residents of the South, younger respondents, and voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• When asked “Which of these candidates will you vote for in the second round of the Presidential election in Ukraine?”, respondents answered as follows: 51% said they would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi, 21% for Petro Poroshenko. Another 18% were undecided, and 10% stated that they did not intend to vote. Among those who intend to vote in the second round, 61% would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi and 24% for Petro Poroshenko, while another 15% were undecided. Among those who intend to vote in the second round and have made their choice, 71% would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyi and 29% for Petro Poroshenko.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads his opponent in all age groups. He is also the leader among residents of the East, South, and Center. At the same time, in the West the positions of both candidates are nearly equal.
• Sixty-one percent of respondents believe that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will become the next President of Ukraine, while 17% believe Petro Poroshenko will win. Another 22% were undecided. Among the electoral groups of candidates who achieved significant results in the first round, a relative majority is convinced that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will become the future head of state. Among supporters of Petro Poroshenko, half are convinced of their candidate’s victory, while a quarter believe that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will win.
• An analysis of the dynamics of voting motives for candidates in the second round of the presidential election indicates a growth of protest voting among voters of both candidates.
• Thus, 75% of voters who are ready to support Petro Poroshenko in the second round are voting rather in favor of him, while 22% are voting rather against Volodymyr Zelenskyi (in February this figure was 12%). At the same time, 57% of voters who are ready to support Volodymyr Zelenskyi in the second round are voting rather in favor of him, while 41% are voting against Petro Poroshenko (33% in February).
• In addition, 31% of respondents believe that when people choose Petro Poroshenko, they are voting directly for the personality, while 26% believe that in this way they are voting against Vladimir Putin. This position is more characteristic of voters in the West of the country. Among Poroshenko’s own voters, almost 40% vote not so much for Petro Poroshenko as against Vladimir Putin.
• Twenty percent of respondents believe that when people choose Volodymyr Zelenskyi, they are rather voting directly for the personality, while 66% are thereby expressing protest against the existing situation in the country (50% in February). This is also acknowledged by Poroshenko’s voters. Even among Zelenskyi’s own voters, about 60% primarily express protest against the existing situation in the country through their choice.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents stated that they had not personally encountered instances of vote-buying during this presidential election campaign. On the other hand, 17% said they had such experience: 8% personally, and 9% heard about it from relatives or acquaintances.
• Thirty-nine percent of respondents stated that they expect significant fraud in the second round of the presidential election on April 21, 2019. Thirty-seven percent believe that fraud will be insignificant, and only 14% do not expect any electoral fraud at all. The highest share of those expecting significant fraud is found among residents of the South and East of the country.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the rating Group based on the third week of March, more than 80% of respondents to some extent declare their readiness to take part in the Presidential election on March 31, 2019. In particular, half of respondents are absolutely confident that they will vote, while another third say they are more likely to vote than not.
• At the same time, 58% are fully confident in their choice of candidate and will definitely come to vote for them. Meanwhile, about a quarter are not confident in their choice, but believe they will still go to vote.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi remains the leader of the presidential rating, supported by 26.6% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Petro Poroshenko and Yuliia Tymoshenko share second place, each supported by 17% of voters. Anatolii Hrytsenko is supported by 9.8%, Yurii Boiko by 9.5%, Oleh Liashko by 5.4%, Oleksandr Vilkul by 4%, Ihor Smeshko by 3.5%, and Ruslan Koshulynskyi by 1.9%.
• Every sixth respondent has not decided on a candidate. It is important that the largest share of undecided voters is found among the poorest voters, residents of Central and Western Ukraine, women, middle-aged people, and Ukrainian speakers.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi has the strongest electoral positions in the south-eastern regions and in the Center of the country. Yuliia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko are strongest in the Center and the West, Anatolii Hrytsenko in the West, and Yurii Boiko and Oleksandr Vilkul in the East and South of the country. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyi is the leader of electoral sympathies in cities, while Yuliia Tymoshenko leads in villages. Zelenskyi is most popular among young and middle-aged voters, Tymoshenko among older voters, while Poroshenko has the strongest positions among middle-aged voters. If Zelenskyi and Hrytsenko are relatively more often supported by men, Tymoshenko is more often supported by women, and Poroshenko is supported equally by men and women.
• Almost 41% of respondents believe that Volodymyr Zelenskyi will advance to the second round of the presidential election, 38% believe Yuliia Tymoshenko will do so, and 37% believe Petro Poroshenko will. Six percent of voters believe Yurii Boiko or Anatolii Hrytsenko will reach the second round. Belief in Poroshenko’s advancement to the second round is relatively higher in the West, in Tymoshenko’s advancement in the Center, and in Zelenskyi’s advancement in the South and East. Voters in Western Ukraine are the least certain about the participants of the second round.
• The leaders of the so-called “second choice” (who respondents would vote for if the candidate they currently support does not participate in the election) are Volodymyr Zelenskyi (8.1%), Anatolii Hrytsenko (7.3%), and Yuliia Tymoshenko (6%). Almost 5% of voters would support Oleksandr Vilkul if their candidate did not run, while about 3% would support Yurii Boiko, Petro Poroshenko, Ihor Smeshko, or Oleh Liashko.
• Voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, among all other candidates, mostly allow the possibility of supporting Yuliia Tymoshenko, while half would not choose any other candidate at all. Voters of Anatolii Hrytsenko allow the possibility of supporting Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Petro Poroshenko, and Ihor Smeshko. Voters of Yuliia Tymoshenko allow Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Anatolii Hrytsenko, and Oleh Liashko. Voters of Oleksandr Vilkul allow Yurii Boiko, and voters of Yurii Boiko allow Oleksandr Vilkul (the electorates of the latter overlap by almost half). Petro Poroshenko has the most stable electorate: the majority would not choose any other candidate, allowing only minor transfers to Anatolii Hrytsenko. Supporters of Ihor Smeshko allow the possibility of supporting Anatolii Hrytsenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyi; supporters of Oleh Liashko allow Yuliia Tymoshenko, Anatolii Hrytsenko, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi; and voters of Ruslan Koshulynskyi allow Anatolii Hrytsenko and Petro Poroshenko

• According to the results of a joint sociological survey conducted by three polling organizations (KIIS, the Razumkov Centre, and Rating Group), 35% of respondents believe that the situation in the country will improve as a result of the presidential elections scheduled for March 31, 2019 (over the last quarter this indicator increased from 31% to 35%). At the same time, 32% believe that the situation will not change, while 10% have negative expectations regarding the elections. A relatively higher level of optimism about improvements after the elections is observed among supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and Petro Poroshenko. The most negative expectations are recorded among those who do not intend to vote.
• A total of 84% of respondents declare their readiness to take part in the presidential election.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains the leader of the presidential rating, with 27.7% support among those who have decided on their choice and intend to vote. Yuliya Tymoshenko is supported by 16.6%, Petro Poroshenko by 16.4%. Arseniy Hrytsenko would receive 9.7%, Yuriy Boyko 8.4%, Oleh Lyashko 5.3%, Oleksandr Vilkul 4.0%, and Ihor Smeshko 3.7%. Support for other candidates is below 2%.
• At this point, nearly one in four respondents has not yet decided on their choice. The highest share of undecided voters is observed in Halychyna, the North, the Center, and the East of the country.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy has the strongest electoral positions in the South and East, as well as in the Center, West, North, and in the capital. Yuliya Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko have stronger positions in the central and western macro-regions. Arseniy Hrytsenko performs best in the West and Halychyna, while Yuriy Boyko and Oleksandr Vilkul are strongest in the South, East, and Donbas. Oleh Lyashko has relatively higher support in the West, Center, and North.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy is the leader of support among young and middle-aged voters, while Yuliya Tymoshenko leads among older voters. Zelenskyy, Poroshenko, and Hrytsenko are relatively more often supported by men, whereas Tymoshenko is more often supported by women.
• The highest anti-rating among candidates belongs to Petro Poroshenko: almost half of voters would not vote for him under any circumstances. Around 30% would not vote for Yuliya Tymoshenko, 20% for Yuriy Boyko, 18% for Oleh Lyashko, 14% for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and 11% for Oleksandr Vilkul.
• Second-round modeling produced the following results: Yuliya Tymoshenko leads in a runoff against Petro Poroshenko (26% vs. 19%). At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy defeats both Petro Poroshenko (39% vs. 18%) and Yuliya Tymoshenko (34% vs. 21%).
• Six political parties have a chance of entering parliament. The leader is the Servant of the People party, supported by 24.8% of respondents who have decided and intend to vote. Support for Batkivshchyna stands at 17.6%, for BPP Solidarity at 14.7%, for Civic Position at 9.3%, for Opposition Platform at 9.2%, and for the Radical Party at 5.3%. Support for the Opposition Bloc is 4.4%, for Svoboda 3.1%, and for Samopomich 2.5%. Nearly 30% of respondents have not yet decided on their choice of political party.
• The highest level of support for the Servant of the People party is recorded in the South and East of the country; for Batkivshchyna in the Center; for BPP Solidarity in Halychyna; and for the Opposition Platform and Opposition Bloc in the south-eastern regions and in Donbas.
• A total of 65% of respondents stated that they had not personally encountered cases of vote-buying during this presidential election campaign. At the same time, 27% reported such experiences: 6% personally and 21% through relatives or acquaintances. Reports of vote-buying were most frequent among residents of the South, Donbas, the North, and the capital.
• Forty-two percent of respondents expect significant electoral fraud in the presidential election on March 31, 2019. Another 41% believe that fraud will be minor, and only 6% do not expect any falsifications at all. The highest expectations of large-scale fraud are observed among residents of the South, supporters of Oleksandr Vilkul and Yuriy Boyko, as well as among those who do not intend to vote.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group in early March 2019, 69% of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, while 16% hold the opposite view. Over the past month, the share of those who negatively assess the situation in the country has slightly increased.
• A total of 84% of respondents, to one degree or another, declare their readiness to take part in the presidential election on March 31, 2019. The highest level of unequivocal readiness to come to polling stations is observed among residents of the West, the oldest respondents, and supporters of Petro Poroshenko, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, and Ihor Smeshko.
• Among the factors that could prevent respondents from voting at polling stations, the most significant are possible provocations, queues at polling stations, and information about vote buying — these factors received scores of 2.1, 2.0, and 1.9 respectively (measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 means “will not interfere at all” and 5 means “will strongly interfere”). Less significant factors are bad weather (1.7) and having vacation plans (1.8).
• As of the end of the second week of March, Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains the leader of the presidential rating, supported by 24.9% of those who have decided on their choice and intend to vote. Yuliya Tymoshenko ranks second (18.8%), followed by Petro Poroshenko (17.4%). Yuriy Boyko would receive 10.2%, Arseniy Hrytsenko 9.4%, Oleh Lyashko 5.8%, Oleksandr Vilkul 3.5%, Ihor Smeshko 3.1%, and Ruslan Koshulynskyi 2.2%. Over the past week, the electoral positions of the leading candidates have remained virtually unchanged.
• One in six respondents has not yet decided on a candidate. Notably, the highest share of undecided voters is among the poorest respondents, rural residents, and women.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy has the strongest electoral positions in the south-eastern regions and in the Center of the country. Yuliya Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko are strongest in the Center and the West, Arseniy Hrytsenko in the West, and Yuriy Boyko in the East. At the same time, Zelenskyy is the leader of electoral preferences in cities, while Tymoshenko leads in rural areas. Zelenskyy is the leading candidate among young and middle-aged voters, while Tymoshenko leads among older voters. Zelenskyy, Poroshenko, and Hrytsenko are relatively more often supported by men, whereas Tymoshenko is more often supported by women.
• Petro Poroshenko tops the candidates’ anti-rating: nearly half of voters would not vote for him under any circumstances. About 30% would not vote for Yuliya Tymoshenko, 19% for Yuriy Boyko, 17% for Oleh Lyashko, 13% for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and 12% for Oleksandr Vilkul.
• A total of 20.8% of respondents believe that Petro Poroshenko will become the next president. Victory for Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected by 19.5%, and for Yuliya Tymoshenko by 18.6%. Thus, according to this indicator, the leading candidates are almost level. Only about 3% believe in the victory of Yuriy Boyko or Arseniy Hrytsenko. Over the past month, confidence in Zelenskyy’s victory has increased, while confidence in Poroshenko’s victory has slightly declined.
• Second-round modeling produced the following results: Yuliya Tymoshenko leads in a runoff against Petro Poroshenko (28% vs. 19%). At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy wins in pairings with Petro Poroshenko (39% vs. 19%), with Yuliya Tymoshenko (35% vs. 22%), and with Arseniy Hrytsenko (34% vs. 26%).
• The parliamentary rating is led by the Servant of the People party, supported by 22.4% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Batkivshchyna is supported by 19.1%, BPP Solidarity by 15.8%, the Opposition Platform by 10.2%, Civic Position by 7.9%, the Radical Party by 6.1%, Svoboda by 3.6%, and the Opposition Bloc and Samopomich by 3.2% each. Other parties receive less than 2% support.
• Nearly one quarter of respondents have not yet decided on their party choice. Over the past month, the positions of the leading parties have strengthened. In terms of dynamics, Civic Position and BPP Solidarity gained the most support, while Samopomich lost ground.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group in early March 2019, almost two thirds of respondents stated that they always take part in elections, while another 22% said that they almost always vote. Four percent of respondents indicated that they would be voting for the first time. Only 10% said that they almost never or never vote. The highest share of the latter group is among the youngest respondents and residents of Kyiv.
• A total of 83% of respondents, to one degree or another, declare their readiness to take part in the presidential election on March 31, 2019. Among supporters of all leading candidates, around 80% express readiness to vote. A relatively lower level of mobilization is observed among the youngest age groups (18–25 and 26–35 years) and in Kyiv.
• At the same time, when assessing the probability of their participation in voting on March 31, 2019 on a 10-point scale, only about two thirds expressed the highest level of confidence that they would come to vote. Relatively fewer such respondents are found among the youngest age group aged 18–25 (46%) and among those who are still undecided about their choice (64%). Among those who always vote in elections, more than 80% demonstrate the highest confidence. At the same time, among those who stated that they almost always participate in voting, this share is 42%, and among first-time voters it is 55%.
• Eighty-two percent of respondents stated that they know exactly where their polling station is located. A relatively lower level of awareness about the voting location is observed among younger respondents, residents of Kyiv and Donbas, those who will be voting for the first time, or those who vote very rarely.
• At the same time, only 18% of respondents have already checked whether their name is included in the voter lists.
• Forty-four percent of respondents stated that they usually vote in the morning, between 8 a.m. and 12 p.m. Another 22% usually vote between 12 p.m. and 3 p.m., 10% between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m., and only 5% after 6 p.m. Morning voting is preferred mainly by the oldest voters, while younger people tend to prefer midday and afternoon hours. Regionally, a relatively higher share of those who vote in the morning is observed among residents of the southern and central regions as well as Donbas, while in Halychyna a relatively higher share vote between 12 p.m. and 3 p.m. Among those who usually vote in elections, the majority do so in the morning, with the highest shares among voters of Yuliya Tymoshenko, Yuriy Boyko, and Oleh Lyashko.
• Only one third of respondents expressed readiness to stand in line at a polling station for more than one hour. At the same time, one third are willing to wait up to half an hour, and another one fifth up to one hour. The most “resilient” voters are in the East, North, and Halychyna, among the oldest respondents, and among voters of Oleksandr Vilkul and Yuriy Boyko. In contrast, supporters of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Oleh Lyashko, and those who are undecided expressed the least willingness to stand in line for a long time to cast their vote.
• Seventy-four percent of respondents stated that they are ready to sacrifice leisure time in order to vote in elections. At the same time, 16% hold the opposite view and would rather spend time with friends and not go to vote if they had to choose only one option. The highest share of the latter group is among the youngest respondents (18–25 years – 34%, 26–35 years – 23%), first-time voters (30%), and those who rarely participate in elections (45%).
• Among the actors of the electoral process, international observers enjoy the highest level of trust (71%). Almost two thirds trust observers from civic organizations, law enforcement officers ensuring order at polling stations, members of precinct election commissions, and sociologists conducting exit polls. Observers from candidates are trusted by 58%, while the Central Election Commission is trusted by only 49% (38% do not trust it).
• Among presidential candidates, Volodymyr Zelenskyy enjoys a relatively higher level of trust (43%). High levels of trust are also recorded for Yuliya Tymoshenko (28%), Anatoliy Hrytsenko (26%), and Petro Poroshenko (24%). Oleh Lyashko is trusted by 19% of respondents, Yuriy Boyko by 18%, Andriy Sadovyi by 17%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk by 16%, Oleksandr Shevchenko by 13%, Ihor Smeshko by 13%, Oleksandr Vilkul by 12%, and Yevhenii Muraiev by 10%.
• At the same time, the highest levels of distrust are recorded for Petro Poroshenko (69%) and Oleh Lyashko (71%).
• The leader of the presidential rating is Volodymyr Zelenskyy, supported by 24.7% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Yuliya Tymoshenko ranks second (18.3%), and Petro Poroshenko third (16.8%). Anatoliy Hrytsenko would receive 10.3%, Yuriy Boyko 9.9%, Oleh Lyashko 5.7%, Ihor Smeshko 3.3%, and Oleksandr Vilkul and Yevhenii Muraiev 2.7% each.
• Over the past week, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko have strengthened their positions.
• Almost one quarter of respondents remain undecided about their candidate choice. Notably, the highest share of undecided voters is among the poorest respondents, those who usually vote most actively in elections, respondents of older and middle age, and more often among women in the Center and the West of the country.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy has the strongest electoral positions in the south-eastern regions. In Kyiv and the Center, he competes with Yuliya Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko. The latter has strong positions in Halychyna and the West. The leader of Batkivshchyna has strong positions in the central-western regions and in the North of the country. The highest level of support for Anatoliy Hrytsenko is recorded in Halychyna, and for Yuriy Boyko in the south-eastern regions, especially in Donbas.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy is the leader of sympathies among respondents who will be voting for the first time (almost every tenth voter of the candidate), as well as among those who do not often vote in elections. Meanwhile, among respondents who always vote, he shares first place with Tymoshenko and Poroshenko, while Hrytsenko and Boyko also have relatively stronger positions in this group.
• Twenty-two percent of respondents believe that Petro Poroshenko will become the next president. Twenty percent believe in the victory of Yuliya Tymoshenko, and 18% in the victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy and Tymoshenko show positive dynamics on this indicator, while Poroshenko’s figures have slightly weakened over the past week.
• Half of respondents stated that their choice is guided by faith that the candidate they support can bring changes to the country. One third choose their favorite because the candidate has a real program for the country’s development, while one quarter cite belief that the candidate will lead the country in the right direction or has experience in public administration. One in five votes because the candidate opposes the existing system.
• The motive of expecting change and protesting against the system is most strongly emphasized among Zelenskyy’s supporters. In contrast, a development program, a strong team, and leadership qualities most inspire voters of Tymoshenko and Poroshenko. The latter’s voters also most often note that they choose their favorite due to experience in public administration; a similar motive is present among supporters of Tymoshenko, Hrytsenko, and Smeshko.
• Almost one in ten supporters of Tymoshenko, Poroshenko, and Zelenskyy choose their candidate because they believe the candidate has the highest chance of winning. At least one in ten supporters of Zelenskyy and Lyashko choose their candidate because the others are even worse. Personal sympathy for the candidate also motivates voters of Zelenskyy, Lyashko, and Muraiev.
• Almost three quarters of respondents believe that the main motive for voting for so-called “new faces” is the expectation of change in the country, while 18% are convinced that this phenomenon is driven by a desire for revenge against the so-called “old politicians” for what they have done to the country. This latter view finds relatively greater support among supporters of Petro Poroshenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Yuliya Tymoshenko.
• Interestingly, almost one in five respondents would like Sviatoslav Vakarchuk to have taken part in the presidential election. The highest share of such respondents is found among voters in Western Ukraine and Kyiv, as well as among supporters of Hrytsenko, Zelenskyy, and Poroshenko.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group, almost 40% of Ukrainians would like to have their own business, while another 10% already own one. At the same time, half of respondents do not express such aspirations. Over the past six months, the share of those who do not want to start a business has slightly increased (in June 2018 it was 41%). A higher level of desire to open one’s own business is observed among younger and more affluent respondents. Within the group of well-off respondents, one quarter stated that they already run their own business.
• When assessing the role of the state in economic development, the majority of respondents (64%) primarily see it as ensuring income equality and social justice rather than establishing freedom of development and fair rules of competition. The latter approach is supported by 27%. Support for social equality has grown significantly over time, increasing from 48% in June of the previous year to 64% in February of the current year. State support for competition is more often favored by younger respondents, residents of the central and eastern regions, wealthier individuals, as well as those who want to have or already have their own business. At the same time, even among these groups, between 40% and 60% support the idea of social equality.
• Two thirds of respondents tend to believe that the state hinders the activity of small and medium-sized businesses in Ukraine. Only 7% think that public authorities contribute to the development of entrepreneurship, while 14% believe that the authorities currently do not interfere in business activities. Residents of the southern macro-region and respondents with lower incomes somewhat more often agree with the view that the state obstructs business activity in Ukraine.
• Fifty-seven percent of respondents believe that the simplified tax system should be preserved, as it stimulates business development. Only 19% support abolishing this system, arguing that it allows tax evasion. One quarter of respondents were unable to form an opinion on this issue. Support for the simplified taxation system is higher among entrepreneurs, residents of central regions, and wealthier respondents.
• An absolute majority of respondents (77%) support lowering bank lending rates for small businesses. Only 9% do not support this idea, while 14% were unable to answer. Those who already have or want to start their own business, middle-aged respondents, individuals with middle and low incomes, and residents of eastern regions are somewhat more inclined to support this initiative.
• Among different categories of business representatives, respondents express the highest level of trust in small (63%) and medium-sized (60%) entrepreneurs. Twenty-seven percent stated that they trust owners of large businesses, compared to 20% in September 2018. At the same time, trust in oligarchs remains very low at 8%. Trust in businesspeople, especially medium and large-scale ones, is noticeably higher among respondents with higher income levels. In contrast, trust in small entrepreneurs is equally high across all age and income groups.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by Rating Group in February 2019, two thirds of respondents believe that affairs in Ukraine are moving in the wrong direction, while every fifth respondent believes they are moving in the right direction (since the beginning of the year, the latter indicator has increased from 14% to 21%).
• Only 10% believe that Ukraine’s economic situation has improved over the past 12 months, while 60% have felt a deterioration. It is important to note that over the past five years this latter figure has decreased from 86% to 60%, while the share of respondents who believe that the situation has not changed has increased (from 11% to 27%).
• At the same time, respondents assess the dynamics of changes in their own household’s financial situation somewhat better than that of the country as a whole. Twelve percent of respondents reported an improvement in their family’s economic situation over the past 12 months, half reported a deterioration, and 36% did not feel any changes.
• Since the beginning of the year, voter mobilization has increased. Almost 85% of respondents (compared to 76% in December) stated that they definitely or rather intend to take part in the presidential elections in Ukraine. Relatively higher growth rates in willingness to vote were recorded in the South and East of the country.
• The leader of the presidential rating is Volodymyr Zelenskyi, supported by 25.1% of those who have decided and intend to vote. The second position is shared by Petro Poroshenko (16.6%) and Yuliia Tymoshenko (16.2%). Yurii Boiko is supported by 11.3%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 7.7%, Oleh Liashko by 5.6%, Andrii Sadovyi by 3%, Yevhenii Muraiev by 2.5%, and Ihor Smeshko by 2.5%. Oleksandr Shevchenko, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, and Oleksandr Vilkul each receive close to 2%.
• Over the past month, the ratings of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Petro Poroshenko, and Yurii Boiko have increased. A slight decline has been observed in the level of support for Yuliia Tymoshenko. The electoral indicators of other candidates have not undergone significant changes. At the same time, over the past month the share of respondents who have not decided on their choice has increased noticeably (from 15% to 25%).
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi has relatively stronger electoral positions among voters in the South and East and is the leader of electoral ratings in Ukrainian cities. Petro Poroshenko leads in the West of the country. Yuliia Tymoshenko maintains her strongest positions in the Centre, where she shares first place with Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Yuliia Tymoshenko have the highest potential for electoral growth (the so-called “second choice”): 7% of voters are ready to support each of them if their preferred candidate does not take part in the elections. Petro Poroshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko each have 4%.
• Twenty-four percent of respondents believe that the next president will be Petro Poroshenko. Nineteen percent believe in the victory of Yuliia Tymoshenko, and 17% in the victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Over the past month, belief in Zelenskyi’s victory has increased significantly. Poroshenko’s indicators have also shown positive dynamics in this rating, while Tymoshenko’s indicators remain at the December level. At the same time, young people tend to believe in Zelenskyi’s victory, while older respondents tend to believe in the victory of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko.
• The anti-rating is led by Petro Poroshenko: almost half of respondents stated that they would not vote for him under any circumstances.
• Second-round modeling produced the following results: Yuliia Tymoshenko leads in a pair with Petro Poroshenko (31% versus 24%). At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyi wins both in a pair with Petro Poroshenko (42% versus 24%) and with Yuliia Tymoshenko (37% versus 24%).
• The party rating is led by the Servant of the People party, supported by 21.5% of those who have decided and intend to vote. Fatherland is supported by 18.7%, Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” by 14.2%, Opposition Platform by 10.5%, Civic Position by 6.2%, and Self-Reliance by 5.5%. Around 4% support the Radical Party and Svoboda, around 3% support the Nashy party, and around 2% support the Opposition Bloc and UKROP.
• It is noteworthy that Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Petro Poroshenko have significantly stronger personal electoral support than their respective parties, Servant of the People and Petro Poroshenko Bloc. A similar pattern is observed for Anatolii Hrytsenko and Oleh Liashko. In contrast, Yuliia Tymoshenko and Andrii Sadovyi have personal ratings that are lower than the ratings of their parties, Fatherland and Self-Reliance.

• According to the results of a study conducted by Rating Group, 67% of Ukrainians stated that they have a permanent sexual partner. Another 4% have a non-permanent partner. Nineteen percent said that they currently do not have a partner but had sexual partners previously. Only 3% stated that they do not have a partner and have never had one before, while 7% refused to answer the question.
• Almost 80% of respondents agreed with the statement that sex is a very important part of a person’s life (10% disagreed). Those who are in registered or unregistered marriages were more inclined to support this statement.
• Two thirds believe that sexual relations before marriage are normal, while every fifth respondent holds the opposite view. This position was more often supported by younger respondents and those who are in unregistered relationships or are unmarried.
• Forty-five percent believe that sex is more important for men than for women, while 34% hold the opposite view. Supporters of this opinion are more common among women and among respondents of middle and older age.
• Forty-one percent agreed with the statement that fulfilling the “marital duty in bed” is obligatory for a man, while nearly the same share disagreed. Support for this view is somewhat higher among men.
• Thirty percent of respondents agree with the statement that sex can be a service that is sold for money, while 55% disagree. Men and respondents of younger and middle age agree with this statement more often.
• Twenty-four percent agree with the opinion that a woman should not show sexual initiative, while 57% disagree. Among those who support this view there are relatively more men, younger respondents, and those in unregistered marriages.
• Only 19% agree that a woman who is married is obliged to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to, while 67% disagree. Support for this statement is somewhat higher among the oldest respondents.
• Only 16% agreed with the opinion that it is normal to have permanent sexual relations with more than one person at the same time, while 70% disagreed. There are somewhat more opponents of this view among women and younger respondents.
• Sixty percent of respondents do not feel discomfort or shame when talking about sex with their husband, wife, or permanent sexual partner. Only 6% feel very ashamed. Thirty-five percent do not feel any shame when talking about sex with friends or acquaintances, while 14% feel very ashamed. Twenty-one percent stated that they do not feel shame when talking about sex with strangers, although almost one third feel very ashamed. Younger respondents and men feel less discomfort when talking about sex.
• Half of respondents plan to celebrate Valentine’s Day. At the same time, 41% do not plan to celebrate it, and 3% do not know this holiday. The highest share of those who plan to celebrate is in the South (59%), while in other regions it is about half. Men, younger respondents, and unregistered couples are more likely to plan celebrations.
• For 40% of respondents, Valentine’s Day is a day of all lovers. Twenty-seven percent said it is an ordinary day, for 19% it is an occasion to congratulate close people. Only 8% consider it a holiday that is not understandable within the traditions and culture of Ukraine. Supporters of this holiday are more common in the southern macro-region, among youth, men, and those in unregistered marital relationships. For one third of older respondents, this holiday is just an ordinary day.
• Almost half of respondents plan to give gifts on Valentine’s Day, while 45% do not have such intentions. In the South, East, and Centre, about half of respondents plan to give gifts, while in the West this share is 43%. Higher intentions are observed among men, younger respondents, and unregistered couples.

24 Channel issued an apology to Rating Group for the erroneous publication of inaccurate information.

The Editor-in-Chief of 24 Channel, Olena Trybushna, sent an explanatory letter to the Director of Rating Group, Oleksii Antypovych, with the following content:

“Regarding the publication on the website 24tv.ua of materials about allegedly manipulative ratings, a technical error and a misunderstanding occurred in the editorial office. The materials ‘Why the ratings of presidential candidates differ significantly’ and ‘How politicians’ ratings in Ukraine changed after the elections: infographic’ were not aired on Channel 24 precisely because the journalist incorrectly раскрыв the topic and presented the facts inaccurately. I personally prohibited the story from being broadcast.

However, the website’s content managers were not aware that the material had been rejected and had not gone on air, and therefore published it on the website. The television channel’s editorial team learned about this only after your publication and, having clarified the situation, asked the website to remove the materials. I apologize for this misunderstanding.”

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You can find the text of the publication here (in Ukrainian): https://24tv.ua/poyasnennya_shhodo_publikatsiyi_nedostovirnoyi_informatsiyi_n1107659

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On February 3, 2019, Channel 24 published a piece titled “Why the ratings of presidential candidates differ significantly: an explanation”. Instead of an analysis of trends, the piece demonstrates the art of manipulation by certain journalists using sociological data. Given the content and tone of the story, one may assume that its purpose is to discredit sociology in general and specific sociological organizations in particular. We also sincerely hope that this story does not reflect the editorial policy of Channel 24 and represents only the opinion of individual journalists. Why do we believe this?

Fact one.
The article accompanying the story states that “the Director of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation claims that so many different surveys are published so that people do not see an objective picture.” In reality, these are not her words — she was reading out a message (a post) written by a journalist. The authors of the story repeatedly use quotes by Iryna Bekeshkina and Oleksii Antypovych from the round table “Sociology and Elections: an argument for a rational choice or manipulation?”, taking them out of one context and placing them into a completely different one.
Conclusion: manipulation.

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Fact two.

A quote from the story states that, having compared the ratings of two sociological groups, journalists noted that during the 2014 presidential election Petro Poroshenko was given quite different percentages before the first round. According to the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Centre, he was given around 45%, while the Rating Group gave 34%. The authors claim that a ten-percent difference is substantial and exceeds statistical error, and further compare these figures with the actual election result, where Poroshenko received nearly 56%.

Conclusion: manipulation. The authors compare indicators that are not comparable and on this basis construct manipulative conclusions.

First, they compare the Democratic Initiatives figure of 45% among those who intended to vote with the Rating Group figure of 34% among all respondents, concluding that the difference is significant. In reality, among all respondents the figures were 35% and 34% respectively — meaning that the difference is фактично absent.

Second, they compare these figures with the actual election result. However, in the 2014 presidential election there were 29.6 million registered voters, about 18 million participated, and 9.9 million voted for Petro Poroshenko. This equals 54.7% of those who voted, but only 33.4% of all registered voters. Thus, the Rating Group not only did not miscalculate its forecast, but predicted the result quite accurately: 34% among all respondents versus the actual 33.4%.

For correct comparison between survey results and election outcomes, the Rating Group specifically calculated and published the indicator “percentage among those who intend to vote and have decided on their choice.” This indicator was available in May 2014, yet the journalists did not refer to it at all.

We could assume that the authors simply confused different indicators (among all respondents, among those who intend to vote, among those who have decided). However, similar theses had already appeared on social media, promoted by certain commentators, such as claims that “your May 2014 rating gave Poroshenko 34%, but he received 55%,” or that “sociological surveys convincingly prove that the Ukrainian people are twice as smart as sociologists think.”

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Fact three.
Another quote from the story claims that different sociological organizations give different outcomes for a hypothetical second round between Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko, and presents a graphic titled “Ratings of sociological centers regarding the second round of the 2019 presidential election.”

Conclusion: manipulation. The authors compare data obtained at different times and construct conclusions on this basis. For example, the most recent data published by the Rating Group in January 2019 show that in a second round Poroshenko would receive 23% and Boiko 21% among all respondents. Meanwhile, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology had not published any second-round data in 2019 at all.

We therefore consider such actions by the journalists — namely, the authors of this Channel 24 story — to be unprofessional from a journalistic standpoint, but quite professional from the standpoint of manipulation.

On February 4, Channel 24’s website published another analytical piece, “How politicians’ ratings in Ukraine changed after the elections: infographic”, which was based exclusively on data from the Rating Group. We have never prohibited journalists from using our data; on the contrary, we welcome genuine analysis. This article itself demonstrates that Channel 24 journalists understand that election results can only be compared with candidate ratings among respondents who have decided on their choice. This is exactly how the infographic was constructed. However, in the earlier story “Why the ratings of presidential candidates differ significantly: an explanation”, the authors compared election results with ratings among all respondents.

Even in this infographic, however, a number of errors were made. For example, figures for November 2016 are given among all respondents (and even then correctly only for Tymoshenko and Poroshenko), while figures for other months are given among those who have decided, and then presented as a single “dynamic.” In such cases, we recommend using a single primary source — the website of the Rating Group — where candidate dynamics are calculated using a unified methodology, ensuring correct comparison. There is also always the option to contact the Rating Group directly for clarification from the primary source.

Therefore, the Rating Group demands that Channel 24 remove the mentioned materials and issue an official retraction of the manipulations disseminated in the story “Why the ratings of presidential candidates differ significantly: an explanation.”

Otherwise, Rating Group will cease any cooperation with Channel 24.

• According to the results of a sociological survey conducted jointly by the Social Monitoring Center, the O. Yaremenko Ukrainian Institute for Social Research, the company Info Sapiens, and the Sociological Group Rating, 73% of Ukrainians believe that the country is moving in the wrong direction. Only 15% consider the direction of the country’s development to be correct, while another 12% were unable to answer this question. The highest levels of pessimism regarding the country’s trajectory were expressed by residents of the south-eastern regions and Donbas, while relatively fewer negative assessments were recorded in Galicia. The most positive evaluations were expressed by voters of Petro Poroshenko, whereas negative assessments prevail among supporters of other candidates.
• Negative perceptions also dominate assessments of development at the local level. Thus, 64% of respondents consider the direction of development of their oblast to be wrong, while only 20% see it as correct. In addition, 58% negatively assess the situation in their place of residence, compared to 28% who view it positively.
• According to the majority of respondents (67%), peace is what Ukraine lacks most today; over the past six months this figure has increased from 62% to 67%. Forty percent believe the country lacks stability most, 37% point to a lack of order, 34% to prosperity, and 31% to development, while 28–30% mention unity and justice. The issue of peace is somewhat more relevant for the West, the South, and Donbas; stability is more salient for the capital region and the south-eastern oblasts; development is more often emphasized in the Center, North, South, and East; and unity is more frequently mentioned in Galicia and Donbas. Issues of order, justice, and prosperity are perceived as similarly relevant across nearly all macro-regions.
• Eighty-one percent of respondents expressed readiness to participate in the presidential election, including 45% who are definitely ready and 36% who are rather ready to vote.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi leads the presidential ratings, with 21.9% support among respondents who have decided on their choice and intend to vote. Yuliia Tymoshenko is supported by 19.2% of such respondents, Petro Poroshenko by 14.8%, Yurii Boiko by 10.4%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 8.4%, Oleh Liashko by 6.5%, Yevhenii Muraiev by 3.4%, Andrii Sadovyi by 2.4%, and Oleksandr Shevchenko by 2.2%. Support for other candidates is below 2%.
• At the same time, nearly one in five voters believe that Yuliia Tymoshenko will become the next president (22.1%). Confidence in Petro Poroshenko’s victory is expressed by 16.6% of those intending to vote, in Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s victory by 11.1%, and in Yurii Boiko’s by 4.1%. Fewer than 3% believe that other politicians could assume the highest state office.
• Petro Poroshenko leads the anti-rating of politicians: half of respondents stated that they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Nearly 30% would not vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, about one quarter for Yurii Boiko and Arsenii Yatseniuk, and one in five for Oleh Liashko.
• Six political forces have significant chances of entering parliament. Batkivshchyna remains the leader of the party rating, supported by 21.2% of respondents who have decided on their choice and intend to vote. Support for the party Servant of the People stands at 19.0%, Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” at 13.0%, the Opposition Platform “For Life” at 10.5%, Civic Position at 8.6%, and the Radical Party at 6.5%. Samopomich (3.8%) and Yevhenii Muraiev’s party Nashy (3.3%) also retain certain chances of crossing the electoral threshold, while support for other political forces is below 3%.
• More than one third of respondents expect that after the presidential election there will be an improvement in optimism, confidence in the future, and in the political and economic situation in the country. At the same time, between 33% and 39% do not expect any changes in these areas.
• Improvements in their family’s material situation after the election are expected by 28% of respondents, while 40% have no expectations of change in this regard. Improvements in work, career, or education are expected by 22%, whereas 50% do not expect such changes. Importantly, positive expectations across all areas have increased over the past month. Optimistic expectations are most often expressed by voters of Petro Poroshenko, Yuliia Tymoshenko, and Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• Mass emigration abroad (55%), economic decline (52%), and impoverishment of the population (47%) are seen by respondents as the most acute threats facing Ukraine today.
• Between 30% and 39% of respondents cite currency devaluation, a full-scale war with Russia, deterioration of the nation’s health, state collapse, rising crime, and population decline as significant threats. Around one quarter consider population degradation, a lack of governance, and environmental disasters to be relevant threats. Possible mass unrest, famine, and the establishment of a dictatorship are mentioned by roughly one in six or seven respondents. Economic decline is more often perceived as a threat in the South and East; a full-scale war with Russia in Galicia, the West, and the Center; and inflation in the capital region, the Center, the North, and Donbas. Notably, the threat of impoverishment is more frequently mentioned by voters of Yurii Boiko, Oleksandr Vilkul, and Yevhenii Muraiev, while the threat of war with Russia is more often cited by supporters of Anatolii Hrytsenko, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Andrii Sadovyi.
• More than half of respondents expressed unwillingness to participate in protest actions to defend their rights and interests, while 37% stated they would be ready to protest if necessary. Over the past few months, the level of protest sentiment has declined (in November, 52% expressed readiness to protest). The highest level of protest readiness is recorded in Galicia, and the lowest in Donbas.

• According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating Group in January 2019, almost 70% of respondents believe that the country needs radical changes. Only 12% are convinced that everything should remain as it is today, while 14% advocate a return to the past. The demand for radical change is relatively high (around 70%) in most regions. A comparatively lower demand for change is observed in the East (62%) and Donbas (52%). In the latter macro-region, one quarter of respondents express nostalgia for the past, and one in five do not want changes because they expect them to lead to deterioration.
• Over the past year, voter mobilization has increased. Forty-four percent of respondents stated that they definitely intend to participate in the presidential election of Ukraine, while another 35% said they are rather likely to do so. At the same time, the share of those who believe that their vote does not matter in elections has decreased (from 47% to 40%).
• The leaders of the presidential rating are Volodymyr Zelenskyi, supported by 19.0% of respondents who have decided on their choice and intend to vote, and Yuliia Tymoshenko, supported by 18.2% of such respondents. Petro Poroshenko is supported by 15.1%, Yurii Boiko by 10.0%, Anatolii Hrytsenko by 8.5%, Oleh Liashko by 7.0%, Yevhenii Muraiev by 3.6%, Oleksandr Shevchenko by 2.9%, Andrii Sadovyi by 2.7%, and Oleksandr Vilkul by 2.6%.
• Over the past month, the ratings of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Petro Poroshenko have increased noticeably. A slight decline has been recorded in the level of support for Yuliia Tymoshenko. The electoral indicators of other candidates have not changed significantly.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi demonstrates relatively higher electoral support among voters in the South and East; in Kyiv he shares the lead with Petro Poroshenko, while in Donbas he shares it with Yurii Boiko. Yuliia Tymoshenko leads in the Center and in the North, and in the West she shares the leading position with the incumbent Head of State. The latter is the leader of voter sympathies in Galicia.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyi is the candidate with the highest potential for electoral growth (the so-called “second choice”). He could be supported by an additional 7.4% of voters if their current favorites did not participate in the elections. Yuliia Tymoshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko could each gain an additional 6%, Yurii Boiko and Oleh Liashko 5% each, Yevhenii Muraiev, Andrii Sadovyi, and Oleksandr Shevchenko 4% each, Oleksandr Vilkul 3%, and Petro Poroshenko and Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 2% each.
• Twenty-three percent of respondents believe that Yuliia Tymoshenko will become the next president. Confidence in Petro Poroshenko’s victory is expressed by 16.3%, and in Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s by 10.3%. Recently, belief in Zelenskyi’s victory has increased significantly. Positive dynamics in this rating are also observed for Tymoshenko and Poroshenko. Belief in Tymoshenko’s victory prevails in almost all macro-regions except Galicia and Kyiv, where respondents are more convinced that the next president will be Petro Poroshenko.
• Petro Poroshenko continues to lead the anti-rating: almost half of respondents stated that they would not vote for him under any circumstances. Thirty-one percent said they would not vote for Yuliia Tymoshenko, one quarter for Yurii Boiko, and one in five for Arsenii Yatseniuk and Oleh Liashko.
• Second-round modeling produced the following results. Yuliia Tymoshenko leads in pairings with Petro Poroshenko (27% versus 18%) and Yurii Boiko (28% versus 18%), but slightly loses in a pairing with Volodymyr Zelenskyi (29% versus 24%). Volodymyr Zelenskyi also wins in pairings with Petro Poroshenko (34% versus 20%) and Yurii Boiko (33% versus 17%). In the Yurii Boiko–Petro Poroshenko pairing, the incumbent president leads by a small margin (23% versus 21%). Importantly, in these hypothetical pairings more than one third of respondents state they would not participate in the vote, while 16–19% remain undecided.
• Sixty-seven percent of respondents state that Ukraine needs a leader capable of uniting, reconciling, and calming society, while 24% prefer a leader inclined toward dictatorship and strict enforcement of order. The latter expectations are relatively more common among voters of Oleh Liashko and Yurii Boiko.
• Forty-three percent continue to see the country’s leader as a politician with experience in governing the state, while 45% believe the president should be a new figure, even without experience in public administration. The demand for renewal of power is strongest among voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, Oleksandr Shevchenko, and Yevhenii Muraiev. In contrast, voters of Yuliia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko, and Yurii Boiko primarily vote for experience.
• Forty-seven percent assert that new people without negative experience in senior positions, untainted by corruption and abuses, should work in government. On the other hand, 43% believe that experienced professionals should occupy senior state positions. As in the previous question, the demand for experience prevails among voters of Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, and Boiko, while the opposite view is supported by voters of “new” politicians.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent Head of State has increased slightly in recent months, while assessments of the work of the Prime Minister and Parliament have declined. Fifteen percent are satisfied with the performance of President Petro Poroshenko, while 80% are dissatisfied. Twelve percent are satisfied with the work of Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroisman, while 81% are dissatisfied. Only 5% are satisfied with the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, while 90% are dissatisfied.
• The number of respondents who place the greatest responsibility for solving the country’s problems on the President has increased: in September 2017 this figure was 49%, now it is 57%. Sixteen percent consider the Prime Minister responsible for the situation in the country, and the same share name the Verkhovna Rada. Responsibility is relatively more often attributed to Parliament by voters of Petro Poroshenko.
• Almost half of respondents believe that oligarchs (48%) and the President (45%) most hinder positive changes in the country. Over the year, the latter indicator has increased from 40% to 45%. One third are convinced that the Cabinet of Ministers is to blame for the slow pace of change (also increasing from 29% to 32%), 22% think so of the parliamentary coalition (down from 29% to 22%), 18% blame Russia, 16% the parliamentary opposition, and 12% the International Monetary Fund.
• Seventy-one percent of respondents believe that state power in the country is currently weak, while 17% hold the opposite view. The latter are most numerous in Galicia and among voters of Petro Poroshenko. Notably, over the past 3.5 years the indicator of perceived “strength” of power has increased by only 4 percentage points (from 13% to 17%).
• Half of respondents believe that the current authorities most lack honesty. One third point to a lack of efficiency, humanity, or public support; one quarter to professionalism and competence; and 13–15% to authority and managerial experience. Over the past 3.5 years, the demand for humanity and public support from the authorities has increased, while the demand for efficiency and professionalism has somewhat decreased.
• Respondents rated progress relatively better in the reform of the Armed Forces, the Ukrainization of the information space, and police reform. The lowest assessments concern anti-corruption and judicial reforms, changes to electoral legislation, de-oligarchization, the abolition of parliamentary immunity, and the adoption of legislation on presidential impeachment. Compared with the previous year, assessments improved regarding Armed Forces reform, Ukrainization, decentralization, education reform, healthcare reform, the fight against corruption, and judicial reform, while assessments of pension reform deteriorated.
• Responsibility for implementing most reforms is most often attributed either to the Government or to Parliament. Exceptions are Armed Forces reform, de-oligarchization, and anti-corruption reforms, where respondents more often consider the Head of State responsible.
• Since October 2018, support for granting the Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has increased to 51%. Twenty-one percent do not support this initiative, while 20% are indifferent. The lowest level of support is recorded among residents of the South, East, and Donbas; in these macro-regions, one third to one quarter of respondents are indifferent to this issue.
• The number of those who consider it important to live in a democratic state has gradually increased: today 40% unequivocally support this statement. No more than 10% consider it unimportant. Demand for democratic values is highest among residents of the capital and in Galicia, and lowest in Donbas.
• Almost 70% of respondents support introducing a mechanism for making state decisions through a nationwide referendum. Forty-seven percent believe voting should be conducted only through personal attendance at polling stations, while 10% support electronic voting via mobile communication or the internet, and one third support combined voting methods. Electronic voting is more popular among younger age groups.
• Sixty-four percent support the thesis that the Ukrainian language should be the sole state language; 15% favor granting the Russian language official status in certain regions; and 15% support state-level bilingualism. Support for granting any status to the Russian language is highest among residents of the South, East, and Donbas.
• Almost 60% support diplomatic ways of resolving the war in Donbas (37% favor ending hostilities and freezing the conflict, and 22% favor granting these territories autonomous or federal status within Ukraine). Only 7% support full separation of the occupied territories. At the same time, 18% support continuing military actions until full restoration of Ukrainian authority throughout Donbas. Support for this latter view is relatively higher among residents of western regions and the capital, and among voters of Ruslan Koshulynskyi and Petro Poroshenko. Meanwhile, 68% of respondents continue to consider Russia an aggressor country toward Ukraine, while 20% hold the opposite view. The largest share of respondents supporting the latter view is found in Donbas.
• Support for a pro-Western vector continues to prevail in Ukraine: 46% support accession to NATO (32% are opposed), and 50% support accession to the EU (30% favor equidistance from Russia and the West, and 9% support joining the Customs Union). Supporters of a pro-Western path dominate in all regions except the south-eastern oblasts and Donbas.

 The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on order of the International Republican Institute.  

Data was collected throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and part of the Donbas) from December 13-27, 2018. The sample consisted of 2,400 residents of Ukraine aged 18 and olderand eligible to vote.The sample is representative by gender, age, region, and settlement size.

The margin of error does not exceed 2,0%. Average response rate was 62.7%.

English version of the report can be downloaded from the IRI.

• Within the framework of the “PORTRAITS OF REGIONS” project, Rating Group conducted a survey of Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and over in all oblasts of Ukraine and in the city of Kyiv (excluding the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) from 16 November to 10 December 2018. In total, 40,000 respondents were interviewed using face-to-face interviews, with 1,600 respondents in each oblast. The sample is representative by type of settlement and by the age and gender structure of each oblast. The margin of error at the level of each individual oblast does not exceed 2.4%, and at the national level does not exceed 0.5%.
• The analysis of the survey results shows that residents assess the overall situation in the country significantly worse than the situation at the local level. Only 6% assessed the political situation in the country as calm, whereas 27% consider the situation in their oblast calm and 43% in their city or village. Nearly 58% of respondents describe the situation in the country as tense and 31% as critical. At the local level, assessments are somewhat more positive: from 38% to 49% describe the situation as tense, and only 13–15% as critical.
• Across regions, there is no substantial difference in assessments of the political situation nationwide. The highest share of those who consider it critical is observed in most south-eastern regions as well as in Khmelnytskyi oblast. At the same time, assessments at the local level vary considerably by region. Relatively more respondents who view the political situation in their oblast as calm live in Ternopil and Lviv oblasts, while the fewest are in Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kherson oblasts. Regarding the political situation in the place of residence, the highest share of calm assessments is found in Lviv and Ternopil oblasts, and the lowest in Kyiv, Kherson oblast, and Donbas.
• Respondents assess the direction of the country’s development worse than that of their oblast or their city or village. Only 14% believe the country is moving in the right direction, compared to 21% regarding their oblast and 29% regarding their settlement. Accordingly, 74% say the country is moving in the wrong direction, while this view is shared by 62% with regard to their oblast and by 55% with regard to their place of residence. The smallest share of those who believe the country is moving in the right direction is found in Odesa, Luhansk, Kherson, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. At the oblast level, residents of Lviv and Kharkiv oblasts more often consider the direction of regional development correct, while this opinion is least common in Donbas and the South. As for the place of residence, the most positive assessments are recorded in Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, and Ternopil oblasts, and the most negative in Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts.
• Despite the generally negative assessments of the current situation, expectations among residents of Ukraine tend to be neutral or moderately positive. Between 16% and 18% express optimistic expectations for the future, both nationwide and locally. More than half believe the situation will remain unchanged, while between 17% and 20% expect deterioration in the coming year.
• The military conflict in eastern Ukraine and bribery and corruption in government are identified as the main nationwide problems. At the personal level, respondents are more concerned about rising utility tariffs, low wages and pensions, and inflation.
• In the presidential race, Yulia Tymoshenko leads the ratings, supported by 20.8% of respondents who have decided on their choice and intend to vote. She is followed by Volodymyr Zelenskyi with 13.4%, Petro Poroshenko with 11.1%, Yurii Boiko with 9.6%, Anatolii Hrytsenko with 7.8%, Oleh Liashko with 6.6%, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk with 4.6%, Yevhenii Muraiev with 4.5%, and Oleksandr Shevchenko with 4.2%. Support for other candidates does not exceed 3%. At the same time, nearly one third of respondents have not yet decided on a candidate or do not intend to vote in the elections.
• Yulia Tymoshenko leads in almost all oblasts of Ukraine, with the exception of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts, where Yurii Boiko occupies the first position. In Lviv oblast, she shares the lead with Petro Poroshenko and Anatolii Hrytsenko; in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast with Oleksandr Shevchenko; and in Mykolaiv oblast with Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• In the annual dynamics, a gradual increase in Yulia Tymoshenko’s rating has been observed since February of the reporting year. With his appearance in electoral ratings, Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s support also increased. The ratings of Petro Poroshenko, Yurii Boiko, and Oleh Liashko remained largely unchanged. Support for Anatolii Hrytsenko and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk declined, while Volodymyr Rabinovych experienced significant losses. At the same time, support for Andrii Sadovyi and Yevhenii Muraiev remained stable.
• Twenty-one percent of respondents believe that Yulia Tymoshenko will win the presidential election, and over the past year the share of those confident in her victory has doubled. Confidence in Petro Poroshenko’s victory stands at 12.8%, which is slightly lower than the previous year. About 5% expect Volodymyr Zelenskyi to win, 3.5% Yurii Boiko, 2.2% Oleh Liashko, and 2.1% Anatolii Hrytsenko. Fewer than 2% believe in the victory of other candidates. Yulia Tymoshenko leads in this indicator in all oblasts except Lviv oblast, where more respondents believe Petro Poroshenko will win. Confidence in their preferred candidate is most pronounced among supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko.
• Petro Poroshenko leads the negative rating. Among respondents who intend to vote, 50.3% state that they would not vote for him under any circumstances. He holds the first position in the negative rating in all regions except Lviv oblast, where Yurii Boiko ranks first.
• Modeling of the second round of the presidential election among all respondents shows that Yulia Tymoshenko convincingly defeats Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko, and also has an advantage over Anatolii Hrytsenko, while her positions against Volodymyr Zelenskyi are nearly equal. Among those who intend to vote in the first round, Yulia Tymoshenko also leads in pairings with Petro Poroshenko and Yurii Boiko, has an advantage over Anatolii Hrytsenko, and a slight lead over Volodymyr Zelenskyi.
• At the regional level, Yulia Tymoshenko leads Petro Poroshenko in the second round in all regions without exception. In a pairing with Yurii Boiko, she loses in Donbas and Kharkiv oblast. In a pairing with Anatolii Hrytsenko, she loses in Lviv, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts. Volodymyr Zelenskyi outperforms Yulia Tymoshenko in most regions of the East and South, while losing to her in most oblasts of Western and Central Ukraine.
• In the party ratings, Batkivshchyna leads with 21.7% among respondents who have decided on their party choice and intend to vote. The party “Servant of the People” is supported by 12.4%, BPP Solidarity by 9.6%, the Opposition Bloc by 9.5%, Civic Position by 7.8%, the Radical Party by 6.5%, UKROP by 4.6%, the party “Nashi” by 4.2%, and Samopomich by 4.0%. Support for other parties does not exceed 4%. More than one third of respondents have not decided on a party choice or do not intend to vote.
• Batkivshchyna leads in all oblasts except Donbas and Kharkiv oblast, where the Opposition Bloc ranks first. Over the year, support has increased for Batkivshchyna, “Servant of the People,” and UKROP. BPP Solidarity has slightly recovered its positions, while the ratings of the Opposition Bloc, Civic Position, and the Radical Party remained almost unchanged. Support for the parties “Za Zhyttia” and Samopomich declined.
• Orientation toward closer cooperation with the European Union and a candidate’s socio-economic program are the most influential motives in presidential choice. About half of respondents also consider personal leadership qualities, focus on solving nationwide problems, political experience, and the ability to ensure stability. For a significant share, the ability to bring about change, belonging to a new generation of politicians, focus on regional issues, and the presence of a strong team are also important. Orientation toward closer cooperation with Russia is significant only for a minority of respondents and is more relevant in most south-eastern regions.
• Thirty-one percent of respondents expect that the situation in Ukraine will improve as a result of the upcoming presidential elections. Thirty-five percent believe the situation will not change, and only 15% expect deterioration. Positive expectations are most common among supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko, and least common among those who do not intend to vote or have not decided. The most optimistic expectations are recorded in Kirovohrad, Ternopil, Rivne, Volyn, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.
• Respondents believe that the likelihood of election fraud is higher at the national level than at the oblast or local level. About one third allow for minor fraud at all levels. Expectations of significant violations are highest in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, while regional-level fraud is more often expected in Vinnytsia and Odesa oblasts.
• A minority of respondents express a positive or neutral attitude toward material assistance from politicians during elections, while the majority oppose this practice. More tolerant attitudes are observed in Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Chernihiv, and Odesa oblasts, and the least tolerant in Ternopil oblast.
• The activities of central authorities are evaluated worse than those of local authorities. Satisfaction with the work of the Prime Minister, the President, and the Verkhovna Rada remains very low, while satisfaction with local heads is higher. Among oblast state administrations, relatively better evaluations are recorded for Kharkiv and Lviv, and the worst for Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Luhansk. Local heads receive the highest satisfaction ratings in Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odesa oblasts, and the lowest in Kherson oblast.
• Respondents more often perceive an increase in corruption at the national level than at the oblast or local level. Many believe the situation has not changed, while only a small share report a decrease in corruption. The worst assessments are recorded in Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Odesa, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, and Lviv oblasts, as well as in Kyiv.
• The vast majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the situation in most public services and sectors. Relatively better assessments are given to school education, road conditions, and personal safety, while healthcare, social protection, youth support, industrial development, and anti-corruption efforts receive the lowest evaluations. Over the year, satisfaction with road conditions increased in most regions, while assessments of school education and local anti-corruption efforts worsened.
• Opportunities for leisure and recreation are evaluated most positively, while opportunities for achieving success and running one’s own business are assessed most negatively. Economic development potential over the next 5–10 years is perceived as low by a significant share of respondents, with only a small minority seeing high potential. Zakarpattia receives the most positive evaluations, while Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Luhansk oblasts receive the most negative.
• Most respondents report feeling proud to be citizens of Ukraine, and even more feel proud of their oblast and their city or village. However, a substantial share of residents in several eastern and southern regions do not share this sense of pride. Nature and history are most often cited as sources of pride in one’s region, followed by traditions, culture, local residents, landmarks, and resources.
• Approximately 70% of respondents consider themselves happy, while about one fifth do not. Happiness is reported more often in western regions and less often in Sumy and Mykolaiv oblasts. One third express a desire to start their own business, while about half do not share this aspiration. Migration intentions have increased compared to the previous year, especially in western regions, although many of those planning to work abroad intend to invest their earnings in Ukraine.
• Most respondents support Ukrainian as the sole state language, while support for granting Russian any official status is higher in south-eastern regions. A majority consider Russia to be an aggressor toward Ukraine, although this view is less common in several eastern and southern oblasts. Support for EU and NATO integration prevails nationwide, with the pro-Western orientation strongest in the West and weakest in Odesa oblast and Donbas.